

MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

AMANI AFRICA

Media and Research Services

April, 2025

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
		1 - Flag Day- for incoming members of Council. - International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action. 	2 Open session on Hate Crimes and Fighting Genocidal Ideology in Africa & 3rd Anniversary Commemoration of the Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. 	3	4	5
6	7 4th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between AU PSC and APRM Johannesburg, South Africa 	8	9	10	11 Update on the Status of the Operations of the AUSSOM. 	12
13	14	15 Adoption of the conclusions of the 4th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between AU PSC and APRM.	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23 The Imperative of a Combined Maritime Task Force in addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. 	24	25	26
27	28 Flag Ceremony for the Incoming Member of Council (Algeria) 	29 Update on the Status of the Operations of the AUSSOM. 	30 Review of the Political Transition Program of the Gabonese Republic. 			

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
THE MONTH AT A GLANCE

In April, under the stand-in chairship of the Republic of Uganda, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) which anticipated six substantive sessions and the PSC's 4th Annual Joint Retreat with the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

The initial PPoW envisaged five thematic sessions and only one country-specific session focusing on Somalia and the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission (AUSSOM). Following revision of the PPoW, the PSC added another session on AUSSOM based on the ministerial and summit level meetings of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) for the mission hosted by Uganda on 25 April.

The revision also saw the introduction of a session on the 'Review of the Political Transition Program of the Gabonese Republic' following the presidential elections held in Gabon on 12 April. Despite the addition of another session on 'Reflection on the implications of the reconfigured ECOWAS membership for Africa's Regional Integration agenda, Democracy and Stability,' the PSC did not go through with the session.

The sessions that transpired during the month resulted in five communiqués. However, the session on 'Hate Crimes and Fighting Genocidal Ideology in Africa' led to a press statement.



USE OF EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS IN POPULATED AREAS SPOTLIGHTED AS PSC COMMEMORATES INTERNATIONAL DAY FOR MINE AWARENESS AND ASSISTANCE IN MINE ACTION

On 1 April, the PSC convened its 1271st session to commemorate the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action.¹ A [communiqué](#) was adopted as the

¹ The session featured briefings by Rania Machlab, Head of Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to the AU. Representatives of AU Member States, the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms and the European Union also delivered statements during

outcome document of the session.

2025 marks the final year to meet the deadline set by the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Ottawa Convention) and the 2014 Declaration of State Parties to the Convention and the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines (Maputo Declaration) for a mine-free world, now extended to 2029 following the 5th Review Conference in Siem Reap, Cambodia last year. This session coincided with global setbacks facing the Ottawa Convention, including the use of landmines in some conflicts and the announcement by some European countries of a plan of [withdrawal](#), citing the deteriorating security situation in the region, marked by military threats to States bordering Russia and Belarus.

As one of the regions of the world affected by landmines and increasingly by the use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas, this theme is of significance for the safety and well-being of civilians. The policy significance attached to the subject is reflected by the fact that 51 of AU's 55 Member States are party to the Ottawa Convention. The session served as an occasion to review the state of affairs around landmines, Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) on the continent and the progress in providing Member States with assistance in Mine Action, as well as to highlight the threats posed by Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (EWIPA).

One of the key areas of focus of the session was the critical issue of funding. The PSC voiced deep concern over the dwindling financial support for Mine Action, which severely hampers demining efforts in Member States affected by landmines and ERW. This funding shortfall is compelling nations to significantly scale back their Land Mine Action Programmes and

clearance operations. Of particular concern are anticipated shifts in policy and funding priorities from major donors, notably the U.S., which could have severe repercussions for demining efforts in more than 14 AU Member States reported to be contaminated by landmines (For a more detailed discussion on the various challenges facing the continent in relation to mine action, see the 31 March 2025 edition of '[Insights on the PSC](#)'). In addition to a general appeal to the international partners to increase support for Africa's efforts to eradicate landmines and ERW, the PSC focused on two other additional approaches. First, the need for national ownership and the primary responsibility of states. Second, and notably, **it called for 'the establishment of a continental mechanism for mine action.'** What is missing is how to source and mobilise the requisite funds for supporting member states and for the continental mechanism to play the role of filling in the growing gaps in mine action.

Relevant previous PSC decisions:

- 1072nd session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1072 \(2022\)](#)]: the PSC requested the AU Commission, with RECs/RMs support, to organise an advocacy forum for Member States and all stakeholders to exchange views and share experiences on addressing threats posed in mine action in Africa.
- 1146th session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1146 \(2023\)](#)]: the PSC called for the establishment of a Continental Mechanism for mine action to coordinate and support the efforts of Member States.

the session.

The PSC also addressed the progress registered and challenges faced by mine action on the continent. It welcomed the successful eradication of landmines by some member states. Twelve (12) Member States previously contaminated with anti-personnel mines have reported being mine-free.² On the other hand, it is concerning that a significant number of Member States remain affected by landmines. Moreover, the re-emergence of landmines in some countries previously declared mine-free—including Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, and Mauritania—has raised alarm. Accordingly, the PSC expressed deep concern over the persistent threat posed by anti-personnel mines, ERW and the growing danger of IEDs, which have become the weapon of choice for non-state armed groups, including terrorist organisations, across the continent.



