

AFRICAN UNION

الاتحاد الأفريقي

UMOJA WA AFRIKA



UNION AFRICAINE

UNIÃO AFRICANA

UNIÓN AFRICANA

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia P. O. Box 3243 Telephone: +251 115 517 700 Fax: +251 115 517 844
Website: www.au.int

ASSEMBLY OF THE UNION
Thirty-Eighth Ordinary Session
15 - 16 February 2025
Addis Ababa (ETHIOPIA)

Assembly/AU/3(XXXVIII)
Original : English

**REPORT OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE
AFRICAN UNION ON ITS ACTIVITIES AND THE STATE OF PEACE
AND SECURITY IN AFRICA**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES.....	iii
LIST OF FIGURES.....	iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	viii
INTRODUCTION.....	1
PART I: ACTIVITIES OF THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL 1	
A. Mandate and Term of Office.....	1
B. Monthly Chairship of the PSC: January to December 2024	2
C. Overview of Meetings.....	3
D. Engagement on Conflict Situations, Political transitions, and Thematic Issues	4
E. Peace Support Operations	5
F. Consideration of Regional and Other Situations.....	6
G. Consultations with other African Union Organs/institutions	8
H. Engagement with the RECs/RMs	8
I. Strengthening Partnerships for African Peace and Security.....	9
J. Consultations and Open Meetings	10
K. Commemoration of the 20 th Anniversary of the AU PSC.....	12
L. Field Missions.....	12
M. PSC Participation in Stakeholders' Activities.....	14
N. Retooling the PSC Working Methods	14
O. Induction Programme	15
P. Support role of the PSC Sub-Committees.....	15
PART II: STATE OF PEACE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA	20
A. OVERVIEW OF PEACE AND SECURITY TRENDS ON THE CONTINENT .	20
B. PEACE AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS ON REGIONAL BASIS	20
(i) CENTRAL AFRICAN REGION.....	20
(ii) EASTERN AFRICA REGION	26
(iii) NORTHERN AFRICA REGION.....	37
(iv) SOUTHERN AFRICA REGION	39
(v) WESTERN AFRICA REGION/THE SAHEL & LAKE CHAD BASIN	41
C. POLITICAL AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE	46
(i) Democracy, the Conduct of Regular Elections, and AUEOMs.....	47

(ii)	Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law	52
(iii)	AU-UN Human Rights Framework Implementation	57
(iv)	Public Sector Governance	58
(v)	Defense and Security Governance.....	60
(vi)	DAGA/APSA Synergy	65
D.	CROSS-CUTTING THEMATIC ISSUES	66
(i)	Mediation and Dialogue Initiatives.....	66
(ii)	Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and Violent Extremism	70
(iii)	Women, Peace and Security	73
(iv)	Protection of Children in Conflict Situations Programme	75
(v)	Youth, Peace and Security Agenda.....	76
(vi)	Climate, Peace and Security Nexus	77
(vii)	Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development	79
(viii)	Operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF)	81
(ix)	Operationalization of the Peace Fund and Financing AU Peace and Security Activities.....	84
E.	AU PRIORITY PROGRAMMES ON PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA....	86
(i)	Early Warning and Conflict Prevention.....	86
(ii)	African Union Border Programme	87
(iii)	AFRIPOL	89
(iv)	Partnerships for Peace, Security and Governance.....	90
(v)	PAPS Knowledge Management System	93
	CONCLUSION: OUTLOOK, IMPACT AND CHALLENGES	95
	ANNEXES	Error! Bookmark not defined.

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Mandate	1
Table 2: Chairship by Month	3
Table 3: Regional Consideration	6
Table 4: Thematic Meetings	6
Table 5: Consultations and open meetings	10
Table 6: Field Missions.....	13
Table 7: PSC-related programmatic activities	14
Table 8: Retreats.....	15
Table 9: Meetings Summary	16
Table 10: Gender Analysis of AUEOMs in 2024	49

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Number of Agenda Items	4
Figure 2 Country & Regional Considerations	4
Figure 3: 2024 AUPSC Considerations	7
Figure 4: 2024 Field Missions	14
Figure 5: Summary of the implementation of activities of the PSC based on the adopted PSC Annual Indicative Programme for 2024	19
Figure 7: Percentage of Member States (MS) where AU deployed Observers in 2024	48
Figure 8: Gender Analysis of AUEOMs in 2024	49

ANNEXES

1. Conclusions of the 11th High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa, the Oran Process.....	1
2. Ministerial High-Level Seminar of the PSC: Commemorating 20 Years of the PSC by taking stock of Women’s Participation and Leadership in Peace Processes in Africa.....	1
3. High-Level Colloquium in Commemoration of the 20 th Anniversary of the AUPSC	1
4. 16 th Tetreat of the PSC of the African Union on the Review of its Working Methods.....	1

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABD	African Border Day
ABF	Abidjan Border Forum
ACRA	Africa Climate Security Risk Assessment
AES	Alliance of Sahelian States
AfDB	African Development Bank
AFRIPOL	African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation
AGA	African Governance Architecture
AHG	African Heads of State and Government
AJCM	Annual Joint Consultative Meeting
ANC	African National Congress
ANP	Assembleia Nacional Popular da Guiné-Bissau
AO	Area of Operation
AP-CAAC	Africa Platform on Children Affected by Armed Conflicts
APPR	Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation
APRM	Africa Peer Review Mechanism
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	African Standby Force
ATMIS	African Union Transition Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
AUBGS	African Union Strategy for Better Integrated Border Governance
AUBP	African Union Border Programme
AUC	African Union Commission
AUCF	African Union Compliance Framework
AUCTC	African Union Counter Terrorism Centre
AUEOM	African Union Election Observation Mission
AUPSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
AUSSOM	African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia
AYAPS	African Youth Ambassadors for Peace
CAP-CPS	Common African Position on Climate, Peace, and Security
CAR	Central African Republic
CBL	Central Bank of Libya
CCCPA	Cairo International Centre for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding in Africa
CEWS	Continental Early Warning Systems
CFYPS	Continental Framework on Youth, Peace and Security
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CISSA	Committee of Intelligence and Security Service of Africa
<i>CMD</i>	Conflict Management Directorate
CNE	National Elections Commission
CNFCI	Cote d'Ivoire, through its National Border Commission
CNSP	National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland
COHA	Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
COP 27	27 th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
CPAPS	Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security
<i>CPC</i>	<i>Coalition des Patriotes pour le Changement</i>

CPS	Special Criminal Court
CSCPF	Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
CSVMS	Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies
CSVRA	Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment
DARBE	Department of Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy, and Sustainable Environment
DDR	Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration
DDRR	Demobilization, Disassociation, Reintegration, And Reconciliation
DOS	Department of Operational Support
DPAPS	Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security
DPO	Department of Peace Operations
DPPA	Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DUoF	Directive on the Use of Force
EAC	East African Community
EASF	Eastern Africa Standby Force
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EIGS	Islamic State group in the Greater Sahara
EU	European Union
EUPSC	European Union Political and Security Committee
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FARDC	Congolese Armed Forces
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FEMWISE	The Network of African Women in Conflict Prevention and Mediation
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FMS	Federal Member States
FOBS	Forward Operating Bases
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit /German International Cooperation Society
HLP	High-Level Panel
HQ	Headquarters
I-RECKE	Inter-Regional Knowledge Exchange
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IED	Improvised Explosive Devices
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IHRL	International Human Rights Law
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISWAP	Islamic State's West Africa Province
JFA	Joint Financing Agreement
JNIM	Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen
JSA	Joint Strategic Assessment
JTC	Joint Technical Committee
KIBO	Kenya International Boundaries Office
LAS	League of Arab States

LCBC	Lake Chad Basin Commission
MCCT	Ministerial Committee on Counter-Terrorism
MIN	Ministerial
MNJTF	Multinational Joint National Task Force
MONUSCO	United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC
MP	Member of Parliament
MSC	Military Staff Committee
MSR	Main Supply Routes
MVCM	Monitoring, Verification, and Compliance Mission
NAPs	National Action Plans
NARC	North African Regional Capability
NCC	National Consultative Council
NCR	National Commission for Reintegration
NDC	National Defense College
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NPP	New Patriotic Party
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OIF	Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie
PAPS	Political Affairs, Peace and Security
PCRD	Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development
PLANELM	Planning Elements
POC	Protection of Civilians
PR	Permanent Representatives
PRSP	Program for the Safeguarding of the Homeland
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSCF	Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework
PSO	Peace Support Operations
R-ARCSS	Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan
RECs/RMs	Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
RSS	Regional Stabilization Strategy
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SADR	Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SALW	Small Arms and Lights Weapons
SAMIDRC	SADC Mission in DRC
SAMIM	SADC Mission in Mozambique
SCS	Sub-Committee on Sanctions
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SIA	Support Implementation Agreement
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SSDP	Somalia Security Development Plan
SSF	Somali Security Forces
STCDSS	Specialized Technical Committee on Defense, Safety and Security
T/PCCs	Troop/Police Contributing Countries
TAPI	Turkmenistan– Afghanistan– Pakistan–India
TCEs/Tis	Training Centres of Excellence/Training Institutions
TPLF	Tigray People's Liberation Front
TSC	Technical Support Committee

UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UCG	Unconstitutional Changes of Government
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Security and Safety
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Education Fund
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOAU	United Nations Office to the African Union
UNPBC	United Nations Peacebuilding Commission
UNPoA	UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSOS	United Nations Support Office in Somalia
USA	United States of America
USD	United States Dollars
USG	Under-Secretary-General
VBIED	Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
WFP	World Food Programme
WPS	Women Peace and Security
YPS	Youth Peace and Security

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) expresses its sincere gratitude to the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government for the continued strategic leadership and guidance in the implementation of its mandate of promoting good governance, peace, security and stability on the Continent, particularly in 2024, in line with the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. The PSC extends its appreciation to all AU Member States for their continued support in addressing the complex peace and security challenges in the Continent. The PSC also expresses deep appreciation to the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) for their unwavering commitment and significant contributions in promoting peaceful solutions to conflict situations in Africa and in addressing thematic issues relating to peace and security, as well as to the partners such as the United Nations and the European Union.

In 2024, the PSC enhanced its engagements with the RECs/RMs to ensure close cooperation and collaboration in finding durable solutions to peace, security, and governance challenges facing the Continent. The engagement with the UN Security Council was equally enhanced, particularly regarding the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) on financing for AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs). Also enhanced during the course of 2024, was the collaboration between the PSC and civil society organizations and international organizations.

The PSC expresses sincere gratitude to all stakeholders, both within and outside the Continent, for their collaboration and support and, indeed, for their participation in the year-long commemoration of the PSC 20th Anniversary, during which period, the PSC organized a number of events, and took stock of the key milestones achieved and lessons learnt in its two-decade journey of promoting peace, security, and stability across the African Continent.

The PSC 20th Anniversary commemorative events included the AU flagship initiative to silence the guns in Africa by 2030, the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, the Youth, Peace and Security Agenda, climate change, peace and security, humanitarian issues, as well as protection of children, particularly in situations of armed conflict.

The PSC commends the AU Commission, particularly the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security under the unique and exemplary leadership of H.E. Ambassador Bankole Adeoye, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), for the steadfast support to the work of Council. The PSC appreciates the Department's relentless efforts in mobilizing the necessary support for the PSC to effectively discharge its mandate of promoting peace, security and stability in Africa and to successfully carry out its activities. As legitimately expected by Council, the Department has continued to provide, with distinction, day to day technical, administrative, operational and logistical assistance, including in preparation of critical working documents for all activities of Council, within the context of its mandate. Council also acknowledges the increasing role of its sub-Committees, particularly, the PSC Committee of Experts (CoE), the Military Staff Committee (MSC) and the Sanctions Committee, in supporting and facilitating its work, including in interfacing with the PAPS Department and the AU Commission as a whole.

The PSC pays special tribute to all African uniformed and civilian personnel who paid the ultimate price in in the line of duty across the Continent, in particular those deployed in peace support operations, and conveys its deepest condolences to the families and Governments of those who lost their lives and wishes speed recovery to all those who are nursing injuries from the line of duty.

The PSC reaffirms its unwavering commitment to continue spearheading the Continental efforts to silence the guns in Africa by 2030, in order to create the conducive conditions for the realization of Agenda 2063 and the Africa we all want, namely: “an integrated, prosperous, and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens, and representing a dynamic force in the global arena”.

INTRODUCTION

1. The Report of the Peace and Security Council on its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa for 2024 is submitted to the 38th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union (AU), pursuant to Article 7(q) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (the PSC Protocol).

2. The Report covers the period from 1 January to 31 December 2024 and is divided into two parts. The first section focuses on activities carried out by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU during the period under review, including meetings, field missions, retreats, joint consultations, informal joint seminars, and other activities of the Union involving the PSC. The second part provides a comprehensive assessment of the state of governance, peace, and security on the Continent, as well as the status of implementation of various decisions of the Assembly within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA).

PART I: ACTIVITIES OF THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

A. Mandate and Term of Office

3. The election of Members of the PSC is based on the provisions of the Constitutive Act of the AU, the PSC Protocol and the Modalities for Election of Members of the Peace and Security Council adopted by the Policy Organs of the Union in March 2004 (the PSC Modalities). During the Sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly in January 2006, the Assembly delegated its power to elect PSC members under Article 5(2) of the Protocol to the Executive Council of the AU.

4. In conformity with the provision of Article 5 (1) of the PSC Protocol, the PSC is composed of fifteen (15) Members elected on the basis of equal rights: i) Ten (10) Members elected for a term of two (2) years, and ii) Five (5) Members elected for a term of three (3) years to ensure continuity. During the 35th and 37th ordinary session of the Assembly held in February 2022 and 2024 respectively, the following countries were elected to serve as members of the PSC:

Table 1: Mandate

No.	Country Name	Region	Start of Mandate	Mandate (Years)	End of Mandate
1.	Angola	Southern	1 April 2024	2	31 March 2026
2.	Botswana	Southern	1 April 2024	2	31 March 2026
3.	Cameroon	Central	1 April 2022	3	31 March 2025
4.	Cote d'Ivoire	Western	1 April 2024	2	31 March 2026
5.	DR Congo	Central	1 April 2024	2	31 March 2026
6.	Djibouti	Eastern	1 April 2022	3	31 March 2025

7.	Egypt	Northern	1 April 2024	2	31 March 2026
8.	Equatorial Guinea	Central	1 April 2024	2	31 March 2026
9.	Gambia	Western	1 April 2024	2	31 March 2026
10.	Morocco	Northern	1 April 2022	3	31 March 2025
11.	Namibia	Southern	1 April 2022	3	31 March 2025
12.	Nigeria	Western	1 April 2022	3	31 March 2025
13.	Sierra Leone	Western	1 April 2024	2	31 March 2026
14.	Tanzania	Eastern	1 April 2024	2	31 March 2026
15.	Uganda	Eastern	1 April 2024	2	31 March 2026

5. The mandate of the five (5) Members of the PSC, elected for a three-year term, will end on 31 March 2025. The 45th Executive Council to be held in February 2024 will elect five (5) Members for a three (3) year term each, to be endorsed by the 38th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union in February 2025. The five (5) newly elected members will assume their seats in the Council on 1 April 2025, and their mandates will end on 31 March 2028. The mandate of the PSC's ten (10) Members with a two (2) year term will end on 31 March 2026.

B. Monthly Chairship of the PSC: January to December 2024

6. Article 8 para 6 of the PSC Protocol stipulates that the chair of the PSC shall be held in turn by the Members of the PSC in the English alphabetical order of the country names. Each Chairperson shall hold office for one calendar month. In 2024, the chair was held as follows:

Table 2: Chairship by Month

No.	Month (2024)	Chairing Country	Permanent Representative
1.	January	Ghana	H.E. Amb. Amma Adomaa Twum-Amoah
2.	February	Morocco	H.E. Amb. Mohammed Arrouchi
3.	March	Namibia	H.E. Amb. Emilia Mkusa
4.	April	The Gambia	H.E. Amb. Jainaba Jagne
5.	May	Tanzania	H.E. Amb. Innocent Shiyo
6.	June	Uganda	H.E. Amb. Rebecca Amuge Otengo
7.	July	Angola	H.E. Prof. Amb. Miguel Cesar Domingos Bembe
8.	August	Botswana	H.E. Amb. Tebelelo Alfred Boang
9.	September	Cameroon	H.E. Amb. Churchill Ewumbue-Monono
10.	October	Egypt	H.E. Amb. Mohamed Gad
11.	November	Democratic Republic of Congo	H.E. Amb. Jean Léon Ngandu Ilunga
12.	December	Djibouti	H.E. Amb. Abdi Mahamoud Eybe


Source: PSC Secretariat, Conflict Management Directorate, DPAPS

7. It should be noted that the Republic of The Gambia chaired the PSC in April 2024 as a standing-in chair and the Arab Republic of Egypt swapped its Chairship with the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire. In this regard, the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire will chair the PSC in January 2025.

C. Overview of Meetings

8. The PSC convened 64 sittings during 2024, in which 81 agenda items were considered, compared to 61 meetings in 2023. One meeting was held at the Heads of State and Government (HoSG) level and 8 at the Ministerial level. Conflict situations and political transitions accounted for 32% of PSC agenda in 2024. The PSC adopted 51 Communiqués, 8 Press Statements, and 3 Summary Records. Decisions and directives of the PSC provided strategic guidance to the Commission, Member States, RECs/RMs and other stakeholders on peacemaking efforts on the continent.


Figure 1: Number of Agenda Items



D. Engagement on Conflict Situations, Political transitions, and Thematic Issues

9. The PSC continued to be actively seized of crisis, conflict and post-conflict situations on the continent. Council devoted attention to the situations in Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, South Sudan, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Gabon, Central African Republic, Ethiopia/Somalia, Libya, the Lake Chad Basin, the Sahel region and the Gulf of Guinea.

Figure 2 Country & Regional Considerations



10. The period under review had PSC considering 31 agenda items on thematic-related issues, among them include: Climate Change, Elections in Africa, Continental Early Warning, Counter-Terrorism, Cybercrime and Cybersecurity, Humanitarian Action in Africa, Private Military and Defence companies and mercenaries operating

in Africa, Civil-Military relations, Peace Security and Development, Security Threats, Health Security, Women Peace and Security, Children in Armed Conflict, Youth, Peace and Security, illegal exploitation of natural and mineral resources, Hate Crimes, Transitional Justice, African Amnesty Month, financing of the AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs), Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) and Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) were also considered.

E. Peace Support Operations

11. On the activities of the MNJTF against Boko Haram and its Mandate, the Council endorsed the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission and decided to renew the mandate of the MNJTF for another period of twelve (12) months, effective from 1 February 2024. Council also requested the AU Commission and the LCBC to renew the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and Support Implementation Agreement (SIA) between AU, LCBC and MNJTF TCCs, which will guide the provision of AU additional support to the MNJTF, for a period of one (1) year, effective from 1 February 2024. Regarding the AU's activities in Somalia, the PSC, during its 1225th meeting held on 1 August 2024, adopted the Strategic Concept of Operations (CONOPs) for the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) submitted by the Commission following extensive consultations with ATMIS, the FGS, the UN and international partners as stipulated in PSC Communique 1217 of 20 June 2024; and endorsed the formation of the new Mission to be known as the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) to be deployed from 1 January 2025.

12. It should also be noted that the PSC has continued supporting the regional peace support operations deployed by various regions. At its 1203rd meeting, held on 4 March 2024, the PSC considered the Situation in the Eastern DRC and the Deployment of the Southern African Development Community Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC). Among others, the PSC took note of the Communique of the Extraordinary Organ Troika Summit, plus SADC Troika and Force Brigade (FIB) troop-contributing countries (TCCs) held on 8 May 2023, approving the deployment of a SADC Force, within the framework of the SADC Standby Force as a regional response in support of the DRC to restore peace and security in the DRC, and the subsequent deployment of the Southern African Development Community Mission (SAMIDRC) on 15 December 2023; and endorsed the deployment of SAMIDRC in the eastern DRC; and requested the AU Commission to mobilise requisite support for SAMIDRC, including from the AU Peace Fund Crisis Reserve Facility. Furthermore, the PSC requested the AU Commission to expedite the transfer of the equipment donated to SADC, which is still at the AU Continental Logistics Base in Douala, Cameroon, to support in efforts of ensuring effective implementation of SAMIDRC mandate.

13. During the same meeting, the PSC also considered the Operations of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM). The PSC took note of the Decision of SADC on the withdrawal of SAMIM from Mozambique, while underscoring the critical importance of sustaining the gains made thus far in the fight against terrorism, including the need for the Mozambican authorities to effectively hold all areas liberated from the terrorists and to implement socio-economic activities in the region, such as peace strengthening and quick impact projects, in order to win the hearts and minds of the local population, as well as the

importance of avoiding the creation of a security vacuum following the withdrawal of SAMIM on 15 July 2024; Council requested the AU Commission to assist in mobilizing the necessary resources; and requested the SADC Secretariat to share experiences and lessons learned with the Peace and Security Council on the nature, scope, depth, challenges and possible recommendations to inform future engagements. The AU Commission was also requested to undertake a Study, in collaboration with the Government of Mozambique, to evaluate the progress made by the Government of Mozambique to fill the gap which will be left by SAMIM; and its readiness to stabilize the country, as well as undertake a needs assessment to determine the support required to accompany the Government in its aspiration to degrade ASWJ and protect the territorial integrity of the Country.

F. Consideration of Regional and Other Situations

14. Underscoring the importance of addressing regional peace and security matters, as well as thematic issues relating to peace and security, the PSC, in line with its 2024 Annual Indicative Programme, held several meetings on regional issues, namely the Lake Chad Basin, the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea, in which decisions were adopted to provide guidance to AU Member States and RECs/RMs on addressing peace and security challenges. Below are the meetings held and outcomes adopted by the PSC on regional, thematic and other situations from January to December 2024:

Table 3: Regional Consideration


No.	Date	Region	Meeting No.	Regional Consideration
1.	8 Apr	Lake Chad Basin	1207	Briefing on the Situation in the Lake Chad Basin, MNJTF Operations and Regional Stabilization Strategy (RSS) implementation
2.	18 Apr	Gulf of Guinea	1209	Briefing on Security Situation in the Gulf of Guinea - Robust Response to Combat Maritime Insecurity and Piracy
3.	20 May	Sahel	1212	Updated briefing on the political transition in Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Gabon.

Table 4: Thematic Meetings

No.	Thematic Meetings	Occurrence	Meeting No.
1.	Elections in Africa	2	1194, 1224
2.	Early Warning	2	1208, 1247
3.	Women, Peace and Security	2	(Swakopmund Process); 1242
4.	Cybercrime and Cybersecurity	1	1196
5.	Ideology of Hate Crimes in Africa	1	1206
6.	Humanitarian Action in Africa	2	1216, 1239
7.	Counter-Terrorism and Related Issues	3	1207, 1237, 1219

8.	Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development in Africa	2	1198, 1245
9.	Transitional Justice	1	1199
10.	Health Security	1	1200
11.	Peace Security and Development	2	1201, 1234
12.	Artificial Intelligence	1	1214
13.	Constitutionalism, Democracy and Governance	1	1226
14.	Children in Armed Conflict	2	1202, 1229
15.	Sanctions	1	1227
16.	Media	1	1230
17.	Climate Change, Peace and Security	1	1240
18.	Youth, Peace and Security	1	1243
19.	Curbing illegal exploitation of Natural Resources by armed and terrorist groups in Africa	1	1246
20.	CSVRA/CSVMS	1	1251
21.	Continental Early Warning and Security Outlook	1	1247
22.	Experiences and lessons learnt in the Implementation of the PSC Mandate in line with AU Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol		1248
23.	Silencing the Guns	1	1252

Figure 3: 2024 AUPSC Considerations



G. Consultations with other African Union Organs/institutions

15. To enhance collaboration with AU Organs/institutions on early warning and intelligence sharing, Committee of Intelligence and Security Service of Africa (CISSA), African Union Counter Terrorism Centre (AUCTC) and African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) were invited to the 1208th meetings held on 16 April 2024 to a joint briefing on “Unblocking the Obstacles to Effective Continental Early Warning Systems (CEWS) and to the 1246th meeting held on 26 November 2024 on a briefing by AUCTC, AFRIPOL, and CISSA on the Continental Early Warning and Security Outlook.

H. Engagement with the RECs/RMs

16. Article 16 of the PSC Protocol provides for the PSC and the RECs/RMs to engage on matters of peace, security and stability in Africa. For the first time since the establishment of the AU PSC, the Council directly engaged with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mediation and Security Council and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ on Politics Defence and Security.

17. The engagement with ECOWAS was held on 24 April 2024 in Abuja, Nigeria, centered on terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism, unconstitutional changes of government, and countries in political transition. The two bodies also agreed to institutionalize their cooperation by holding annual joint consultative meetings, regular interactions between the Chairperson of the AU PSC and ECOWAS MSC, swiftly communicating decisions on peace and security to each Council, holding joint field missions, holding joint retreats/brainstorming sessions, establish focal points from both Secretariats to facilitate consultations to organize staff exchange visits and lastly, emphasized the need for joint mobilization of resources to support peace operations in the region, in particular, addressing the scourge of terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism.

18. The engagement with SADC held on 30 August 2024 in Gaborone, Botswana, centered on combating terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism in Southern Africa; the situation in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and the operations of SAMIDRC; Joint efforts in resource mobilization for regional peace and security; and joint efforts towards peacemaking efforts and Silencing the Guns. They underscored the need for the implementation of the outcome of the Quadripartite Summit held in Luanda, Republic of Angola and stressed the imperative of enhanced coordination of efforts within the framework of the quadripartite mechanism and the revitalization of the Peace, Security Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the Region. Furthermore, they committed to enhancing a stronger and more structured cooperation on conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and peace-building. The two bodies also agreed to institutionalize their cooperation by holding annual joint consultative meetings.

19. Lastly, the PSC took part in the 3rd policy session of the African Union Inter-Regional Knowledge Exchange (I-RECKE) which was held on 20th July 2024 in Accra, Ghana. In October 2024, the PSC Chairperson represented the PSC at the 15th High-Level Retreat on Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation held from 24 to 26 October

2024, Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire. The retreat focused on the role of preventive diplomacy and mediation in addressing Africa's peace and security challenges. Key discussions emphasized trust-building, complementarity, and inclusivity in peace processes, underscoring the importance of multilateralism, self-sustainability, women and youth engagement, and the reinforcement of democratic institutions as crucial pillars for stability and progress across the continent.

I. Strengthening Partnerships for African Peace and Security

20. Article 17 of the PSC Protocol provides for the PSC to cooperate and work closely with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and other relevant international organizations on the issues of governance, peace and security in Africa. In this context, the PSC and the UN Security Council convened their 9th Annual Informal Joint Seminar and 18th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting (AJCM) on 17 and 18 October 2024 in New York, USA, and adopted a Joint Communiqué. The Annual Informal Joint Seminar focused on the exchange of views on the operationalization of working methods between the AU PSC and the UNSC, the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) on financing AU-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and further deliberated on issues of Youth, Women, Peace and Security, Children Affected by Armed Conflicts, and the adverse effects of Climate Change on the Stability and Development in Africa. On the occasion of the 18th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting, the AUPSC and the Members of the UNSC held discussions on the situation in Sudan; the situation in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, including countering the threat of terrorism; the Situation in Somalia and the Post-ATMIS Security Arrangements; the situation in the Great Lakes Region: the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); and on the situation in Central African Republic (CAR). While underscoring the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, the two Councils reaffirmed their unwavering commitment to (i) working together to address the challenges in these theatres in a coordinated manner and (ii) the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Member States.

21. Underscoring the importance of post-conflict and reconstruction activities in Member States emerging from conflict, the PSC convened a consultative meeting with the UN Peacebuilding Commission (UN-PBC) on 15 October 2024 in New York, USA. The session focused on the collaborative peacebuilding efforts of the AUPSC and the PBC for peacebuilding and sustaining peace in Africa, as well as the comprehensive review and progress of the status of implementation of outcomes of the 6th Informal Meeting in November 2023. The two bodies urged international partners, including in the UN system; as well as international and regional financial institutions, to align and coordinate their peacebuilding-related efforts in Africa, with nationally led peacebuilding, regionally and continentally supported efforts, including through the role of the Commission and the African Union Center for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development.

22. The two bodies also emphasized the role of the PBC in convening stakeholders and garnering International support, as well as the role of the AU in implementing and advancing Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) policy, noting that strengthened cooperation between the AUC-PCRD in Cairo and the Un Peacebuilding

Support Office, in the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (PBSO/DDPA), is essential for implementing the AU-UN MoU on Peacebuilding.

23. In this regard, they stressed the important role of the AU PCRD Centre in developing programs to support African countries emerging from conflict and political transitions by building strong and resilient state institutions and encouraged partners and stakeholders to invest and provide necessary support for implementing such programs.

24. During its visit to Cairo, the PSC engaged with H.E. Ahmed Abou El-Gheit, the Secretary General of the League of Arab States. The PSC and the Secretary-General expressed mutual commitment to enhancing coordination and cooperation on peace and security and agreed to hold regular consultations on areas of mutual interest.

25. The PSC and the European Union Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) held their 15th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting (AJCM) on 22 November 2024, which was preceded by an informal engagement that took place on 1 March 2024, respectively, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Joint Consultative Meeting between the AU PSC and EU PSC deliberated on peace and security developments in Africa. The AU PSC and EU PSC held extensive discussions on the situation in Somalia and the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2719 (2023), the situation in Sudan, the situation in the Sahel region, the situation in the Lake Chad Basin and the situation in the Great Lakes region: Eastern DRC. Meanwhile, informal consultations exchange views on conflict prevention, mediation, and post-conflict issues in Africa. However, the PSC and the EUPSC did not reach commonly agreed conclusions for the third time.

26. On 1 and 2 December 2024, the PSC and the three elected African Members of the UNSC (A3) participated in the Eleventh High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa: Assisting Incoming African Members of the United Nations Security Council (A3) in Preparing to Address Peace and Security Issues on the Continent, in Oran, Algeria, pursuant to communiqué [PSC/AHG/COMM/1.(CCCXCVII)], adopted by the PSC at its 397th meeting held at the level of Heads of State and Government on 23 September 2013. Key outcomes centered on enhancing PSC-A3 Plus 1 cooperation in advancing and promoting Africa's common positions, agenda and interests in the UNSC agenda. The conclusions of the seminar are attached as Annex I.

J. Consultations and Open Meetings

27. Article 8 (10) and (11) of the PSC Protocol provides for the PSC to hold open meetings and informal consultations with parties concerned by or interested in a conflict situation or thematic issue under its consideration. The list of such engagements undertaken in 2024 is as below:

Table 5: Consultations and open meetings

Informal Consultations

Date	Location	Level	Invitees	Agenda
-------------	-----------------	--------------	-----------------	---------------

7 March	Addis Ababa	PR	PSC and CPAPS	Post-2024 ATMIS Security Mechanisms for Somalia, Withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from ECOWAS and the Lifting of Economic Sanctions by ECOWAS Authority: Implications for AU/Continent-Wide Regional Integration and Peace and Security Agenda Proposed Activities for the Commemoration of the 20 th Anniversary of the PSC in 2024
21 May	Addis Ababa	PR	PSC Members and CPAPS	Informal Consultation on Somalia/updated briefing on post-ATMIS arrangement
19 July	Addis Ababa	PR	PSC, CPAPS and the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD)	Evolving Findings by the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) Review and Early Action
7 October	Addis Ababa	PR	PSC, CPAPS and High Representative of the Chairperson for the AU Peace Fund and Institutional Reform	Financing options for the AU post-ATMIS Mission in Somalia in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2748(2024)

Open High-Level Meetings

23 March	Swakopmund and Namibia	MI N	PSC Members; AU Member States; FEMWISE from the RECs/RMs, women peacebuilders, gender experts, development partners, CSOs, think tanks and other relevant stakeholders.	Commemorating 20 Years of the PSC by Taking Stock of Women’s Participation and Leadership in Peace Processes in Africa.
----------	------------------------	---------	---	---

28. On 23 March 2024 in Swakopmund, Namibia the PSC organized a “Ministerial High-Level Seminar on the AU PSC on the theme: Commemorating 20 years of the PSC by taking Stock of Women’s Participation and Leadership in Peace Processes in Africa”. The Seminar was the first in a series of events held to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Council, and served to observe the 2024 International Women’s

Day aimed at (i) advocating for women's meaningful participation and representation in all aspects of peacemaking, and in particular, in the formal peace processes in Africa; and (ii) to explore policy options for enhancing women's participation in peace processes. The seminar called for increased participation of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, the seminar agreed to institutionalize the 'High-Level Ministerial Seminar on Women, Peace and Security in Africa' to be formally called the '**Swakopmund Process**,' to be held every two years on a rotational basis, representing a significant step toward ensuring that women's voices are consistently heard in peace and security dialogues, with concrete actions taken to dismantle the barriers that prevent their full participation. They further called for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) and for Member States to ensure that the national action plans on Women Peace and Security are costed and budgeted for, as a way of operationalizing the key interventions and programmes therein the conclusions [CONCLUSIONS (1/2024)] of the seminar are attached as Annex II.

K. Commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of the AU PSC

29. The 20th anniversary celebrations of the African Union Peace and Security Council marked a significant milestone in its two-decade-long journey of promoting peace, security, and stability across the African continent. Since its establishment in 2004, the PSC has been a central pillar of the AU, designed to provide a collective security framework and early warning system aimed at ensuring timely and effective responses to conflicts and crises.