Figure 1: PSC's 1271st session
(Source: X @AUC_PAPS)

This year's session also drew attention to the issue of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (EWIPA), in light of the increasing

² The 12 Member States are: Algeria, Burundi, Republic of Congo, Djibouti, The Gambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Swaziland, Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia.

urbanisation of armed conflicts and the use of explosive weapons, as recently observed in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The use of such weapons in populated areas has been documented to have devastating impacts on civilians and civilian infrastructure. Instead of mobilising political will for ending the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, the PSC resorted to a less ambitious policy position. It thus encouraged member states to urgently review and adapt their military policies and practices, and to adopt policy measures that *limit* the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas—*unless adequate mitigation measures* are in place to reduce their broad impact and the risk of civilian harm.' It was a missed opportunity that the use of the words 'encourage' and 'limit' watered down the force of the policy course of action to be adopted by member states. Not only are member states encouraged only to 'limit', but also such limitation can be put aside if 'adequate mitigation measures' for reducing the broad impact of the use of explosive weapons are taken. Despite the significance of the formulation of the PSC's request as a negotiated compromise, the qualifications can undermine effective implementation.

Regarding the Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas—formally endorsed by 83 states in November 2022—the PSC requested the AU Commission to continue sensitising Member States on the humanitarian impacts of such weapons and the importance of the Declaration. The PSC also urged those Member States that have not yet done so to endorse the Declaration, given that only 11 AU Member States have done so to date. In view of the upcoming Second International Conference on the Political Declaration, scheduled for November 2025 in Costa Rica,

the PSC encouraged AU Member States to actively participate in preparations, including through the drafting of a Common Plan of Action outlining steps in support of the Declaration.

In terms of the PSC's long-standing request for the review of the AU Mine Action and Explosive Remnants of War Strategic Framework (2014–2017) and the development of a Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) Strategy, the session underscored the urgent need for the AU Commission to share the draft of these documents with Member States for review and validation. Although Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are not explicitly mentioned in this context, their engagement in the review and validation process will be important before their submission to the Council for consideration.

Key actionable decisions requiring follow-up:

The PSC:

- Urged the AU Commission to share the updated AU Strategy on Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW), as well as the Draft AU Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) Strategy, with Member States for review and validation.
- Requested the AU Commission to continue sensitising Member States in promoting a better understanding of the humanitarian impacts of explosive weapons, including landmines and cluster munitions in populated areas, as well as the importance of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (EWIPA) Political Declaration, and the policy and practical changes it seeks to generate.
- Called for the establishment of a continental mechanism for mine action.
- Encouraged member states to further strengthen their national regulation

and control measures for materials and components used in manufacturing landmines and IEDs, and to review and adapt military policies and practices to adopt policy measures limiting the use of explosive weapons with a wide impact area in populated areas.

NO MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT IN THE PSC SESSION COMMEMORATING THE 1994 GENOCIDE

On 2 April, the PSC convened its 1272nd session as an open session on Hate Crimes and Fighting Genocidal Ideology in Africa in accordance with the Council's 678th session decision to convene an annual session on the theme of April and in commemoration of the 31st anniversary of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.³



Figure 2: The PSC's 1272nd meeting
(Source: X @AUC_PAPS)

The session the PSC held on 2 April 2025 was dedicated to the annual standing thematic agenda on hate crimes and fighting the ideology of genocide in Africa, which is convened to mark the commemoration of the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda. It is worth noting that this

³ The session featured addresses from Charles Karamba, Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the AU, recorded statements by Adama Dieng, AU Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, and Alice Wairimu Nderitu, UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.

session was held against the background of a growing regional and continental sentiment against the fighting in Eastern DRC involving the M23.⁴ The outcome of the session was a [press statement](#), which largely reiterates past pronouncements rather than outlining new substantive elements. Even then, the statement is characterised by the use of broadly formulated language without much reference to Rwanda as in the past.

The Statement references Assembly Decision [\[Assembly/AU/Dec.695\]](#) (2018) and previous decisions such as the [678th](#) meeting, to reinforce the PSC's commitment to structured, institutional commemoration and to prevention.

The convening of the session signifies the importance of remembering the tragedy that unfolded in Rwanda in 1994 as an act of both paying respect to the victims and survivors and being reminded of the lessons from that catastrophe. The session also addressed such challenges as the denial of the genocide and the fact that various individuals suspected of playing an active part in the genocide remain at large. Additionally, the session reflected on how to deal with hate crimes and the ideology of genocide, both at the national and continental levels. The PSC also used the occasion to follow up on the outcome of its previous sessions.

In terms of the lessons from the 1994 genocide, the interventions and the deliberation underscored the need for member states to 'fully comply with their commitments to fight impunity' and the importance of promoting accountability. Considering the role the media played in 1994, the PSC called on the media to play a positive role and to more actively engage [in preventing](#) and fighting incitement to

⁴ See for example 1256th session and 1261st session of the PSC held at Ministerial and Summit levels respectively.

hatred and violence by adopting journalism principles, guidelines and ethical values.' In addition, the statement called for civic education and the promotion of tolerance, underscoring the importance of cultural and educational interventions in long-term prevention.

With respect to the challenge of denial of the genocide, which the AU Special Envoy described as a travesty to the victims and survivors, the PSC limited itself to making a general statement on 'the need for Member States to continuously fight genocide denialism in all its manifestations.' It is worth recalling that PSC's 1088th session was more specific in calling on member states not to allow 'deniers any space and/or platform for denial activities in their territories.' Concerning individuals indicted for their role in the genocide, the PSC called on AU Member States and the international community 'to cooperate with the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals and the Government of Rwanda in the arrest and prosecution of the remaining indicted fugitives,' and 'to further investigate, arrest, prosecute, or extradite all fugitives accused of genocide who may be residing in their territories.'

On the issue of how to deal with hate crimes and ideology of genocide, the session put emphasis on the need at the national level 'to promulgate legislation and establish national institutions for the effective prevention and combating of the ideology of hate, hate crimes, and genocide.' At the continental level, the session underscored the necessity of strengthening the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) in detecting warning signs and in strengthening 'the cyber capabilities in the CEWS to detect online disinformation and hate speech, particularly those of ethnic and religious nature.' Additionally, the Council stressed the need for establishing

a Continental Research Centre on Hate Speech and Genocide Ideology.’

Although it reiterated the calls it has previously made such as for the Panel of the Wise to undertake a review of the status of implementation of the recommendations contained in the Report of the OAU International Panel of Eminent Personalities on the 1994 Rwanda Genocide and the Surrounding Events and the establishment of a Continental Research Center on Hate Speech and Genocide ideology, it failed to provide a concrete roadmap and timeline. This reflects a familiar tendency in previous pronouncements, such as 678th, 1088th and 1206th meetings, where forward-looking commitments were not accompanied by elements for their practical operationalisation.

The only new thing in the statement is that the PSC took note of the adoption of Note [507 \(S/2024/507\)](#) by the UNSC, which, among others, allowed equal access to all UNSC archives, including the Rwanda genocide archives, to all elected members of the UNSC. This milestone was made possible through the efforts of the A3 – the African non-permanent members of the UNSC who successfully challenged previous restrictions that limited access to key documents to the five members of the Security Council.

Apart from the terse formulation of the statement, reflective of the background against which the session was held, the fact that the contents of the statement made no reference to current manifestations of mass atrocities in some conflict settings makes the session sound largely performative. The silence of the outcome of this session is a far cry from the observation of the AU Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and other Atrocities, Adam Deng that ‘[f]ar too many crises in almost all regions of our continent feature acts that may constitute

atrocities...genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.’ As such, this session is a manifestation of the disconnect between the work of the PSC and the realities of violent conflicts on the continent, underscoring the need for course correction.

Relevant previous PSC decisions:

1088th Session: [[PSC/PR/COMM.1088 \(2022\)](#)] PSC:

- Requested the Panel of the Wise to undertake a review of the status of implementation of the recommendations contained in the Report of the OAU International Panel of Eminent Personalities on the 1994 Rwanda Genocide and the Surrounding Events

1206th Session: [[PSC/PR/BR.1206 \(2024\)](#)]: PSC:

- Reiterated the call for the Panel of the Wise to undertake a review of the status of implementation of the recommendations contained in the Report of the OAU International Panel of Eminent Personalities on the 1994 Rwanda Genocide and surrounding events

Key actionable decision requiring follow-up

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to further strengthen the operational capacities of the cyber units integrated into the CEWS, by equipping them with advanced technologies for the automated detection of online disinformation campaigns, in particular those of an ethnic or religious nature.
- Reiterated the call for the Panel of the Wise to undertake a review of the status of implementation of the recommendations contained in the Report of the OAU International Panel of Eminent Personalities on the 1994

Rwanda Genocide and the Surrounding Events.

- Encouraged AU Member States, in collaboration with the AU Commission, to develop partnerships with digital platforms, the media, and civil society to combat misinformation and prevent the dissemination of content that incites hatred and violence.

PSC RECEIVES BRIEFING ON AUSSOM'S DEEPENING FUNDING CRISIS, WITH NO END IN SIGHT

On 11 April, the PSC held its 1273rd session to receive a briefing on the status and operations of the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM)—the first such update since AUSSOM's mandate commenced on 1 January 2025. As the session was primarily intended for information sharing, the outcome of the session took the form of a summary record. Convened on short notice, the session followed a last-minute revision to the PSC's April programme of work, which had initially scheduled the AUSSOM briefing for 17 April. It also came ahead of the Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of AUSSOM Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), which had been postponed from 15 April to 23–25 April in Entebbe, Uganda. While the agenda was framed as an update on the status of the operations of AUSSOM, the main concern of the session was the funding of the mission.