30. The commemorative event of the 20th anniversary of the AU PSC took place on 25 May 2024 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, marking a significant milestone in the council's commitment to promoting peace and security across Africa. Hosted by H.E. Dr. Samia Suluhu Hassan, President of the United Republic of Tanzania and chair of the AU PSC for May 2024, the event brought together a wide array of stakeholders, including high-level officials, member state representatives, the African Union Commission, regional economic communities (RECs) and regional mechanisms (RMs), civil society, and international partners. Alongside the Dar es Salaam celebrations, the PSC organized a series of year-long activities including open sessions; exhibitions; public lectures at the University of Dar es Salaam and Yale University; thematic week; awards and recognitions, and commemorative publication among other special events.

31. The 20th anniversary commemoration provided an opportunity to reflect on the successes, challenges, and ongoing initiatives of the PSC, as well as to chart the way forward in addressing Africa's complex and evolving security landscape. During the launch event, the Council adopted the Dar es Salaam Declaration dated 25 May 2024, attached as annex III

L. Field Missions

32. The PSC undertook six field missions in 2024 including (i) the mission to South Sudan, from 23 to 26 June 2024, in line with Communiqué [PSC.PR.COMM.1202.1 (2024)] of the PSC adopted at its 1202nd meeting, held on 27 February 2024, so as to engage and encourage the parties to the Revitalized Peace Agreement to redouble their efforts through compromises, in order to accomplish the remaining tasks ahead

of the general elections; (ii) the PSC mission to Mozambique conducted from 28 to 31 July 2024 provided an opportunity to the PSC to gather first-hand information on the prevailing political, security, economic, and humanitarian situation in the country; (iii) PSC Mission to the Central African Republic conducted from 9 to 11 September in celebration of the 2024 Africa Amnesty Month; (iv) Mission to Gabon conducted from 12 to 13 September 2024 to gather first - hand information on the prevailing political, security, economic, social and humanitarian situation; (v) Mission to Cairo, Egypt conducted from 1 – 4 October 2024 for a consultative Meeting with the Secretary General of the League of Arab States (LAS) and (vi) Mission to Port Sudan conducted on 3 October 2024 to engage with the transitional leadership of Sudan and key Sudanese stakeholders.

Table 6: Field Missions

Date (2024)	Undertaken by	Country	Agenda
Jun. 23 to 26	PSC	South Sudan	Review the overall situation on the ground particularly the implementation of R-ARCSS
Jul. 28 to 31	PSC	Mozambique	Gather first-hand information on the prevailing political, security, economic, social, and humanitarian situation.
Sep. 9 to 11	PSC	Central African Republic	Celebration of the Africa Amnesty Month
Sep. 12 to 13	PSC	Gabon	Gather first-hand information on the prevailing political, security, economic, social and humanitarian situation.
Oct. 1 to 4	PSC	Egypt and Port Sudan	(i) Engage with the transitional leadership of Sudan and key Sudanese stakeholders and (ii) Consultative Meeting Between the PSC and the Secretary General of the League of Arab States (LAS)

Figure 4: 2024 Field Missions



Source: PSC Secretariat, CMD, DPAPS

M. PSC Participation in Stakeholders' Activities

PSC-related programmatic activities

Table 7: PSC-related programmatic activities

Date	Activity	Country	Main Objective
18 March 2024	Accra II UCG Process: Reflection Forum	Accra, Ghana	Assess the efforts and initiatives undertaken since the 2022 Accra Reflection Forum and the key achievements and gaps in implementing its recommendations.
22 April 2024	High-Level Africa Counter-Terrorism meeting organized by the Federal Republic of Nigeria with the support of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism.	Abuja, Nigeria	Exchange views on the threat landscape, lessons learned and best practices in preventing and countering terrorism, enhancing regional capacities, and strengthening cooperation between international partners and African Member States.

N. Retooling the PSC Working Methods

33. The PSC held its 16th Retreat on working methods from 5 to 7 November 2024 in Djibouti. The 16th Annual Retreat of the PSC was organized as part of steps by the PSC to continuously strengthen its working methods so as to enable the Council to discharge its mandate within the framework of the APSA and AGA more effectively, as embodied in the PSC Protocol. The Retreat focused on Working methods of the Council, as well as on PAPS Footprints in Africa; Virtual tour of the ASF Continental Logistics Base. The PSC adopted the Conclusions of the 16th PSC Retreat through communique [PSC/PR/COMM.1250 (2024)], adopted at its 1250th meeting of 9 December 2024, as Annex IV.

Table 8: Retreats

Date	Activity	Chair	Outcome
5-7 November 2024	16 th Retreat of the PSC on its Working Methods	Amb. Jean Leon Ngandu, Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of Congo to the African Union	Conclusions of the 16 th Annual Retreat on the Review of its Working Methods

O. Induction Programme

34. The induction programme of the newly elected PSC Members was conducted from 25 to 27 March 2024 in Swakopmund Namibia. It primarily aimed at a strategic orientation on the core mandate, powers, and functions of the PSC from the legal perspective and time-cherished practice. Participants were enlightened on the Rules of Procedure, the Modalities for the elections of PSC members, and the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy, as well as the working methods of the PSC. In attendance were: **sitting members:** Cameroon, Djibouti, Morocco, Namibia and Nigeria, outgoing **members:** Burundi, Congo, Ghana, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia and Zimbabwe **re-elected members:** The Gambia, Tanzania and Uganda, and the **newly elected members:** Angola, Botswana, Cote D'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea and Sierra Leone. As a lesson-learning platform, the induction offered the opportunity for outgoing and re-elected PSC Members to share experiences with incoming Members on the work of the PSC and jointly reflect on improving its working methods in discharging the flagship mandate of promoting and preserving peace, stability, and security in Africa. On the same occasion, ISS and AMANI Africa were invited to share their insights on the working methods of the PSC and on how to further strengthen the PSC Mandate.

P. Support role of the PSC Sub-Committees

35. **The Committee of Experts (CoE)** is a subsidiary body of the PSC established to provide support to ensure the efficient functioning of Council activities. The CoE, during the reporting period prepared a number of technical documents in preparation of PSC activities, such as 20th anniversary celebrations of the PSC, joint meetings, retreats, induction of the new PSC members and regular PSC meetings. The CoE had its induction in June 2024 in Johannesburg, South Africa. It should be noted that in 2024, the CoE held fourteen (14) meetings.

36. **The PSC Military Staff Committee (MSC)** has continued to support the Council's efforts by advising on peace and security issues, particularly those relating to the deployment and sustainment of peace support operations. The MSC met four (4) times, including its second Induction Training Workshop held in May 2024 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

37. **The Sub-Committee on Sanctions (SCS)** is a subsidiary body of the PSC established pursuant to Article 8(5) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the Africa Union. The SCS held its inaugural meeting on 12 June 2024 to discuss its working methods under the Chairship of the Republic of Uganda. The report of the Inaugural SCS meeting was endorsed during its 1227th meeting of the PSC held on 15 August 2024. The Council stressed the need for the SCS to devise practical measures for addressing cases/situations of prolonged or stalled transitions or restoration of constitutional order. Furthermore, the meeting requested the AU Commission to undertake an assessment of the effectiveness of the sanctions regime as a deterrent against UCGs in Africa, including the challenges, lessons learnt and good practices, to broaden its scope of application and to determine the nature of sanctions in order to make it more applicable to the current dynamics of the peace and security environment of the continent.

Summary of the meetings held by the PSC from January to December 2024


Table 9: Meetings Summary

Month	Chair	Meeting
January	Ghana	H.E. Amb. Amma Adomaa Twum-Amoah, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Ghana to the African Union 1191, 1192, 1193, 1194, 1195, 1196.1, 1196.2, 1197, 1198
February	Morocco	H.E. Amb. Mohammed Arrouchi, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Morocco to the African Union 1199, 1200, 1201, 1202.1, 1202.2,
March	Namibia	H.E. Dr. Peya Mushelenga (MP), Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of Namibia Inaugural Ministerial High-Level Seminar on Women, Peace and Security, 23 Mar. 2024, Swakopmund, Namibia.
		H.E. Amb. Emilia Ndinelaio Mkusa, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Namibia to the African Union 1203.1, 1203.2, 1204.1, 1204.2, 1205
April	Gambia	H.E. Amb. Jainaba Jagne, Permanent Representative of the Republic of The Gambia to the African Union 1205, 1206, 1207.1, 1207.2, 1208.1, 1208.2, 1209.1, 1209.2

May	Tanzania	H.E. Dr. Samia Suluhu Hassan, President of the United Republic of Tanzania	20 th Anniversary Colloquium Celebrations in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
		H.E. Amb. Innocent Shiyo, Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the African Union	1210.1, 1210.2, 1211, 1212.1, 1212.2, 1213.1, 1213.2
June	Uganda	H.E. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda	1218
		H.E. Gen. Odongo Jeje Abubakhar, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uganda	1216
		H.E. Amb. Rebecca Amuge Otengo, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uganda to the African Union	1214, 1215.1, 1215.2, 1217, 1219.1, 1219.2
July	Angola	H.E. Ambassador Tête António, Minister of External Relations of the Republic of Angola	1222
		H.E. Prof. Amb. Miguel Cesar Domingos Bembe, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Angola to the African Union.	1220, 1221, 1223, 1224, 1225
August	Botswana	H.E. Ambassador Tebelelo Alfred Boang, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Botswana to the AU	1226, 1227, 1228, 1229
September	Cameroon	H.E. Mbella Mbella, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cameroon	1233.1, 1233.2
		H.E. Amb. Churchill Ewumbue- Monono, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cameroon to the African Union	1230, 1231, 1232
October	Egypt	H.E. Amb. Mohamad Omar Gad, Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the African Union	1234, 1235, 1236, 1237, 1238, 1239.1, 1239.2, 1240, 1241.1, 1241.2, 1242
November	Democratic Republic of Congo	H.E. Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, Minister of State, Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and Francophonie of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	1248
		H.E. Mr. Mbadu Crispin, Minister of Urbanism and Habitat of the DRC, on behalf of H.E. Thérèse	1245

		Kayikwamba Wagner, Minister of State, Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and Francophonie of the DRC	
		H.E. Ambassador Jean-Leon Ngandu Ilunga, Permanent Representative of the DRC to the AU	1243, 1244, 1246, 1247
December	Djibouti	H.E. Mahmoud Ali Youssef, Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Djibouti	11 th High Level Seminar, Oran Process; 1253
		H.E. Amb. Abdi Mahamoud Eybe, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Djibouti to the African Union	1249, 1250, 1251, 1252

Figure 5: Summary of the implementation of activities of the PSC based on the adopted PSC Annual Indicative Programme for 2024¹



Source: PSC Secretariat, CMD, DPAPS

PART II: STATE OF PEACE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA

A. OVERVIEW OF PEACE AND SECURITY TRENDS ON THE CONTINENT

38. Whereas limited progress has been made in addressing peace and security issues in the continent towards silencing the guns in Africa in the implementation of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and African Union Governance Architecture (AGA), the continent continues to battle with myriad threats, both new, emerging and pervasive, to peace, security and stability, which include, a) exponential growth of terrorism, violent extremism conducive to terrorism and transnational organized crime, especially human trafficking and the proliferation of weapons, as well as maritime Insecurity/piracy across the five (5) regions of the continent; b) Unprecedented intra and inter-State tensions and disputes; c) Renewed cold war-like geopolitical and ideological competition; d) Governance deficit; e) Resurgence of Unconstitutional Changes of Government; f) Youth Restiveness resulting from political exclusion and structural unemployment; g) Post Covid-19 Pandemic cascading effects of economic crises and unsustainable external debts; h) Prolonged Humanitarian crises, forced displacement and the weaponization of sexual/gender based violence; i) Acute competition for natural resources and climate Insecurity as threat-multiplier; and, j) New technologies and cybersecurity k) illicit exploitation of natural resources by armed groups and terrorists;. These scourges and the persistence of conflict impede development and the attainment of developmental goals enshrined in Agenda 2063 and silencing the guns.

B. PEACE AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS ON REGIONAL BASIS

(i) CENTRAL AFRICAN REGION

- Great Lakes Region / Eastern DRC

39. The situation in the Great Lakes region remains a major concern, with rising regional tensions threatening the fragile ceasefire and jeopardizing the Angola-led Luanda Process for peace in Eastern DRC. This includes renewed activities by negative forces operating in the eastern DRC and the continued tensions between the DRC and Rwanda.

40. It should be noted that despite the mediation efforts under the Luanda Process, some obstacles were faced within the framework of the organization of the Summit that was supposed to take place in Luanda on 15 December 2024.

41. There is need to note the resumption of hostilities between the M23 and the DRC in North Kivu and South Kivu. This situation continues to result in forced displacement of people and unprecedented humanitarian disaster with an estimated 6.4 million people displaced in the DRC, making it the second-largest number of internally displaced persons in Africa. Gender-based violence and sexual exploitation continue to be reported, including violations of human rights against children.

42. Relations between Rwanda and Burundi were particularly strained following Burundi's decision in January 2024 to close its border with Rwanda over allegations that Rwanda was supporting armed groups in Burundi in particular Red Tabara.

43. The PSC, at its 1203rd meeting held on 4 March 2024 on the situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the deployment of the Southern African Development Community Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC), endorsed the deployment of SAMIDRC in the eastern DRC and requested the AU Commission to mobilize the necessary support for SAMIDRC. In line with the PSC decision, the Chairperson of the AU Commission approved the sum of USD 1,000,000 (one million dollars) from the AU Peace Fund Crisis Reserve Facility to support the SADC deployment.

44. Furthermore, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2746 authorizing specified logistical and operational support from the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) to the SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC), following the request of the PSC. The Resolution also highlighted that the full operationalization of SAMIDRC would contribute to the stability of the eastern DRC through its support in creating a secure environment and protecting civilians that will be conducive to the successful implementation of ongoing regional peace efforts.

45. Despite the insecurity and tensions in the eastern region of the DRC, the diplomatic efforts of regional actors remain crucial in promoting dialogue between the countries in conflict and supporting political processes. Following the Extraordinary Mini-Summit on the Peace and Security Situation in the Eastern DRC, held on 17 February 2024 on the eve of the 37th AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government at the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa, under the auspices of H.E. João Lourenço, President of the Republic of Angola and AU Champion for Peace and Reconciliation, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the DRC and Rwanda, engaged regularly from March to December 2024 in Luanda, Angola. They considered proposals for a lasting solution to the long-standing conflict in eastern DRC. These Luanda Process-facilitated engagements resulted in the signing of a ceasefire on 30 July 2024. The ceasefire, which entered into force on 4 August, is being monitored by the ad hoc verification mechanism established as part of the Luanda Process.

46. Prior to this, in April, representatives of the Guarantor institutions of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF) for the DRC and the region, namely the AU, UN, SADC and ICGLR, convened in Nairobi, Kenya and explored strategies to enhance the role of their organisations in the ongoing PSCF revitalisation. The Guarantor institutions further expressed concern about the continuing tensions between countries in the region and called for restraint and dialogue to peacefully resolve all contentious issues.

47. On 15 July, the 1222nd PSC meeting on the role of mediation and reconciliation in conflict resolution in the eastern DRC, reaffirmed that the PSCF Agreement for the DRC and the Region remains the viable instrument to enable the DRC and the countries of the region to achieve peace and stability, and emphasized that signatory countries individually and collectively need to redouble their efforts to fully implement the national and regional commitments enshrined in the Framework Agreement.

48. Furthermore, the PSC reiterated that the Luanda and the Nairobi Processes remain the viable frameworks for reconciliation between the DRC and Rwanda to facilitate the resolution of the crisis in eastern DRC; and called for the strengthening and escalation of the political process to involve all key stakeholders.

49. On 5 November 2024, in Goma, in the presence of the three (3) Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Rwanda, DRC, and Angola, a new platform of the joint monitoring mechanism, called the "Reinforced Ad hoc Verification Mechanism, " was launched to monitor compliance with the ceasefire.

50. On 30 November 2024 the 24th Ordinary Summit of the Eastern African Community Heads of State held in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, received a report from H.E. Uhuru Kenyatta, former President of the Republic of Kenya and Facilitator of the EAC-led Nairobi Process. Due to the complexity of the parallel processes the Summit called for a coordinated approach and a consolidation of the various initiatives, specifically, the Luanda Process and the EAC-led Nairobi Process to be merged into one and managed jointly.

51. **The Assembly may wish to reaffirm that the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF) Agreement for the DRC and the Region, subsists as a viable instrument to enable the DRC and countries of the region to achieve peace and stability; reiterate the continued commitment of the AU, as one of the guarantors of the Framework Agreement for the DRC and the region, to support and the ongoing efforts to revitalise the Peace and Security Cooperation Framework; and commend the efforts of the Luanda Process, under the auspices of H.E. Joao Lourenco, President of the Republic of Angola; and the EAC-led Nairobi Process under the leadership of H.E. Uhuru Kenyatta, former President of the Republic of Kenya, and lend full support to the efforts by the SAMIDRC, alongside the FADRC, not only to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC, but also to create a secure environment and protect civilians towards contributing to the stability of eastern DRC and an environment conducive to the successful implementation of ongoing regional peace efforts. The Assembly expresses its appreciation to H.E. Felix Tshisekedi, President of the Democratic Republic of Congo, and H.E. Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of Rwanda, for their commitment towards the implementation of the Luanda Process.**

52. **The Assembly may wish to express deep concern over the resurgence of the attacks by M23, ADF and other armed groups against the DRC Armed Forces in eastern DRC and may also wish to condemn the human rights violations and attacks perpetrated by these armed and terrorist groups against IDP camps, schools and administrative infrastructure. The Assembly may wish to underscore the need for enhanced coordination of efforts within the framework of the Quadripartite Initiative (EAC, SADC, ECCAS and ICGLR) to monitor the progress made. In the same vein, the Assembly may wish to welcome the call by the Heads of State of the EAC for a coordinated approach and consolidation of various initiatives on the resolution of the conflict in eastern DRC.**

53. **The Assembly may further wish to reaffirm the need for all parties to respect and implement all the decisions agreed upon at previous meetings of Heads of State, including the first Quadripartite meeting held in Luanda, in June 2023 and the meeting of 17 February 2023, held in Addis Ababa to address the situation in eastern DRC.**

54. The Assembly may wish to condemn the illegal exploitation of natural resources by armed and terrorist groups in the eastern DRC and, in this regard, the Assembly may wish to appeal to all concerned entities to stop this practice and to strengthen existing control mechanisms. Furthermore, the Assembly may wish to request the AU Commission and all partners to support the DRC in its new Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration, and community recovery program.

55. The Assembly may wish to condemn foreign military support provided to M23 and any other group operating in eastern DRC and demand the immediate secession of such support and the immediate withdrawal of any such external party from the entire Congolese territory. Furthermore, the Assembly may wish to also condemn the support provided by military forces to specific armed groups, in particular, the FDLR and demand the immediate cessation of such support. The Assembly may wish to urge all armed groups particularly, the M23, ADF, and FDLR operating in eastern DRC to immediately cease all forms of violence permanently disband and lay down their arms.

56. The Assembly may also wish to condemn all illegal activities in the DRC supported by state and non-state entities, including to overthrow the democratically elected government through unconstitutional changes of government as prohibited by the various AU instruments such as the AU Constitutive Act, the Malabo Declaration of 2022, as well as the Accra Declarations of 2022 and 2024.

57. The Assembly may wish to encourage Member States to enhance cooperation in the fight against terrorism and armed groups in eastern DRC and Africa, in general, place emphasis in information sharing, in border surveillance, and by facilitating dialogue between border communities. In the same context, the Assembly may wish to welcome the renewal on 20 May 2024, of the Agreement on Joint Operations between the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) and FARDC, code-named "Operation Shuja", in order to neutralize terrorist groups ADF and MTN operating in Lubelo and in part of the territory of Irumu.

58. The Assembly may also wish to congratulate H.E. Felix Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo, President of the DRC, and H.E. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda, for their commitment and dedicated efforts in the fight against terrorism between the two countries. Furthermore, the Assembly may wish to request the AU Commission and international partners to mobilize necessary support to the two countries in their joint efforts to end the activities of these terrorist groups (MTN and ADF), affiliated to the Islamic State in East Africa.

59. The Assembly may wish to pay tribute to the MONUSCO and SADC peacekeepers (Malawi, South Africa, and Tanzania) Burundi and Uganda who continue to fight armed and terrorist groups in eastern DRC.

60. The Assembly may welcome the establishment of the joint monitoring mechanism called "Reinforced Ad Hoc Verification Mechanism" to achieve

lasting peace in the eastern DRC, encourage the parties to honor their commitments, and ensure its full implementation. The Assembly may request the Commission to provide adequate support to the reinforced Ad Hoc Verification Mechanism and to deploy a liaison officer to Goma to coordinate the said support.

- Central Africa Republic (CAR)

61. The peace process remains on track through the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic (APPR-CAR) and the Joint Roadmap for Peace in the Central African Republic, though steady progress is being made. CAR has witnessed a notable increase in surrenders, with many fighters from the Coalition des Patriotes pour le Changement (CPC) laying down their arms.

62. Meanwhile, despite the steady progress, the path to peace is not without challenges, particularly as some former rebels return to armed groups due to lack of necessary funding for the DDR programme, particularly for reintegration. The country's border with Sudan (which is going through a devastating conflict) is also exacerbating the fragile security situation in border communities as armed groups remain active along the frontier. Likewise, some armed groups are active along the borders with Chad and Cameroon.

63. Signed in Bangui on 6 February 2019 between the Government and fourteen (14) armed groups, the APPR-CAR has witnessed 9 out of the 14 armed groups joining the DDR process while negotiations are ongoing for the others to embrace the DDR initiative.

64. Through the national-led DDR process in the country, 3000 ex-combatants have been disarmed and some of them are to be enrolled in the Armed Forces and Police Force of the CAR. Some 2000 combatants from the Coalition of Patriots for Change will also undergo the DDR process. The CAR called on stakeholders to support and mobilize financial and logistical resources to enable the successful completion of the DDR process in the country.

65. Given the steady progress towards lasting peace, the relations between CAR and bilateral and multilateral partners, continue to improve. Noteworthy is that the UN Security Council on 30 April lifted the arms embargo on CAR while urging countries to prevent arms from reaching armed groups. The UNSC also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until August 2025, tasking the Panel to investigate illicit trafficking networks that support armed groups. In July, France resumed bilateral aid to the CAR after suspending it over concerns about the government's ties to Russia's Wagner Group.

66. The Special Criminal Court (CPS), on 30 April 2024, issued an international arrest warrant against former President Francois Bozize for serious and consistent evidence indicating his liability in crimes against humanity committed by the CAR military between 2009 and 2013, especially those led by his presidential guard.

67. Within the framework of the Africa Amnesty Month (AAM) 2024, the PSC undertook a field mission to the Central African Republic from 9 to 11 December 2024. The PSC met the African Ambassadors accredited to the CAR, civil society

organizations, and discussed the political, security, economic and humanitarian situation in the country. The PSC urged Member States and the international community to provide additional support to the CAR for the implementation of the political Agreement or Peace and Reconciliation, DDR process; reaffirmed its commitment to work with all parties to further strengthen state authorities as well as peace and stability in the CAR.

68. Relating to the political context, 2025 will be a crucial year for CAR as it prepares for general elections that will encompass presidential, legislative, and local elections. At the beginning of 2024, the National Assembly adopted a new electoral code, which among other things, establishes gender quotas for party lists and a seven-year term for presidents, parliamentarians, regional representatives, and municipal councilors; stricter nationality process, and physical presence requirements for presidential and legislative elections. The new electoral code drew criticisms from opposition circles. Anicet Georges Dologuele founder of a political party, the [Union for Central African Renewal](#) (URCA) threatened to boycott the local elections, which is the first in 36 years unless the constitution and electoral laws are revised to ensure fairness. He argued that current regulations favor President Faustin-Archange Touadera's party and hinder candidates with dual nationality.

69. The upcoming elections may face numerous challenges, including inadequate funds. The Government indicated that it requires approximately USD\$15 million. The EU and MINUSCAR have mobilized USD\$3.8 million to support the upcoming local election. The support of the AU and bilateral/multilateral partners will be required to ensure successful elections in CAR.

70. The Assembly may wish to commend CAR for the steady progress recorded in the peace and reconciliation process through accomplishments in the APPR implementation, and to encourage the Government and people of CAR to continue the efforts towards fully achieving the goals of the DDR; The Assembly may further call on the African Union to use all existing mechanisms by effectively convening the reconciliation process and APPR implementation, as the lead convener of the Peace Agreement, by reconciling and uniting all actors for a concerted and coordinated approach in assisting CAR to achieve lasting peace.

71. The Assembly may also welcome the UN Security Council's lifting of the arms embargo on CAR, in response to the 37th Assembly Decision's call for the complete lifting of the arms embargo to allow CAR to properly respond to its security challenges and promote national security. The Assembly may wish to salute MINUSCAR and all troop/police contributing countries for their commitment in sustaining peace and stability, as well as protection of civilians in the CAR. The Assembly may also wish to salute the CAR configuration of the UN Peacebuilding Commission in mobilizing international support to catalyze sustainable peace and socio-economic growth in the CAR.

72. The Assembly may wish to call upon the Commission to engage all Member States in a position to do so and development partners to mobilize resources to assist CAR technically and financially in the organization of the upcoming local and general elections which will be held in April and December

2025, respectively. The Assembly may further wish to urge the CAR Government to continue engaging all political leaders in the country regarding the organization of the 2025 elections, in order to ensure inclusivity, including the participation of women and youth.

(ii) EASTERN AFRICA REGION

- Ethiopia

73. With over two (2) years since the historic signing of the “Lasting Peace through the Permanent Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)” on 2 November 2022, the guns are effectively silent in the Tigray region. This landmark agreement has been a beacon of hope, significantly contributing to the silencing the guns in the Tigray Region and enhancing humanitarian access to affected populations. The Agreement has resulted also in confidence-building measures such as restoring essential services and resuming commercial activities in Tigray.

74. The AU’s commitment to peace, security, and stability in Northern Ethiopia was reaffirmed through two Strategic Reflection consultations with the parties and stakeholders, on 11 March and 9 July 2024.

75. Convened by the Chairperson of the AU Commission, these forums, coordinated by the High-Level Panel on Ethiopia, served as a platform to review progress and address outstanding political challenges in implementing the CoHA. These two strategic reflections underscored AU’s fundamental role in this peace process, promoted political dialogue, and strengthened the resolve towards effective Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), transitional justice, and the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs).

76. Both strategic reflections highlighted the opportunities in implementing the Permanent CoHA. The parties reaffirmed their unwavering commitment to fully implement the agreement while recognizing the importance of respecting human rights and international norms, protecting civilians, and a phased DDR process. They called for partner support for the DDR process led by the Ethiopian National Commission for Reintegration (NCR). Funding support and pledges for the DDR program included one million US Dollars (\$1,000,000) from the Crisis Reserve Facility of the AU Peace Fund.

77. The AU Monitoring, Verification, and Compliance Mission (MVCM) based in the Tigray region, since 2023, has continued to facilitate humanitarian support and interaction with key stakeholders, including the TPLF, the Interim Regional Administration of Tigray, and partners, particularly UN agencies. The MVCM conducts long-range patrols to various areas in the Tigray region to monitor progress and ensure compliance with the Pretoria Peace Agreement and is actively collaborating with the National Commission for Reintegration in support of the Ethiopian DDR activities. The main outstanding issues include the return/relocation of IDPs; the comprehensive commencement of the DDR process and the internal political wrangling within the TPLF leadership. The parties to the Pretoria Agreement recently agreed to the extension of the AU MVCM.

78. Since the handover of heavy and medium weapons by the TPLF, there has been a resumption of commercial air and road transport services, and normal economic activities, as well as the reopening of schools and colleges. These form part of the overall achievements, making the peace process stay on track, steadily.

79. **The Assembly may wish to commend the signatories to the Pretoria Agreement- the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and TPLF for their strenuous efforts to permanently silence the guns in the Tigray region, and promote national dialogue and reconciliation.**

80. **The Assembly may wish to urge the AU High-Level Panel on the Ethiopian peace process, to continue to engage with the Parties, stakeholders, and strategic partners to render strong support for the COHA implementation process, particularly the DDR, while facilitating political dialogue on the outstanding issues.**

81. **The Assembly may express solidarity with the people of Ethiopia, and encourage all stakeholders to embrace the national dialogue process as a vehicle to promote unity, peace, and national reconciliation. The Assembly may wish to welcome the establishment of the National Commission for Reintegration by the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and, in this regard, may direct the AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa and members of the AU High-Level Panel to canvass the support of international partners and the African private sector to support the nationally led DDR and return of IDPs initiatives.**

82. **The Assembly may further commend the AU Monitoring, Verification, and Compliance Mission deployed in the Tigray region since January 2023 for the commitment and high sense of duty by serving as a positive instrument of the Pretoria Agreement and welcomes the extension of the MVCMM by the signatories to the Pretoria Agreement while encouraging the international community to scale up its support to the MVCMM. The Assembly also wishes to commend regional, international, and bilateral actors, particularly IGAD, UN, AfDB, USA, Norway, UK, Ireland, Denmark, Germany, and Japan, for supporting the implementation of the peace process in the Tigray region.**

- Somalia and Transition from ATMIS to AUSSOM

83. Somalia continues to achieve progress at the political level in terms of state building, including steps towards constitutionalism and democratization. Notably, this covers the convening of the National Consultative Council (NCC) from 2 to 30 October 2024 which reaffirmed Somalia's commitment to a one-person-one-vote electoral system. Somalia has also made tangible progress over the past two years, including milestones, such as debt relief, admission to the East African Community (EAC), lifting the UN Security Council's arms embargo, and securing a non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council for the 2025-2026 term.

84. It is important to underline, however, that the NCC continues to face internal challenges, especially the absence of the Puntland Member State and the recent withdrawal of the Jubaland Member State due to disagreements over the priorities

within the state building agenda, the electoral process and key governance issues. These developments are detrimental to Somalia's political unity, and social cohesion and may affect its democratization process.

85. On the security front, Somalia is continuing to meet its goals, gradually assuming more ownership of its security; however, it faces challenges. On its part, the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) continued to provide operational support to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)-led offensive operations against Al-Shabaab. This support enabled the Somali Security Forces (SSF) to achieve considerable operational success. While the SSF demonstrated effectiveness in offensive operations, they continue to face challenges in holding liberated areas due to logistical and equipment deficits.

86. In addition, while a significant degrading of Al-Shabaab capabilities has occurred in the ongoing operations, a fluid and unpredictable security situation is evident across the country and in all ATMIS sectors. Continued Al-Shabaab enabling and kinetic activities have led to some security and operational setbacks, indicating that Al-Shabaab retains the ability to undertake deadly attacks across the country and pose an existential threat to Somalia specifically and the entire Horn of Africa region.

87. Somalia's diverse clan landscape continues to influence its security and governance structures, with ongoing conflicts in Federal Member States (FMS), including Jubaland, Southwest, Hirshabelle, and Galmudug. While the federal system aims to balance political representation, some groups still cite marginalization, contributing to recurrent instability. These dynamics appear to present Al-Shabaab with opportunities to manipulate clan rivalries, further complicating Somalia's stabilization efforts.

88. The FGS is advancing in the implementation of its Security Sector Development Plan to enhance force capabilities. However, recent months have witnessed a fluid security landscape in Somalia, characterized by progress and setbacks. The SSF intensified efforts to degrade Al-Shabaab capabilities, through improved targeted counter-terrorism operations that led to the elimination of insurgent leaders and dismantling of several operational bases.

Nevertheless, Al-Shabaab has been resilient in continuously deploying asymmetric tactics, including complex attacks, IEDs, VBIEDs, and indirect fire. The recent mortar attacks on AU/UN camps in Baidoa, Mogadishu, and Kismayo, and other forms of attacks against civilian and military targets in Mogadishu and across the ATMIS Sectors, demonstrate Al-Shabaab resilience and underscore the need for robust intelligence sharing mechanisms. Moreover, reports of Al-Shabaab acquiring missiles and armed UAVs are a further source of concern, increasing drone threat and hostility to FGS installations, ATMIS, UN and SSF locations, and civilian targets. Similarly, the growing risk of infiltration and collaboration between Al-Shabab and the Houthis is a considerable security challenge, threatening regional stability in the Horn of Africa as well as maritime navigation and shipping routes in the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Channel of Mozambique.

- **African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)**

89. The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and Post-ATMIS Security Arrangements: The Commission has continued its support to ATMIS and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). The FGS has made significant progress in promoting peace and security; however, Al Shabab continues to be resilient and remains a major threat to peace and security in Somalia. ATMIS has worked with the FGS through joint offensive operations which led to the recovery of territories. Also, ATMIS retained a presence in all the sectors, secured key population centers, and supported Somali Security Forces (SSF) to open and secure Main Supply Routes (MSRs) to facilitate the movement of forces, delivery of logistic supplies, humanitarian assistance, and commercial use.

90. Meanwhile, ATMIS is in its final year of the transition and 2024 has been a crucial year for the mission as the FGS is preparing to take over security responsibilities as outlined in the Somalia Security Development Plan (SSDP). As per the transition, a total of two drawdowns comprising 5,000 ATMIS troops occurred in 2024. The first drawdown of 3,000 ATMIS troops occurred in January and the second drawdown of 5,000 troops occurred in July 2024.