As extensively discussed in our [‘Insights on the PSC’](#), AUSSOM faces a critical funding challenge, with the total cash requirement to settle ATMIS liabilities for AUSSOM for the period January to June 2025 amounting to over US\$92.1 million. However, the approved available commitment to cover the 2025

AUSSOM budget currently stands at only US\$16.7 million, comprising contributions from China (US\$1 million), Japan (US\$3 million), Republic of Korea (US\$1.6 million), and the Crisis Reserve Facility of the AU Peace Fund (US\$10 million). This has placed significant strain on the new mission, which commenced operations not only without securing sustainable funding but also while grappling with the huge debt it inherited from its predecessor, ATMIS.


The severity of the challenge was aptly captured by IGAD Executive Secretary, Workneh Gebeyehu, during the ministerial meeting of AUSSOM TCCs on 24 April in Kampala, Uganda, where he [remarked](#) that ‘[t]he mission that began on New Year’s Day under UN Resolution 2767 inherited not just ATMIS’s mandate but also a funding shortfall of 96 million dollars.’

Although UN Security Council Resolution 2767, which authorised AUSSOM, requested the UN Secretary-General to implement the ‘hybrid implementation’ of the Resolution 2719 framework for AUSSOM—whereby 75% of the mission’s budget would be covered by UN assessed contributions, with the remaining 25% to be mobilised by the AU and UN from other sources—the application of this framework was made subject to an additional layer of decision-making envisaged in paragraph 39 of Resolution 2767. This session was convened as the UN Security Council was set to consider this financial arrangement around mid-May.

Against this backdrop, the PSC expressed concern over the significant debt inherited from ATMIS and the three-month payment arrears to AUSSOM personnel. While highlighting the need to intensify efforts to secure predictable and sustainable funding for AUSSOM, the Council hoped for the urgent organisation of the international donor pledging conference in Doha, Qatar,

to support AUSSOM and Somalia. Although the conference was initially scheduled for the end of April and has since been postponed to the end of May, no new date has yet been confirmed. Noting the contributions—albeit modest—made by new donors such as China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, the session also encouraged other partners to follow suit.

Meanwhile, it appears that Council members were briefed on a planned visit by the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) to the U.S. Congress in Washington, D.C., aimed at convincing the Trump administration to support the application of Resolution 2719. The visit took place in May, during which Commissioner Bankole engaged various interlocutors, including members of the U.S. Congress and the State Department. However, reports indicated that this final ditch effort by the AU to secure U.S. backing for the application of Resolution 2719 to AUSSOM ultimately failed. This was further reflected during the 12 May [closed consultations](#) of the UN Security Council on AUSSOM, where the U.S. reaffirmed its categorical rejection of applying the resolution to the mission.



PSC communiqué of [1236th](#) session

Internally, the session underscored the need to further explore the possibility of tapping into the AU Peace Fund and utilising equipment from the AU Continental Logistics Base in Douala, Cameroon, to support the mission. The AU has already committed \$10 million from the Peace Fund to AUSSOM for this year. Although the PSC's [1236th](#) session recommended using part of the interest accrued from Peace Fund investments to 'substantially contribute to the financing of [AUSSOM]', it remains to be seen how far the

AU can go in committing additional funds beyond the \$10 million already allocated. As noted in our 28 April 2025 edition of '[Insights on the PSC](#),' given that AUSSOM has received the largest commitment from the Fund to date, the call for additional allocations may face significant pushback from some PSC members. Some members fear that the Peace Fund could be diverted into becoming a de facto financing mechanism for AUSSOM at the expense of other peace and security initiatives on the continent.

Taken together, these developments point to the high stakes facing AUSSOM, whose ability to deliver on its mandate is now critically dependent on addressing the existential funding crisis facing it.

PSC ENDORSES AUSSOM TCCS AND TROOP ALLOCATION FOLLOWING KEY COORDINATION MEETING

On 29 April, at its 1276th session, the PSC convened for the second time to receive an update on the status of the operations of AUSSOM, with a [communiqué](#) adopted as an outcome document.⁵ Unlike the first session—which primarily involved an information-sharing briefing by the Commissioner for PAPS on the funding aspect of the mission—this session featured a more comprehensive deliberation on key issues related to the full operationalisation of the mission, as well as the overall situation in Somalia, including political, security, and humanitarian developments.

The session took place at a critical juncture for both Somalia and the operationalisation of AUSSOM. The country is facing mounting challenges, with Al-Shabaab intensifying its offensives in the Middle Shebelle, Lower

⁵ IGAD was one of the speakers at the session.


Shebelle, and Hiraa regions, and carrying out attacks in Mogadishu. The attack on Adan Yabaal—a strategic town and logistical hub for government forces located about 245 km north of Mogadishu—was particularly significant, marking a major setback in the fight against the group. It raised serious concerns that years of security interventions and sacrifices in Somalia could be quickly reversed. In this context, the PSC expressed concern over the prevailing security situation and particularly condemned the 18 March car bomb attack in Mogadishu targeting President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.

Although the situation in Somalia demands greater political unity between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the Federal Member States (FMS), deep divisions persist—particularly between the FGS and Puntland and Jubaland. A key point of contention remains the proposed direct voting model. During the session, the Council urged the FGS and all political stakeholders to ‘remain open to political dialogue towards peaceful, inclusive and transparent elections.’

On the humanitarian front, the Council appealed to humanitarian actors to scale up support for the 2025 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, which, as of 28 February 2025, was only 12.4 per cent funded.

Ongoing efforts to operationalise AUSSOM were a major focus of the session. A key highlight of the communiqué adopted at the session was the PSC’s endorsement of the outcomes of the Somalia Operations Coordination Committee (SOCC) meeting held on 25 February 2025 in Addis Ababa. That meeting reached an agreement on the Troop and Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs) for AUSSOM, as well as the military breakdown of the mission. The PSC endorsed Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda as AUSSOM TCCs. In

terms of the deployment of the new TCC, Egypt troops, the PSC highlighted the need to expedite AU and UN procedures for the deployment of Egyptian troops, echoing the communiqué of the 25 April 2025 AUSSOM TCCs Summit. If this reference to AU and UN procedures includes the establishment of the financing mechanism for AUSSOM, it is not clear how the non-finalisation of this mechanism affects the deployment of the troops.



Troop contributions to AUSSOM, as endorsed by the PSC Communique [PSC/PR/COMM.1276 (2025)]

The PSC also endorsed Egypt, Nigeria and Sierra Leone as Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) providing Formed Police Units (FPUs), with further support from individual police officers from Djibouti, Eswatini, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia. Meanwhile, during the February SOCC meeting, it was confirmed that Burundi troops, as well as Ghanaian and Ugandan FPUs, would not be part of AUSSOM’s T/PCCs. (Burundi’s exclusion followed disagreements with the FGS regarding troop allocations.) In light of this, the PSC directed the AU Commission, in coordination with the UN, to ensure a smooth and coordinated repatriation of Burundian troops and the Ghanaian and Ugandan FPUs to avoid any security vacuum. It further urged the AU and UN to finalise the procedures for their repatriation.

Additionally, the PSC welcomed the AUSSOM deployment plan and the roadmap for the liquidation of ATMIS. These were the outcomes of a four-day [technical working sessions](#) held in Mogadishu, involving the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) of the AU Commission, the FGS, and T/PCC representatives. The technical working session culminated in the finalisation of AUSSOM's capabilities generation and deployment plan, along with the roadmap for ATMIS's closure and liquidation.

The other key highlight is its endorsement of the [communiqué](#) of the Extra-Ordinary Summit of AUSSOM TCCs adopted on 25 April 2025 in Entebbe, Uganda. It is recalled that the Summit had agreed to submit its decisions and recommendations to the PSC for endorsement and onward transmission to the UN Security Council as a working document. The summit, which was preceded by a preparatory senior officials and ministers meeting on 22-24 April that critically assessed the security situation in Somalia and the performance of AUSSOM, adopted key decisions to preserve the hard-won security gains achieved over the years.

As previously noted in our ['Insights for the PSC'](#), the decisions of the Summit reflect a clear admission that the drawdown of ATMIS forces in recent years has not been replaced with Somali forces as planned, creating a major security vacuum that Al Shabaab has been able to exploit to regain territories.

In this context, the TCCs Summit underscored the need to increase AUSSOM troop levels on a bilateral basis in the short term to address the deteriorating security situation in Somalia. The [ministerial report](#) submitted to the Summit recommended augmenting the authorised AUSSOM troop strength of 11,146 by at least 8,000 through bilateral arrangements—underscoring the gravity of the prevailing security threat.

Echoing the communiqué of the Summit, the PSC, in its communiqué adopted at the 1276th session, 'commended' and 'encouraged' the 'commitment of TCCs to deploy additional troops on a bilateral basis'.

On its part, the FGS is expected to recruit Community/Local Defence Forces and mobile forces to hold and consolidate the areas that were liberated, while directing the Chiefs of Defence Forces of the TCCs plus Somalia to work out a comprehensive plan to deter, degrade and eliminate Al Shabaab. The summit also endorsed the proposal for enhancing air assets and capabilities, as well as strengthening Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), considering the fragmented deployment of AUSSOM TCCs and their limited ability to support Somali Security Forces in conducting mobile operations.

Perhaps the most controversial outcome of the TCCs meeting—particularly within Somalia's domestic politics—is the proposal to establish a TCCs plus Somalia Peer Review Mechanism at the Heads of State and Government level, to be chaired by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, Uganda's President and Dean of the TCCs, with support from the AU Commission as institutional memory and Secretariat. Although this was one of the key outcomes of the ministerial meeting and its report was adopted by the TCCs Summit, the proposal was not reflected in the Summit's final communiqué. Some Somali observers viewed the mechanism as placing Somalia's politics under external oversight and therefore compromising the country's sovereignty. Somali officials, however, [rejected](#) this line of interpretation, asserting that the mechanism is solely [aimed](#) at enhancing the effectiveness of AUSSOM.