91. In preparation for post-ATMIS security arrangements, the Commission has undertaken several joint activities with the FGS, the United Nations, and international partners. These activities included the deployment of a technical team, by the Commission to Somalia from 23 to 29 April 2024 to conduct the Joint Strategic Assessment (JSA). The JSA aimed to undertake comprehensive and detailed planning based on the situation on the ground. The JSA was conducted in consultation with the FGS, ATMIS Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), and the United Nations. The mission carried out political, economic, humanitarian, and sector-by-sector security analyses which were useful for the Commission in undertaking further steps for the transition.

92. Pursuant to the AU PSC Communique 1217 adopted on 20 June 2024 and UN Security Council Resolution 2741 adopted on 28 June 2024; the Commission dispatched, in July 2024, a technical team to Somalia to consult with ATMIS, TCCs, the FGS, and partners for the development of a strategic Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for a new AU Mission as part of post-ATMIS security arrangements. The CONOPS identified key roles and responsibilities for the new mission and provided clear indications about deployment.

93. The CONOPS was presented to the AU PSC, and through Communique 1225 of 1 August 2024, the CONOPS was adopted, and the new mission named the “African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia” (AUSSOM) was also endorsed. The new mission would comprise three (3) components; - civilian, military, and police.

94. Several engagements have been undertaken with the United Nations, the European Union, and other international partners to seek support for AUSSOM. Also, the Commission seeks to explore every possible avenue including the use of the AU Peace Fund, the UN Security Council Resolution 2719, and other options. In this regard, the Council recommended in its Communique 1236, the use of part of the interest accrued from the AU Peace Fund investment, including the Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF), to substantially contribute to the financing of AUSSOM.

95. On 27 December, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2767 (2024), which endorsed the AU PSC Decision to replace ATMIS with AUSSOM and authorize its deployment in Somalia as an AU-led Peace support operation in line with its CONOPS. The UN Security Council requested the Secretary-General to continue to provide, in accordance with the existing financial and administrative arrangements, a logistical package, and in consultation with the AU and the FGS to update the logistical support plan as appropriate in full compliance with HRDDP through UNSOM.

96. The UN Security Council requested the Secretary-General to implement, the “hybrid implementation” of the framework established by Resolution 2719 (2023) to AUSSOM starting from 1 July 2025, including access to UN Assessed contributions not exceeding 75% of AUSSOM’s total annual budget, if the Council confirms the request to the Secretary-General through a Security Council decision. The Council further affirmed that the remaining amount of AUSSOM’s total annual budget is to be jointly mobilized by the AU and UN from the international community as extra budgetary resources and committed to consider all viable resources for that remaining amount in the event of significant shortfall in resource mobilization.

97. The implementation of Resolution 2719 is contingent on the submission of two reports to the Security Council by the Secretary-General, namely, 1) an independent strategic review of UNSOS to be submitted by 1 April 2025 and 2) a report detailing the progress made in preparation made in preparation of the framework established by Resolution 2719 (2023) to AUSSOS by 1 May 2025.

98. While the Commission continues to support ATMIS and the transition process, the Federal Government of Somalia is working steadily to take full responsibility for the provision of overall security to avoid any vacuum that could be exploited by Al Shabab. Following three (3) drawdowns, ATMIS’s force stands at about 12,000 as compared to its initial approximately 18,000 troops.

99. The Assembly may wish to commend the Federal Government of Somalia for the continued progress it has made in the political and socioeconomic fields, demonstrating a great leap towards post-conflict reconstruction and development for enduring peace and security.

100. The Assembly may wish to urge political actors to collectively resolve peacefully the growing disputes between the FGS and FMS, and encourage all parties to engage in dialogue, cohesion, and reconciliation; stress the importance of further efforts to reconcile rival clans and prevent Al-Shabaab from exploiting community grievances.

101. The Assembly may express concern over the security situation and the recent surge in Al-Shabaab’s attack on AU/UN camps and civilian targets, and underscore the necessity of avoiding any security vacuum during the transition period between ATMIS and AUSSOM; Most importantly the Assembly may wish to appeal to the international community for a continued commitment to adequately support Somalia’s pace to peace, security, and stability, especially the implementation of the Somali Development Plan in building capacities of the SSF, especially in terms of equipment, training, and logistics, to ensure a smooth exit of ATMIS.

102. In this respect, while recalling the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Assembly may wish to emphasize the imperative of ensuring reliable, predictable, and sustainable funding of the AUSSOM. In this regard, the Assembly may wish to stress the importance of establishing a dedicated funding mechanism, through UN assessed contributions in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) as the most suitable mechanism for providing adequate, predictable and sustainable funding in order to avoid the perennial financial challenges faced by previous missions.

103. The Assembly may wish to welcome UN Security Council Resolution 2767 (2024), endorsing AUSSOM and call for its implementation especially as it relates to the provision on funding using framework resolution 2719 (2023). The Assembly may wish to request the Chairperson of the Commission to closely work with the UN Secretary-General in meeting the reporting obligation in paragraphs 43 and 44 of Resolution 2767 (2024) and urge the UN Security Council to provide the necessary confirmation to allow the implementation of 2719 starting on 1 July 2025.

104. The Assembly may wish to request the AU Commission to continue the engagements with the UN, EU, other strategic partners and new donors, in order to ensure adequate, predictable and sustainable funding, and forms of support to AUSSOM; in this regard, may request the AU Commission to draw up a roadmap in collaboration with the UN for resource mobilization to fill the funding gap of 25% in accordance with Resolution 2719 (2023), including the possibility of convening a pledging conference. The Assembly may wish to commend the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the UN Secretary-General for their joint endorsement of the Joint Roadmap to operationalize UNSCR 2719, starting with Somalia, and overall high-level commitment to financing AU peace support operations.

105. The Assembly may wish to take note of, with appreciation, the Member States which recently formally expressed interest in contributing troops to AUSSOM, namely, Burundi, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, and request the AU Commission to finalize the report on the responses, in consultation with the Federal Government of Somalia on the composition of the Mission.

106. In this regard, the Assembly may wish to welcome the agreement recently signed between Ethiopia and Somalia in Ankara, Türkiye on 11 December 2024 ; and commend the Government of Türkiye and the AU Commission for the efforts deployed, reiterate the AU unwavering commitment to respect the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of both countries in accordance with the AU Constitutive Act and International Law; and request the two parties to demonstrably take all necessary mutual trust and confidence-building measures towards ensuring the successful implementation of the agreement.

- Sudan

107. Since the eruption of hostilities on 15 April 2023, the armed conflict between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), led by Lieutenant-General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemetti, shows no signs of abating. The security situation in Sudan remains highly volatile in general and has continued to deteriorate at an alarming rate. Despite the numerous efforts of regional, continental, and international actors to facilitate a ceasefire and define a political path out of the conflict and towards an inclusive settlement, the conflict is intensifying and spreading to a large majority of the 18 states of Sudan.

108. Recent developments have seen the SAF gain control over key areas, including the strategic Jebel Moya area, as well as the strategic Halfaya Bridge, El Kadaro, and parts of Khartoum North (Bahri) in Khartoum. Armed movements aligned with the SAF have also secured territory in northern El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, and in West Darfur. Clashes between the SAF and the RSF have escalated in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur as the RSF has been attacking the latter city since 10 May 2024, in an attempt to seize control of the last major urban center in the region. Clashes between the SAF and RSF escalated in October 2024 across multiple localities in Aj Jazirah State.

109. The political landscape in Sudan continued to be negatively influenced along many lines: those in support of the military, signatories of the Juba Peace Agreement, the holdout groups, and civil society groups that are also divided along the lines elaborated above.

110. The ongoing conflict in Sudan has triggered a humanitarian crisis making it one of the most severe humanitarian situations in the world today. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that there are more than 11 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) as of 22 October 2024, displaced to 9,470 locations, in 184 localities, across all 18 states in Sudan.

111. Additionally, according to data from the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), more than 3 million people crossed the border into the neighboring countries of Egypt, Chad, the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Libya, South Sudan, and Libya. Sudan is now among the top four countries in the world with the highest prevalence of global acute malnutrition. It is also currently grappling with multiple disease outbreaks, including cholera, malaria, dengue fever, measles, and rubella. Various reports refer to patterns of conflict-related sexual violence, enforced disappearance, and physical assaults, including murder, theft, looting, rape, and sex for food.

112. It is in this context that the AU PSC undertook a one-day field visit to Port Sudan, in Sudan, on 3 October 2024, and engaged with the Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, who expressed readiness to urgently end the war, on the condition that RSF vacates civilian areas based on the Jeddah Agreement which consensually agreed on cantonment areas or assembly points; and the restoration of a civilian-led political transition provided that the civilian political groups are united.

113. The PSC met about seven (7) times on the resolution of the conflict. Sudan, spearheading the implementation of the AU Roadmap. The PSC, at its 1218th meeting, held at the level of Heads of State and Government, held on 21 June 2024, established a PSC Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Sudan to facilitate the engagement between the warring parties towards finding an amicable solution. The meeting appointed H.E. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda, who was the Chairperson of the PSC for June 2024, to preside over the PSC Presidential Ad Hoc Committee.

114. Following consultations between the Chairperson of the AU Commission, four (4) other Heads of State were nominated to represent all the five (5) AU regions; namely; Angola (Southern Africa); Equatorial Guinea (Central Africa); Egypt (Northern Africa) and Nigeria (West Africa). The Commission is working closely with the Chairperson of the Ad Hoc Committee to convene the inaugural meeting of this PSC Ad Hoc Presidential Committee.

115. On its part, the AU High-Level Panel on the Resolution of the Conflict in Sudan (HLP-Sudan), together with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Special Envoy, organized, in July and August 2024, two preparatory processes towards an inclusive political process. These processes offered a select group of representatives from political parties and other key political constituencies to engage on key parameters for the all-inclusive political dialogue. The AU High-Level Panel is now taking necessary steps to convene the follow-up inter-Sudanese political dialogue in 2025.

116. In coordinating with other partners in resolving the Sudanese crisis, the AU High-Level Panel on Sudan engaged in the Inclusive Conference for Sudanese civil and political forces , on 6 to 7 July 2024, in Cairo, organized by the Arab Republic of Egypt; and the Second Consultative Meeting on Enhancing Coordination on Peace Initiatives and Efforts in Sudan, held on 24 July 2024, in Djibouti, and the Mediators Planning Retreat on the Situation in Sudan, held on 25 – 26 July 2024 also in Djibouti and the High-Level Dialogue Conference with the Sudanese women held on 3 to 4 June 2024 in Kampala Uganda.

117. Furthermore, the AU Panel took part in the Switzerland talks on the crisis in Sudan, convened by the United States of America, Switzerland, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, the AU, and the United Nations, from 14 to 24 August 2024. The Chair of the AU High-Level Panel on Sudan, Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas, also undertook a working visit to Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, from 9 to 12 September 2024. The AU has equally engaged in global processes on Sudan, including the Ministerial Meeting on Sudan, organized by Germany, France, the United States, and the European Union, on 25 September 2024, in New York, during the 79th UN General Assembly in support of the Sudanese people and their aspirations for a peaceful, prosperous and democratic future.

118. The situation in Sudan is cause for grave concern for the AU. It represents one of the most severe humanitarian crises in the world today, and the situation is reaching catastrophic conditions, threatening food security. Any collapse of Sudan, one of the largest AU Member States in terms of geographical space, would have very serious

implications for the Horn of Africa, East, and Sahel region, the neighboring countries and beyond, especially for the Red Sea, which is the strategic waterway for a large percentage of global trade.

119. **Given the foregoing, the Assembly may wish to strongly condemn the continued unjustified devastating conflict in Sudan, resulting in loss of lives and destruction of property, including critical infrastructure; Reiterate to the Parties that there is no military solution to the crisis and that the Parties must immediately and unconditionally stop the conflict, establish a permanent ceasefire and return to negotiation followed by an inclusive national dialogue and political transition, in order to alleviate the long suffering of the Sudanese people, and to preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sudan and safeguard its national institutions; Strongly condemn the commission of atrocity crimes in violation of international humanitarian law and international human rights law; encourage the PSC Ad-Hoc Presidential Committee on Sudan chaired by H.E. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda, to help find a long-term solution to the conflict, based on the six (6) pillars of the AU Roadmap while prioritizing a cessation of hostilities deal, political dialogue, addressing the needs of neighboring countries while avoiding spillover; and ensuring humanitarian access.**

120. **The Assembly may also wish to commend the governments and people of the neighboring countries of Sudan for hosting the Sudanese citizens fleeing the conflict and seeking refuge in their territories and urges the international donor partners to fulfil their pledges and disburse the funds in order to support the governments of the neighboring countries as well as the UN agencies in their endeavors to provide services and basic needs to the Sudanese refugees and internally displaced persons in Sudan.**

121. **The Assembly may further condemn in the strongest terms possible, external interference in the conflict by various actors and demand that those fueling the conflict by arming the belligerents, in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004), cease doing so immediately, stop prolonging the conflict and thereby contributing directly and indirectly to the continued suffering of the Sudanese people.**

122. **Assembly may further commend especially the AU HLP-Sudan and the IGAD Special Envoy for Sudan and the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for Sudan, H.E. Mohammed Belaihe, for their collaborative and coordinated efforts aimed at resolving the conflict in Sudan, and request the AU & IGAD to speed up the convening of the inclusive, Sudanese-led, Sudanese-owned political dialogue; Reiterate its concern for the proliferation of mediation and peace initiatives and coordinating bodies, and reiterate the central role of the AU in close coordination with the IGAD and the neighboring countries and call for all stakeholders to work through the existing AU Expanded Mechanism and Core Group for the Resolution of the Crisis in Sudan.**

- South Sudan

123. The security situation in South Sudan remains relatively stable as the Permanent Ceasefire continues to hold. However, intermittent intercommunal violence continued in some parts of the country, especially in Unity, Jonglei, and Lakes States, and some security-related incidents in Juba, with the tendency to worsen the security situation.

124. The implementation of the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), has witnessed some significant progress, but challenges remain that are critical to the implementation of the agreement, particularly those related to the unification of the forces, the making of a permanent constitution, the holding of the census and the institution of transitional justice mechanisms.

125. In September, the parties to the Agreement agreed to an extension of the transitional period by another two years from February 2025 to February 2027. This action effectively postponed the long-awaited elections originally scheduled for December 2024, now postponed to December 2026. According to the parties, the postponement was necessitated by the generally slow pace of implementation of the R-ARCSS and the failure to put in place the Permanent Constitution and lack of adequate funding for the peace process.

126. Relatedly, the High-level Standing Committee on the Transition in South Sudan, responsible for facilitating inter-party dialogue and evaluating the status of peace implementation, concluded its review. The findings indicate that many of the Agreement's provisions remain only partially implemented, which raised concerns about the feasibility of holding elections. Hence, the Committee highlighted the need for the completion of key pending actions critical for creating an environment conducive to free, fair, and peaceful democratic elections.

127. Following the request from H.E. President Salva Kiir to H.E. William Ruto, President of the Republic of Kenya, the Tumaini Initiative for South Sudan was launched in May 2024 in Nairobi. The mandate of the High-level mediation for the conflict in South Sudan was to incorporate all holdout groups that had not signed the 2018 R-ARCSS. The Tumaini Initiative proposed new monitoring oversight and implementation mechanisms and a National Leadership Council structure. The launch was attended by AU Commission Chairperson, H.E. Moussa Faki Mahamat, H.E. Salva Kiir of South Sudan, H.E. Lazarus Chakwera of Malawi, H.E. Hakainde Hichilema of Zambia, H.E. Nangolo Mbumba of Namibia, and H.E. Faustin-Archange Touadera of the Central African Republic.

128. The PSC undertook a field mission to South Sudan from 23 to 26 June 2024 as a follow up to the Council's decision and the decisions of the AU Assembly in relation to the situation in South Sudan. Particularly, Communique PSC/PR/COMM. 1141 (2023) adopted at its 1141st meeting held on 28 February 2023. The objective of the mission was to gather first-hand information on the prevailing political, security, economic and humanitarian situation in the country, in order to gauge the status of progress achieved in the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, in particular, the status of preparations for the successful organization of elections in December 2024 to mark the end of the transition, including the challenges to be urgently addressed.

129. The AU Commission conducted a high-level engagement in South Sudan, in particular, the deployment of the AU Panel of the Wise and FemWise to promote dialogue, national cohesion, and reconciliation. The Commission deployed technical experts in elections and constitution-making processes, gender empowerment, post-conflict reconstruction, and development in support of the political transition. It also facilitated several capacity-building training programs for South Sudanese stakeholders, covering political parties, civil society organizations, faith-based organizations, traditional leaders, women, and youth groups.

130. On the humanitarian front, the situation continues to worsen and is compounded by worsening food insecurity, the influx of refugees and returnees from Sudan as a result of the ongoing conflict therein; projected record levels of flooding resulting in many communities being isolated with impassable roads cutting off access to markets, livelihoods, and vital humanitarian aid, as well as an economic crisis and insufficient funding for tackling the crisis.

131. **In this regard, the Assembly may wish to commend H.E. Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan and First Vice President, H.E. Dr. Riek Machar, and all South Sudanese parties for upholding the permanent ceasefire for the past six years. The Assembly may also encourage all stakeholders in South Sudan to continue to build on the momentum in speedily implementing all outstanding provisions of the R-ARCSS, particularly, security sector reform, as it relates to the unification of forces, the conclusion of the permanent constitution, voters' registers, the question of refugees, returnees and IDPs, and the conduct of a population census that will pave the way for the holding of free, fair, and credible elections to end the long transition.**

132. **The Assembly may also take note of the decision by the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to extend the transition period by two (2) years, thus effectively postponing the elections from December 2024 to December 2026.**

133. **The Assembly may further wish to appeal to AU Member States and the larger international community to continue to provide all necessary support towards the full implementation of the R-ARCSS. The Assembly may also commend the Government and People of South Sudan for hosting Sudanese refugees and South Sudanese returnees fleeing the conflict in Sudan and urge the international donor partners to provide funding and necessary support to relief agencies that will enable them to provide the needed relief supplies to the vulnerable population.**

134. **To this effect, the Assembly may wish to call upon the Ad hoc High-Level Committee of Five (C5) on South Sudan to scale up its engagements.**

135. **The Assembly may wish to reiterate the appeal to the UN to urgently lift the arms embargo and other sanctions imposed on South Sudan as well international partners to lift all punitive measures imposed on the country, in order to facilitate the successful implementation of the outstanding aspects of the R-ARCSS**

136. The Assembly may wish to urge the R-TGNU to find solutions to the sporadic cases of inter-communal violence, and in this context, urges the responsible authorities in all parts of the country affected by the inter-communal violence to devise inclusive processes of holistically addressing the root causes, including DDR programmes and stockpile management of small arms and light weapons, with a view to promoting durable peace and security in these areas.

(iii) NORTHERN AFRICA REGION

137. The Northern Africa region remained generally calm except for the continuing situation in Libya and the presence of foreign forces and foreign terrorist fighters worsened the situation given also the contiguity of the instability in the Sahel. As was the case in 2023, the region continued to witness the high rates of transnational organized crime especially human and weapons trafficking.

138. In particular, activities of foreign military interests and non-state armed movements, in particular, terrorist groups in the Sahelo-Saharan area constitute great violations of States' sovereignty and raise serious concerns over escalations as a response to preserve their territorial integrity.

- Libya

139. On the reconciliation track, the AU High-Level Committee on Libya held its meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government, in Brazzaville, Republic of Congo, on 5 February 2024, to consider the status of Libya's national reconciliation process and its way forward. The meeting was convened at the initiative of the Chair of the High-Level Committee on Libya, H.E. Denis Sassou N'Guesso, President of the Republic of Congo. H.E. Mohamed Al-Menfi, President of the Libyan Presidential Council and AUC Chairperson H.E. Moussa Faki Mahamat, participated in the meeting alongside the Prime Minister of Algeria, and ministerial/senior officials of Chad, Tunisia, Egypt, Mauritania and South Africa.

140. The Committee reviewed the situation in Libya and reiterated the call to all Libyan stakeholders to fully embrace the reconciliation in an inclusive and constructive manner, while it highlighted the essential aspects of transitional justice, promotion of national consensus, unity, and social cohesion.

141. Furthermore, the Committee reiterated its appeal to all external actors to cease and refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of Libya, as this undermines the fundamental interests of the Libyan people and their legitimate aspirations for stability, peace, prosperity, and development. It also stressed the need for all Foreign Fighters, Foreign Forces, and Mercenaries to withdraw from Libya, in line with the 2020 October Ceasefire Agreement.

142. In the same context, the AU continuously supported the Libyan stakeholders to find a peaceful resolution to the ongoing crisis relating to the division of the Libyan High Council of State, since August 2024, with a view to ensuring the unity of the current Libyan legislative bodies.

143. In the same vein, the national reconciliation conference that was initially expected to take place on 28 April 2024, in Sirte, as announced at the High-Level Committee meeting for Libya in Brazzaville, was postponed indefinitely, due to the continuous political divergences, and also the withdrawal of major stakeholders from the process.

144. In an effort to bring back Libyan stakeholders to the reconciliation talks, H.E. Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, President of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, and the Chairperson of the African Union for 2024, along with H.E. Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the Commission and H.E. Jean-Claude Gakosso, Foreign Affairs Minister of the Republic of Congo; undertook a working visit to Libya in October 2024. The high-level delegation consulted with various stakeholders in Tripoli as a positive step towards genuine national reconciliation. On this note, the visit crystallized the imperative need to achieve political reconciliation as a critical step towards a Libyan-owned and Libyan-led social reconciliation. The High-Level Panel also concluded a fruitful visit to the eastern region (Benghazi) from 9 to 11 December 2024.

145. The political situation in Libya has not witnessed any notable improvements. The two conflicting Governments of the West and the East remain in a posture of a constant quest for legitimacy and continually compete for supreme authority over the country. Constitutional and Presidential elections did not take place in 2024, although progress was achieved by the 6+6 Committee in charge of reviewing electoral laws. However, critical contentious points over these laws persist, mainly over the criteria of presidential candidatures, which continue to hinder any prospects for the formation of a unified Government in charge of convening general elections.

146. On the economic track, the dispute over the leadership of the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) and the crisis related to the closure of oil fields and terminals in the Eastern region has further fueled the already ongoing political stalemate. In this respect, the AU welcomes the settlement of this crisis by the designation of a new leadership of the CBL. The independence of the Bank must be ensured for sustainable financial and economic stability in the country.

147. The overall security situation in Libya remains of great concern, labeled by episodic heavy clashes and skirmishes, as the country is yet to control the local militias. The control over these militias became more and more challenging for the Libyan authorities over the last year due, inter-alia, to the arms embargo breaches and continuous direct foreign interferences in Libyan internal affairs. For its part, the Withdrawal of Foreign Forces, Foreign Fighters, and Mercenaries from Libya remains a crucial shortcoming of the implementation of the 2020 October Ceasefire Agreement, due amongst other considerations, to the lack of political unification of the State institutions.

148. With respect to the relocation of the Tunis-based AU Liaison Office for Libya to Tripoli, the Commission made tangible efforts in finalizing the Country Host Agreement, with the Government of the State of Libya. The signature of the said agreement is planned in the near future in order to officially initiate the effective relocation.

149. The Assembly may wish to appeal to the AU High-Level Committee for Libya to intensify its support towards the intra-Libyan National Reconciliation of all stakeholders, with the active and close support of Libya's direct neighboring countries and other key countries of the northern region that have a critical role to play in the stability of the country and its sustainable peace.

150. The Assembly may wish to specially acknowledge and commend H.E President Denis Sassou NGuesso, Chair of the AU-HLC for Libya for his profound leadership and dedication towards Libya's peace and national reconciliation. The Assembly may also wish to equally recognize the mediation efforts by Jean-Claude Gakosso, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Congo, and Professor Mohamed Al Hacem Ould Lebatt, Chief of Staff to Chairperson of the Commission, for their efforts in supporting the reconciliation under the auspices of the HLC for Libya. Thus, the Assembly may wish to call on the PSC to carry out a field mission to Libya, in the first half of 2025, after consultations with the Libyan authorities.

151. The Assembly may wish to reiterate that the Skhirat Agreement of 17 December 2015 resulting from the process of reconciliation between the Libyan parties, under the auspices of the UN, remains a credible basis and framework for a lasting political solution for the Libyan crisis. The Assembly may also wish to take note of the considerable progress made in preparation for the conduct of the electoral process in Libya during the meeting of the Joint Commission between the House of Representatives and the High Council of State, held in Bouznika, Morocco, on 18 and 19 December 2024, which resolved disagreements and formulated the laws governing the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in Libya.

(iv) SOUTHERN AFRICA REGION

152. The state of peace and security in the region remained stable compared to 2023. This relative stability is characterized by the strengthening of democratic institutions and processes in many countries of the region. A record number of SADC Member States organized general elections peacefully, allowing the smooth transition of political power. The Final Communiqué of the 44th SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government held on August 17, 2024, in Harare, Zimbabwe, highlights the attention that the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) has paid to security issues in the region, including through the deployment of SAMIM in Mozambique and SAMIDRC in the DRC with the AU support.

153. On 30 August 2024 the PSC held a consultative meeting with the SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security and some SADC Member States in Gaborone, Botswana. The meeting was convened to deliberate on peace and security issues in the Southern Africa region within the context of the ongoing implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), as well as the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and to reflect on issues relating to the strengthening of collaboration of efforts to promote peace, security and democracy in the region.

154. The effects of climate change continue to threaten regional peace, security, and development. These effects include forced migration, food insecurity, and other

socio-economic impacts that have the potential to exacerbate ongoing conflicts and add structural vulnerability factors to conflicts. Floods, cyclones, droughts, and other climate-related shocks, as well as responses to these shocks, continue to seriously affect the region.

- Mozambique

155. The conflict situation in Cabo Delgado province continues to greatly affect regional stability particularly the increasing number of internally displaced persons (IDPs), mainly in Mozambique, and of Mozambican refugees in Tanzania. The ongoing post-election political tension in Mozambique also contributes to further insecurity within the country.

156. The Government of Mozambique has made strenuous efforts to ensure that the closure of SAMIM on July 15, 2024, does not affect the counter-terrorism actions. Despite the continued support of the Rwandan Army, as well as the Tanzanian armed forces, and South African armed forces under bilateral agreements with the government of Mozambique, the security and humanitarian situation in Cabo Delgado, is still fluid. An increase in the number of refugees in neighboring countries, and insecurity have forced the UN Agencies operating in the area (UNICEF, OCHA, WFP, UNDSS) to suspend their humanitarian activities since May 2024. This situation in Cabo Delgado province and the post-general election violence since October 2024 should be frontally addressed by the AU and SADC in the interest of stability in the region.

157. In this context, the AU/PSC conducted a field mission to Maputo, Mozambique, from 28 to 31 July 2024 to obtain first-hand information regarding the general situation in Cabo Delgado, particularly, the humanitarian and security situation; taking into consideration the exit of SAMIM, to ascertain the state of progress in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism in Cabo Delgado and the challenges to be urgently addressed, including the impact of the support rendered by the AU; and to express AU's solidarity with the people and government of Mozambique, as well as reaffirm the AU's Commitment to continuing to support them in the relentless efforts to eradicate terrorism and violent extremism, to restore lasting peace, security, stability and development in the region.

158. The AU may commend the Government of Mozambique, for the efforts made in addressing the security challenges in Cabo Delgado with the support of SAMIM and other bilateral partners. The Assembly may request the AU Commission to continue providing the necessary support to the Government of Mozambique to address the humanitarian and security situation in Cabo Delgado; and appeal to the international community to redouble its efforts in supporting the peace efforts by Mozambique and SADC. The Assembly may wish to commend Mozambique for the conduct of elections in October 2024 and to encourage the Government of Mozambique to work with SADC and AU, towards dialogue for a peaceful resolution of post-election crisis and avoid any escalation of violence and to prevent this situation from escalating into extreme violence, with further loss of human lives.

159. The Assembly may wish to encourage the Government of Mozambique to continue to consolidate on the gains made thus far, as well to take all necessary steps to effectively restore State authority in all areas recaptured from the terrorists, including through the adoption of “a whole of society and a whole of government” approach in addressing the fundamental root causes and drivers of terrorism, restoration of basic public services, investments in conducive peace building activities and reconciliation, with a view to more effectively preventing a relapse and the creation of a security vacuum.

160. The Assembly may wish to underline the need for the Government of Mozambique to redouble effort to promote counter narratives, de-radicalization and reintegration programmes that are needed for citizens who were involved in terrorism and to create conditions such as amnesty for those defecting from terrorism and voluntarily surrender, as well as to avoid stigmatization from their communities.

(v) WESTERN AFRICA REGION/THE SAHEL & LAKE CHAD BASIN

161. The state of peace, security, and stability in the West Africa region, including the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, remains broadly characterized by intensified instability and insecurity, driven by political turmoil, escalating terrorism and violent extremism, and governance challenges. The political landscape has remained bleak, with all Central Sahelian States experiencing complex political transitions following unconstitutional changes of government and stalled transition processes. Meanwhile, terrorist activities recorded a surge, especially in the Sahel region, with jihadist groups expanding into coastal states like Benin, Togo, and Côte d’Ivoire, as well as the proliferation of foreign mercenaries, requiring heightened surveillance and early warning actions.

162. The creation of the Alliance of Sahelian States (AES), following the withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger from ECOWAS, is a source of concern. This has emboldened the activities of terrorist groups and transnational organized criminal networks operating in the region. The complex political transitions and ensuing uncertainties have weakened democratic structures, infringed on civil liberties, undermined public trust, and disrupted essential governance reforms as detailly expounded below.

- Guinea Bissau

163. The protracted political crisis remained a critical concern for political stability. The lingering disagreements among key political actors continue to heighten tensions and impede governance processes, exacerbating the socio-economic challenges facing the citizens.

164. After the dissolution of the National People’s Assembly of Guinea-Bissau (Assembleia Nacional Popular da Guiné-Bissau, or ANP) in December 2023, the scheduled legislative election, originally slated for 24 November 2024, did not hold.

165. The legislative election was also hindered by the lack of constitutional legitimacy of the current Comissão Nacional de Eleições (National Elections

Commission, or CNE), as the mandates of its president and executive secretariat members, which expired in April 2022, had not been renewed. This challenge was further exacerbated by the question of the capacity of the judiciary, stemming from the resignation of José Pedro Sambu, the president of Guinea-Bissau's Supreme Court, in November 2023, as well as the suspension of six of the court's 12 judges.

- **Guinea**

166. The political context has been marked by debate surrounding the possible candidacy of the President of the Transition in the next elections. This follows statements by certain members of the government, including the Prime Minister, to the effect that they are not ruling out the possibility of the Transitional President standing as a candidate. This situation could rekindle tensions in the country, as some political players have called on the President of the Transition to clarify his position on the questions concerning his possible candidacy in the forthcoming elections.

167. In addition, concerns about the delay in establishing the electoral timetable remain unclear, especially given the fact that, during a ministerial conference of the Francophonie, the Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that the elections would be held in 2025. In addition, activities to publicize the preliminary draft of the new Constitution are continuing in the country and among the diaspora.

168. Importantly, the resumption of dialogue with ECOWAS, following the visit of an ECOWAS delegation to Conakry, on 13 August 2024 as part of its assessment of the transition process, is a positive sign for the political transition process. The reintegration of Guinea into the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) on 24 September, 2024, as the body decided to lift Guinea's suspension, was also recorded.

Central Sahel, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger

- **Burkina Faso**

169. The security and political climate remain unstable. The rise of insurgent and terrorist attacks continue to make the path to political transition uncertain, as the Transitional Government continues to use ongoing insecurity as a justification for not prioritizing election preparations. The political situation is marked by allegations of counter-coups and foreign interference. The Government announced that it had thwarted “several attempts at destabilization” by military personnel and civilians. Former ministers, including Djibril Bassolé, and the former president of the transition, Lt. Colonel Paul Damiba, were once again accused of involvement in these “destabilization attempts”.

- **Mali**

170. The situation in Mali reflects political uncertainty and insecurity characterized by insurgency, rebellion, terrorist acts, influence of mercenaries, ban on political activities, and charges on grounds of attempts to destabilize the country.

171. The challenge over the ongoing approach towards the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali and border fragility dynamics remains a key concern. However, the

drafting process for the preliminary version of the National Charter for Peace and Reconciliation is ongoing.

172. The AU Commission continued to engage with the various institutions of the Republic, which provided an opportunity to share recommendations and make contributions with a view to enriching the content of the draft charter.

- **Niger**

173. Following the military coup in 2023, the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP) continued to consolidate its power through the strengthening of partnerships with the Alliance of the Sahelian State (AES) and some global powers. The constitution and key national institutions remained suspended despite the national dialogue announced in August 2023 which should set the duration of the political transition as well as the orientations to be integrated into the Resilience Program for the Safeguarding of the Homeland (PRSP).

174. The security situation remains volatile, particularly in the Liptako-Gourma region bordering Burkina Faso and Mali with increased deadly attacks from several armed and terrorist groups, including the EIGS and the rival Al-Qaeda-linked organization, the JNIM, as well as the ISWAP in the western and southeastern regions.

175. Despite the sanctions, the economic situation of Niger improved in 2024, with GDP expected to increase by 11.2%, according to the African Development Bank (AfDB). This forecast was based on the export of 90,000 barrels of oil per day via a new pipeline to the port of Sèmè in Benin, generating significant tax revenue. The Humanitarian situation remained dire as the impact of climate change exacerbated the country's humanitarian situation. In fact, floods and torrential rains of September 2024 destroyed tens of thousands of homes and crops across the country and caused massive population displacement.