The funding challenge facing AUSSOM received only limited attention during this session, with the communiqué devoting just one paragraph to the issue—likely because the PSC’s previous session on 11 April had focused specifically on funding. While reiterating its ‘deep concern’ over the mission’s financial shortfall, the PSC restated measures proposed in earlier sessions, including the 1273rd session of 11 April. These measures include consideration of the urgent use of additional resources from the AU Peace Fund, enhanced engagement with partners for financial support (including the utilisation of Resolution 2719 and its hybrid component), the convening of a resource mobilisation forum for AUSSOM and Somalia, and the exploration of innovative approaches to raise funds from both traditional and non-traditional partners and stakeholders. (For a more detailed discussion on the issue of funding, see the section on the PSC’s 1273rd session in this edition of the Monthly Digest.)

Key actionable decisions requiring follow-up:

The PSC:

- Directed the Commission, in close collaboration with the UN, to ensure the smooth repatriation of the Burundian troops, as well as Ghanaian and Ugandan FPU, in an orderly and coordinated manner to avoid a security vacuum.
- Requested the AU and UN to finalise the procedures for the repatriation of Burundian troops, as well as Ghanaian and Ugandan FPU.
- Called on the T/PCCs and the FGS in coordination with the AU Commission to finalise the necessary steps for the full and expeditious deployment of AUSSOM.
- Underscored the need to finalise the AU and UN procedures to expedite the deployment of the Egyptian troops.

In relation to addressing the perennial financial challenges facing AUSSOM, the PSC also called:

- For the consideration of the urgent use of additional resources from the AU Peace Fund.
- To scale up the engagement with partners for financial support, including the utilisation of the UNSC Resolution 2719 (2023) and its hybrid component.
- For the convening of a resource mobilisation forum for AUSSOM and Somalia.
- To explore innovative approaches to raising resources from both traditional and non-traditional partners and stakeholders.

PSC CONSIDERED THE OUTCOME OF ITS JOINT RETREAT WITH APRM

On 15 April, the PSC held its 1274th session on the adoption of the conclusions of the 4th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the PSC and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

The [communiqué](#) endorses the Conclusions of the Fourth Joint Retreat of the PSC and the APRM, held on 7–8 April 2024 in Johannesburg, South Africa, under the theme: ‘Enhancing the role of the APRM in early warning and in contributing towards conflict prevention and strengthening good governance in accordance with AU normative instruments.’

The communiqué reflects the continued collaboration between the PSC and the APRM, building on a series of joint retreats, including the [Third Joint Retreat](#) and earlier engagements such as the Second Joint Retreat held in 2022. This sustained engagement underscores efforts to operationalise the APRM’s mandate in early

warning, as outlined in Assembly Decision [\[Assembly/AU/Dec.686 \(XXX\)\]](#) adopted in 2018. That decision explicitly called for the enhancement of the APRM's early warning capacity, in alignment with initiatives such as Silencing the Guns, which prioritises preventive diplomacy and governance reform.

The communiqué is nonetheless constrained by several limitations. Chief among these is the lack of specificity in its recommendations. While it endorses the conclusions of the Fourth Joint Retreat, it neither summarises nor elaborates on them, thereby undermining transparency. In the absence of clearly defined action points, implementation timelines, or resource commitments, the Communiqué risks implementation challenges.

The PSC-APRM joint retreat's effectiveness could be significantly strengthened through the inclusion of detailed action plans, enhanced accountability mechanisms, and more inclusive stakeholder participation, particularly the Continental Early Warning System and the early warning system and governance institutions of RECs/RMS. The ultimate success of the outcome of the consultation and the PSC session on the outcome will depend on the extent to which its previous commitments and the details in the outcome of the 4th retreat are translated into measurable and actionable outcomes within the continent's evolving governance and security context.

Key actionable decision requiring follow-up

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission and APRM Continental Secretariat to ensure the implementation of the Conclusions and report back to the next PSC-APRM Joint Retreat.

PSC SHAPING A NEW MARITIME SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IN THE GULF OF GUINEA

On 23 April, the PSC held its 1275th session to discuss the imperatives of the Combined Maritime Task Force in addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. The outcome of the meeting was adopted as a [communiqué](#).

The session included a series of presentations and statements from key regional and continental stakeholders.⁶ However, despite the importance of receiving an update from the AU Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department, the department was not represented and therefore did not provide a briefing on the implementation of previous decisions.

One of the key outcomes of the session was the PSC's endorsement of the Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF) for the Gulf of Guinea as a standing, ready-to-deploy force, capable of delivering rapid and coordinated maritime security responses across the region. In addition to endorsing the CMTF, the PSC also affirmed the CMTF's vision of a united, secure, safe, and resilient region, free

⁶ Moses Vilakati, AU Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development, Sustainable Environment, and the Blue Economy, opened with insights on the AU's strategic maritime vision. Emmanuel Budu Addo, speaking on behalf of Jose MBA Abeso, Executive Secretary of the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GoG), delivered a message underscoring regional cooperation. Commodore Mohammad Saghir Shettima, Coordinating Commander of the Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF), offered an operational perspective on joint deployments and maritime security readiness. Ahamada Soilihi Hassan, representing the Indian Ocean Commission, contributed a critical voice on the need for cross-regional synergy. The discussion was further enriched by statements from representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

from transnational organised crime.