176. Overall, in the Sahel region, attacks by terrorist groups continued. In Mali, on September 17, at around 5:30 a.m., at least two defense and security force installations were attacked, including the Faladié national gendarmerie school and a military post near the airport. The JNIM claimed responsibility for these attacks, which gave them access to the presidential pavilion at Bamako airport. In Burkina Faso, on August 24, 2024, the Al-Qaeda-linked Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen, JNIM) attacked hundreds of civilians who were digging a military trench to protect Barsalogo, which has a military base.

177. Meanwhile, after Mali, Niger signed an agreement with the Russian company Glavkosmos on Friday, 1 November 2024, for the acquisition of three satellites. Once deployed, this equipment should strengthen the fight against armed and terrorist groups in Niger and neighboring AES Member States.

178. The human rights situation continues to be characterized by violations of citizens' fundamental rights, particularly given the security situation with its attendant persistent humanitarian crisis, aggravated by flooding. In Mali, violations of the right to life, the right to physical integrity, and the right to security continue to be recorded. The

humanitarian situation remained critical throughout the Basin as flooding has caused significant casualties and damage since August 2024. By the end of September 2024, more than 7.9 million people needed humanitarian aid, with 2.3 million displaced internally.

- **Lake Chad Basin**

179. Despite the relative political stability, the security climate continues to be unstable in the Basin. Boko Haram and ISWAP remained active in some parts of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Of particular concern was the rise of a new terrorist group called the Lakurawas, primarily active in Nigeria's northwestern region. The group emerged from the Sahel after the coup in Niger disrupted joint military patrols along the Niger border.

180. Moreover, transnational organized, crime especially human and drug trafficking, kidnapping and abductions, was prevalent by non-state armed groups and criminal networks, targeting school children, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and people living in vulnerable rural communities.

181. Nevertheless, the Multinational Joint National Task Force (MNJTF), intensified efforts to combat attacks by insurgent groups and mitigate their impact on populations. As of September 2024, counter-offensive operations have led to the neutralization of scores of criminals and suspected terrorists.

182. Overall, the security situation in the region has remained uncertain and volatile with sporadic and unprecedented attacks by terrorist and insurgent groups, who have renewed the use of political violence, recently.

183. The Assembly may wish to request the AU Commission to scale up its support to the countries in political transition in the region to ensure their swift return to constitutional democratic order and re-emphasize the imperative for Member States to strengthen regional cooperation with the countries in the Sahel, in the areas of intelligence sharing, collective border security mechanisms, and counterterrorism efforts, especially within the ambit of the Nouakchott Process and the MNJTF Initiative.

184. The Assembly may wish to call on the transitional authorities to place the supreme interests of their respective countries and their people above all else, and to ensure the strict implementation of their respective transitional roadmaps, within the agreed timelines, and to operationalize the joint transition monitoring committees in the respective countries as well as ensure inclusive and transparent transition processes.

185. Furthermore, the Assembly may wish to encourage the countries in the Sahel to engage in inclusive political processes, through political dialogue to address the root causes of conflict that may include grievances related to governance, marginalization, and socio-economic inequalities, as this could assist in attaining major milestones in the promotion of democratic governance, respect for human rights, and the rule of law.

186. **The Assembly may consider encouraging bilateral and international partners, as well as the AU Commission to continue providing humanitarian relief support to State institutions operating in the Sahel in a timely and impartial manner, reaching the most vulnerable populations.**

- Lake Chad Basin Region and the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram (MNJTF)

187. The MNJTF, in pursuance of its mandate, has continued to record successes in its operations against the terrorist group. The force has remained a formidable coalition against terrorism within the Lake Chad Basin region, leveraging coordination, partnership, critical mass, delivery and reach to remain cohesive and decisive in the conduct of its operational activities. Consequent upon the successes recorded by the MNJTF in the preceding year, the Council endorsed the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Activities of the MNJTF against Boko Haram and renewed the mandate of the MNJTF for another period of twelve (12) months, effective from 1 February 2024, during its 1197th meeting held on 30 January 2024. Council also requested the AU Commission and the LCBC to renew the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and Support Implementation Agreement (SIA) between AU, LCBC and MNJTF TCCs, as a guide for the provision of AU additional support to the MNJTF, for a period of one (1) year, covering the period of the mandate.

188. The additional support provided to the MNJTF by the AU Commission has enhanced the efficacy and efficiency of the HQ MNJTF in planning and coordinating joint operations within MNJTF Area of Operation (AO). In addition, the support has saved many lives of injured troops and reduced the turnaround time for the delivery of logistics and the evacuation times for injured troops from the field. The Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) activities and projects have facilitated the acceptance of the MNJTF among the civilian population within the MNJTF AO and enhanced cooperation with the local population in fighting Boko Haram extremism.

189. Additionally, the Commission supported the MNJTF Headquarters in the implementation of the mission-specific Protection of Civilians (PoC) Strategy, the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) on Handling Persons Associated with Boko Haram, SOPs on Managing Recovered Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), and of the AU Compliance Framework (AUCF) for PSOs in respect of International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and International Humanitarian Law (IHL).

190. The MNJTF has created an enabling environment that is currently facilitating the return and resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), as well as the implementation of humanitarian activities in the local communities. While the number of resettled populations has continued to rise, most of these communities have received little or no form of humanitarian assistance, and there is a need for urgent action to enhance the livelihood of these resettled communities.

191. There exist some political challenges to the MNJTF coalition that are undermining the cohesion of the force. In particular, the current situation in Niger Republic has affected the operational activities of the Force. However, there are

indications that this will be resolved through the regional mechanism of the Lake Chad Basin Commission.

192. The MNJTF also continues to face challenges of restricted movement during the wet season, limited counter-IED equipment and other equipment to conduct kinetic operations and inadequate funding to conduct non kinetic operations, including civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) activities in the affected communities.

193. **The Assembly may wish to commend the Member States of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) for their unwavering support to the MNJTF, and call on the AU, through the Peace Fund, as well as AU Member States and the UN to support the ongoing efforts aimed at providing support to the resettlement of IDPs and returning refugees in the area as well as the reintegration of the surrendering Boko Haram fighters.**

194. **The Assembly may wish to request the AU Commission and international partners to scale up the provision of adequate, predictable and sustainable funding to support MNJTF, including in the provision of adequate force multipliers and enablers, including through in order to allow the effective execution of its mandate. The Assembly may also wish to request the AU Commission and Partners to revive the implementation of the Regional Stabilization Strategy for the communities affected by the terrorist activities of Boko Haram. The Assembly may further wish to direct the provision of additional equipment for the MNJTF through the Continental Logistics Base to enable the Force to continue its operations against the Boko Haram.**

C. POLITICAL AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

195. Human rights, justice, and the rule of law in Africa are pertinent to the overall landscape of peace and security. Through the mechanisms and synergies between the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance (ACDEG) supports State parties to the Charter in building on the foundation set out in the Constitutive Act of the African Union.

196. In particular, the Constitutive Act in Articles 3 and 4 outlines the principles of good governance, democracy, rule of law, and respect for fundamental rights and freedoms towards a peaceful and secure continent. From the nexus approach, it is recognised that effective governance (political and socio-economic) is critical to resolving some of the root causes of conflicts and ensuring structural conflict prevention.

197. In 2024, modest progress was made by Member States with the support of the AUC, towards enhancing democratic governance, constitutionalism, and the rule of law, as well as transitional justice, human rights, public sector delivery, defense and security governance, and post-conflict reconstruction and development.

(i) Democracy, the Conduct of Regular Elections, and AUEOMs

198. Democratic governance, being at the core of Aspiration 3 of the AU Agenda 2063, the majority of Member States continued to uphold the shared and cherished values of advancing the participation of citizens in the selection of their leaders through the ballot, respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms, enhancing the rule of law and accountability.

199. Equally important is that Member States are focusing more on citizen empowerment especially women and youth, to engage in decision-making processes and the peaceful resolution of conflicts through inclusive dialogue and mediation.

200. Likewise, the AU Commission continues to support Member States to enhance their democratic processes through technical support and capacity enhancement programmes in the governance domain.

- AU Election Observation Missions (AUEOMs)


201. A record number of fifteen (15) Member States in the Union organized General, Presidential, and Parliamentary elections during 2024, namely; Algeria, Botswana, Chad, Comoros, Ghana, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Togo and Tunisia. And one Member State under suspension, Gabon, organized a constitutional referendum as part of its roadmap for a return to democratic regime.

202. Upon invitations to the AU, the Chairperson of the Commission, as mandated by the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), deployed observation missions to thirteen (13) of the above-mentioned fifteen (15) countries, that held democratic elections.

203. The AU Election Observation Missions conducted a comprehensive assessment and documentation of electoral processes and identified areas for improvement and strengthening, through policy recommendations. The Missions afforded the Commission to accelerate the implementation of the AU normative frameworks for democratic elections.

Percentage of Member States (MS) where AU deployed Observers in 2024

Figure 6: Percentage of Member States (MS) where AU deployed Observers in 2024



204. In the Member States, where observer missions were deployed, the AU identified commendable practices and proffered solutions to address emerging challenges associated with electoral processes. This also informs subsequent targeted technical assistance, in order to strengthen democratic and peace institutions and future processes. The overall outcomes from AUEOMs to Member States in 2024 may be summarised as follows:


- a) visible increased participation of women and youth in the political system as voters, election officials, and party agents;
- b) However, fewer female and youth candidates were presented by political parties or as independent candidates for presidential, parliamentary, and local elections.
- c) rise in the number of young persons as registered voters;
- d) improving efficient delivery by many national electoral management bodies;
- e) preventive diplomacy and lessons learning and exchange have become key components of AUEOMs;
- f) evolving closer synergies between the Member States, RECs, and AUC, to ensure seamless conduct of AUEOM deployment
- g) A majority of Member States are now increasingly using domestic financial resources to organize elections, thereby drastically reducing the dependence on partners to fund election processes:
- h) Managing election results in some cases, is a huge concern and sometimes leads to post-election protests and violence despite peaceful and orderly pre-election and Election Day processes
- i) The continuing reorganization of the AU election observation system to ensure inclusivity across the broad categories of participation by African youth, women, and civil society organizations as well as relevant AU Organs is already

producing results. For example, in the case of the AU's commitment to achieving gender parity in its election observation deployments, the ratio of female participation moved to parity and in 2024, at 66%.

Table 10: Gender Analysis of AUEOMs in 2024

No	MS	Female Observers	Male Observers
1	Comoros	72.22%	27.78%
2	Senegal (PR)	62.50%	37.50%
3	Togo	66.66%	33.34%
4	Madagascar	57.14%	42.86%
5	South Africa	65.00%	32.00%
6	Mauritania	57.14%	42.86%
7	Rwanda	69.23%	30.77%
8	Tunisia	52.38%	47.62%
9	Mozambique	69.69%	30.31%
10	Botswana	79.16%	20.84%
11	Mauritius	70.58%	29.42%
12	Senegal (PAR)	50.00%	50.00%
13	Namibia	83.33%	16.67%
14	Ghana	47.61%	52.39%
15	Gabon (Referendum)	50.00%	50.00%

Figure 7: Gender Analysis of AUEOMs in 2024



Source: AUC PAPS / GCP Directorate, Democracy and Elections Unit (DEU)

205. The peaceful nature of political transitions following democratic elections in the Republics of Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius, and Senegal, are also landmarks achieved

in 2024. However, in a few cases, election results have been contested culminating in post-election violence by losing political parties, citing mistrust and non-transparency in election outcomes management. In effect, some parties alleged that election results did not reflect the will of the people. It is therefore important for election administration authorities to ensure higher levels of transparency and accountability, particularly in results collation and transmission processes. African Governments are also encouraged to ensure the timely provision of budget resources for elections to give the EMBs adequate preparation for elections.

206. The Assembly may wish to congratulate the Member States that successfully conducted democratic elections during the year 2024, highlighting the specific smooth transfer of power in Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius and Senegal, and the formation of the Government of National Unity in South Africa. The Assembly commends all Member States for making fervent efforts towards consolidating democratic governance and the peace dividends, in the spirit of realizing Agenda 2063 and respecting the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance.

207. The Assembly may also wish to encourage all Member States to continue to strengthen institutional mechanisms that will enhance women and youth participation in national political and electoral processes.

208. The Assembly may wish to encourage Member States to continue to further strengthen the institutional capacities of national election management bodies and the judiciary, including through provision of adequate financial and human resources in order to enable them to more effectively discharge their mandate. The Assembly may also wish to encourage Member States to address the issue of voter apathy by encouraging election management bodies to embark on sensitization and civic education programmes during electoral processes to ensure high voter turn out and in the same context, encourage civil society organizations and the media to play a positive role by contributing towards the successful organization of elections in Member States, including through related civic education and objective reporting. The Assembly may further wish to encourage Member States to continue to promote and strengthen democracy, prioritise dialogue between and among political actors, adopt election code of conduct and to utilize existing legal channels for addressing any election related disputes and request Member States to create conducive conditions that encourage and promote the effective participation of their diaspora, women, the youth and people living with disabilities, as a commitment to facilitate their inclusion in national decision-making and in recognition of their contribution to national development.

209. Furthermore, the Assembly may wish to encourage Member States to consistently invite the African Union to observe their national elections and prioritize the timely facilitation of the deployment of such Missions.

- AU Support to Electoral Processes

210. The AUC continues to support Member States through the Electoral Management Bodies in the preparation for elections.

211. Through the assessment, the AUC identified the needs of public institutions and processes supporting democracy to design an appropriate technical support mechanism ahead of elections. The Commission prepared a comprehensive strategy to support the request from the Republic of South Sudan. This entailed the capacity building of the electoral commission including the procurement of fifty (50) laptops, and training programmes conducted for various stakeholders including women and youth on effective participation in the electoral processes throughout the electoral cycle.

212. Furthermore, pre-election assessment missions were conducted in four (4) countries – South Africa, Mozambique, Botswana and Ghana. The missions assessed the state of preparedness of each country and provided technical guidance accordingly by reviewing the progress made in implementing AUC's recommendations based on thematic priorities relevant to each country's democratic trajectory.

- **Specialized Training of Short-Term Observers, Women and Youth**

213. **Third Specialized Training Programme for African Election Observers, held in Rabat, Morocco:** The third cohort of the Specialized Training Program for African short-term election observers took place in Rabat, Morocco, from 29 April to 3 May 2024. This edition brought together youth and women representatives from all five AU regions. Launched in 2022 as a joint initiative between the govern of the Kingdom of Morocco and the AU Commission, this Programme reached a milestone with the participation of 70 potential election observers. These participants, ready for deployment across the Continent were drawn from 42 AU Member States, with a full gender parity. The training successfully advanced its strategic objective of strengthening the knowledge, efficiency and responsiveness of the AU Election Observation Missions, contributing to the effective execution of Africa's democratic agenda.

214. The trainees also benefited from the Seminar on "Elections and Democracy in Africa" as an interface with researchers, analysts, and practitioners hosted by the Policy Centre of the New South based at the Mohamed VI University in Rabat, organized on the sidelines of the training. The Seminar explored the necessary reforms to improve the efficiency of electoral processes in Africa with a focus on the critical roles of civil society and media in ensuring fair and transparent elections, fostering peace and public trust.

215. **Training for African Women, Youth, and Technical Experts:** Two training programs, one for women and youth on elections and political participation and another for a core group of technical experts, were organized by the PAPS Department, in Nairobi, and Gaborone, in June and August 2024, respectively. Both were supported by the European Union, EISA, and International IDEA.

216. **The Assembly may wish to commend the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco for its continued support to the training of election observers, for the**

third time in a row. The Assembly may also wish to request the AU Commission to organize the 4th edition of the specialized training, with a view to ensure its continuity and to further reinforce the professional conduct of the AUEOMs.

217. Furthermore, the Assembly may wish to encourage Member States to support the Commission in the training and deployment of observers including through voluntary contributions to the budget for elections.

218. In this respect, the Assembly may wish to specially acknowledge the voluntary contribution of US\$ 1 million dollars by the Government of the Republic of Niger, in 2023, which was used as the budget for AUEOMs deployment in 2024 and encourage other member states to emulate Niger's example.

- **International Cooperation in Election Observation**

219. In the spirit of promoting South/South Cooperation, the AU was invited to the presidential elections Bolivian Republic of Venezuela in South America. The AU participation afforded the Commission the opportunity to witness and study how democratic elections are organized in another developing region of the Global South.

220. For the first time, the AU, upon invitation, deployed a peer learning mission to the 2024 European Parliamentary Elections, covering three (3) EU countries; Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg. This provided a platform for African electoral stakeholders and AUC to share experiences and build partnerships with the EU on the conduct and management of democratic elections.

221. Furthermore, the Commission engaged in the 2024 platform on the Declaration of Principles (DoP) for International Election Observation in Warsaw, Poland. The DoP platform was an opportunity for the AUC to influence global perceptions about elections in Africa.

(ii) Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law

- **Second African Union Reflection Forum on UCG- Accra II**

222. The Second African Union Reflection Forum (Accra II) on Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCG) in Africa was held on 18 to 19 March 2024, in Accra, Ghana, under the auspices of the AU PSC, and the leadership of H.E. Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo Addo, President of the Republic of Ghana.

223. The Accra II Forum took stock of the achievements and gaps in the rollout of the Accra and Malabo Declarations, by revisiting the existing tools to find innovative solutions to efficiently prevent and respond to UCGs. The forum called for the need to go beyond condemnation and take concrete actions in addressing UCGs to ensure non-recurrence. The AUPSC was urged to speed up the operationalization of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions to ably monitor the implementation of the PSC decisions on UCGs. Happily, this has been effected by the PSC.

224. In addition, Accra II renewed the essence of coordination, cooperation, and coherence of the efforts by the AU, RECs/RMs, CSOs, and international organizations in order to support countries in complex political transitions.

225. The Accra II Forum urged the African people to actively engage in the democratic processes in their respective countries. In the same vein expressed the need for all stakeholders to support government programmes aimed at improving the lives and livelihoods of the people. To this end they stressed the nexus between democracy and development and urged all partners, including the AU Commission, UN and international partners to support the realization of this nexus.

226. The AUC was urged to scale up guidance and technical support to countries in conflict situations as a result of unconstitutional changes of government and to adopt strategic pathways to accompany their transitional processes.

227. The Forum made strong call for the African people to reject coup d'états and their proponents and seek to address their grievances through existing national processes.

- Study on Root Causes and Structural Drivers of Unconstitutional Changes of Government

228. It is to be noted that the spectre of unconstitutional changes of government remains a huge concern as the political transitions in the six (6) suspended Member States, were stalled, except Gabon which organized a peaceful and orderly referendum on its new constitution.

229. In response to the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government in the continent, an in-depth experts' study on Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCG) was mandated by the 1061st Session of the AU Peace and Security Council. The study was commissioned to offer a comprehensive understanding of the causes/drivers, consequences, and impact of UCG, as well as to draw actionable recommendations for better prevention and management.

230. Once reviewed and endorsed by the Peace and Security Council, the research will serve as one of the basis and reference knowledge output for the AU to elaborate a new doctrine on preventing and managing UCG situations thereby reinforcing the continent's dedication to constitutionalism and the rule of law.

- Launching the Pilot Phase of ACDEG School Curricula Project

231. The Pilot phase of the ACDEG School Curricula Project was launched in Abidjan under the distinguished patronage of the Ivorian Minister for National Education and Literacy, H.E. Mrs. Mariatou Kone. Following the continent-wide development of various manuals, tools, and curricula in the past three (3) years, Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea Bissau were chosen by the meeting for the West Africa phase, to serve as pilots for mainstreaming the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and

Governance (ACDEG) into school curricula. Similar ones are expected in the remaining 4 regions.

232. The ACDEG project provides a platform for educating a new generation of young Africans to learn and imbibe the values of democracy, good governance, respect for the rule of law, and human rights, as enshrined in the African Charter. It will contribute to equipping young Africans with the required skills to become responsible citizens who can build a better, more prosperous, and democratic Africa, in line with and as part of the implementation of the AU Agenda 2063.

- **Africa Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions (AFSIT)**

233. Pursuant to the decision by the 2022 16th AU Extraordinary Assembly of Heads of State and Government on Unconstitutional Changes of Government and Terrorism, the AU Commission and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) co-created the Africa Facility to Support Inclusive Transition (AFSIT). Launched on 15 July 2023, the AFSIT seeks to strengthen governance and uphold development gains during complex political transitions. The AU Peace Fund contributed financially to the AFSIT program implementation in 2024.

234. In 2024, AFSIT deployed a strategic support mission to Niger, provided support to women parliamentarians and the National Transition Council in Mali, facilitated dialogue platforms between citizens and the National Council of the Transition in Guinea, provided technical assistance to the transition process in Chad, and deployed assessment missions to South Sudan and Burkina Faso; and the deployment of an AU solidarity mission of experts to monitor the Referendum on the new Constitution of the Gabonese Republic held on 16 November 2024.

235. At the regional level, AFSIT facilitated three (3) regional dialogues in 2024 which convened senior representatives from the AU, UN, RECs/RMs, and non-governmental stakeholders. The dialogues focused on reimagining cooperation during transition periods, building understanding about complex political transitions, exchange of experiences, best practices, and lessons learned, and strengthening collaboration between state and non-state actors — including opposition parties and civil society.

236. In addition, AFSIT supported the development of the Africa Transition Index (ATI), which provides robust and data-driven analysis of political transitions. In partnership with UNDP, AFSIT is currently developing a Futures Forecast Study for Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Gabon, leveraging the Integrated Futures forecasting tool to provide a detailed analysis of development trajectories and potential outcomes. The study will align with the Agenda 2063 and the UN Sustainable Development Goals, presenting macro-level projections up to 2030 and 2043.

- **AU Transitional Justice**

237. The AU Transitional Justice Policy (AUTJP) is a key AU strategy aimed at promoting peace, justice, national reconciliation, and democratization in post-conflict and post-authoritarian societies in Africa. The AUTJP Roadmap (2021-2024) identifies

both state and non-state actors as critical stakeholders whose collaboration is essential to achieving the policy's objectives. This transitional justice mechanism provides post-conflict and post-authoritarian societies with the tools, through capacity building, to escape cycles of instability, human rights violations, and poor governance.

- Support to Member States Implementing Transitional Justice Processes

238. To facilitate the effective implementation of transitional justice processes in Member States, the AU Commission provided technical support to The Gambia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR), and Lesotho.

239. In the DRC, AU support has resulted in the development of a draft National Transitional Justice Policy. On her part, Ethiopia adopted a Transitional Justice Policy and its Implementation Roadmap. In South Sudan, following the passage by the National Assembly, the President of the Republic of South Sudan assented to the Commission on Truth, Reconciliation, and Healing (CTRH) and Compensation and Reparations Authority (CRA) Act on 3rd September 2024. The AU Commission deployed a Mental Health and Psychosocial Support expert for one year to help in the establishment of a survivor and mental health support unit in the Ministry of Justice and under the Truth Commission in South Sudan.

240. AU assistance to the Central African Republic is expected to help establish a new Truth and Reconciliation Commission shortly. The AUC is also providing technical assistance to Lesotho for a transitional justice needs assessment, which will guide efforts to promote national peace and stability. The official launch of transitional justice interventions to popularize the AUTJP took place on 15 October 2024 in Maseru, Lesotho.

241. At the regional level, the AU is providing support to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) through the recruitment of expert to assist in the development of transitional justice and human rights mechanisms for its Member States. This initiative helps to consolidate peace and security, while deepening the culture of respect for human rights and justice in the IGAD region.

242. The strategic approach by the Commission to increase Women and Youth participation in transitional justice is progressing steadily. Thus, the Commission implemented a series of programmes to empower youth across the continent with knowledge of transitional justice principles and practices, with a specific focus on the AUTJP. Over 300 youth-especially from post-conflict countries, participated. These efforts culminated in the establishment of the African Youth for Transitional Justice (AY4TJ) Platform, which includes opportunities for career mentorship, involvement in AU programs, and research.

243. More young Africans are now more engaged in transitional justice studies and practice, and some have founded youth-led continental groupings to coordinate efforts, such as the Youth Organization for Research and Justice Advocacy (YORJA). Another important initiative in the AUTJP Roadmap is the African Youth Fellowship on Transitional Justice. The fellowship is designed to deploy its members in transitional justice processes across Africa, putting their training to practical use.

244. Following the continental training on AUTJP, the AU Commission, through the PAPS Department, set up a task force for women, resulting in the formation of the African Women for Transitional Justice (AW4TJ) Platform.

245. **Support to IGAD Human Rights and Transitional Justice mechanism:** As part of strengthening the nexus between transitional justice and human rights in East Africa, the AU conducted consultations with IGAD Member States from 30 January to 1 February 2024, towards the development of an IGAD Human Rights and Transitional Justice mechanism. The key output of the consultations was IGAD decision to design an IGAD's Transitional Justice and Human Rights Protocol Mechanism. The AU is partnering with the UNOHCHR Regional Office for Eastern Africa on this project.

246. **Promoting AU-inspired processes on Transitional Justice:** The transformative power of education was re-emphasized at the 8th TJ Forum, held in Port Louis, Mauritius, from September 11–12, 2024, in alignment with the AU 2024 annual theme. The Forum recognized education as a critical tool for fostering a culture of peace, respect for human rights, justice, and resilience.

247. Acknowledging the profound trauma experienced by victims of human rights violations in post-conflict and post-authoritarian contexts in Africa, the Forum emphasized the urgent need to prioritize Mental Health and Psycho-Social Support (MHPSS) for affected individuals and communities. It also recommended that the deployment of MHPSS experts to post-conflict countries become a key AU priority moving forward.

248. **At the 4th AU-EU Seminar of Transitional Justice,** African and EU experts shared experiences, challenges, and best practices in transitional justice, and on integrating Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS). They stressed the need to focus on the transformative impact and objectives of transitional justice processes, rather than just the mechanisms involved. On the need for integration of mental health and psycho-social support in all aspects of transitional justice, interventions that are culturally relevant and incorporate existing community support systems, were indicated as crucial.

249. **The 30th Commemoration of 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda,** was marked in April 2024, in continued solidarity with the survivors, honour the victims of the genocide, while pledging commitment to fight hate speech, genocide ideology and discrimination on the continent. The Chairperson of the Commission took part in the solemn activities in Kigali, as one of the special guests of H.E. Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of Rwanda.

250. Member States renewed their collective commitment to protect and uphold fundamental human rights. On the eve of the 30th anniversary of the genocide against the Tutsis in Rwanda, the AUC Chairperson appointed the first-ever AU Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities H.E. Adama Dieng, from Senegal. The Envoy is saddled with the responsibility to among other things support the accelerated implementation of the AU's broader strategy to prevent genocide, mass atrocities, and related crimes across the continent.

251. The Special Envoy undertook a series of engagements covering the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, and South Sudan. The focus of the Special Envoy's consultations with various stakeholders, including political leaders, CSOs, internally displaced persons (IDPs), bordered on addressing human rights violations, combating impunity and hate speech, promoting inter-communal dialogue, and preventing violent and armed conflicts.

252. In addition, the engagements highlighted national and globally -recognized efforts in reconciliation and atrocity prevention. The Envoy explored lessons that could be shared to strengthen genocide and atrocity prevention mechanisms across Africa.

253. The Assembly may wish to commend Member States that have put in place the relevant legislative frameworks for the implementation of their transitional justice processes and encourage them to address the fundamental root causes of conflict, including through the promotion of the culture of peace, tolerance of diversity, the fight against hate speech, inclusivity, national unity, dialogue and reconciliation, in order to guarantee enduring peace and stability

(iii)AU-UN Human Rights Framework Implementation

254. Engagement with OHCHR took place during the first quarter to attend the 55th Session of the UN Human Rights Council during its High-Level Segment, which was chaired by the Kingdom of Morocco, as an African country and President of the Human Rights Council in Geneva. The AU Commission also attended the side event under the theme: "The right to Development" in February 2024. The mission enhanced the relationship between the AU and the UN Human Rights Council, strengthened the role of the Africa Group of Ambassadors in Geneva in promoting the rights to development and their impact on global human rights policies pertaining to Africa, and raised support for the effective implementation of the AU-UN Human Rights Framework.

255. Meeting with the UN Special Envoy for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism was held during the second quarter. A comprehensive discussion was held on common interests, including the role of regional and sub-regional organizations in countering terrorism and identifying shared challenges and opportunities within the mandate. Valuable insights were drawn that were used as input for the General Assembly Report and the Special Rapporteur's first report to the UN General Assembly in October 2024. It also strengthened collaboration and coordination mechanisms among various regional and sub-regional organizations to enhance their counter-terrorism initiatives. One of the recommendations communicated was the development of clear, actionable recommendations to improve the effectiveness of regional and sub-regional organizations in countering terrorism while ensuring the protection of human rights.

256. As part of the Commemoration of Human Rights Event, the 10th Global Conference on the Commemoration of the International Day to End Impunity of Crimes against Journalists (IDEI) was successfully held in November 2024 and brought together around 400 participants who recommitted to protecting and ensuring the safety of Journalists in Crisis and emergencies.

257. **The Assembly may wish to congratulate the Kingdom of Morocco, as an African country, for assuming the Presidency of the United Nations Human Rights Council, in Geneva.**

- **Human Rights Dialogues**

258. The 19th AU-EU Human Rights Dialogue was organized in January 2024 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia with the objective of promoting peace through the Right to Education, addressing topical human rights challenges, strengthening partnerships, and fostering dialogue and exchange. The Session was able to enhance understanding and cooperation between the AU and EU on key human rights issues, particularly the Right to Peace and Education. The meeting also recommended the development of joint initiatives, and strategies, and adopted action plans to implement and monitor shared human rights initiatives, norms, and standards in relation to the Rights to Peace and Education.

259. The AU-China Human Rights Dialogue was held on 22 April 2024, in Addis Ababa during the second quarter with the objective of exchanging best practices, experiences, and strategies for promoting and protecting human rights, with a focus on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ESCR). A joint Outcomes Statement adopted on 22 April 2024 has reaffirmed the AU and China's commitment to collaborate on agreed-upon strategy and programs for implementing and monitoring topical human rights discussions.

(iv)Public Sector Governance

260. The concept of good governance offers a normative framework for promoting effective, accountable, and inclusive governance practices. Good public sector governance serves as a guiding light in our efforts to prevent and manage conflicts. By strengthening institutions, enhancing transparency, and fostering civic engagement, we can build resilient societies capable of addressing grievances and resolving disputes through peaceful means. Decentralized governance provides an opportunity to empower local communities and enhance their capacity to manage conflicts at the grassroots level. By devolving decision-making authority and resources to subnational entities, decentralization promotes local ownership, participation, and accountability. Leveraging decentralized governance structures, we can foster dialogue, build social cohesion, and address the root causes of conflicts in a manner that is responsive to the unique needs and aspirations of diverse communities

- **Local Governance and Decentralisation**

261. The planning processes for the World Bank funded BIASHARA project took place in Morocco with World Bank representatives to promote public sector reforms in line with the decisions of the Specialised Technical Committee no 8 on Public Service, Local Government, Urban Development and Decentralization. The deliberations sought to ensure alignment in the implementation areas designed to promote good governance. The agreed areas of implementation include the organisation of the 5th Ordinary Session of the Specialised Technical Committee No. 8, the Bureau Meeting and the Conference of State Parties on the African Charter on the Values and

Principles of Public Service. The work plan for implementing decisions of the various sub-committees of the STC was thoroughly reviewed and refined.

- **Public Service and Decentralisation**

262. The Commission conducted a capacity building workshop on Governance and Decentralization in the Sahel, in Nouakchott in October 2024, which brought together participants from Burkina Faso, Mali, and Mauritania, alongside experts from regional institutions and development partners, to address critical governance challenges in the region. These challenges include misappropriation of public resources, weak anti-corruption mechanisms, insufficient public service delivery, inadequate resource transfers to local authorities, and political instability. Key recommendations for AU Member States included strengthening political will, accelerating digitalization of public services, enhancing resource transfers to local authorities, aligning anti-corruption strategies with sociological realities, and involving civil society and youth. For the African Union Commission (AUC), recommendations emphasized implementing the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, supporting asset recovery, developing capacity-building mechanisms, and promoting the African Charter on Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration and the African Charter on Values and Principles of Decentralization and Local Governance and Development. The workshop provided a collaborative platform to address structural governance issues and set a roadmap for improved decentralization and public service delivery in the Sahel.

- **Anti-Corruption Initiatives**

263. During the period under review, the Commission deepened engagement with the African Union Board on Anti-Corruption for renewed collaboration and joint initiatives especially on the domestication of the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, and the implementation of the Common African Position on Asset Recovery (CAPAR). The key outcomes from this engagement include agreement on collaborative anti-corruption initiatives, joint in-country assessment missions, integration of anti-corruption principles into public administration reporting guidelines, implementation of CAPAR strategies, development of CAPAR reporting guidelines, and strengthening institutional capacity within the AU Advisory Board Against Corruption (AUABC) and AUC. Additionally, tailored capacity-building programmes will be developed to support member states, and a joint work plan outlining collaboration area was developed.

264. Furthermore, the Commission participated in the ACWG meetings and contributed to the development of the G20 ACWG Action Plan 2025-2027, High-Level Principles on Incentives for the Private Sector to Adopt Integrity Measures, and a Ministerial Communique. There were comprehensive discussions on the impact of corruption on social inclusion, gender equality, climate change, financial markets, public procurement, public sector recruitment, and sustainable development, strengthening the overall framework for combating corruption globally. The G20 ACWG Action Plan 2025-2027 prioritizes strengthening anti-money laundering and beneficial ownership transparency measures, countering foreign bribery through enhanced enforcement and international cooperation, and improving asset recovery efforts with a focus on international legal assistance. It also emphasizes increasing

public sector transparency, integrity, and accountability to foster trust in government and support sustainable development goals, particularly in public procurement. Additionally, the plan promotes collaboration with the private sector, including SMEs, to implement anti-corruption measures and build a culture of integrity, leveraging past G20 principles and incentives

- **Establishment of Forum of African Asset Recovery Practitioners**

265. In collaboration with the African Union Advisory Board Against Corruption, and the GIZ Global Programme on Illicit Financial Flows, discussions were held on the establishment of an Asset Recovery Practitioners' Forum for Africa and the implementation of the Common African Position on Asset Recovery (CAPAR) and combat Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) in May 2024, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The primary objective was to review the proposed framework for the Forum, including its mission, objectives, structure, governance, resource mobilization, and sustainability, and to sensitize stakeholders on the CAPAR's content and the Forum's role in its implementation. The key outcomes from this forum were the adoption of CAPAR as a policy instrument to guide asset recovery, repatriation, and management, enhancing efforts against illicit financial flows in Africa.

266. Recommendations emanating from the forum include, utilizing escrow accounts with the African Development Banks for asset tracing, leveraging global platforms for advocacy, preparing for the next COSP, registering as observers to advocate for inclusive strategies, mobilizing resources for CAPAR, and raising awareness on African Anti-Corruption Day. Additionally, the forum emphasized including institutions mandated with asset recovery, securing commitment from Member States and development partners for sustainability, ratifying the African Asset Recovery Practitioners Forum Charter, and electing an Interim Executive Council to ensure effective initiation of the Forum.

267. **The Assembly may wish to encourage Member States to ratify the African Charter on the Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration, and the African Charter on the Values and Principles of Local Governance and Local Development, in order to promote effective service delivery and enhance efforts towards combatting corruption.**

(v) **Defense and Security Governance**

268. Defense and Security governance encompasses the structures, processes, and mechanisms through which Member States manage and oversee their security institutions, including the military, police, intelligence agencies, and other relevant bodies. It is a critical component of overall governance, as the security sector plays a fundamental role in ensuring the safety, stability, and well-being of societies. Effective security sector governance is essential for upholding the rule of law, protecting human rights, and promoting peace and security within and across borders.

- **Security Sector Reform**

269. In the Gambia and Lesotho, the AUC, jointly with the Geneva Centre for Security Governance (DCAF), and in close collaboration with the respective AU

Member States, provided training and research support to strengthen national SSR competences during the period under review. The main objective of this project is to support AU Member States in identifying their needs for strategic SSR capacities and to increase AU Member States' national ownership of SSR processes. The AU Member States are supported to undertake self-assessments to identify their strategic needs in developing national SSR process capacity and competence, as well as to look at past experiences of expert support. This will result in action plans to help Member States to develop the needed capacities and competences. The action plans will be used for strategic prioritization as well as resource mobilization.

270. Furthermore, the AUC, jointly with African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum (APCOF) and UNOAU provided support in the area of developing AU SSR Operational Guidance Notes (OGNs) related to oversight & accountability and mediation to support AU Member States in enhancing the implementation of national SSR processes. The Commission organized a Member States Meeting to discuss and validate the OGNs, which was attended by representatives from CAR, DRC, Ethiopia, Gambia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, and South Sudan; and ECOWAS. These OGNs will contribute to guide the establishment of oversight mechanisms to enhance democratic control and oversight in the security sector. In addition, they provide insights related to challenges in the deficit of appropriate political foundations to negotiate and implement peace agreements, due to unresolved security-related disputes. These tools are essential for conflict prevention and promoting sustainable peace and security.

271. In Mali the AUC, through MISAHHEL, provided technical and institutional support in the area of SSR and Monitoring & Evaluation to build national capacity, in line with AU Guidelines on SSR and M&E. In partnership with the UN office to the African Union and Africa Security Sector Network (ASSN), deployed technical experts to collaborate with national experts, in organizing a workshop to build the capacity of Mali national officials in Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) of SSR processes. The main objective of the workshop was to train appointed national SSR team members to help build national expertise required to conceptualize, institutionalize, and implement the M&E of SSR processes, within the framework of the implementation of the Mali National SSR strategy 2022-2024 adopted by the transitional Government.

272. In the Gambia, the AUC, in close collaboration with the Gambia Office of National Security (ONS), provided technical and institutional support for an SSR review and an establishment of a Monitoring and Evaluation Framework as part of the ongoing SSR national process (Nov 2024), and in line with AU Operational Guidance note on M&E. The AUC is supporting in a comprehensive assessment of the Gambia's SSR Strategy implementation process to evaluate the progress made and to assess how it aligns with the Gambia's national security priorities and democratic principles. This review will provide a crucial opportunity to assess The Gambia's progress in implementing SSR and identify areas for further improvement.

- **Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration**

273. Effective DDR is a crucial element of stabilization and recovery interventions, and DDR processes are often amongst the fundamental preconditions for stability. However, inadequately conceptualized and delivered DDR programmes may undermine stabilization efforts and even in some instances be a cause of further

conflict and insecurity. Member States undergoing DDR processes across the continent are facing various challenges, including very difficult political and security contexts where there has not been a definitive end to conflict; complex cross-border dynamics associated with transnational crime; weapons movements and people trafficking; proliferation of non-state armed and terrorist groups, and violent extremism conducive to terrorism. Therefore, to understand the approach to the dynamics of armed and terrorist groups in the Sahel, the AU Commission and the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), jointly with partners such as the United Nations Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO) and the Bonn International Center for Conflict Studies (BICC), and with funding from the German Federal Foreign Office, launched a research initiative on “Approaches to Dealing with Armed Groups in the Sahel” (2023-2024). In this regard, it should also be noted that, since 2023, the MONUSCO support programme and IOM, UNDP, UN Habitat, FAO, UNESCO, and other partners provided technical and financial support to the DDR and community recovery programmes in the DRC. Through socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants in Ituri, Beni, Tanganyika, Walungu, Uvira and Fizi.

274. The Commission’s support to Ethiopia’s DDR process has been implemented within the framework of the Lasting Peace through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA). This series of support included but not limited to, convening of high-level and technical consultations, deployment of technical experts and site visit support required to launch a comprehensive DDR process. This set of interventions contributes to the implementation of the COHA and DDR. Supporting the implementation of the COHA in Ethiopia holds the potential to significantly contribute to lasting peace, political stability, and socio-economic development in the conflict-affected regions. This stability can foster greater confidence among communities, encourage the return of displaced populations and facilitate development projects.

275. Within the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), the AU Commission deployed an Expert to South Sudan, to provide technical and institutional support in the area of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Transformation. The technical assistance provided included, developing SSR Coordination Framework and relevant Security Sector Transformation (SST)/DDR guidelines in close coordination with Strategic Defence and Security Review Board (SDSRB). Furthermore, through the capacity-building support provided by the AU SSR/DDR consultant, the national SDSRB has now clarity in conceptualizing required documents within the implementation of the peace agreement. The SDSRB intends to develop required SST frameworks based on a holistic approach and submit them for approval by the Council of Ministers and the Transitional National Legislative Assembly

276. **The Assembly may wish to encourage the development of a continental strategy to address the issue of non-state armed and terrorist groups in Africa. The Assembly may also wish to request the AU Commission, UN and other partners to continue to provide necessary support to Member States in their national DDR programmes.**

- **Mine Action**

277. Concerning mine action, the Commission organized a joint AU-ICRC Roundtable on Mine Action in Africa for contaminated AU Member States that are parties to the Mine Ban Convention. The roundtable enabled State parties to share their experiences, challenges, and priorities. Partners, including the ICRC Japan Delegation, presented the innovative drone-based technology developed through collaboration with Waseda University (Japan), which is intended to improve landmine and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) detection through remote sensing system integrated with a thermal sensing camera and using Artificial Intelligence (AI). South-South cooperation was stressed, and Algeria reiterated its offer to provide support to AU member states in their mine action programmes. Moving forward, three State parties — Eritrea, Nigeria, and Senegal — expressed interest in the ICRC's innovative drone-based technology for detecting landmines. The AUC and ICRC agreed to follow up on this interest and assist the said State parties in testing the new technology.

278. The AU Commission undertook missions to Guinea Bissau and Zimbabwe in November 2024 to assess the current demining efforts in the two Member States. It is noted that the Member States signalled their commitment to meeting their mine clearance obligations and have put in place institutional frameworks to coordinate national mine action efforts. However, the main challenge remains inadequate resources to procure demining equipment.

279. The Assembly may wish to commend Member States for their demining efforts and urge the Commission to explore modalities for establishing a Centre of Excellence to provide technical support and mobilize funding to support contaminated Member States in their mine action efforts, taking into account the moratorium on the creation of new AU Organs.

- Small Arms and Lights Weapons

280. The AUC participated in the Fourth Review Conference (RevCon4) of the UN Programme of Action (PoA) on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI). During the meeting, AU Member States were mobilized to refer to the CAP during RevCon4. The outcome document of RevCon4 was adopted by consensus. However, Member States need support in areas like reporting and resource mobilization, among others. The outcome document of RevCon4 was adopted by consensus and in addition to the General Declaration, it covered:

- Action-oriented measures for effective implementation of the UNPoA for the period 2024–2030;
- Action-oriented measures for effective implementation of the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace illicit SALW in a Timely and Reliable Manner;
- Action-oriented steps to address developments in small arms and light weapons manufacturing, establishment of a government's expert group on new technologies in small arms manufacturing within the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), 2024–2030.

281. The Regional conference on landmines, on improvised anti-personnel mines in West Africa and the Sahel region, held in Accra, sought to address the humanitarian

impact of improvised anti-personnel mines in west Africa and the Sahel regions. Key outcomes from the discussions included: prioritizing increased resource mobilization and partnerships to effectively implement the Mine Ban Convention and counter Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IEDs) strategies; urging the African Union to actively engage in resource mobilization to provide humanitarian aid for victims of Improvised Anti-Personnel Mines and tackling the growing issue of IED contamination; calling upon States parties to raise pertinent issues for debate at the upcoming Fifth Review Conference of the Mine Ban Convention in Siem Reap, Cambodia, and considering revisions to the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons to better address current threats, including IEDs, among other challenges.

282. The Commission concluded the study “Nexus Between Illicit Proliferation and Circulation of Small Arms and Light Weapons and Terrorism in Africa” as requested by the Specialised Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS) at its 12th meeting, held in Cairo, Egypt, on 19 December 2019. The study report concludes that there is a strong link between illicit arms flows and terrorism by showing direct correlation between regions with high illicit arms flows and regions hard hit by terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism.

283. The Assembly may wish to instruct the Commission, to work with the RECs/RMs, and in collaboration with UN and relevant international partners, to scale up support for Member States to fight the illicit proliferation, trafficking, circulation of SALW as a strategy to deny terrorists and criminals tools of violence.

- Cyber Security and Diplomacy

284. A Workshop on Cyber Diplomacy was organized in Addis Ababa to raise awareness of existing cyber threats and adopting key priorities for cyber security with a focus on cyber diplomacy within the diplomatic community in Addis Ababa. This included discussions on the nature and extent of the cyber threats and underscored the need for an African Framework for Peace & Security in Cyberspace to guide Member States in developing and enhancing their cyber resilience. As outcomes, a blueprint of key areas for Cyber Diplomacy in Africa were adopted, including: the development of the continent’s digital capacity in line with the AU’s Digital Transformation Strategy; and agreement to articulate common positions on critical issues like cybersecurity, data privacy, and the governance of emerging technologies.

- Maritime Security

285. Security in the maritime domain continues to be of concern to the continent, facilitating the trafficking of drugs and arms and negatively impacting international trade. To help reverse this trend, the Commission has developed a joint strategy and an action plan in partnership with the Gulf of Guinea Commission and the Indian Ocean Commission. The action plan seeks to strengthen cooperation among Member States in enhancing maritime security through building the capacities of the relevant national agencies.

286. The Assembly may wish to call for enhanced efforts to strengthen continental initiatives on maritime security.

(vi)DAGA/APSA Synergy

- Statutory Technical and Political meetings of the African Governance Platform

287. The Statutory Technical and Political meetings of the AGA-APSA Platform were held in February and July 2024 ahead of the Heads of State and Government Summit in Addis Ababa. The new Chairperson and Vice Chairperson of the AGA-APSA Platform were elected. The meeting also adopted the 2024 AGA-APSA flagship initiatives and the roadmap for the harmonization of state reporting mechanisms/processes for instruments focusing on Human rights, Democracy and Governance which is intended to reduce the reporting burden on Member States.

288. The e-AGA-APSA Platform, through the Secretariat, also held several discussions to identify priority areas for the platform including of PAPS, RECs/RMs and Organs. The priority areas were presented at the Second Statutory Meeting of the AGA-APSA Platform held in Accra, Ghana prior to the 6th Mid-Year Coordination Meeting (MYCM).

289. An Extraordinary meeting of the AGA-APSA Platform was also held in November 2024. The discussions focused on the report back of flagship initiatives, validation of important documents like the Citizens Engagement Strategy of the AGA-APSA, Validation of the feasibility study and the Compendium of the High-Level Dialogue (HLD) discussions of the past 12 years among other issues. Key outcomes of the discussion included the adoption of the CES strategy for AGA-APSA platform, a decision for the AUC to be more inclusive in the negotiations of the new AGA-APSA project.

- Harmonisation of Reporting mechanisms Feasibility Study

290. The Harmonization of State reporting mechanisms/processes initiative, which is an AGA-APSA platform flagship initiative, successfully worked on a feasibility study to identify practical options on how to make harmonization a reality for instruments on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance (HRDG).

- The PRC Sub-Committee on Human Rights Democracy and Governance

291. The Sub-Committee on HRDG, chaired by the Republic of South Sudan, proceeded with the implementation of the adopted 2024 Work Plan. As part of bridging the information gap between AU Organs, RECs/RMs, a Stakeholders Seminar on the ACDEG and AU Shared Values and Instruments was held on 13-14 June 2024 in Bujumbura, Burundi. The Stakeholder seminar deepened the understanding of these important instruments for our Member States. The Stakeholders Seminar and subsequent organization of a Recognition ceremony hosted by the Chairperson of the Sub-Committee for the two State Reports received under the ACDEG, reflected strong commitments from Members of the Sub-Committee to promote the ratification, domestication and implementation of ACDEG and other relevant AU instruments.

- **Promotion of the AU Shared Values Instruments**

292. Stakeholders engagement on AU Shared Values Instruments with emphasis on ACDEG was organized during the second quarter. The seminar assessed the status of ratification, signature, domestication, and implementation of ACDEG and other AU shared values instruments. As a result, efforts to encourage MS on the ratification as well as implementation was initiated, and renewed commitments were made by the PRC Sub-committee to address the governance challenges by promoting the implementation of ACDEG and other AU shared value instruments. The key outcomes of the Stakeholder Seminar were a strong commitment and pledge from Member States of the PRC Sub Committee on HRDG to ratify, domesticate, implement, and report on the ACDEG. Among many, the republic of Burundi and the Republic of The Gambia have expressed their commitment towards ratification and state reporting process.

- **Compendium on High Level Dialogues**

293. The AGA-APSA Platform Flagship initiative, the High-Level Dialogue (HLD) and its pre-events on Gender and youth had been implemented for the past 12 years on an annual basis. Following a decision of the HLD to be a biennial event instead of an annual one, the Secretariat was tasked to embark on the process of compiling the outcomes and report of the past dialogues. The compendium is intended to not only compile but provide an analysis of the status of implementation of the outcomes of the discussions. During this reporting period, a resource person has been tasked to compile this compendium.

294. **The Assembly may wish to commend the PRC Sub-Committee on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance for its work and encourage the Sub-Committee to enhance efforts towards the promotion of democracy, accountability, good governance, rule of law and human rights.**

D. CROSS-CUTTING THEMATIC ISSUES

(i) Mediation and Dialogue Initiatives

- **The Panel of the Wise and Subsidiary Mechanisms**

295. In 2024, the Panel of the Wise advanced its mandate of preventive diplomacy, mediation, and advisory support, engaging deeply in conflict resolution, governance transitions, and peacebuilding initiatives. The Panel's activities, undertaken in accordance with the 2002 Protocol for the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), emphasized its critical role in fostering peace and stability across Africa.

296. Comprising Hon. Justice (Rtd) Effie Owuor (Eastern Africa), H.E. Domitien Ndayizeye (Central Africa), H.E. Amre Moussa (Northern Africa), H.E. Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka (Southern Africa), and Professor Babacar Kante (Western Africa), the current 5th Panel of the Wise has concluded its tenure with significant contributions to Africa's peace and security framework. The Panel's engagements reflected its

commitment to addressing complex challenges in political transitions, electoral processes, and natural resource governance.

- **Supporting Political Transitions**

297. On 26 April, 2024, the Panel held consultations in Addis Ababa, with representatives of Member States undergoing political transitions. This platform served to assess governance reforms, security challenges, and humanitarian concerns in the countries going through political transition. Notably, issues raised include: delays in electoral timelines, the imperative of security sector reforms, and the impact of sanctions and arms embargoes. This engagement reaffirmed the Panel's pivotal role in guiding the AU in supporting Member States through fragile and protracted transitions.

- **Strengthening Peace in South Sudan**

298. The Panel has actively been seized of the South Sudan situation. In July 2024, the Panel of the Wise organized a High-Level Reflection Roundtable in Addis Ababa, as part of fostering trust and confidence-building measures critical for the implementation of the R-ARCSS. With only 10% of the Agreement implemented, the meeting aimed to provide the Panel with an informed strategy to address the challenges impeding progress. The roundtable attracted South Sudanese experts, representatives from the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), IGAD, and other envoys, to explore mechanisms for addressing persistent trust deficits among stakeholders.

299. The Panel underscored the importance of aligning peace initiatives, particularly the Tumaini Initiative, with the R-ARCSS framework to ensure a unified approach to South Sudan's governance and peacebuilding transition.

300. To strengthen regional support, the Panel undertook shuttle diplomacy missions to Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and South Africa, engaging key leaders and stakeholders to advance the South Sudan peace process. In Ethiopia, the Panel met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs to discuss regional cooperation and the broader implications of South Sudan's transitional challenges. In Uganda, the Panel held discussions with H.E. Yoweri Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda, focusing on consolidating Uganda's role as a key partner in supporting South Sudan's stability. In South Africa, the Panel engaged with the Deputy President, who also serves as the Special Envoy of the President for South Sudan, to explore ways to align regional and international efforts to support the peace process.

301. In Kenya, the Panel was received in the audience by H.E. William Ruto, President of the Republic of Kenya and Principal Mediator of the Tumaini Initiative. The Panel also convened with Tumaini Consensus mediators, non-signatory groups, the South Sudanese government delegation, and representatives from civil society organizations. These engagements were instrumental in fostering inclusivity and promoting cooperation among all parties involved in South Sudan's transition.

302. The Panel of the Wise emphasized the critical need for the Tumaini Initiative to complement the R-ARCSS, which has served as the foundation for peace and stability

in the country over the past six years. By aligning efforts, the Panel underscored the importance of creating a unified and coherent approach to South Sudan's governance and peacebuilding agenda.

303. In November 2024, the Panel conducted a field mission to Juba to evaluate the implementation of the R-ARCSS and assess South Sudan's readiness for the 2026 elections. Key findings included slow progress on constitutional reforms, inadequate technical and financial resources for electoral preparations, and gaps in voter registration and civic education. Additionally, the mission highlighted the need for inclusivity, particularly the participation of women, youth, and marginalized communities in governance and electoral processes.

304. It was underscored that the necessity of sustained international and regional support would ensure the successful implementation of R-ARCSS as it remains the cornerstone for South Sudan's stability and governance transition.

- **Electoral Observations and Governance Initiatives**

305. The Panel of the Wise played a pivotal role in supporting credible electoral processes and addressing governance challenges in key Member States during 2024. These efforts underscored the Panel's critical role in promoting democratic integrity, preventing electoral violence, and fostering inclusive governance as essential components of peace and stability across the continent. Specifically, the Panel of the Wise engaged in the elections in Comoros (January 2024), Senegal (February 2024), and Ghana (October and December 2024). In these elections, the Panel of the Wise led efforts to mitigate electoral tensions, engaging key stakeholders to address concerns over potential irregularities and promote transparency.

- **Fostering Synergies**

306. The Pan-African Network of the Wise (PanWise), which encompasses the AU Panel of the Wise and similar mechanisms at the RECs/RMs, presented a critical platform for the Panel's engagements in 2024. In collaboration with the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Panel of the Wise convened the First Joint Retreat of the ECCAS Committee of Elders from 25–26 November 2024, in Brazzaville, Republic of Congo. This retreat focused on cross-border challenges and the complex regional dynamics in Central Africa, thereby serving as a vital step in strengthening cooperation between the AU and ECCAS to enhance peace and security in the region.

307. The Assembly may wish to highly commend the esteemed Members of the AU Panel of the Wise for their immense contributions to political stabilization initiatives in Member States currently undergoing political transitions and to direct the Panel to sustain the lines of communication, fostering trust and confidence between these countries, the African Union, and RECs/RMs to ensure cohesive and coordinated support during complex transitions.

308. The Assembly may wish to request the Panel to strengthen and expand its collaboration with Regional bodies of similar mandate, inclusive of the ECCAS Committee of Elders, the SADC Panel of Elders, the ECOWAS Council

of the Wise, and the COMESA Committee of Elders, through the PanWise Network, and other recognized like-minded groupings including the Forum of Former African Heads of State and Government (Africa Forum) and the West African Elders Forum (WAEF), to jointly develop cohesive strategies and initiatives aimed at effectively addressing common challenges and advancing peace, security, and sustainable governance across the continent.

309. The Assembly may wish to reaffirm the Panel's advisory capacity to PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission, emphasizing its integral function in conflict prevention, management, and resolution. The Assembly may wish to direct the AU Commission to develop and implement streamlined standard operating procedures for the swift deployment of the Panel of the Wise and other High Representatives and Special Envoys to areas experiencing crises.

310. The Assembly may acknowledge the exemplary leadership and dedication of the Chairperson of the Panel of the Wise, Hon. Justice Effie Owuor, of the Republic of Kenya during her tenure. Additionally, the Assembly may wish to recognize the contributions of the entire 5th Panel of the Wise, whose tenure has concluded, and look forward to the 6th Panel to ensure the continuity of the Panel's important work.

- **FemWise-Africa**

311. The Network of African Women in Conflict Prevention and Mediation (FemWise-Africa) continued to advance the implementation of its decentralization process toward strengthening the meaningful role of women in preventive diplomacy, mediation, and dialogue at national, regional, and continental levels.

312. At the national level, FemWise-Africa established the South Sudan national chapter, its fourth after Uganda, Malawi, and Ethiopia, while at the regional level, the establishment of the Southern Africa Regional Women Mediators Network by SADC marked the third regional network after ECOWAS and ECCAS.

313. At the continental level, FemWise-Africa commenced the preparations for the 2nd Cohort of members of the Network, who will begin their mandate in 2025, and be expected to advance the AU's gender mainstreaming efforts in its mediation processes. Furthermore, in collaboration with the Gender Peace and Security Program and the Office of the Special Envoy on Women, Peace, and Security, the Network welcomed the directive of the PSC to develop a policy framework to guarantee gender equity and equality in all AU-led mediation and peace processes. Concurrently, FemWise-Africa continued to systematically deploy women mediators and peacebuilders to all AU Election Observation and Preventive Diplomacy missions and further promoted peace dialogue platforms for women in countries affected by conflict, including Sudan.

314. Globally, through its role as the Secretariat of the Global Alliance of Women Mediator Networks, FemWise-Africa led high-level discourse and advocacy amongst member states and policymakers on the need to strengthen the role of women mediator networks and their contributions to more inclusive peace processes. These multi-track efforts, collectively, aim to strengthen mechanisms and policies aimed at

advancing women's strategic contributions to peacebuilding, peacemaking, and mediation efforts at all levels.

315. The Assembly may wish to welcome the progress made in the decentralization process for the FemWise-Africa Network and encourage Member States and RECs/RMs to accelerate their efforts to establish national and regional chapters to strengthen the meaningful role of women in preventive diplomacy, mediation, and peace processes at all levels. The Assembly may wish to encourage Member States, RECs/RMs, and the Commission to allocate sufficient resources for the deployment of women mediators and peacebuilders to bridge the gap between early warning and early response, by engaging in peace efforts at grassroots, national, regional and continental levels.

- WiseYouth Network

316. The PAPS Department finalized the selection of the 1st Cohort of members for the Network of African Youth in Conflict Prevention and Mediation (WiseYouth Network), who will serve for a three (3) year mandate. This is in line with the Assembly's Decision to fully operationalize the WiseYouth Network as a subsidiary mechanism of the Panel of the Wise, with the objective of promoting a focused and strategic engagement of youth in preventive diplomacy, mediation, and dialogue across the continent.

317. Since its full formation, WiseYouth members have carried out a number of preventive diplomacy engagements, including with youth to discuss pertinent issues of peace and security in line with contextual relevance, and further amplify their role in shaping youth-inclusive peace efforts for sustainable impact.

318. The Assembly may wish to welcome the selection of the 20-member first Cohort of the WiseYouth Network and commend the Commission for mainstreaming youth in preventive diplomacy and mediation in the continent. The Assembly may further wish to call upon Member States and RECs/RMs to promote the utilization of the WiseYouth Network in conflict prevention and resolution at national, regional, and continental levels, toward enhancing youth sensitive-and-inclusive peace processes.

(ii) Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and Violent Extremism

- Terrorism Threat in Africa

319. The 3,130 attacks recorded by November 2024, resulted in 12,753 deaths, including 6,586 civilians and 3,545 military/security personnel. Over 2622 terrorists were killed. Terrorist tactics included Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) in 68.4% of attacks, IEDs (22.6%), kidnappings (5.2%), and mixed-method approaches (3.8%). Most affected countries included Somalia, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali, and Cameroon, with terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab, Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), Boko Haram, ADF- MTN and the Islamic State affiliates in various regions. The geographic spread of terrorism, weak governance, and exploitation of natural resources have contributed to the sophistication and adaptability of these groups.

- **Projections and Outlook**

320. If current trends persist, terrorist activities will escalate further. In the Sahel and West Africa, political instability may result in a 10-15% increase in attacks, while Boko Haram and ISWAP activities in the Lake Chad Basin are projected to rise by 5-10%. Al-Shabaab is expected to sustain operations in East Africa, with cross-border incursions in Coastal West Africa anticipated to increase terrorist activities by 15-20%. Addressing these challenges requires urgent, coordinated actions targeting root causes and operational mechanisms.

- **Evolving Threat Landscape**

321. Technological advancements have amplified the complexity of counter-terrorism efforts. Terrorist organizations increasingly use the Internet for recruitment, propaganda, and financing. The growing reliance on weaponized drones and IEDs highlights their technical sophistication. Weak border security has facilitated the spread of terrorism into previously unaffected regions, emphasizing the need for robust border management.

322. The Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, in partnership with the United Nations Office for Counter-terrorism (UNOCT), organized from 22 to 23 April 2024, in Abuja, Nigeria a High-Level counterterrorism meeting on “Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Institutions to address the Evolving Threat of Terrorism in Africa”. The High-Level meeting was intended to enhance multilateral counterterrorism cooperation, and reshape the international community’s collective response to terrorism in Africa, while emphasizing the importance of Africa-led and Africa-owned solutions. It allowed AU Member States and partners to reflect on the challenges and share best practices and lessons learned in addressing terrorism-related concerns, strengthening synergies in regional and sub-regional counterterrorism endeavors, and building the capacities of AU Member States affected by terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism

323. Despite ongoing efforts, significant challenges persist. The reliance on technology by terrorist groups outpaces many nations' ability to respond effectively. Inadequate coordination among African Union Member States undermines collective counter-terrorism actions. Limited financial resources and capacity-building initiatives further constrain efforts to address the evolving threats. Finally, the humanitarian crises arising from displacement, food insecurity, and human rights violations demand greater attention and sustained international support.

324. The African Union Counter-Terrorism Centre (AUCTC) continues to face specific challenges, including:

- **Resource Constraints:** Limited financial and human resources hinder the Centre's ability to fully implement its initiatives across the continent.
- **Coordination Gaps:** Effective collaboration with Member States and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) remains inconsistent, affecting the collective counter-terrorism response.

- **Bureaucratic Delays:** Prolonged internal processes slow down the operationalization of strategic initiatives.
- **Evolving Threat Dynamics:** Rapid advancements in technology used by terrorist groups outpace the Centre's current capabilities.
- **Humanitarian and Social Impacts:** Addressing the complex socio-economic factors, driving radicalization requires more comprehensive and sustained interventions.
- **Update on the Continental Strategic Plan of Action**

325. In fulfilling the decision of the AU May 2022 Extraordinary Assembly Malabo Declaration on Terrorism and UCG, the draft Continental Strategic Plan of Action has been finalized by the AUCTC and is currently being validated by RECs/RMs for updates and feedback. This strategic plan aims to align counter-terrorism efforts across the continent with a unified framework, ensuring coherence and effectiveness in addressing terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism.

326. Additionally, the draft mandate, statute, and structure of the AUCTC have been updated and now set to undergo the internal approval process. These documents will provide the legal and operational basis for the Centre's activities, ensuring greater clarity and authority in its counter-terrorism efforts.

- **AUCTC's Activities in 2024**

327. The Centre implemented diverse initiatives to enhance counter-terrorism capacity in Member States. These included:

- **National Counter-Terrorism Capacity Assessments:** Conducted in the Republic of Congo, evaluating legal and operational frameworks and border security practices.
- **Capacity Building Programs** that addressed preventing radicalization, countering violent extremism, and improving responses to terrorism.
- **Collaboration with International Organizations:** Partnered with NATO, ICRC, and others to address specific challenges such as humanitarian law, child protection, and counter-terrorism financing.
- **Technical Assistance Missions:** Supported regional organizations like SADC and EASF in developing counter-terrorism strategies, training curricula, and operational procedures.
- **Thematically focused engagements:** Focused on human rights, prison security, and the use of drones and IEDs in counter-terrorism operations.

328. To counter escalating threats, the following actions are recommended:

- **Strengthen Regional Cooperation:** Enhance intelligence-sharing, cross-border coordination, and border management to address terrorism's transnational nature;
- **Leverage Technology:** Invest in cybersecurity and detection technologies to counter online recruitment and weaponized drones;
- **Invest in Counter-Terrorism Capacities:** Equip and train security forces with modern technologies and region-specific strategies;

- **Promote Whole-of-Society Approaches:** Address root causes through socio-economic initiatives and deradicalization programs;
- **Enhance Humanitarian Responses:** Mobilize resources to address displacement and food insecurity, strengthening regional frameworks for IDP and refugee management;
- **Develop Comprehensive Strategies:** Align national counter-terrorism plans with regional frameworks, incorporating legal, operational, and preventative measures;
- **Foster International Partnerships:** Deepen collaboration with global organizations to enhance technical support, resource mobilization, and training.

329. **The Assembly may wish to encourage AU Member States to adopt a unified approach in prioritizing regional cooperation, technological innovation, and humanitarian considerations to safeguard peace, security, and development across the continent. The Assembly may also wish to endorse the Declaration of the High-Level African Counterterrorism meeting, held from 22 to 23 April 2024, in Abuja, Nigeria under the theme; “Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Institution Building to Address the Evolving Threat of Terrorism in Africa” and welcome the decision to upgrade the Nigerian National Counterterrorism Centre in Abuja, to a Regional Counterterrorism Centre.**

(iii) Women, Peace and Security

330. The AU Commission has made notable progress in advancing the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda by integrating gender considerations into its peace and security framework. Through a comprehensive approach based on the four pillars of prevention, protection, participation, and recovery and relief, the Commission has ensured that these principles are embedded in conflict management and peacebuilding efforts across the continent. This approach is tailored to the specific needs and realities of countries affected by armed conflict or those transitioning from conflict.

331. By taking into account the unique contexts of these Member States, the Commission has worked to ensure that gender equality is not only a theoretical goal but a practical one that is effectively implemented through policy, programming, and strategic interventions.

332. Following the Conclusions of the Swakopmund High-Level Seminar, which requested for the development of a gender parity policy to be applied to all AU-led and co-led mediation efforts, the AU Commission is in the process of developing the policy which would aim to ensure equal representation and participation of women in peace negotiations, mediation processes, and other critical peacebuilding activities by institutionalizing the Swakopmund Process as a biennial event, the PSC has created an important platform for engaging local, national and continental actors fostering dialogue and collaboration on women, peace and security issues, thus, taking a significant step toward making women, peace and security an integral part of the AU peace and security agenda.

333. In collaboration with relevant AU bodies including the Office of the Special Envoy on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS), the PAPS Department supported, in

2024, the implementation of the WPS agenda in a number of African countries, whose list is provided in the PAPS report².

334. The primary focus was on implementing National Action Plans (NAPs) on UNSCR 1325, boosting women's participation in elections, peace dialogues, and governance, promoting gender parity, and activating the Maputo Protocol domestication. Key efforts include fostering women's roles in constitution-making, enhancing democratic governance, and social cohesion, and aiming for a more inclusive and peaceful Africa.

335. In line with the PSC Decision [PSC/HoGSG/COMM.1140 (2023)] at the level of Heads of State and Government, the revitalization of the Peace and Security Cooperation Framework (PSCF) in eastern DRC, held on 17 February 2023, was prioritized through the action plan of the Technical Support Committee (TSC), with a clear emphasis on reinforcing the role of CSOs, particularly women and youth, in monitoring and ensuring the effective implementation of the PSC Framework.

336. In this context, the AU Commission, from 4 to 5 December 2024 in Addis Ababa at the Headquarters of the African Union Commission, convened the Civil Society Dialogue Forum which focused on the revitalization of the PSC Framework, engaging in particular, with women's and youth networks to propose initiatives aimed at enhancing the framework's impact on the stabilization and development of the region. This dialogue acknowledged the persistent challenges posed by the unequal participation of marginalized groups in peace and security processes. The active engagement of women is particularly crucial, as their involvement, leadership, and perspectives are essential to shaping a more holistic and resilient approach to peacebuilding in the Great Lakes region.

337. As part of efforts to integrate gender dimension in early warning and conflict prevention efforts, the Commission, in collaboration with the RECs/RMs developed a guidance note in order to strengthen conflict prevention by ensuring gender-sensitive data is collected, analyzed, and acted upon. This approach recognizes that conflict impacts men, women, boys, and girls differently, and by incorporating gender perspectives, early warning systems can more effectively anticipate and address risks.

338. The ultimate goal is to build more resilient, inclusive conflict prevention mechanisms, promoting peace and security across the continent. In this regard, the Commission supported an orientation exercise in December 2024 for women affected by Boko Haram's terrorist activities in northeast Nigeria under the auspices of Abuja-based African First Ladies Peace Mission (AFLPM).

339. The Assembly may wish to commend the Commission for its continued and steady efforts to mainstream the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda across the continent. The Assembly may wish to encourage AU Member States that have not yet done so, to adopt National Action Plans (NAPs) for the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325. Furthermore, the Assembly may wish to also encourage Member States to consider allocating

² [PAPS Engagement Mission on Women Peace and Security Agenda](#)

sufficient and context-specific budgetary resources to ensure the effective and sustainable implementation of the WPS Agenda at the national level.

(iv) Protection of Children in Conflict Situations Programme

340. In 2024, Children in Africa continued to face severe challenges in conflict situations, where their fundamental rights are often violated. These turbulent environments often resulted in the violations of fundamental rights, disrupting access to essential services such as education and healthcare.

341. Tragically, children are killed, maimed, and frequently recruited into armed forces and forcibly enrolled by armed and terrorist groups. Many find themselves separated from their families, schools, leading to displacement and a precarious existence. This dire situation underscores the urgent need for comprehensive protection measures to safeguard the rights and well-being of children in conflict zones.

342. In its efforts to protect children in conflict situations, the Commission ensured the integration of child protection-sensitive indicators into the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), which enhances its ability to prevent violations of children's rights. By developing and incorporating child-sensitive indicators and keywords, CEWS has started producing thematic reports that include essential segments on child protection; recognizing the impact of terrorism on children, a study was commissioned by the Peace and Security Council to examine this issue, proposing strategies to integrate child protection into counterterrorism frameworks. The Commission also focused on the dissemination of the Policy on Child Protection in AU Peace Support Operations through establishing a Training of Trainers programme for RECs/RMs, Centers of Excellence, CSOs, and Experts that enhances understanding of child protection within AU PSOs. This effort ensures that child rights and welfare are systematically integrated into conflict management and peacebuilding processes.

343. Moreover, the Commission supported an advocacy mission to Nigeria conducted by the Africa Platform on Children Affected by Armed Conflicts (AP-CAAC), which engaged stakeholders to strengthen child rights protection and facilitate the implementation of the Safe Schools Declaration. The mission identified and engaged with the Government and other stakeholders on further actions necessary to prioritize children's needs in decision-making and enhance cross-border cooperation.

344. In light of this, the Assembly may wish to commend the progress made and encourage accelerating the integration of child protection into all AU early warning and response systems to ensure comprehensive coverage across Member States. The Assembly may wish to condemn in strongest terms possible the continued killing, recruitment and use of children on the Continent by all belligerents to a conflict, particularly, non-state armed groups and terrorist organizations, for either direct or indirect participation in hostilities or any other purposes. The Assembly may also wish to request the AU Commission to develop a best practices document of reference to prevent and end the recruitment and use of child soldiers by armed groups.

345. The Assembly may wish to further encourage Member States to implement national policies that align with AU directives on child protection in conflict situations; and reaffirm the urgent need for the Chairperson of the Commission to appoint a Special Envoy for Children in Conflict Situations in line with its former decision.

346. The Assembly may wish to encourage Member States to continue strengthening the protection of refugee and IDP camps, and to continue to take additional measures to protect them from any exploitation by armed and terrorist groups. The Assembly may also request the AU Commission to develop systems for the collection, analysis and management of data and statistics related to refugees, returnees and IDPs for their registration, in order to improve decision making and ensure effective humanitarian action on the Continent. The Assembly may wish to request the AU Commission, particularly the PAPS Department, to develop an exhaustive list of leaders of armed and terrorist groups in Africa guilty of crimes against refugees and internally displaced persons and for the prosecution of those who perpetrate, encourage, finance, or facilitate such crimes.

347. The Assembly may wish to emphasize the need for mainstreaming child protection into disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes to establish an environment that prioritizes children's needs and ensures equal access to such program.

348. The Assembly may wish to encourage Member States to provide psycho-social support including post-trauma support to children and educators affected by conflict, including integrating health services into education programmes and implementing targeted measures to ensure the safety of children such as safe school routes and safe learning environments.

(v) Youth, Peace and Security Agenda

349. The Youth for Peace Africa program continued the implementation of the Continental Framework on Youth, Peace, and Security (CFYPS) and its 10-year implementation plan in 2024. The program capacitated youth in preventive diplomacy, governance, and elections at the national, regional, and continental levels, and further increased youth engagement in conflict prevention, management and resolution efforts. In 2024, the youth have been part of over 7 preventive diplomacy and Election observation missions at both general and presidential elections, across the continent.

350. Through the African Youth Ambassadors for Peace (AYAPs), the program continued to upscale its direct engagements with African Youth toward advancing their contributions to the continental Silencing the Guns Agenda, as well as in shaping global discourse on youth peace and security through the "African Youth Perspectives on the New Agenda for Peace" that was presented to both the AU PSC and UNSC. The program also established a Roster of Youth Experts to provide technical support to the implementation African YPS agenda.

351. Under the auspices of the AU Champion for YPS, H.E Evariste Ndayishimiye, President of the Republic of Burundi, the 3rd Annual Continental Dialogue on Youth,

Peace and Security was convened in Bujumbura in December 2024. The African youth recommitted to promoting the AU peace and good governance agenda, for stability and prosperity.

352. The Youth for Peace Africa program has also continued to engage Member States and RECs/RMS in the development and implementation of National Action Plans (NAPs) on YPS. To this end, the program finalized the development of the Draft Continental Guideline for the Development and Implementation of NAPs on YPS, which is aimed at assisting Member States in their efforts to harmonize and accelerate their NAPs. Increased interest by Member States was witnessed in the design and development of NAPs. However, youth initiatives, coalitions, and councils still face numerous financial challenges in the implementation of these NAPs.

353. **The Assembly may wish to congratulate the 3rd Cohort of the African Youth Ambassadors for Peace (AYAPs) for kickstarting a 2-year non-renewable mandate as advocates for the Youth, Peace, and Security agenda in their respective regions as well as the creation of the Youth for Peace Roster of Experts to provide technical support to the YPS agenda. The Assembly may wish to commend the AU Champion on YPS, H.E Evariste Ndayishimiye, President of the Republic of Burundi, for convening the 3rd Annual Continental Dialogue on Youth, Peace, and Security. As well as commend Member States for their steadfast and intentional support towards the YPS agenda in the continent especially in the development of NAPS. The Assembly may wish to encourage Member States to consider allocating sufficient resources for the implementation of National Action Plans (NAPs) on youth peace and security in line with their national policies, to increase the active engagement and sustainability of the YPS agenda at the National, regional, and continental levels.**

354. **The Assembly may wish to take note of the development of the Draft Continental Guideline on the Development and Implementation of NAPS on YPS and request the AU Commission to expedite the process for their validation and adoption by the Peace and Security Council following the due process within the next three months with a view to their submission to the 39th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly. The Assembly may also wish to encourage Member States to continue to promote the effective participation of the youth and to promote their role through concrete continental action by leveraging specialized agencies and organs on youth matters such as the Pan-African Youth Union**

(vi)Climate, Peace and Security Nexus

355. In May 2018, the AU Peace and Security Council (AU-PSC) directed the AU Commission to embark on a critical study on the nexus between climate change, peace, and security in Africa. The AU Assembly's 35th and 37th Ordinary Sessions further reinforced this call in February 2022 and 2024. These sessions reiterated the urgency of finalizing the climate-related security risk assessment and developing a comprehensive Common African Position on Climate, Peace, and Security (CAP-CPS).

356. In March 2024, the Chairperson of the AU submitted a comprehensive report to the PSC, outlining the challenges and providing concrete recommendations for addressing climate-induced conflict in Africa. The report highlighted the importance of key stakeholders such as the AU Assembly Committee on Climate Change (CAHOSCC), RECs/RMs, and AU-wide bodies. It emphasized enhancing governance by strengthening climate-security capacities, ensuring inclusivity, and focusing on marginalized groups.

357. The report also called for developing knowledge through building capacities and improving early warning systems, building civil society capacities, leveraging local knowledge, and involving the private sector in resilience efforts. Also, the report underlined the need to mobilize finance, close the adaptation financing gap, and ensure a just transition to meet Africa's unique challenges.

358. The AU has since identified 15 key messages on the Climate Change, Peace, and Security Nexus, which were presented at COP 27 in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt in 2022. These messages highlight the direct and indirect impacts of climate change on peace and security, advocating for a peaceful and stable continent to facilitate effective preventive, adaptation, and mitigation efforts. Key areas of focus include national ownership, coordinated approaches, climate financing, early warning systems, and addressing climate-induced displacement and migration.

359. The key messages underscored that climate change security risks adversely affect vulnerable groups such as women, children, and refugees in Africa. Assessments and security profiles are needed within regional mechanisms to aid effective responses. Strengthened early warning systems are crucial for disaster risk reduction and adaptation. Just transition pathways are essential for growth and development, and failure to address climate change can exacerbate vulnerabilities.

360. In August 2024, a Member-State Consultation in Nairobi convened over 100 experts from various sectors to deliberate on the Common African Position on Climate Peace and Security (CAP-CPS). This collaborative effort between the AU Department of Political Affairs and Peace and Security (DPAPS), the AU Department of Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy, and Sustainable Environment (DARBE), congregated leading actors including the African Group of Negotiators, Cairo International Centre for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding in Africa (CCCPA), supported by international partners namely; Germany through GIZ and Adelphi, United Kingdom, Republic of Ireland, and the UNOAU. Its focus was on the overall thrust of the CAP-CPS.

361. With the invaluable support of African institutions and partners, these efforts resulted in the Africa Climate Security Risk Assessment (ACRA) Report. Although the Assessment did not receive full support of all Member States, it facilitated in-depth deliberation on the priorities and challenges faced by Member States. This process led to the development of eleven (11) principles and identified nine (9) key priorities and eleven (11) challenges as the Nairobi Outcome. The Nairobi Outcome offers crucial preliminary principles that should contribute to the development of the CAP-CPS. .

362. On 17 October 2024, the AUPSC and the UNSC explored collaboration on integrating climate-related security risks into peacebuilding efforts. The two Councils focused on developing joint frameworks, investing in capacity building and training, and engaging local communities in decision-making processes, as well as early warning systems, joint analysis, and planning sessions to better anticipate climate risks and strengthen stability. This collaboration seeks to ensure coherent and effective responses to climate-related security risks, aligning both AU PSC and UNSC climate, peace, and security decisions.

363. The AUPSC Communique of 30 October 2024, emphasized the need for strengthened cross-sectoral coordination among actors working on climate, peacebuilding, development, and humanitarian issues. It calls for the Common African Position (CAP) as an informed framework for collaboration. Climate change responses should be conflict-sensitive and security-sensitive, addressing interlinkages between climate change and human mobility. It also highlighted the importance of prioritizing water and food security, sustainable cross-border transhumance, and holistic responses to climate impacts, including sea-level rise and desertification.

364. The AU Commission participated at the COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, in November 2024. In collaboration with the Aswan Forum for Sustainable Peace and Development, the Political Affairs Peace and Security Department, on 15 November 2024 in Baku, Azerbaijan, held a high-level Panel on: “Africa and the Climate, Peace, and Security Nexus: Towards a Common African Position.,” on the margins of the COP29. The meeting took stock of progress made towards forging a Common African Position on Climate Change, Peace, and Security and charted a pathway towards launching it in 2025. The event was attended by high-level officials from African governments, Members of the AU PSC, African stakeholders, and development partners

365. The Assembly may wish to urge the Commission to finalize the consultations with Member States, RECs/RMs, African Institutions, and partners on the Common African Position on Climate, Peace, and Security. The Assembly may wish to commend the Commission for its strategic lead in the process of developing the first-ever continental Common African Position on CPS, globally.

366. The Assembly may wish to stress the importance of ensuring Africa’s access to Climate Finance through concessional instruments, including, grants, guarantees and non-debt instruments and the need for early warning mechanisms to honour international funding commitments to support African countries’ mitigation and adaptation efforts as key tools for peacebuilding and social cohesion.

(vii) Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development

- Development of the Mental Health Psychosocial Support Guidelines

367. The Commission is developing Mental Health Psychosocial Support Guidelines, aimed at enhancing mental health and psychosocial support services in post -conflict contexts. Key outcomes included the establishment of a clear framework

for these guidelines, incorporating best practices and culturally appropriate approaches. The work towards the development of the Guidelines fostered collaboration among mental health professionals, policymakers, and community leaders, ensuring that the guidelines will be practical, inclusive, and sustainable. It is expected that this initiative will significantly improve mental health support systems and outcomes across the region, addressing critical gaps in care and support.

368. The PSC held its 1234th meeting on Peace, Security and Development Nexus in Africa: Bridging Gaps Between Policy and Practice, in Cairo, Egypt. In particular, the PSC noted, with serious concern, the exponential growth of violent conflicts and complex crisis situations threatening peace, security and stability in Africa. The Council reiterated the imperative to redouble PCRD, stabilization, transition and peacebuilding efforts to prevent relapses and adoption of renewed and integrated approaches to effectively address emerging threats, in the pursuit of the AU flagship of Silencing the Guns and Agenda 2063.

- **AU Journal on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development and Peacebuilding**

369. The AU through its PCRD Centre launched the first edition of the AU Journal on PCRD and Peacebuilding with articles contributed by scholars and practitioners from the five regions of the continent. This journal provides insight into the state peace, security, and development on the continent, the prospects, and challenges, and proposes ways of improving different peacekeeping/building interventions in relevant contexts.

- **Support to Post-Conflict Countries**

370. A Capacity Building Program for States Institutions and CSOs was held on 28 – 30 October 2024 in Juba, South Sudan. This program aimed to introduce and expose the stakeholders in South Sudan to the newly adopted AU revised PCRD Policy with a focus on specific indicative elements such as Political Governance/Transition, Security, and Transitional Justice. This contributes to their capacity building in developing their democratic-governance mechanisms, especially as they prepare for the 2026 elections.

- **PCRD Awareness Week**

371. The 4th Edition of the AU PCRD Awareness Week was commemorated from 18 – 23 November 2024 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia under the theme ‘Collaborative Strategies & Pathways for Effective AU PCRD Policy Implementation’. This edition aimed to enhance the awareness of the general public and the main stakeholders on the consequences and risks of the resurgence of violence focusing on the lessons shared to maintain and consolidate peace as well as facilitate robust engagement with all stakeholders towards building a network of African and non-African practitioners of PCRD activities in Africa. The activities of the week also sought to mobilise resources and technical assistance to assist Member States that are recovering from conflicts.

372. **The Assembly may wish to reiterate its congratulations to the Champion for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development H.E. Abdel Fattah EI-Sisi for**

his continued leadership and encourage Member States to support the work of the PCRD Centre in Cairo.

373. The Assembly may also wish to take note of the progress made by the AU Commission in the implementation of PCRD activities across the Continent and encourage the Commission to continue the implementation of the Revised AU PCRD Policy Framework to provide the necessary support to all Member States in [particular, those in political transition and those emerging from violent conflict. The Assembly may wish to urge the Commission and RECs/RMs to tailor support to Member States in holistically addressing the underlying structural root causes, drivers and enablers of violent conflict in Africa while stressing the importance of State building and the development of strong resilient State institutions as critical foundation for sustainable peace and development in Africa. The Assembly may wish to urge the AU Commission to expedite the operationalization of the AU Humanitarian Agency in order to enhance Africa's capacity to address humanitarian crises and to promote resilience by ensuring coordinated and comprehensive responses to humanitarian challenges that support long-term peace, stability and sustainable development across the Continent.

374. The Assembly may also wish to call on the AU Commission, UN and other partners to continue supporting the activities of the AU PCRD Centre in its efforts in promoting post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts in the Continent.

375. The Assembly may also wish to recognize the contribution of all relevant stakeholders, including civil society organizations, private sector, and local communities, in advancing the work on post-conflict reconstruction and development, particularly in countries undergoing political transitions and those in post-conflict situations, with the aim of effectively building and consolidating peace in Africa.

(viii) Operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF)

376. Strategic Review of the ASF: The 15th and 16th Ordinary meetings of the Specialized Technical Committee on Defense, Safety, and Security (STCDSS) directed the Commission to conduct a comprehensive strategic review process for the ASF. The review process was conducted in consultation with key stakeholders including the AU Member States, RECs/RMs, the AU PSC, Training Centres of Excellence/Training Institutions (TCEs/TIs), and other relevant stakeholders and partners.

377. Pursuant to this directive, the Commission initiated a phased approach to the review process involving multiple levels of consultations and engagements. The first phase, held from 2–6 December 2024 in Algiers, Algeria, included a Technical Consultative Meeting, and dedicated consultations with ASF RECs/RMs Planning Elements (PLANELMs), TCEs/TIs, and Subject Matter Experts. The outcomes of this phase developed draft recommendations and key considerations to inform the development of a Strategic Review Report and laid the groundwork for the next phase

of engagements with key stakeholders envisioned to take place in the first quarter of 2025.

378. These include consultations with strategic partners and stakeholders, AU Member States and RECs/RMs, and the AUPSC. The main outcome in the form of the Strategic Review Report, will be presented to the 17th STCDSS meeting due for the second quarter of 2025, for further guidance and endorsement by AU Policy Organs.

379. The 14th Extraordinary Assembly of the Union held on 6th December 2020 declared the African Standby Force (ASF) as fully operational and directed the AU PSC to utilize the ASF framework in mandating and authorizing AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs). Pursuant to this decision, the Commission facilitated the conduct of the 16th ordinary meeting of the STCDSS in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 5th June 2024. The STCDSS meeting deliberated on several crucial agenda items, culminating in the endorsement of strategic recommendations for enhanced continental security and cooperation. These include the request for the Commission to extend the consultation to include the PSC, AU Member States, and all RECs/RMs and African Centers of Excellence accredited to the AU, on the discussion of the detailed strategic review of the ASF. They also include the request for the Commission to develop a comprehensive and inclusive roadmap for the extensive review of the ASF building on the background paper, the outcome and recommendations of which should be presented at the next STCDSS meeting in 2025.

380. The STC meeting further endorsed the adoption of policies central to the operationalization of the ASF, including the AU Training Policy for Peace Support Operations, the AU Strategic Lift Concept, and the Guidelines for Case Management in Peace Support Operations.

381. The adoption of these key policy documents will enhance the standardization of training across AU PSOs and enable further implementation of the AUCF. The 16th STCDSS also welcomed and endorsed the strategic documents for submission to the 38th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly and the 45th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council.

382. The Assembly may wish to commend the AU Commission, Member States, and the RECs/RMs for continued commitment to the enhancement of the African Standby Force (ASF), and to endorse the adoption of the AU Training Policy for Peace Support Operations, the AU Strategic Lift Concept, and the Guidelines for Case Management in Peace Support Operations.

383. The Assembly may wish to urge the AU Commission to expedite and extend the process of consultations on the strategic review of the ASF to include the PSC, Member States, all RECs/RMs and African Centers of Excellence accredited by the AU.

384. The Assembly may wish to request the Commission to accelerate the process of r the development of a comprehensive and inclusive roadmap for the extensive review of the ASF, and to submit the Report of the extensive review to the 17th Session of the STCDSS.

385. The Assembly may further wish to urge Member States to commit to providing strategic air, land and maritime lift capabilities as part of the operationalization of the ASF, as well as humanitarian and relief missions in the event of disasters.

- **Verification of African Regional Capability**

386. The Commission in line with the African Standby Force Pledged Capabilities Verification Guidelines (2019) conducted verification of ASF pledges and Planning Elements within RECs/RMs to ascertain the operational readiness of the ASF. The verification exercise focused on personnel (civilian, military, and police), political decision-making processes and legal frameworks, mission support, and training and exercises among others. Verification exercises were carried out with the EASF Secretariat, NARC, and ECCAS. These RECs/RMs have shown a continued improvement of ASF capabilities through regular verification of pledges by Member States, continued training as well as exercises. Challenges however remain on funding, Member States' hesitancy to have their pledges verified, and the staffing in Planning Elements that has seen key functions not being staffed owing mainly to limited funding.

- **AU Compliance and Accountability Framework**

387. The African Union Compliance and Accountability Framework (AUCF) Project has made significant progress in enhancing prevention, response, and remedial measures to ensure that its Peace Support Operations (PSOs) are conducted in compliance with International Human Rights Law (IHRL), International Humanitarian Law (IHL), Protection of Civilians (POC) and standards of conduct and discipline. Following the adoption of key policies, including the AU Policy on Protection of Civilians in PSOs, the AUCF has taken critical steps to facilitate their implementation.

388. Notable efforts include a mission to the ATMIS which engaged its leadership on the new POC policy, assessed the impact of the ATMIS drawdown on civilian protection, and discussed tools and measures for enhanced POC. This afforded the opportunity to also introduce the revised Rules of Engagement (RoE) and Directive on the Use of Force (DUoF) to military and police leadership while addressing civilian protection challenges through collaboration with Somali Security Forces and Troop/Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs).

389. Furthermore, the AUCF project engaged in working sessions with T/PCCs in May 2024 to strengthen selection and screening mechanisms for PSO personnel, addressing gaps in vetting processes, training programs, and coordination.

390. The AUCF project continues to support RECs/RMs such as ECOWAS and SADC as well as PSOs including SAMI DRC and MNJTF by providing technical assistance and developing mission-specific compliance frameworks as well as targeted training on Compliance and Accountability. The targeted training included the AU training of trainers for NARC Member States from 22-31 July 2024 in Cairo, Egypt, support to EASF in organizing a basic training on compliance and accountability for its personnel in Kigali, Rwanda, from 2-10 August 2024, the AU in collaboration with Nigeria's National Defense College (NDC) conducted a Pilot training on the protection

of civilians in peace support operations from 26-30 August 2024 in Abuja. Likewise, the basic training on compliance and accountability was arranged for SAMI-DRC from 18-22 November 2024.

391. A major achievement has been the development of a case management system to digitize the case management process. To enhance the reporting process, the AUCF project has developed guidelines for standardized complaint information reception mechanisms and communication with T/PCCs regarding violations of IHRL and IHL as well as personnel misconduct.

392. Additionally, the AUCF project, in collaboration with the Office of Internal Oversight, has conducted specialized training sessions for ATMIS to strengthen the capacity of personnel in handling cases of misconduct.

393. On the remedial front, the AUCF project finalized a Policy on Remedial Actions for Victims of Misconduct and Harm in AU PSOs, aimed at providing timely and comprehensive redress for victims, including those affected by sexual exploitation and abuse. These initiatives underscore the AUCF's commitment to strengthening accountability, protecting civilians, and addressing misconduct within AU PSOs. The policy will be submitted to the policy organs for approval.

(ix) Operationalization of the Peace Fund and Financing AU Peace and Security Activities

394. Pursuant to the Assembly Decision, Assembly/AU/Dec.2(XXXVI) of February 2023 approving the immediate use of the AU Peace Fund and its Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF), the Commission under the auspices of the Chairperson commenced operationalization of the Peace Fund with the utilization of the CRF.

395. In this regard, the Commission through the Department of PAPS, collaborated closely with the relevant organs and statutory bodies of the Union particularly the Assembly, Executive Council, PSC, PRC, Board of Trustees (BoT) and the Peace Fund Executive Management Committee (EMC) to operationalize the Fund in 2023. Thus, the Commission secured approval of USD 7 million as CRF level for the 2023 financial year, which the Commission disbursed as follows:

396. USD 2 Million to support the East African Community (EAC) Regional Force deployed to Eastern DRC for stabilization operations. This disbursement was effected through the signing of a Grant Agreement between the AU Commission and the EAC Secretariat in June 2023 in Luanda, Angola on the sidelines of the Quadripartite Summit on Eastern DRC. Thus, EAC became the first REC/RM beneficiary of the AU Peace Fund.

397. USD 3.5 Million as AU support to address the funding gap arising from the extension of the drawdown in ATMIS military personnel, through two tranches of USD 2 Million and USD 1.5 Million in July and December 2023 respectively, in addition to USD 19 million to bridge the financing gap of ATMIS.

398. USD 1 Million to support DDR program of the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in Tigray region as an integral part of the

implementation of the Pretoria Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. This disbursement was realized through the signing of a Grant Agreement between the AU Commission and the Government of Ethiopia in December 2023 in Addis Ababa. Significantly, Ethiopia became the first AU Member State to benefit directly from the AU Peace Fund.

399. The balance of USD 500,000 from the approved CRF USD 7 Million was approved by the Chairperson of the Commission and set aside to support the Sudanese Peace process including the AU/IGAD political dialogue. However, this funding could not be utilized due to the ongoing protracted consultations with Sudanese civil actors on the modalities and dates for the Dialogue already endorsed by the AUPSC.

400. Furthermore, the AU Assembly through Decision, Assembly/AU/Dec.842(XXXVI) at its thirty-sixth Ordinary Session in February 2023 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, approved the utilization of the Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF). Subsequently, the 43rd Executive Council in Nairobi in July 2023, through Decision EX.CL/ Dec.1218 (XLIII), approved a US\$ 10 million CRF Level for 2024.

401. On 06 September 2024, the Chair of the EMC and Chairperson of the Commission approved the disbursement of US\$ 7 million (70%) to meet the critical needs of AU Member States including the following:

- i. Support to South Sudan transition process **US\$ 1 Million**
- ii. Sudan Peace Process/Political Dialogue **US\$ 500,000**
- iii. Support to SADC Mission in Eastern DRC (SAMIDRC) **US\$1 million**
- iv. Reinforcing Lake Chad Basin Stabilization through the MNJTF (Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria) – **US\$ 1 million**
- v. Support to Libya – National Reconciliation, Dialogue and Stabilization Initiatives **US\$ 500,000**
- vi. Support to stabilization efforts as part of Niger's Transition **US\$ 500,000**
- vii. Burkina Faso – Capacity support to Counter Terrorism **US\$1 million**
- viii. Support to stabilization efforts as part of Mali's Counter Terrorism initiatives **US\$500,000**
- ix. Support to Mozambique – Strengthening Counterterrorism Initiatives towards Stabilization in Cabo Delgado **US\$1 million**

402. It is pertinent to mention that the CRF implementation in future will continue to spread across all regions and as per the guidance from policy organs.

403. It is important to note that the disbursement of the aforementioned funds will only happen in 2025. Therefore, the Commission has submitted a request to the Joint sitting of the Subcommittee on General Supervision and Coordination on Budgetary, Financial and Administrative Matters (GSCBFAM) and F15 Experts for their consideration and approval for a rollover of US\$7m from 2024 to 2025.

404. Based on experience from 2023 and 2024 in the use of the CRF and due to increase in the emerging crisis situations on the continent the Commission, envisages a similar crisis reserve need for 2025. In this regard the AU Commission proposes the level of CRF for 2025 as US\$10 million with a carry-over of US\$7 Million from 2024 to 2025.

405. The AU Policy Organs approved USD\$5 million for pilot projects in 2024. The implementation rate of the Peace Fund Pilot Projects Budget Performance from 1 January to 31 November 2024 is at 32%. The low execution is due to US\$1 million allocated to Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) which the grant agreement has just been signed and a request has also been submitted to the joint sitting of the subcommittee on GSCBFAM and F15 Experts for their approval to roll over the disbursement and implementation by RECs/RMs in 2025.

406. Most importantly, the operationalization of the revitalized AU Peace Fund is in fulfilment of the AU's commitment to promote African ownership and leadership by contributing substantially to financing its own agenda for peace, security and stability, in compliance with relevant Assembly Decisions. This has not only provided a political signal that Africa is committed to improving on its self-reliance targets but will also provide the Commission with the capacity to operationalize its early response mechanism, which further helps bridge the gap between early warning and early response.

407. **The Assembly may wish to commend the Executive Council, the Chairperson of the Commission, the PSC, PRC, F-15, the Chairperson of the PRC Sub-Committee (GSCBFAM), Board of Trustees and EMC for steps taken to operationalize the Peace Fund and call on the Peace Fund Secretariat to accelerate initiatives to mobilize more resources, particularly from the private sector and development partners to the Peace Fund. In addition, the Assembly may wish to commend the direct contributions of the AU through the disbursements to the EAC, ATMIS and Ethiopia as pioneer beneficiaries of the Fund, and as a testament of the Union's commitment towards contributing to its peace enforcement, stabilization, recovery and DDR activities.**

408. **Further, the Assembly may also wish to commend the 2024 allocation from the CRF for the Support to South Sudan transition process, support to the Sudan Peace Process/Political Dialogue, Support to SADC Mission in Eastern DRC (SAMIDRC), For the reinforcement of the Lake Chad Basin Stabilization through the MNJTF (Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria), Support to Libya – National Reconciliation, Dialogue and Stabilization Initiatives, Support to stabilization efforts as part of Niger's Transition, Burkina Faso for Capacity support to Counter Terrorism, Support to stabilization efforts as part of Mali's Counter Terrorism initiatives and Support to Mozambique for Strengthening Counterterrorism Initiatives towards Stabilization in Cabo Delgado.**

E. AU PRIORITY PROGRAMMES ON PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA

(i) Early Warning and Conflict Prevention

409. In partnership with the RECs/RMs and APRM, the AU Commission advanced the implementation of the Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF). In this regard, the Commission provided financial and technical support to Member States in 2024 for structural conflict prevention efforts through the establishment and strengthening of national peace infrastructures and the conduct of

the Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) and its corresponding Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategy (CSVMS).

410. In 2024, significant progress was made in advancing the implementation of the Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF) through financial and technical support to Member States. In National Peace Infrastructures (NPI), the establishment and strengthening of national peace infrastructures were supported in Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Zambia, and Benin. On CSVRA processes support was provided Zambia and Malawi. The AU, in partnership with COMESA, facilitated virtual consultations with Seychelles to advance the CSVRA. Also in partnership with COMESA, multi-stakeholder consultations were conducted in Rwanda and Burundi, contributing to the CSVRA process. A planning meeting in Kenya was held as part of the CSVRA initiative.

411. The PSC, in its Communique 1163 of July 21, 2023, encouraged Member States to “fully embrace the Continental conflict prevention frameworks, which include the voluntary CSVRA and CSVMS.” In 2024 support zeroed in on two (2) new Member States, namely, Malawi and Kenya, as they embarked on their self-assessment through the CSVRA/CSVMS processes. With this, five (5) AU Member States have now acceded to the CSVRA/CSVMS processes. This follows the pace-setting roles of Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, and Zambia.

412. Specifically, in collaboration with COMESA, the Commission, in 2024, supported Zambia in validating the CSVRA/CSVMS report; supported Malawi and Kenya in developing a comprehensive roadmap for the implementation of the CSVRA/CSVMS processes; and facilitated multi-stakeholder consultations in Rwanda, Burundi and Seychelles.

(ii) African Union Border Programme

413. The Commission, through the AU Border Programme (AUBP), continued its support to Member States in the areas of delimitation/demarcation/reaffirmation of inter-state boundaries, the promotion of cross-border cooperation, and strengthening the capacities of border stakeholders.

414. In this regard, the Programme facilitated a confidence-building exercise between Ethiopia and South Sudan, from 3 - 5 September 2024, to foster trust between the two parties, share best practices, and agree on the next steps for the establishment of a joint technical committee (JTC) for the reaffirmation of their common border. In November 2024, the AUBP, in collaboration with the EAC, facilitated the sensitization of border communities in Kenya, South Sudan, and Uganda. A follow-up to the Peace Caravan held in 2023, the sensitization raised awareness for community leaders on the resolutions adopted in 2023 and sustainable peace initiatives in the border areas.

415. In line with the AUBP Action Plans for Border Governance with the EAC, ECCAS, and ECOWAS, the AU Commission in partnership with the Kenya International Boundaries Office (KIBO), the National Border Commission of the Republic of Congo and the Inauguration of the Heads of National Border Commissions

in West Africa, respectively, conducted regional consultations with relevant stakeholders.

416. The regional exercises focused on the establishment and operationalization of national structures responsible for borders; field visit to the Namanga One-Stop-Border-Post, enabling knowledge exchange of experiences with fully operational regional border structures; enhancing the capacities of border stakeholders; creation of a coordination platform between national border structures, regional and continental border actors.