Beyond expressing its endorsement, in an effort to set up the institutional backbone of the Task Force, the PSC requested the AU Commission to facilitate the further development of the Task Force, welcomed the adoption of the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) by additional member states, and encouraged others to consider joining the initiative. The Council also emphasised the need to advance the Task Force's operational instruments and urged Member States of the Gulf of Guinea Commission to extend their political backing for its effective operationalisation. Furthermore, the PSC emphasised the need for the Military Staff Committee to visit the CMTF headquarters in Lagos to gather direct insights and advise the PSC on advancing its operationalisation. While this political commitment provides essential legitimacy and momentum, it must be accompanied by concrete resource mobilisation and inclusive engagement, ensuring that less-resourced littoral states are not left behind in the implementation process. Additionally, translating these institutional arrangements into a tangible maritime presence and effectiveness will require adequate funding, logistical support and coordination.

The outcome also reflects a growing momentum in developing institutional and operational frameworks for advancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, deserving of sustained support from the AU. Additionally, symbolic steps, like the proposed flag-off ceremony and Nigeria's readiness to host the CMTF headquarters, highlight political will on both sides of the AU and Member States. Institutionally, the PSC reiterated its call for the AU Commission to take concrete measures to ensure inclusive stakeholder engagement, including the formal inauguration of the Committee of African Heads of Navies and Coast Guards

(CHANS), as outlined in the AIMS 2050 framework.

The emphasis on coordinated maritime deployments and readiness to establish permanent headquarters suggests growing interest and commitment. However, the reliance on individual states for leadership and hosting functions, in the absence of a clear burden-sharing framework, also raises concerns about long-term sustainability and inclusivity.

On capacity building, the Council recognised the importance of intelligence sharing, joint operations, and strategic partners to support the Gulf of Guinea Commission in planning and conducting the AMANI Africa III Command Post Maritime Exercise. It rightly emphasised the need for tailored support—logistical, financial, and technical—for coastal Member States, and encouraged international partnerships for sustainable capacity development.

Concerning coordination and interoperability, the Council's call for harmonising efforts between the CMTF and the Yaoundé Architecture reflects an increasing awareness of the fragmentation across regional efforts. Again, operationalising such structures will require not just institutional mandates but clarity on the division of labour among AU organs, RECs/RMs, and regional mechanisms.

Importantly, **the emphasis on addressing the root causes of maritime crime, such as poverty, weak governance, and limited economic alternatives, signals a welcome and necessary shift toward a more holistic and preventive approach to maritime security. This broader perspective acknowledges that sustainable security cannot be achieved solely through military and law enforcement responses, but must also tackle the socio-economic**

and structural drivers that make maritime crime attractive or viable in coastal territories. By focusing on development deficits, corruption, youth unemployment, and lack of livelihoods, the approach has the potential to generate long-term stability and resilience in coastal communities.

The inclusion of environmental protection discussions and the call for strategic environmental assessments (SEAs) to safeguard marine ecosystems marks a significant and commendable departure from earlier sessions where such concerns were often overlooked. This shift reflects a recognition of the interlinkages between maritime security and environmental sustainability, particularly as climate change, pollution, and unsustainable exploitation of marine resources increasingly contribute to insecurity in coastal regions. However, there is a need for clarifying the practical implications of conducting SEAs and the institutional and policy framework for anchoring such an exercise and the follow-up to it. Without defined implementation mechanisms and integration into existing regional frameworks, such as the African Blue Economy Strategy and 2050 AIMs, the commitment risks becoming a token gesture.

Lastly, although the meeting primarily focused on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, the PSC demonstrated a broader continental outlook by urging Member States to actively support the operationalisation of the Maritime Coordination Centre. This move is aimed at enhancing the coordination and governance of maritime safety and security across all five regions of the continent, reflecting the Council's growing recognition of the interconnected nature of Africa's maritime security challenges. Furthermore, the PSC acknowledged the Indian Ocean Commission's participation in Gulf of Guinea Commission meetings and called

for a consultative engagement with the Commission, signalling an effort to bridge regional maritime security efforts.

In the absence of updates from the Department of PAPS on the implementation of its previous decisions, the PSC reiterated its September 2023 decision, adopted during its 1174th session. The Council renewed its request for the Commission to expedite the establishment and operationalisation of a Coordination Mechanism—or Maritime Security Unit—within the AU Commission, while demanding that it does not entail any financial implications.