417. In commemorating the African Border Day (ABD) on 7 June 2024, the AUBP, in collaboration with Benin, marked the 14th African Border Day from 12-13 June 2024. Held in line with the AU theme of the year, the ABD showcased Benin's commitment to investing in education, infrastructure, and livelihoods to foster and promote prosperity and resilience among its border communities. The development of borderlands presents an opportunity for cross-border cooperation and local community engagement – stakeholders who are pivotal to the success or failure of security and development in border areas.

418. In promoting the implementation of the AU Strategy for Better Integrated Border Governance (AUBGS), regional forums were held in collaboration with IGAD, in May and SADC in July/August 2024. These contributed to sensitizing the IGAD and SADC Secretariats and their Member States on AUBGS, alongside existing border-related strategies; as well as facilitation of the exchange of information, and best practices. The AUBP has now completed the sensitization process on the AU Border Governance Strategy.

419. Importantly, the AU Commission, in collaboration with the Government of the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire, through its National Border Commission (CNFCI) organized the 2nd edition of the Abidjan Border Forum (ABF) from 23 to 25 October 2024. The Forum served as a continental platform for Member States, RECs/RMs, development partners, the private sector, and border communities to prompt synergies for collective action in the prevention and management of disputes and the sustainable development of cross-border spaces.

420. The theme of the 2nd edition “Green Borders: bridging the gap between shared natural resources and Security across borders”, afforded debate on the environment and climate and their implications on border governance. Given that border areas have increasingly suffered from the effects of climate change and the mismanagement of transboundary resources, the ABF called for urgent action to address the imbalance in the utilization of the territorial security of states and human security.

421. In November 2024, a joint retreat took place between the AU Panel of the Wise and the Bureau of the ECCAS Committee of Elders to consider the findings of the Study on Border and Territorial Disputes in the Central Africa Region. The retreat agreed to establish a coherent framework to coordinate interventions and share experiences aimed at the resolution of border and territorial disputes in the region.

422. The Assembly may wish to note the steady progress in the implementation of the AU Border Program; and call upon Member States, who

have not yet done so, to accelerate the delimitation and demarcation of their borders, adopt national border governance policies in line with the AU Strategy on Better Integrated Border Governance, and reinforce the institutional capacities of the national structures responsible for border governance.

423. Furthermore, to foster the transformation of borders into catalysts of integration and sustainable development, the Assembly may commend Member States that have signed and ratified the African Union Convention on Cross-Border Cooperation and encourage those Member States who have not yet done so, to do the same. While pursuing the implementation of the AU Border Programme, the Assembly may wish to request the Commission and RECs/RMs to reinforce coordination to enable joint interventions and strengthen the impact in cross-border spaces.

424. The Assembly may also wish to congratulate the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire for successfully co-hosting the 2nd Abidjan Border Forum with the Commission and endorse the institutionalization of the Forum as a continental platform for border stakeholders, to be co-convened every two years, co-hosted by the Government of Cote d'Ivoire and Commission.

(iii)AFRIPOL

425. AFRIPOL has strengthened its initiatives to combat transnational organized crime in Africa, prioritizing the disruption of criminal networks through targeted operations and collaborative strategies. Notably, AFRIPOL launched its first cross-border operation, Operation TAPI 2024, engaging countries including Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Chad, Cameroon, and the Central African Republic. This operation led to significant seizures of narcotics, protected wildlife items, and forged documents, as well as the arrest of traffickers and dismantling of trafficking networks. These outcomes demonstrate AFRIPOL's dedication to addressing the socio-economic impacts of organized crime and building resilience against such threats across the continent.

426. In a critical collaborative effort with INTERPOL, AFRIPOL executed Cyber Surge 3.0 to address the growing threat of cyber-enabled crime, resulting in over 1,000 arrests and the dismantling of 134,089 digital infrastructures across 19 African countries. This operation targeted various cyber threats, including ransomware, digital extortion, and phishing scams, all of which have become prevalent challenges in Africa's digital landscape. Cyber Surge 3.0 highlights AFRIPOL's commitment to enhancing cybersecurity capacities and reinforces the importance of international cooperation in tackling cybercrime that increasingly threatens both public and private sectors across the region.

427. AFRIPOL's approach also includes extensive capacity-building initiatives. Since January 2024, AFRIPOL has organized eleven specialized training sessions for African Union Member States, covering areas such as criminal intelligence analysis, digital forensics, financial crime investigations, and cross-border operations. These programs included intensive training on forensics and criminal intelligence, workshops on using smartphone applications for police operations, and cybersecurity awareness sessions conducted in collaboration with regional and international partners.

428. As part of the cybercrime-focused training, the trainees received donations of Spektor devices, Mobiledit, Shodan, and Maltego investigative tools and licenses to enhance their digital investigative capacities, particularly in combating cybercrime. These tools and skills empower law enforcement officers with the critical resources needed to counter organized crime networks effectively. AFRIPOL's Central Criminal Analysis Unit further supports these initiatives by monitoring crime trends and providing actionable intelligence to Member States, thus reinforcing Africa's security infrastructure.

(iv) Partnerships for Peace, Security and Governance

429. Inclusive, smart, and mutually beneficial partnerships continue to be the topmost priority for the PAPS Department. To this end, the Department pursues enhanced interconnectivity with all stakeholders and partners toward promoting good governance, peace, and security. Furthermore, the department seeks to continue to engage think tanks, do-tanks, the academia, and CSOs within and outside the continent, towards rethinking and proposing the pragmatic role of women and youth in peace and security as well as on other thematic areas, to make peace happen.

- United Nations

430. Significant progress has been recorded in the implementation of the Joint UN-AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security of April 2017 despite increasing threats to peace, security, and good governance on the continent. AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security and DPAPS senior staff held a strategic dialogue with UNOAU on 20 February 2024 which reflected on the experiences of the AU-UN partnership in peace and security in 2023 and the priorities for 2024.

431. The 23rd Joint Task Force of USGs and CPAPS consulted at the UN Headquarters on 16 April 2024, comprising the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security and the UN Under Secretaries General for Political & Peace Building Affairs; Peace Operations and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the African Union; along with the Assistant Secretaries-General (Africa) and Operational Support.

432. The consultative platform examined the peace and security developments in the CAR, DRC, Ethiopia, Libya, Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan, as well as West Africa and the Sahel region. It also considered the way forward, following the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2719 (2023). A senior-level Joint Task Force was established to coordinate the efforts of the Secretariat and its engagement with the AU towards the implementation of UNSCR 2719.

433. The Joint Working Group on PSOs and Ad-hoc Security Initiatives continued interaction and coordination throughout the year. The AUC and the UN Secretariat maintained technical-level contacts on regional, country-specific, and thematic files. As part of the revitalization of the AU climate security cluster and the UN climate security mechanism, the first interdepartmental retreat on climate, peace, and security convened on 11 May 2024; the Retreat built on the consultative process conducted as part of the African continental climate security risk assessment, as requested by the

AU PSC, as well as collaboration towards the development of the common African position on climate, peace and security. This includes sustained policy dialogue, horizon scanning and clustered meetings, joint high-level missions, coordinated messaging including during electoral processes, and country-level coordinated action.

434. The Commission also collaborated with the UN to develop strategic documents namely; policy guidelines, monitoring and reporting, and accountability mechanisms for the Maputo Five-Year Work plan to operationalize the ASF. In collaboration with the RECs/RMs, and the African Peacekeeping Training Centers of Excellence (TCEs), the AU and UN contributed to enhancing the capacities of RECs/RMs' planning and management of peace operations and supported the operationalization of the Continental Logistics Concept and Continental Movements Control Centre.

435. AU/UN Partnership also resulted in the development of the training curriculum on gender-mainstreaming for PSOs, the revision and harmonization of the gender training package for AU PSOs; and the production of "She Stands for Peace" Podcast series on different thematic issues of the WPS agenda.

436. In addition, the two organizations worked together in the implementation of the Gender, WPS agenda, and implementation of the AU Compliance Framework on the Conduct and Discipline and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse; and the finalization of the AU Board of Inquiry policy for ATMIS.

437. The UN and AU continued to hold strategic dialogues, both at Headquarters and in the field, to assess conflict situations, complementarities, and coordination of actions, and explore areas for common messaging. In this regard, the Annual Conference also officially established the High-Level Strategic Dialogue on Sustainable Development, to be chaired by the Deputy Secretary-General and the Deputy Chairperson. The High-level Strategic Dialogue held its 3rd meeting on 29 May 2024, at which they reviewed implementation mechanisms for the operationalization of the five "college-to-college" formations as a new method of working between AU Commissioners and their United Nations counterparts in the context of AU Agenda 2063 and SDGs 2030.

438. On 8 July 2024, the Military Staff Committee of the AUPSC and representatives of the Military Staff Committee of the UN engaged in their first informal consultations at the AU headquarters. This enabled the two Committees to better understand their respective mandates, working methods, and challenges while laying the foundation for more effective collaboration to provide timely and informed advice to the two Councils.

439. On 15 October 2024, the Peacebuilding Commission and the AUPSC scheduled at the UN Headquarters, their seventh annual consultative meeting, which explored the opportunities for enhancing cooperation with a view to supporting the African Union's PCRDR and peace-building efforts.

440. The 18th AUPSC / UNSC Annual Joint Consultation took place on 18 October, in New York, preceded by the 9th Informal Joint Seminar on 17 October 2024. The deliberations considered matters about financing AU-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs), Youth, Peace and Security, and the working methods of the joint

meetings and other engagements; as well as the review of the conflict situations in the Sudan, Sahel, Somalia, and eastern DRC.

441. The meetings of the two Councils were preceded by two-day consultations of the AUPSC Committee of Experts and the Security Council's Ad-hoc Working Group on Peace and Security in Africa, which included comprehensive briefings by the AU Commission.

442. The eighth Annual Conference between the Secretary-General and the AUC Chairperson took place on 21 October 2024. The Secretary-General and Chairperson reviewed progress in the implementation of the "UN-AU Joint Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security" and the "AU-UN Framework for the Implementation of Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development" and signed the AU-UN Joint Framework on Human Rights. Then discussions covered Unconstitutional changes of government and political transitions on the continent; the coordination of peace efforts in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa (Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan) and the Great Lakes region; the progress on Security Council negotiations on predictable financing of the AU-led peace support operations; Africa's socio-economic recovery and the reform of the international financial architecture. The annual conference also endorsed the jointly developed roadmap for the implementation of UNSCR 2719 (2023) on the financing of AU-led PSOs.

- **European Union**

443. The strategic partnership between the AU and EU continued to bolster and benefit from the guidance of the 2018 MoU on Peace, Security, and Governance. The formulation of the combined EU support programme for the AGA and APSA is nearing completion. Set to begin in January 2026, the programme is designed to capitalize on the synergies between the AGA and APSA, with a planned duration of four years. Key areas of cooperation include early warning, mediation, climate and security, human rights, and the promotion of good governance and democracy. This integrated programme will enhance human rights adherence in AU-led Peace Support Operations and will place a strong emphasis on increasing citizen participation in governance, peace, and security. Additionally, EU support through the Early Response Mechanism will be redirected to support the initiatives under the Crisis Reserve Facility of the AU Peace Fund.

444. The Joint Financing Arrangement (JFA) has evolved into a non-binding coordination framework, now referred to as the "Joint Framework Arrangement (JFA)." The JFA is designed to strengthen coordination among all stakeholders involved in managing and supporting AU Commission initiatives. This framework encompasses both partners contributing earmarked funding and those providing non-earmarked funding for the Commission's activities, with the coordination platform now extended to include AUC Member States. The JFA is set to remain in place until December 2028, with Canada, Denmark, the EU, Germany, Ireland, Norway, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, already committed to it.

- **TICAD Ministerial**

445. In preparation for the 9th Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) scheduled for August 2025, the PAPS Department participated in the TICAD Ministerial session in Tokyo, Japan, from August 24-25, 2024. This strategic engagement aimed to enhance partnerships and advance Africa's peace and security agenda. The session allowed stakeholders to deepen cooperation, sharpening collective approaches toward ensuring human dignity and security in Africa. While underscoring the imperative for robust Global multilateralism to achieve global security and the Peace we want in Africa, the following key reflections were highlighted (i) the free will of African citizens to build innovative capacity in the advanced age of the knowledge economy and new technologies particularly the youth for assured human security; (ii) Political will to boost democratic leadership In Africa evident In constitutionalism, rule of law, and building of resilient Institutions; (iii) Collective will that Is anchored on smart partnerships to achieve global sustainable security for all.

446. The ministerial presented a platform to reaffirm the importance of prioritizing prevention while working to ensure lasting solutions to pervasive security threats including lingering conflicts, terrorism, and violent extremism by tackling the root causes. Overall, it highlighted the need to strengthen African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and African Governance Architecture (AGA) including support to AU-led peace support operations through UNSC Resolution 2719 (2023), sustainable and predictable financing, and capacity building for public institutions, as appropriate.

- **Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)**

447. In September 2024, President Xi Jinping hosted 34 African leaders to the 2024 Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) held in Beijing. The AUC Chairperson, ably supported by the CPAPS and other Commissioners were also in attendance. Chinese President Xi announced China's readiness to work with Africa to implement China's 10 partnership actions carefully crafted to jointly advance modernization in the two (2) continents and the overall characterization of China-Africa relations to be elevated to an all-weather China-Africa community with a shared future for the new era. Within the ten (10) partnership actions for modernization to deepen China-Africa cooperation, the PAPS related areas reflecting China's confidence and sincerity in promoting modernization with Africa are mutual learning among civilizations in state governance; development cooperation; people-to-people exchanges; and common security.

(v) PAPS Knowledge Management System

- **Enhancing Institutional Effectiveness and Policy Impact**

448. To advance its knowledge management and institutional learning framework, the Department has launched a series of strategic initiatives aimed at enhancing organizational capacity and fostering continuous learning.

- **Knowledge Management Strategy**

449. The Department has launched a comprehensive Knowledge Management Strategy to optimize the creation, curation, and application of knowledge. This strategic framework empowers staff to leverage data-driven insights, enhancing

decision-making, policy development, and implementation. By streamlining internal processes, it strengthens the Department's capacity to respond effectively to the region's evolving political, security, and socio-economic challenges.

- **Standardized Working Documents Handbook**

450. To further enhance operational efficiency, the Department has introduced a Handbook for Standardizing Working Documents. This initiative aligns internal documentation with international best practices, ensuring clarity, consistency, and precision in reports and policy briefs. By reducing redundancy and minimizing errors, the Handbook accelerates decision-making and improves the Department's responsiveness to peace and security challenges.

- **African Union Stabilization Guidelines**

451. In alignment with the Peace and Security Council's directive, the Department has developed the African Union Stabilization Guidelines. These guidelines build on lessons from the Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery, and Resilience of Boko Haram-affected Areas. They provide a framework for comprehensive, multi-dimensional stabilization efforts, focusing on physical, political, legal, and socio-economic protection, while ensuring coordinated, impactful interventions in conflict and post-conflict regions.

- **2023 Annual Report on Elections in Africa:**

452. The 2023 Annual Report on Elections in Africa serves as a key tool for advancing democracy and good governance across the continent. By drawing on AU Election Observation Missions, it offers comparative insights to improve electoral processes. The report underscores the importance of free and credible elections in fostering conflict prevention, democratic consolidation, and sustainable development—critical to achieving the AU's Vision 2030 and Agenda 2063.

- **Operational Guidance on Security Sector Reform (SSR):**

453. The Department has completed seven Operational Guidance Notes on Security Sector Reform, offering practical frameworks for the design, implementation, and monitoring of SSR initiatives. These guidelines ensure alignment with international standards and promote coordinated action among governments, regional organizations, and international partners, fostering inclusive and transparent SSR processes.

- **Leadership Manual on Youth**

454. A new Leadership Manual on Youth has been developed to support the cultivation of young leadership across Member States. This resource aims to empower youth in driving Africa's development and peace-building efforts.

- **Capacity Building Initiatives**

455. Recognizing that human capital is the Department's greatest asset, we remain committed to staff development. In 2024, the Directorate delivered two key training programs tailored to enhance staff competencies. These included five strategic

manuals covering Leadership, Strategic Planning, Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation, and Report Writing—critical skills for organizational success.

456. In addition, 30 General Services staff were trained in office administration and official correspondence, while 17 staff participated in training on analytical and progress reporting. These initiatives are designed to strengthen the capacity of the staff supporting the Department's core operations, ensuring effective and efficient delivery of its mandate.

457. The Assembly may wish to commend the Commission through the PAPS Department for its efforts at enhancing knowledge management and institutional learning and encourage continued investment in capacity-building to strengthen institutional effectiveness and coordination across the continent.

CONCLUSION: OUTLOOK, IMPACT AND CHALLENGES

458. In 2025, the AU is poised to be pivotal in addressing the myriad conflicts and crises plaguing the continent. As the premier regional organization, the AU, through its Commission, will remain at the forefront of efforts to promote peace, security, and stability across Africa. It is envisaged that the crises will mostly remain internal and, in some cases, externally influenced and will continue to impact the overall state of peace and security in Africa. Additionally, it is expected that the situation will be compounded by emerging and pervasive threats of a transnational nature, including Terrorism and violent extremism, climate change, organized crime, irregular migration, and drug and human trafficking.

459. Despite the concerted efforts of the AU Member States and the Specialized AU offices, such as the AUCTC, Africa will continue to confront the threat of terrorism and violent extremism at an alarming rate. In 2025, the threat of terrorism will mostly continue to expand. This will mean there will be an increase in terrorism-related deaths compared to recorded statistics in 2024. Furthermore, the nexus of transnational organized crimes and terrorism will remain, as will the use of autonomous weapons systems, including unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and artificial intelligence.

460. The outlook in some conflict situations across Africa will remain of increasing concern, with the growing presence of irregular private military contractors and foreign power competition for influence. This trend will likely continue and remain a source of instability. The worsening security situation, especially in the Sahel, coupled with low internal capacity to tackle the menace, will continue to attract the presence of irregular private military contractors and enable foreign power competition to persist, hindering the AU's efforts to bring peace to these conflict settings.

461. Although no successful Unconstitutional Change of Government in the form of a military coup was recorded in 2024, it remains a concerning issue for Africa in 2025 given the attempts in the outgone year. Unless concerted efforts are made to address the root causes including political governance gaps, vacuum in security governance/peace deficiencies, and lack of respect for the rule of law, the trend is likely to persist. Relatedly, except for last-minute changes, the countries in transition will likely continue to experience low advancement of their political transition process.

In this regard, the AU Commission relies on the guidance of the AU PSC and the wisdom of the Assembly to chart a way forward.

462. As underscored throughout this report, the current state of governance, peace, and security reflects the need to reverse the trend. One of the key areas of focus for the AU will be to actively support the resolution of the conflict in Sudan through a comprehensive ceasefire and political dialogue. Similarly, the AU would reinforce support for ongoing peace initiatives in the Eastern DRC through the Luanda and Nairobi processes, while not forgetting the implementation of the peace and agreement in CAR. Certainly, hard-won peace agreements, such as the one in Ethiopia would be sustained with support mobilized for the DDR process and national reconciliation and healing and promotion of the Peace and Reconciliation Day and its initiatives. Renewed support for countries such as South Sudan Somalia in their security transition, would also be a priority. These efforts will be crucial in consolidating the gains and preventing a relapse into conflict.

463. Despite an overall electoral management system improvement across Africa in 2024, challenging factors will persist, resulting in low participation of women and youth and insecurity. The AU will, therefore, sustain engagement with member states, particularly to promote democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. In this regard, technical assistance to member states will be prioritized, especially in specific post-conflict settings, to support governance and consolidation of democracy. While promoting democratic governance it is also imperative to promote security governance. The AU will, therefore, enhance the capacity of member states through the rollout of the AU fellowship program on Disarmament and the peaceful development of nuclear technology – targeting African diplomats, technical experts, and policymakers of AU Member States, not losing sight of security sector reform (SSR) in priority countries.

464. To gain traction, the AU will need to work closely with other regional organizations and international partners to develop effective strategies to counter the threats. In this regard, the AU Commission will leverage its institutional stakeholders-related initiatives, including the Inter-Regional Economic Communities Knowledge Exchange (I-RECKE), Network of Think-Tanks for Peace (NeTT4Peace), as well as Pan-African Network for Political Affairs Peace and Security (PAN-PAPS).

465. The AU remains committed to delivering on its governance, peace, and security mandate to foster integration and prosperity across the continent. The attainment of all the aspirations of Agenda 2063 is contingent on a peaceful and secure continent amenable to socio-economic growth, and prosperity. However, the Commission remains bedeviled by inadequate, unsustainable, and unpredictable sources of funding always at the whim and caprices of partners.

466. The leadership role and strategic support of AU Heads of State and Government are paramount in ensuring that the process towards achieving the Africa we want is fully owned and financed by Africa itself. In this regard, the department is determined to roll out the AU Peace Fund and its Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF) as approved by relevant policy organs towards the goal of robust response to the direct and immediate threats; deepening democracy and effective governance; and building collective security for peace enhanced peace dividends.

AFRICAN UNION

الاتحاد الأفريقي

UMOJA WA AFRICA



UNION AFRICAINE

UNIÃO AFRICANA

UNIÓN AFRICANA

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. P.O. Box: 3243 Tel.: (251-11) 5513 822 Fax: (251-11)
5519 321

Email: situationroom@africa-union.org

PSC/HLS/11 (2024)

**CONCLUSIONS OF THE 11TH HIGH-LEVEL SEMINAR
ON PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA, ORAN PROCESS**

1 TO 2 DECEMBER 2024, ORAN, ALGERIA



**CONCLUSIONS OF THE 11TH HIGH-LEVEL SEMINAR
ON PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA, ORAN PROCESS**

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) and the African Members of the United Nations Security Council (A3), in collaboration with the Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department of the AU Commission (AUC) and the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, organized the *11th Annual High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa: Assisting Incoming African Members of the United Nations Security Council (A3) in Preparing to Address Peace and Security Issues on the Continent*, from 1 to 2 December 2024, in Oran, Algeria. The Seminar was held pursuant to the 397th PSC meeting held at the level of Heads of State and Government, in New York, on 23 September 2013, which reviewed the partnership between the AU and the United Nations (UN) in the area of peace and security, and decided, inter alia, on the need for "greater consultations between the Peace and Security Council and the African Members of the Security Council to ensure that PSC decisions and those of the AU Assembly are effectively promoted and defended in the UN Security Council."

2. The 11th High-Level Seminar was held in the context of the 20th anniversary of the PSC. Participants seized the opportunity to take stock of progress achieved by the A3 Plus 1 in amplifying the African voice and in effectively championing African interests and common positions as part of the United Nations Security Council decision-making process, which includes the challenges faced, lessons learned, and best practices. They also seized the opportunity of the Seminar to appreciate the achievements of the AUCTC since its establishment twenty years ago.

3. Participants at the 11th High-Level Seminar also recalled the primacy of the United Nations Security Council in maintaining international peace and security, in line with the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter, the AU Constitutive Act and the Protocol on the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.

4. The Seminar was chaired by H.E. Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Minister of Foreign Affairs of The Republic of Djibouti and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of December 2024. H.E. Ahmed Attaf, Minister of State and Minister of Foreign Affairs, National Community Abroad and African Affairs, and host and Coordinator of African Members of the United Nations Security Council, delivered opening remarks; H.E. Sidi Mohamed Mohamed Abdellahi, Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania to Algeria, delivered a keynote address on behalf of H.E. Mohamed Salem Merzoug, Minister of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Mauritanians Abroad – Chairperson of the AU. H.E. Ambassador Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security AU, delivered a statement, while Switzerland delivered a message of goodwill on behalf of partners.

II. PARTICIPATION

5. Participants included the fifteen members of the PSC as follows: Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti (Chair),

Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, The Gambia, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Uganda. The following Members of the current A3 Plus 1 also attended the High-Level Seminar: Algeria, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Guyana. Somalia attended as an incoming A3 Member.

6. The High-Level Seminar was also attended by Friends of the Seminar, namely Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia and South Africa. The United Nations and the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA), Institute for Security Studies (ISS), and Amani Africa also participated in the High-Level Seminar. Representatives of Denmark, Norway and Switzerland attended the Seminar as partners of the High-Level Seminar.

III. MAIN OBJECTIVE

7. Held within the context of the PSC 20th Anniversary and building on the solid foundation and momentum established by the previous ten (10) High-Level Seminars, the 11th High-Level Seminar sought to review the milestones achieved, lessons learned, best practices, and challenges to be addressed. As with previous editions, the High-Level Seminar was meant to contribute towards further strengthening the capacity of the A3 Plus 1 to more effectively promote and defend common African positions on peace and security issues within the UN Security Council, as well as to further strengthen coordination between the AU PSC and the A3 Plus 1 to foster coherence between the two entities.

8. The High-Level Seminar took note of the 20th Anniversary of the AU Counterterrorism Centre (AUCTC) and commended it for its continued efforts to enhance African responses to terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism. It reiterated the urgency of fully capacitating the Centre to enable it to discharge its mandate more effectively.

IV. AGENDA ITEMS

9. The Agenda of the High-Level Seminar was structured around the following three main thematic sessions:

- A. Building Integrated Capacity for Combating Counterterrorism and Violent Extremism,
- “20th Anniversary of the African Union Counter-terrorism Center: Achievements and Vision for the Future”.**
- B. Implementation of the Pact for the Future: “Focusing on the UN Security Council Reform and Update on the Implementation of the Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023).”**
- C. Coordination between the PSC and the African Members of the United Nations Security Council Plus (A3 Plus) towards the Africa agenda in the PSC and in the UN Security Council.**

Session 1: *Building Integrated Capacity for Combating Counterterrorism and Violent Extremism,*

“20th Anniversary of the African Union Counter-terrorism Center: Achievements and Vision for the Future

10. The Panelists in this session acknowledged the global nature of terrorism and its growing threat in Africa, where the scourge is now prevalent in all five regions of the continent. They noted with deep concern the growing capacity of terrorist organizations to integrate the use of sophisticated modern technologies such as drones and artificial intelligence in their activities. They recalled all relevant AU and international instruments on terrorism, radicalization and violent extremism, in particular the Declaration on Terrorism and Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa, adopted by the 16th Extraordinary Session of the AU Assembly held on 28 May 2022, in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, as well as all relevant international instruments.

11. During the extensive deliberations, participants underscored the following:

- i. Member States to establish synergies for the effective early detection, prevention and swift combating of terrorism, as well as the development of comprehensive, integrated and whole-of-society security approaches, including through establishing deliberate socio-economic programs aimed at economically empowering the population, especially the Women and Youth. This will not only capture the hearts and minds of the people but will re-orient them away from the politics of identity to the politics of interests, in order to more effectively combat the scourge of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa;
- ii. Need for the AU Commission, in particular the AUCTC, AFRIPOL and CISSA, to work together towards the development of a new AU Continental Strategic Plan of Action on Counter-terrorism and, in this regard, to review and update the 2002 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of terrorism to ensure that the AU effectively adapts to the contemporary nature of terrorism on the Continent;
- iii. Enhancement of collective security approaches between and among Member States and RECs/RMs, including enhanced intelligence and information sharing as well as joint operations between and among Member States;
- iv. Utmost importance of fast-tracking the implementation of the Malabo Declaration adopted by the 16th Extraordinary Session of the AU Assembly held on 28 May 2022 as well as the Abuja Declaration of April 2024, particularly with regard to the operationalization of the Ministerial Committee on Counter-Terrorism and the PSC Sub-Committee on Counter-Terrorism;
- v. Enhancement of collaboration between and among Member States and also between and among the RECs/RMs, as well as the need for enhancing the effectiveness of the regional intelligence cooperation platform such as the Djibouti and Nouakchott Processes, and other complementary mechanisms;

- vi. Balance between kinetic and non-kinetic strategies that more positively address underdevelopment, poverty, unemployment and other drivers of conflict to address the structural root causes and catalysts of terrorism;
- vii. Need for partners and stakeholders to invest and provide the necessary support to facilitate the implementation of AU post-conflict, reconstruction and development programmes, including support for efforts of the AU PCRD Centre.
- viii. Need for Member States to ensure predictable, adequate and sustainable funding for their national defence and security institutions so as to ensure their robustness and to enable them to guarantee human security;
- ix. Member States to implement comprehensive approaches to combating the financing of non-State illegal armed groups, negative forces, and terrorist organizations, by implementing a multidimensional strategy that more effectively restricts the financial lifelines of such groups;
- x. Members to promote cooperation between States and to pursue the exploration of economic opportunities, in particular trade facilitation and cross-border infrastructure to strengthen the regional integration necessary for the consolidation of peace and security on the continent;
- xi. Expediting the development of a watchlist of terrorist organizations and individuals, including foreign terrorist fighters operating on the Continent;
- xii. Expediting the operationalization of the AU Special Fund for combating terrorism, as well as the operationalization of the Africa Arrest Warrant, in order to promote effective cooperation between and among Member States, with the active support of the African Standby Force;
- xiii. Need for the establishment and further strengthening of inclusive platforms for promoting genuine inter-faith and inter-community dialogue, as well as the efficacy of community-based approaches, mindful of the critical role of local communities, particularly traditional leaders and leaders of various religious persuasions;
- xiv. Emphasis on the efforts of the AU Champion on counter-terrorism and violent extremism, President of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, Mr. Abdelamadjid Tebboune, in advancing the AU agenda of combating terrorism and violent extremism;
- xv. Need to encourage Member States to continuously enhance/reinforce the institutional capacities of their national defence and security forces, including equipping them with the correct ideology of Non-Sectarianism; Pan-Africanism; and Nationalism, in order to ensure their resilience and capacity to more effectively defend their national unity and territorial integrity, as well as to guarantee the human security of their populations; and

- xvi. Encouragement of Member States to redouble investments in countering dangerous narratives that contribute to the easy radicalization and recruitment of the youth by terrorist organizations;

Session 2: Implementation of the Pact for the Future: “Focusing on the UN Security Council Reform and Update on the Implementation of the Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023)”:

- **On the Pact of the Future;**

12. The Seminar welcomed the adoption of the Pact for the Future and underscored the urgent need for the reform of the UN Security Council to make it more representative, inclusive, transparent, efficient, effective, democratic and accountable.

13. Participants expressed concern over the lack of progress on the reform of the UN Security Council and reiterated the call for the reform to be in line with the common African position, as enshrined in the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration, which emphasize the importance of ensuring that Africa has two permanent seats on the Security Council, with the same powers and privileges as the current Permanent Members. The Seminar further underscored the imperative of democratizing the penholder system in favour of the A3 Plus 1, especially on African files.

- **On UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023):**

14. Participants highlighted the lack of sufficient funding as a major challenge for Peace Support Operations in Africa and underscored the importance of UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) as an important framework for guaranteeing adequate, predictable and sustainable funding for AU-led Peace Support Operations. They called for its full operationalization and application to the new AU Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) as the first beneficiary case.

15. Furthermore, the Seminar underscored the need to ensure that AUSSOM does not face the same challenges that ATMIS and AMISOM faced over the years, namely the lack of adequate force multipliers and enablers, and insufficient funding.

16. Participants appealed to international partners to continue supporting ATMIS as it transitions to AUSSOM, including in addressing the current funding deficit. They welcomed the decision of the PSC, adopted during its 1236th meeting, to use part of the interest accrued from the AU Peace Fund, including the Crisis Reserve Facility, to contribute to the financing of AUSSOM.

CLOSED SEGMENT:

Session 3: Coordination between the PSC and the African Members of the United Nations Security Council Plus (A3 Plus) towards the Africa agenda in the PSC and the UN Security Council:

17. Participants noted the significant contribution of the High-Level Seminar towards enhancing and further strengthening the capacity of the A3 Plus 1 to more effectively discharge their continental mandate within the UNSC.

18. Participants commended Algeria for the successful coordination of the A3 Plus 1 and endorsed the summary of the A3 Plus 1 Ministerial Meeting, held on 24 September 2024, in New York. They also encouraged the A3 Plus1 to ensure the full implementation of the recommendations of the A3+ Ministerial meeting.

19. Participants noted with satisfaction the significant achievements made by the A3 Plus 1 since the launch of the 1st High-Level Seminar in 2013, in Oran, Algeria, and specifically commended the current A3 Members (Algeria, Mozambique and Sierra Leone). They commended the Republic of Mozambique, an outgoing A3 Member, in particular, for its exemplary contribution to the efforts of the A3 Plus 1. They congratulated the Federal Republic of Somalia on its election as the new Member of the A3 Plus 1 family and encouraged the incoming A3 to sustain the existing momentum in order to further strengthen the A3 cohesion, with a view to amplifying and spearheading the African voice within the UN Security Council.

20. Participants commended the AU Permanent Observer Mission to the UN in New York, as the Secretariat of A3+, for its continued support to the activities of the Group. They noted with concern the continued institutional capacity challenges facing the AU Permanent Observer Mission and reiterated the request for the Chairperson of the AU Commission to urgently find lasting solutions. Participants commended the Governments of Algeria, Morocco and Nigeria for the secondment of staff to the Mission and encouraged other Member States to do the same.

21. In addition, participants underscored as follows:

- a) Synchronization of the meetings of the PSC and those of the UNSC on matters relating to peace, security and stability in Africa, which come under the joint mandate of the two Councils, so as to ensure proper guidance to the A3 Plus;
- b) Need for ensuring continued push for the A3 to take effective pen-holders or co-pen-holding on African files on the UNSC Agenda, and which come under the joint jurisdiction of the two Councils;
- c) Frequency and institutionalization of the interactions between the PSC and A3 plus, at the level of experts and ambassadors on African issues, which come under the joint mandate of the two Councils;
- d) Strengthening of the A3 Plus mechanism with a view to getting the support of the future Caribbean countries in the UN Security Council;
- e) Need for the A3 Plus 1 to brief the PSC on a quarterly basis, or at any other time when the need arises, on African issues on the Agenda of the UN Security Council and which come under the joint mandate of the two Councils, for the purposes of information sharing and necessary guidance;
- f) Encouragement of the A3 Plus 1 to hold coordination meetings at the high level on the margins of the AU Summit the UN General Assembly, and Joint Consultations between the PSC and the A3 on the margins of the AU Assembly

Sessions; the UN General Assembly and the Annual Joint Consultative Meetings between the PSC and the UNSC;

22. Participants underscored the importance of further enhancing the institutionalization of the strategic partnership between the AU and the UN, with a view to further promoting coordination, coherence and complementarity of effort between the two institutions.

23. Participants also noted the significant progress achieved by the Oran Process and raised the possibility of replicating it on other thematic areas to foster common African positions.

24. Participants also took note of the progress made in the development of the Manual on Engagement between the PSC and A3+ and looked forward to its finalization by the Committee of Experts of the PSC before its submission to the Ambassadors for consideration and adoption.

V. CONCLUSIONS

25. Participants expressed gratitude to the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria and, in particular, to the Oran authorities for the generous hospitality and the excellent facilities that ensured the successful organization of the 11th High-Level Seminar. They also expressed gratitude to UNITAR, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland for their continued support towards the successful organization of the High-Level Seminar and looked forward to the successful organization of the 12th High-Level Seminar in Oran, Algeria, in December 2025.

AFRICAN UNION

الاتحاد الأفريقي

UMOJA WA AFRICA



UNION AFRICAINE

UNIÃO AFRICANA

UNIÓN AFRICANA

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. P.O. Box: 3243 Tel.: (251-11) 5513 822 Fax: (251-11)
5519 321

Email: situationroom@africa-union.org

**MINISTERIAL HIGH-LEVEL SEMINAR OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY
COUNCIL
COMMEMORATING 20 YEARS OF THE PSC BY TAKING STOCK OF WOMEN'S
PARTICIPATION AND LEADERSHIP IN PEACE PROCESSES IN AFRICA**

**23 MARCH 2024
SWAKOPMUND, NAMIBIA**

PSC/MIN/CONCL.INAUGURAL (2024)

CONCLUSIONS



CONCLUSIONS

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) organized a Ministerial High-Level Seminar on Women, Peace and Security, in Swakopmund, Republic of Namibia, on 23 March 2024. The Seminar was held under the theme: “Commemoration of the 20 years of the PSC by taking Stock of Women’s Participation and Leadership in Peace Processes in Africa”. Apart from the PSC Members, other participants included representatives of some Member States, the Network of African Women in Conflict Prevention (FemWise-Africa) and its regional chapters, African Women Leaders Network (AWLN), Pan African Women’s Organisation (PAWO), as well as representatives of the United Nations (UN) and partners, including African Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and think tanks.

The High-Level seminar was **officially opened by Hon. Dr. Peya MUSHELEGA (MP), Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of Namibia and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of March 2024.** During the opening ceremony, statements were delivered by H.E. Ambassador Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, and H.E. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of United Nations Secretary-General to the African Union and Head of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU).

NOTING the briefing by H.E. Mme Bineta Diop, Special Envoy of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on Women, Peace and Security and H.E. Hanna Serwaa Tetteh, United Nations Secretary-General Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa on the progress made thus far on the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in line with the relevant AU and UN instruments and policies;

ALSO NOTING the presentations by H.E. Amb Liberata Mulamula, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tanzania, AWLN Steering Committee Member and Member of the FemWise-Africa Network, Hon. Justice (Rtd) Effie Owour, Co-Chair of FemWise-Africa and Member of the AU Panel of the Wise, H.E. Ambassador Willy Nyamitwe, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Burundi to the AU and Ambassador Perpetua Dufu, Coordinating Director for Multilateral and International Organizations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration of the Republic of Ghana;

FURTHER NOTING the presentations by Ms. Mpule Kgetsi, African Youth Ambassador for Peace for Southern Africa; Faida Mwangilwa, Woman Peace leader who participated in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) peace process; Ms. Koiti Emmily, Signatory of the Revitalized Agreement on The Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) and Dr. Renata Hessmann Dalaqua (PhD), Head of Programme: Gender and Disarmament, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.; and

FOLLOWING EXTENSIVE DELIBERATIONS, PARTICIPANTS:

RECALLED the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights; the Maputo Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa and the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325;

APPLAUDED the PSC for *celebrating its 20th Anniversary* and for its dedication to

championing the Women, Peace and Security Agenda; **COMMENDED** the AU Commission for the progress made thus far, including the institutionalization of the Office of the Special Envoy on WPS, the establishment of FEMWISE Africa, African Women Leaders Network (AWLN), cooperation with the African First Ladies Peace Mission and the inclusion of female African Youth Ambassadors for Peace that enhancing women's participation in peace processes in the Continent;

REAFFIRMED the AU's commitment to promoting meaningful participation of women, particularly in the leadership of peace processes, including in conflict prevention, resolution, management, post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding, in line with the commitments to gender equality enshrined in the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) and other relevant universal human rights instruments and relevant Assembly and PSC decisions.

UNDERScoreD the AU's commitment to actualise Agenda 2063 and all its Aspirations, particularly Aspirations 3, 4 and 6, as well as the flagship programme of Silencing the Guns in Africa by the Year 2030.

EXPRESSED GRAVE CONCERN over the continued prevalence of violent conflicts in the Continent, which have a disproportionate impact on women;

ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER the continued underrepresentation of women in formal peace processes, despite the various institutional mechanisms in place at national, regional and Continental levels;

UNDERScoreD the critical role of women in the promotion of peace, security, stability and development in Africa, including the importance of women's participation in track one (I) mediation processes and the importance of inclusion of women in leadership of peace processes; in this regard, **UNDERLINED** the imperative for peace agreements to include gender provisions to address women's security in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction and development.

COMMENDED Member States that have already adopted National Action Plans (NAPs) for the implementation of the UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security and **ENCOURAGED** them to submit their reports to the Commission through the Continental Result Framework (CRF); **ALSO ENCOURAGED** Member States which are yet to adopt their NAPs to do so without further delays; and **REQUESTED** the Commission to provide the required technical support to accelerate the adoption and implementation of NAPs.

PARTICIPANTS AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING:

1. The AU to have a gender parity policy for all AU-led and co-led mediation processes and to reinforce the AU gender parity policy in the selection and appointment of local, national and continental mediators, special envoys and technical teams in all peace processes, as well as intergenerational inclusion in all AU-led and co-led processes;

2. The AU Commission to track and monitor the implementation of gender parity policy in peace processes and to develop accountability frameworks for meeting this target; including through annual reporting to the PSC on the progress made. In this regard, the Participants requested the AU Commission to develop a Policy Framework of Women Quotas in Formal Peace Processes across Africa, which will guide the Continent to meet the statutory minimum of thirty percent (30%) gender quota for women's participation in all conflict prevention and management missions, peace processes and election observation missions led by the AU; while reaffirming its adherence to the goal of full gender parity;
3. Member States and the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) to enhance cooperation and coordination to ensure the protection of women in formal and informal peace processes, as well as to develop a rapid response mechanism and a robust monitoring system that tracks the security situation of women representatives;
4. The AU and its Member States to adopt measures to capacitate and include women experts/gender experts in mediation and conflict management and resolution processes, drawn from, among others, the FemWise-Africa Network and African Women Leaders Network;
5. The AU to facilitate the establishment of platforms for consensus and coalition building among women to promote and amplify their collective voice and common agenda and ensure women's representation in technical or thematic working groups set up to lead thematic discussions in a national dialogue, as well as to enhance women's economic empowerment;
6. The AU, through the existing frameworks, to facilitate consultations with civil society organisations (CSOs) working on women and girls living in conflict settings to leverage their lived-in experiences and technical expertise in promoting peace and security at the community, local, and regional levels, with a view to deepening understanding of the particular needs and perspectives of women and include gender, women, peace, and security provisions in the outcomes.
7. The need to support women's CSOs and networks, with a view to strengthening women's peace networks and local movements advocating for gender equality and women's participation in peacebuilding.
8. The need for mobilization of financial resources, technical assistance, and capacity-building support to empower women-led initiatives and organizations working on peacebuilding and conflict resolution.
9. The need to provide support for CSOs to champion and advocate for gender-transformative policies that counter patriarchal norms, women's elevated positions in society, and the work of formal women delegates and representatives in peace negotiations and bodies tasked to implement conflict response initiatives throughout a peace process;
10. Need to redouble efforts in implementing the UN Security Council resolution 1325(2000) and for Member States to ensure that the National Action Plans on

Women, Peace and Security are costed and budgeted for, as a way of operationalizing the key interventions and programmes therein; in this regard, agreed to dedicate one session of the Peace and Security Council to focus on financing women, peace and security agenda in Africa;

11. The need to raise public awareness through engagement with policymakers, government institutions, civil society organizations and the general public to mobilize support for gender quota measures and initiatives aimed at increasing women's participation in peacebuilding. In this regard, highlighted the need for the special Envoy of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on Women Peace and Security, with the support of the AU Commission, to spearhead the campaign of raising awareness on the Continent;
12. The need to further enhance partnership and ensure synergies between the AU and the UN within the Joint AU-UN Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security on the promotion of women's participation and leadership in peace processes, in line with the principles of complementarity and building on comparative advantages;
13. The need to include women, peace and security agenda, in line with the celebration of the 20th Anniversary of the PSC, should be one of the agendas during the annual consultative meeting between the PSC and the UN Security Council;
14. The need for regular engagements of the PSC on women, peace, and security agenda at the ministerial level and in this context, agreed to institutionalize the '**High-Level Ministerial Seminar on Women, Peace and Security in Africa**' to be formally called the '**Swakopmund Process**,' to be held biennially on a rotational basis, as a platform for the PSC to engage with local, national, regional and continental actors on women peace and security matters.

FURTHERMORE, PARTICIPANTS:

PAID TRIBUTE to H.E. Hage Gottfried Geingob, the late President of the Republic of Namibia, for his distinct role in championing meaningful participation of women in decision-making globally; and **EXPRESSED** sincere condolences to the Government and People of the Republic of Namibia on his passing.

EXPRESSED GRATITUDE to the Government and People of the Republic of Namibia for graciously hosting the First Ministerial High-Level Seminar on Women, Peace and Security in Africa; and **CONGRATULATED** the Republic of Namibia on celebrating its 34th year of independence on 21 March 2024.

Adopted on 23 March 2024 in Swakopmund, Namibia

AFRICAN UNION

الاتحاد الأفريقي

UMOJA WA AFRICA



UNION AFRICAINE

UNIÃO AFRICANA

UNIÓN AFRICANA

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. P.O. Box: 3243 Tel.: (251-11) 5513 822 Fax: (251-11)
5519 321

Email: situationroom@africa-union.org

**PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL
HIGH-LEVEL COLLOQUIUM IN COMMEMORATION OF THE 20TH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE AUPSC**

**25 MAY 2024
DAR ES SALAAM, TANZANIA**

**DAR ES SALAAM DECLARATION
ON THE PSC 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE AUPSC**

DAR ES SALAAM DECLARATION ON THE PSC 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE AUPSC

We, the Members of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU),

On 24 May 2024, on the eve of the 20th Anniversary, the PSC in cooperation with the University of Dar es Salaam, hosted a Public Lecture on PSC@20 on the theme: “The Peace and Security we Want,” at the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The Public Lecture provided an opportunity for the PSC to engage with the public that included the Youth, Think Tanks, Researchers, Civil Society Organizations and Members of the private sector on the state of peace and security on the Continent and the preeminent role of the PSC in preventing, managing and resolving conflicts in Africa.

At our High-Level Colloquium, held on 25 May 2024, in Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, in marking the 20th Anniversary of the establishment of the PSC, having critically reviewed the work undertaken by the PSC during the past two decades, in the promotion of governance, peace and security in Africa, adopt the following Declaration:

RECALLING the relevant provisions of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) and the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, which attach paramount importance to the necessity of peace, security and stability in Africa, as necessary pre-conditions for the acceleration of socio-economic development and integration of the Continent;

RECALLING the Statement of Commitment to Peace and Security in Africa, adopted in Addis Ababa by the Heads of State and Government of the Members of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, PSC/AHG/ST.(X), on 25 May 2004, during the launching of the PSC, reaffirming our commitment to realize the objectives enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the Union and the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, the noble goal of silencing the guns in Africa by 2030, and aspiration 4 of AU Agenda 2063;

ACKNOWLEDGING that the establishment of the PSC marked a historic commitment by Africa to bring to an end conflicts and promote peace, security and stability. Today, we celebrate the Twentieth Anniversary of the establishment of the PSC with the participation of PSC Member States, relevant AU Organs and entities, Representatives of the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RECs/RMs), as well as African Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, Bilateral and Multilateral Partners;

STRESSING that this celebration provides an opportunity for the PSC to take stock of its achievements over the past two decades and the challenges that need to be urgently addressed, as well as its prospects in the next two decades to more effectively and efficiently discharge its mandate of promoting and maintaining governance, peace and security in Africa, in order to fulfil the noble goal of not

bequeathing the burden of conflict to the next generation of Africans and undertake to end all wars in Africa;

MINDFUL of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, conferring on the United Nations Security Council the primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security, as well as the provisions of the Charter on the role of regional arrangements in the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security, as well as the need to forge closer cooperation and partnership between the United Nations, other international organizations and the AU, in the promotion and maintenance of governance, peace and security in Africa;

GUIDED by the vision of our Union and **REAFFIRMING** our determination to create conducive conditions for “An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena”;

COMMITTED to respecting the principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act, Conventions and Protocols of the AU, namely respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty of States, as well as non-interference by a State in the internal affairs of another State;

TAKING NOTE of the keynote address by **H.E. Dr. Samia Suluhu Hassan**, President of the United Republic of Tanzania and Chairperson of the PSC for May 2024; statements delivered by Honourable Moulaye Mohamed Laghdaf, Minister Secretary General to the Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania on behalf of **H.E. Mohamed Ould Ghazouani**, President of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and Chairperson of the African Union; Honorable John Mulimba, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in charge of Regional Cooperation of the Republic of Uganda on behalf of **H.E. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni**, President of the Republic of Uganda; and the strategic reflection statement by **H.E. Moussa Faki Mahamat**, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission; **ALSO, TAKING NOTE** of the remarks by **H.E. January Makamba**, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation of the United Republic of Tanzania;

ACKNOWLEDGING the significant milestones that the PSC has achieved since its operationalization in May 2004, in addressing peace and security challenges in the Continent, including the enhancement of engagements with all AU Member States, the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), other AU Organs, the Civil Society Organizations, and the International Entities such as the United Nations Security Council and the European Union Political and Security Committee, and the League of Arab States, in order to find durable solutions to the peace and security challenges in Africa; and the signing and ratification of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council by fifty-three (53) AU Member States;

We,

1. **APPLAUD** all Member States for their continued support to the PSC and **ENCOURAGE** them to continue facilitating the work of the PSC in line with Article 7 (2) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union;

2. **COMMEND** the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) for their continued collaboration with the PSC, and **UNDERTAKE** to fully actualize the letter and spirit of Article 16 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, the 2008 Memorandum of Understanding, and the 2021 Revised Protocol on Relations Between the AU and the RECs;

3. **UNDERTAKE** to further enhance collaboration with all other AU Organs and entities whose respective mandates relate to the promotion of peace, security and stability in the Continent, as well as the general well-being of the African people, including but not limited to the Pan African Parliament, the African Peer Review Mechanism; the African Commission on Human and People's Rights, the African Court of Human and People's Rights, the Panel of the Wise, the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development/AU Development Agency;

4. **COMMEND** the United Nations and the AU Partners, in particular the European Union (EU) for the growing partnership with the AU in the area of peace and security within the spirit of enhancing the AU peace and security agenda and forging strategic partnerships for the Continent; also **COMMEND** the civil society organizations, African private sectors and the media for the support provided to the Council.

5. **UNDERScore THE NEED** for AU Member States to continue to further strengthen governance institutions, accelerate socio-economic development programmes, comprehensively address the structural root causes and drivers of conflicts, including governance deficits, and to redouble investments in infrastructures for peace, as well as respond more positively to the legitimate grievances of the population in promoting the nexus between peace, security, stability and development;

6. In the spirit of the ongoing AU institutional reform, **UNDERScore** the need to pursue common strategies to enhance the implementation of the PSC mandate for effective and efficient conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa;

7. **UNDERTAKE** to ensure the expeditious implementation of Declaration [Ext/Assembly/AU/Decl(XVI)] on Terrorism and Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa, adopted by the 16th Extraordinary Session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government on 28 May 2022 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea;

8. **UNEQUIVOCALLY CONDEMN** all manifestations of terrorism and violent extremism on the Continent and Reaffirm the importance of adopting comprehensive national, regional, and continental strategies to tackle the escalating menace of terrorism and its underlying causes, as well as all the factors that contribute to its expansion and dissemination; and in this context, **EMPHASIZE** the need for countries affected by terrorism to mainstream political solutions to their ongoing security and military measures;

9. **URGE** Member States and RECs to commit to resolving conflicts in accordance with the provisions of the Constitutive Act of the AU and the PSC Protocol, to call on them to redouble joint efforts to combat terrorism, armed groups, illicit cross-border trafficking in drugs, effectively prevent and curb the flow of illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons and the illegal exploitation of natural resources in order to promote the

silencing the guns initiative as envisaged in Agenda 2030 and Agenda 2063 of the Africa we want;

10. **UNDERTAKE** to redouble efforts to defeat insecurity in Africa and, in this regard, **AGREE** to build strong and professional armies equipped with the correct ideology of non-sectarianism, Pan-Africanism, and nationalism in order to defeat terrorism;

11. **EXPRESS** deep concern over the alarming resurgence of military coup d'état, which undermines democracy, peace, security and stability on the Continent, and **REITERATE** its zero tolerance on unconstitutional changes of government in line with AU Constitutive Act and **COMMIT** to implement all AU normative frameworks on illegal takeover of government in the continent;

12. **AGREE** to redouble efforts to address the governance deficits and promote democracy and good governance and uphold constitutionalism and fully respect all AU shared values, as defined in the AU Constitutive Act and other AU relevant instruments;

13. **UNDERTAKE** to further enhance the Council's conflict prevention mandate, including by responding swiftly to early warning signs of looming conflicts and crises and by making full use of all available preventive diplomacy tools, including the Panel of the Wise, FEMWISE, PANWISE, and YouthWISE; and **UNDERScore** the need for the Commission to elaborate a clear and objective criterion on a trigger mechanism so as facilitate the role of the PSC in assessing the need for early action, and such an approach should be consistently applied in all circumstances;

14. **APPEAL** to all Member States to address the issue of denialism whenever early warning signs are provided to prevent full-blown conflicts; **CALL FOR** stronger and more sustained support to countries emerging from conflict with regard to reconciliation and post-conflict stabilization, reconstruction and development to prevent relapses into conflict, including the full operationalization of the Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) Centre;

15. **UNDERScore THE NEED** to expedite the process to fully operationalize the AU Peace Fund and explore complementary sources of funding for peace and security matters, including special levies and engagement with the private sector and continental financial institutions; and **UNDERScore THE NEED** to implement all PSC decisions and **CALL** for greater political commitment and resources in support of the PSC and the pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA) to ensure effective implementation of the Architectures and decisions on governance, peace and security in the Continent;

16. **STRESS THE NEED** to ensure more meaningful and effective participation of women and youth in determining 'the Africa we Want' in the next two decades while **WE EMPHASIZE** the protection of children in conflict situations and other settings, as well as protection of their rights and well-being;

17. **REITERATE** the imperative for peaceful resolution of conflicts to minimize its effects on civilians, in particular women and children; **EXPRESS CONCERN** over the

increase in conflicts and tensions on the continent and its tragic consequences on millions of civilians, destruction of economic fabrics and infrastructure, as well as its humanitarian consequences and **APPEAL** to all Member States and the international community to continue to support Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), refugees and returnees, as well as countries hosting refugees;

18. **UNDERLINE** the need for the promotion of effective synergies between health security and peace security initiatives, including through collaboration between national health authorities, security forces, humanitarian agencies, regional and international organizations;

19. **EXPRESS DEEP CONCERN** over the increasing global cyber threats and attacks, which constitute a serious threat to national, regional and international peace and security and, in this respect, **ENCOURAGE** Member States to develop robust regulatory frameworks that facilitate the ethical use of ICTs, including the establishment of credible data governance infrastructure and to work together with the private sector, with a view to further strengthen the national cyber security capacities;

20. **COMMIT** to provide resources to enhance the capacity of the Department of Political Affairs Peace and Security and the PSC Secretariat in order to effectively support the work of the Council in discharging its mandate;

21. **FURTHER COMMIT** to continue promoting peace, security, and stability to achieve the goal of a conflict-free Africa, implementing aspiration 4 of AU Agenda 2063, which is the prerequisite for sustainable development;

22. **APPRECIATE** the contributions of the former Presidents H.E. Olusegun Obasanjo, former President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa region; H.E. Jakaya Kikwete, former President of the United Republic of Tanzania; H.E. Domitien Ndayizeye, former President of the Republic of Burundi and Member of the AU Panel of the Wise, as well as H.E. Ambassador Said Djinnit, the first AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, to the efforts towards prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and crises on the Continent; and

23. **EXPRESS DEEP APPRECIATION** to H.E. Dr. Samia Suluhu Hassan, the President of the United Republic of Tanzania and Chairperson of the Peace and Security Council for the month of May 2024, for chairing the 20th Anniversary High-Level Colloquium of the PSC, and **COMMEND** the Government and People of the United Republic of Tanzania for hosting the 20th Anniversary of the PSC.

***Adopted by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union
Dar Es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, on 25 May 2024***

AFRICAN UNION

الاتحاد الأفريقي

UMOJA WA AFRICA



UNION AFRICAINE

UNIÃO AFRICANA

UNIÓN AFRICANA

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. P.O. Box: 3243 Tel.: (251-11) 5513 822 Fax: (251-11)
5519 321

Email: situationroom@africa-union.org

**16TH RETREAT OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE AFRICAN
UNION ON THE REVIEW OF ITS WORKING METHODS**

**5 - 6 NOVEMBER 2024
DJIBOUTI, DJIBOUTI**

PSC/Retreat.16 (2024)

CONCLUSIONS



CONCLUSIONS OF THE 16TH RETREAT OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE AFRICAN UNION ON THE REVIEW OF ITS WORKING METHODS

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) held its 16th Annual Retreat on the Review of its Working Methods from 5 to 6 November 2024, in Djibouti, Djibouti. The Retreat was chaired by H.E. Ambassador Jean Leon Ilunga Ngandu, the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to the AU, in his capacity as the PSC Chairperson for November 2024. During the Opening Ceremony, H.E. Ambassador Bankole Adeoye, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, delivered a statement on behalf of the Chairperson of the AU Commission.

2. The Retreat was officially opened by H.E. Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and Spokesperson of the Government of the Republic of Djibouti. During the Official Opening Ceremony, statements were also delivered by the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and PSC Chairperson, H.E. Ambassador Jean Leon Ilunga Ngandu and by H.E. Ambassador Bankole Adeoye, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security.

II. PARTICIPATION

3. The Retreat was organized at the Ambassadorial level. All PSC Members, namely: Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo; Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, The Gambia, The Kingdom of Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Uganda participated at the Retreat, accompanied by the Members of the PSC Committee of Experts. The AU Commission was represented at the highest level by H.E. Ambassador Bankole Adeoye, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, who was accompanied by Dr. Alhaji Sarjoh Bah, the Director for Conflict Management Directorate and Ms. Patience Zanelie Chiradza, the Director for Governance and Conflict Prevention, Ms. Neema Chusi, the Head of the PSC Secretariat, as well as support staff. The detailed list of all participants is herewith attached as an Annex.

III. RATIONALE

4. The 16th Annual Retreat of the PSC was organized as part of the ongoing efforts to further strengthen the PSC working methods, with a view to enabling the PSC to more effectively and efficiently discharge its mandate of promoting peace, security and stability in Africa, within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and African Governance Architecture (AGA), as embodied in the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (herein after referred to as 'PSC Protocol').

IV. AGENDA OF THE RETREAT

5. The Retreat focused on the following key Agenda Items, namely:

- a) PAPS Footprints in Africa;
- b) Virtual tour of the ASF Continental Logistic Base;
- c) PSC Working Methods and Budget of the PSC; and
- d) Brainstorming on the Future of Complex Political Transitions in Africa: A Prospective Analysis of the End State and AU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Governments; and the PSC Sanctions Sub-Committee.

V. SUMMARY OF KEY OUTCOMES OF THE RETREAT

A. On the PAPS Footprints in Africa

6. After taking note of the presentation by the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, H.E. Bankole Adeoye, and while acknowledging that the tool « **AU PAPS Footprints in Africa** », is still work in progress, commended the Political Affairs Peace and Security (PAPS) Department for the innovation in the development of the tool, which is still work in progress, and underscored;

- a) The importance of de-segregating the data in the tool, in order to ensure enhanced clarity, including detailed information on the legal basis of each activity, the categories of the activities, the impact of each activity, progress registered thus far, challenges to be urgently addressed and intended target users and target beneficiaries of the programmatic activities being implemented by the PAPS in various Member States;
- b) The need to link the activities with the outcomes and the necessary working documents for each country, including all related decisions of the Assembly Decisions and PSC Communiqués and/or Press Statement, as well as reports of the of the AU Commission;
- c) The need for the tool to take into consideration the complexities of Member States in political transition and the activities being implemented by PAPS in supporting such countries to facilitate their expeditious return into the AU Family;
- d) The need for the tool to also include information relating to early warning on potential areas of instability in Africa, in order to further enhance the conflict prevention mandate of the PSC;
- e) The need for more clarity regarding the intended objectives and outcomes of the activities;
- f) The need for the DPAPS to ensure broad access by the intended users to the tool.

7. The PSC Members emphasized the need for the “The AU PAPS Footprints in Africa,” to be finalized, as soon as possible and shared with Member States.

B. On the Virtual tour of the Continental Logistic Base

8. The PSC took note of the virtual tour of the Continental Logistics Base, as well as the briefing by the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security and:
- a) Commended the Republic of Cameroon for its generosity in hosting the Continental Logistics Base.
 - b) Took note of the challenges to be urgently addressed, including the maintenance costs and the fact that some of the donated equipment is exposed to the harsh weather conditions and, as a result, is rusting;
 - c) Also took note of the visit to the CLB in August 2024, by H.E. Ambassador Bankole Adeoye, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs Peace and Security; and H.E. Ambassador Churchil Ewumbe Monono, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cameroon to the AU;
 - d) Urged the AU Commission to also appeal to other partners for assistance, including technical support to maintain and keep the equipment in a safe condition, including strategic lift assistance of the equipment to where it is needed most in the Continent;
 - e) Requested the AU Commission to submit to Council a comprehensive inventory of the equipment at the Base, including detailed recommendations on where some of the equipment can possibly be utilized immediately;
 - f) Took note of the appeal by the Commission to all Member States with strategic airlift capacity, to assist in transporting the equipment from the CLB to the Peace Support Operations in need, such as MNJTF and AUSSOM, and to the Regional Logistics Depots;
 - g) Also proposed the utilization of part of the Crisis Reserve Facility of the AU Peace Fund to support the airlifting of some of the equipment from the AUCLB to Member States and theatres where they are needed;
 - h) Urged the AU Commission to consider various options, such as sea drift, which would be comparatively a cheaper way of transporting the donated equipment to where it is urgently needed;
 - i) Directed the Military Staff Committee to urgently undertake a Field Mission to Douala with a new set of Terms of Reference (ToRs) and provide a detailed Report and Plan of Action for consideration to Council at the latest by December 2024p
 - j) Directed the AU Commission to submit a comprehensive report and the action plan matrix on the CLB, providing inventory costs for maintenance and airlifting/sea drift of the donated equipment, including key recommendations to decongest the Base and transport the equipment to where it is needed;

- k) Urged the Commission to urgently take necessary steps to mobilize required resources to build a security fence around the site for the CLB and the Medical Training Center, and
- l) Took note of the proposal by the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security for the PSC to consider undertaking a field visit to the CLB, in early 2025.

9. The PSC requested the Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department to provide a Comprehensive Report and Plan of Action (Matrix) to Council for consideration as soon as possible.

C. On the PSC Working Methods and Budget of the PSC: Challenges and Way Forward

10. The PSC took note of the presentations by Dr. Alhji Sarjoh Bah, the Director of the Conflict Management Directorate and Ms. Neema Chusi, Head of the PSC Secretariat, on the PSC Working Methods, whose scope included the status of implementation of the decisions of Council, the PSC Indicative Annual Programme of Work, challenges to be addressed and recommendations on areas that require improvements, going forwards. The PSC:

- a) Expressed concern over the gap between early warning and early action in terms of conflict prevention and, in this regard, underscored the need for the AU Commission to submit to Council periodic early warning reports, mindful of the related sensitivities/ confidentiality, in order to further enhance the conflict prevention mandate of Council;
- b) Underlined the need to improve the methodology of drafting PSC decisions, as well as the need for the PSC to dedicate more time to review the status of implementation of the decisions/pronouncements;
- c) Underscored the need for the PSC to continuously pay particular attention to the Member States in political transition, including through the provision of technical assistance to facilitate the expeditious restoration of constitutional order and those emerging from conflicts in order to prevent relapse;
- d) Also underlined the need for enhanced outreach activities, in order to popularize and raise public awareness of the PSC and its work ;
- e) Stressed the need for scaling up the interactions and collaboration between the PSC and the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) and, in this regard, called for the revival of the annual joint consultations, at least twice per year, while also continuously enhancing the collaboration and interactions with individual RECs/RMs, including by undertaking joint field missions, in order promote and deepen strategic convergence and common messaging;
- f) Also stressed the need for enhanced interactions and collaboration between the PSC and other Organs of the Union whose respective mandates are

complementary to the mandate of the PSC, including undertaking joint field missions;

- g) Underlined the need for the PSC to always include in the budget for the field missions, some symbolic humanitarian gesture in support of populations in dire humanitarian situations in IDP and Refugee camps;
 - h) Emphasized the need to strike a balance between country situations and thematic files on the agenda of the Council to preserve its *raison d'être*, The need for the monthly PSC Chairs to fully comply with the provisions of paragraph 12 of the Manual on the Working Methods of the PSC and Annual Indicative Programme of Work (AIP) in developing the Monthly Provisional Programme of Work, and in particular, to reduce the introduction of new thematic issues on the agenda of the PSC and to always strike a balance between their individual national self-interests and Continental interests;
 - i) The need for reviving and regularizing the monthly briefings by the PSC Chairperson to the PRC, on the activities of the PSC, in order to ensure accountability to the broader membership of the AU;
 - j) The importance of reinforcing the use of the PSC Troika at all necessary levels (from the PR level to the Committee of Experts level, to the Ministerial and Heads of State level), including in immediate follow-ups on the recommendations of PSC field missions;
 - k) Emphasized the need to synchronize the overlaps between the provisional monthly programme of work of the PSC and the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC);
11. The PSC further emphasized:
- a) The need for the PAPS Department to always circulate all working documents for the activities of the PSC, in good time ahead of the meetings in line with the relevant provisions of the Manual on PSC Working Methods (Article 16);
 - a) The need for the Committee of Experts (CoE) to regularly consider the Matrix of State of Implementation of the PSC Decisions at least quarterly, which shall be, henceforth, known as the 'Djibouti Formula';
 - b) The need to further enhance the confidentiality and integrity of the PSC work, including the working documents for its activities;
 - c) The importance of enhancing PAPS collaboration with other AU Commission Departments to maximize responses and to be more impactful on nexus projects;
 - d) The need to ensure that all PSC Members attend the Annual Retreats of the AU Special Envoys/Representatives;

- e) The need to consider the possibility of transcribing the records of PSC meetings in order to ensure accuracy and minimize the possibility of distortions;
- f) The need to regularize the reporting by the Military Staff Committee to the PSC, on its activities;
- g) The need for including the working languages of all PSC Members, in order to enable them to more effectively participate in the PSC meetings; and agreed that the PSC Budget should include the AU languages of Members of the PSC;
- h) The need to institutionalize and regularize interactions between the PSC and the Commission Chairperson, consistent with the Mombasa Retreat Conclusions, as well as with the rest of the Commissioners of the other AU Commission Departments.

D. On the Future of Complex Political Transitions in Africa: A Prospective Analysis of the End State and AU Responses to Unconstitutional Changes of Governments

12. The PSC took note of the presentation by the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security and had a preliminary reflection on the Future of the Complex Political Transitions in Africa: A Prospective Analysis of the End-State of AU Responses to Unconstitutional Changes of Government and the operations of the Sanction Committee

13. The PSC reiterated the AU's zero tolerance of unconstitutional changes in Africa, brainstormed on new developments regarding the implications of unconstitutional changes of government, and looked forward to the finalization of a comprehensive study on the matter incorporating the spirit and content of the deliberations at the 16th Retreat. Council also deliberated on the possibility of convening at the level of Heads of State and Government to deepening appreciation and provide further guidance on the issue of UCGs (to be caveated on the maturity of the process).

VI. CONCLUSION

14. Participants expressed gratitude to the Government and people of the Republic of Djibouti for graciously hosting the Retreat and for the warm hospitality.