Key actionable decisions requiring follow-up:

The PSC requested:

- The AU Commission, through the PSOD, to take practical steps to collaborate with the Combined Maritime Task Force in the Gulf of Guinea to identify the capacity needs of the Task Force and to provide such support, including from the Continental Logistics Base (CLB) in order to position the Task Force as a critical naval component of the African Standby Force (ASF), operating in the Gulf of Guinea region;
- Members of the Combined Maritime Task Force to continue to cooperate in carrying out joint maritime operations and counter piracy operations in the region;
- The AU Commission and the Gulf of Guinea Commission to leverage the interest of international partners in capacity building and in improving infrastructure for maritime security, as well as to support regional mechanisms to align their maritime security and safety strategies with the AIM 2050 framework;

- The AU Commission to expedite the establishment and operationalisation, within the AU Commission, of a Coordination Mechanism, or Maritime Security Unit, without any financial implications, pursuant to paragraph 12 of Communiqué [PSC/ PR/COMM. 1174 (2023)] adopted by the PSC at its 1174th meeting held on 18 September 2023; and
- For a consultative meeting between the Indian Ocean Commission and the Council.

PSC FAILED TO DEFEND THE ESTABLISHED AU NORM WHILE LIFTING THE SUSPENSION OF THE PARTICIPATION OF GABON IN AU'S ACTIVITIES

The last meeting of the PSC was to review the Political Transition Program of the Gabonese Republic. The Council's 1277th meeting, held on 30 April, was convened following the successful holding of the presidential election on 12 April 2025. A gesture which marked the end of the political transition in the country.

From the adopted [communiqué](#) of the session, the Council congratulated the President-Elect, Brice Oligui Nguema. In apparent attempt to signal to other coup makers in the other countries still under suspension that it is willing not to insist on full compliance with AU norms if they opt for speeding up the 'restoration' of constitutional order as long as they hold elections, the PSC commended the 'successful holding on 12 April 2025 of the presidential election in the Gabonese Republic...[marking] the end of the political transition.' It even went further and stated that it looked forward to 'the inauguration of the President Election.' Subsequent to this, the PSC decided: '(i) To lift

the suspension of the participation of Gabon in AU's activities, as contained in paragraph 3 of Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.1172 (2023) adopted on 31 August 2023 and in line with Article 26 of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance' and in this regard, invited Gabon to immediately resume its participation in the activities of the AU. The PSC further decided: '(ii) To keep the situation in Gabon under review, in particular to determine the modalities for the continuation of AU support with the support of Member States, ECCAS and the United Nations.'

Despite the non-compliance of the elections held in Gabon with Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, the PSC opted to remain silent on the matter. In opting for burying its head in the sand, the PSC not only further dented its already precarious credibility in terms of upholding the AU norms on unconstitutional changes of government but also sends a message that upholding the rule under Article 25(4) of the African Charter is optional. Apart from paving the way for all those who seized power unconstitutionally in the other countries suspended from the AU for legitimising themselves by holding elections, the PSC's failure to use the session for expressing its commitment to and the continuing application of the AU norm signals to all militaries on the continent that the disincentive for staging a coup is removed and the rewards of staging a coup has now become far greater than the costs.

In what seems to express admission of problems in its application of the norm of unconstitutional change of government, the PSC made reference to the need for addressing 'root causes of unconstitutional changes of government' and envisaged to rely on such root causes 'to apply the existing AU norms' on the basis of a vaguely formulated formula of 'a rational manner

and a sense of equity.’

Key actionable decisions requiring follow-up

The PSC requested:

- The AU Commission, with support from Member States and Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), to conduct ‘a comprehensive and objective study on the structural root causes of unconstitutional changes of government to apply the existing AU norms in a rational manner and a sense of equity.’

OTHER ACTIVITIES OF THE PSC

In addition to the substantive sessions, the PSC held a flag installation ceremony for the incoming members of the Council elected for the three-year term during the 38th AU summit: Nigeria, Eswatini, Cameroon and Ethiopia, with a briefing from the AUC Chairperson at the beginning of the month on 1 April. The Council also held its 4th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting with the APRM in Johannesburg, South Africa, 7-9 April.

Later in the month following the election of a PSC member from the North Africa Region during the extraordinary session of the Executive Council on 14 April, Algeria’s installation was held on 28 April.



Figure 3 Flag Installation ceremony
(Source: [@AUC_PAPS](#))

The Committee of Experts (CoE) also met twice during the month. On 2 April, the Committee met to prepare for the 4th annual consultative meeting between the Council and APRM, and again on 22 April to prepare for the induction of new CoE members, which took place from 28- 30 April in Cape Town, South Africa.



MEDIA AND RESEARCH SERVICES


ABOUT AMANI AFRICA

Amani Africa is an independent African based policy research; training and consulting think tank with a specialization and primary focus on African multilateral policy processes, particularly those relating to the African Union.

We support the pan-African dream of peaceful, prosperous and integrated Africa through research, training, strategic communications, technical advisory services, and convening and facilitation.

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ADDRESS

On the Corner of Equatorial Guinea St. and ECA Road,
Zequala Complex, 7th Floor, Addis Ababa
Tel: +251118678809
Mobile: +251944723204 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia