The LCB, encompassing Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, remains a region of complex security, humanitarian and governance challenges. In addition to the impact of climate change and underlying historical and socio-political governance factors, these challenges are largely driven by the activities of Boko Haram and its factions, including the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS).

In terms of the activities of armed violent groups, the reporting period has been marked by an intensifying pattern of insurgent attacks, an issue expected to feature prominently in tomorrow’s session. According to the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, militant Islamist-related fatalities in the LCB region rose 7 per cent over the past year to 3,982, representing 18 per cent of the continental total, while civilian targeting increased by 32 per cent to 880, the highest since 2016. Nigeria recorded an 18 per cent rise in fatalities, with Borno state alone accounting for 74 per cent of regional deaths; Cameroon registered 467 deaths with a 45 per cent decline, whereas Chad more than doubled to 242. This escalation is accompanied by notable tactical advancements; ISWAP reportedly overran 15 Nigerian military bases, introduced night vision and deployed armed and surveillance drones. Since June, JAS has attacked positions at Baga, Goldavi near Talakatchi, and Kirawa, with night assaults aided by night vision and modified commercial drones, and with reports citing rocket-propelled grenades, armed drones and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).  Meanwhile, Insurgent infighting has also resurged. From 5 to 8 November 2025, JAS attacked ISWAP across Lake Chad islands and river routes for control of extortion revenues, arms and fuel smuggling corridors through Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.

The other issue expected to feature during tomorrow’s session concerns the operational challenges facing MNJTF. Despite ongoing support from the AU and partners, the MNJTF continues to face capability gaps that undermine the effectiveness of its counterterrorism operations, such as a lack of appropriate counter-IED equipment. IEDs, particularly those placed along main supply routes, accounted for approximately 60% of MNJTF casualties in 2024. The unavailability of sophisticated IED detectors has delayed troop movements and placed both civilian convoys and military convoys at risk. The absence of a dedicated attack aircraft has also left the force reliant on TCC’s national air forces, delaying approvals and undermining the force’s ability to mount coordinated air-ground operations. Considering that terrorist forces have continued to use surveillance drones to monitor MNJTF movements and started using drone attacks, the Force’s lack of anti-drone technology or jamming systems reduces its operational advantage and leaves it vulnerable to both terrorist forces intelligence and drone attacks. In this respect, the PSC may reiterate from its last session its call on the AU Commission and international partners to mobilise support required to address these deficits through availing assets, including modern drone detection and jamming equipment, combat and reconnaissance drones, combat boats, armoured vehicles, and demining equipment.’

As highlighted in respect to the PSC’s 1254^th session, another major challenge for the MNJTF is the continued presence of terrorist groups on the islands of Lake Chad. As reported back then, the 4^th LCB Governors’ Forum identified as a major challenge the need ‘to clear remnants of Boko Haram fighters from their bases on the Tumbuns (islands on the fringes of the Lake Chad) from which they continue to launch attacks on the surrounding areas and beyond.’ The Tumbuns serve as logistics hub, secure havens and staging grounds for terrorist groups. Their occupation of these islands also facilitates their generation of funds through illegal fishing and farming activities. In this respect, the 5^th LCB Governors’ Forum held late in January 2025 called for ensuring that ‘member states effectively occupy the Lake Chad islands as a means of strengthening transboundary security, with a focus on securing and controlling waterways.’

Another issue for tomorrow’s session is the follow-up on PSC’s decision on ensuring the participation of Niger in the MNJTF. Although the initial interruption of Niger’s participation in MNJTF following the June 2023 coup was restored owing to engagement from Nigeria, in March 2025, Niger announced its withdrawal from MNJTF. A major factor for Niger’s severance of ties with MNJTF appears to be the withdrawal of support for Niger. The Communique of the LCB 5^th Governors Forum for the Regional Cooperation on Stabilisation, Peacebuilding and Sustainable Development, thus ‘noted with concern the suspension of donor support for Niger’s National Window of the Regional Stabilisation Facility (RSF), which could negatively impact progress across the region.’ Niger’s withdrawal from the MNJTF has created a security void in its Area of Operations in Sector 4 (Diffa), complicating cross-border coordination and patrols along key stretches of the Lake Chad frontier. In this regard, the Council may wish to seek an update on efforts to restore the support to Niger and facilitate its return to MNJTF, recalling its 1282^nd meeting at which it took note ‘with deep concern of the withdrawal of the Republic of Niger from TCCs and its impact on the operations of the MNJTF.’

The other issue that the PSC is expected to discuss during tomorrow’s session is the regional stabilization strategy. The RS-SRR, endorsed by the PSC during the 816^th session held on 5 December 2018 and entered its second phase in 2024, complements the MNJTF’s military efforts by addressing the structural drivers of conflict through addressing broader governance, humanitarian and development challenges. The strategy, implemented across eight targeted territories in the four LCBC states, has facilitated community reconstruction, market reactivation, and the reintegration of former combatants. Following the revision of the RS-SRR for 2025 – 2030 at the 5^th steering committee meeting on 20 September 2024, with updated Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) and a Community-based Reconciliation and Reintegration Policy to enhance its effectiveness, the 70^th Ordinary Session of the LCBC Council of Ministers held in Niamey, Republic of Niger, on 27 February 2025, adopted the revised strategy. Subsequently, during its 1282^nd session, the PSC endorsed and validated the revised RS-SRR as adopted by the 70^th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the LCBC. The revised strategy seeks to shift focus from stabilisation efforts to sustained stability and put greater emphasis on socio-economic development on the basis of the security, humanitarian and development nexus approach. The LCBC Council of Ministers also directed the Executive Secretariat to revise the Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) and develop a Regional Transitional Justice Policy. Tomorrow’s session will thus provide an opportunity for the PSC to assess progress on the implementation of the strategy.

Another issue expected to feature in tomorrow’s meeting is the humanitarian situation, which has remained dire over the reporting period. Insecurity, attacks and violence continue to affect millions.  Recurrent flooding is devastating the region, exacerbating existing humanitarian challenges and forcing counterterrorism assets to be diverted to relief operations. MNJTF canoes and army drones were deployed to support evacuations. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports that in the first half of 2025, 487 security incidents were recorded, causing 415 deaths. By June 2025, IDPs still numbered 2.9 million, reflecting only a 6 per cent decrease. Around 330,000 refugees have been registered, marking a 23 per cent rise since January 2025. Nigeria remains the epicentre of the crisis, hosting 2.1 million IDPs due to persistent insecurity in the northeast, followed by Cameroon, where over 476,000 people have fled violence in the Far North. An estimated 220,000 children are severely malnourished, with more than 87 per cent of them in Nigeria. As of June 2025, violence and attacks had forced the closure of 1,827 schools across the LCB, 80 per cent of which are in Chad, the most severely affected country. As of September, humanitarian actors had received US$618 million, just 19 per cent of the total funding required. The Council may therefore call for an urgent and coordinated scale-up of humanitarian access and funding, prioritising the protection of civilians, support for severely malnourished children and the reopening and safeguarding of schools, while urging member states and partners to close the 2025 funding gap and align relief with longer-term resilience in the LCB as part of the stabilisation strategy.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may commend the MNJTF for its efforts to degrade terrorist groups and stabilise affected areas in the LCB, while noting with concern that Boko Haram and its splinter groups remain an existential threat to the region. Given the persistent threat posed by terrorist groups in the region and the need to preserve existing gains, the PSC may extend the MNJTF’s mandate for another 12 months. It may also call for the AU, LCBC and MNJTF TCCs MoU and SIA to be extended for an additional year. The Council may also reaffirm its continued support for the Force and the need for predictable and sustainable resources for its operations. Taking forward its call from its last session on the need for provision of additional modern technological capabilities, including drone and anti-drone and jamming technology, the PSC may call for the LCBC working together with the AU Commission to develop a realistic plan on the mobilisation of such capabilities. It may also call for restoring the support given to Niger in its capacity as MNJTF TCC in order to facilitate its return to the MNJTF and remove the void created due to its withdrawal. The PSC may further highlight the need to deepen cooperation between the MNJTF and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), particularly the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in order to ensure more coherent cross-border responses commensurate with the transnational nature of the threat. In addition, considering that the Council held its last field mission to the region in July 2017, whose report was considered at the PSC’s 721^st meeting in September 2017, the Council may seek to follow up on its 1207^th decision to conduct a solidarity field mission to the LCB.

The Lake Chad Basin, encompassing Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, remains a region of complex security, humanitarian, and developmental challenges. In addition to the impact of climate change, these challenges are largely driven by the activities of Boko Haram and its factions, including the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS).

One of the issues likely to feature prominently in tomorrow’s session is the intensifying pattern of insurgent attacks. According to the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, militant Islamist-related fatalities in the LCB region rose 7 per cent over the past year to 3,982, representing 18 per cent of the continental total, while civilian targeting increased by 32 per cent to 880, the highest since 2016. Nigeria recorded an 18 per cent rise in fatalities, with Borno state alone accounting for 74 per cent of regional deaths; Cameroon registered 467 deaths with a 45 per cent decline, whereas  Chad more than doubled to 242. This escalation is accompanied by notable tactical advancements; ISWAP reportedly overran 15 Nigerian military bases, introduced night vision and deployed armed and surveillance drones. Since June, JAS has attacked positions at Baga, Goldavi near Talakatchi, and Kirawa, with night assaults aided by night vision and modified commercial drones, and with reports citing rocket-propelled grenades, armed drones and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).  Meanwhile, Insurgent infighting has also resurged. From 5 to 8 November 2025, JAS attacked ISWAP across Lake Chad islands and river routes for control of extortion revenues, arms and fuel smuggling corridors through Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.

The other issue expected to feature during tomorrow’s session concerns the operational challenges facing MNJTF. Despite ongoing support from the AU and partners, the MNJTF continues to face capability gaps that undermine the effectiveness of its counterterrorism operations, such as a lack of appropriate counter-IED equipment. IEDs, particularly those placed along main supply routes, accounted for approximately 60% of MNJTF casualties in 2024. The unavailability of sophisticated IED detectors has delayed troop movements and placed both civilian convoys and military convoys at risk. The absence of a dedicated attack aircraft has also left the force reliant on TCC’s national air forces, delaying approvals and undermining the force’s ability to mount coordinated air-ground operations. Considering that terrorist forces have continued to use surveillance drones to monitor MNJTF movements and started using drone attacks, the Force’s lack of anti-drone technology or jamming systems reduces its operational advantage and leaves it vulnerable to both enemy intelligence and drone attacks. In this respect, the PSC may reiterate from its last session its call on the AU Commission and international partners to mobilise support required to address these deficits through availing assets, including modern drone detection and jamming equipment, combat and reconnaissance drones, combat boats, armoured vehicles, and demining equipment.’

As highlighted in respect to the PSC’s 1254^th session, another major challenge for the MNJTF is the continued presence of terrorist groups on the islands of Lake Chad. As reported back then, the 4^th Lake Chad Basin Governors’ Forum identified as a major challenge the need ‘to clear remnants of Boko Haram fighters from their bases on the Tumbuns (islands on the fringes of the Lake Chad) from which they continue to launch attacks on the surrounding areas and beyond.’ The Tumbuns serve as their logistics hub, secure havens, and staging grounds. Their occupation of these islands also facilitates their generation of funds through illegal fishing and farming activities. In this respect, the 5^th Lake Chad Basin Governors’ Forum held late in January 2025 called for ensuring that ‘member states effectively occupy the Lake Chad islands as a means of strengthening transboundary security, with a focus on securing and controlling waterways.’

Another issue is the follow-up on its decision on ensuring the participation of Niger in the MNJTF. Although the initial interruption of Niger’s participation in MNJTF following the coup of June 2023 was restored owing to engagement from Nigeria, in March 2025, Niger announced its withdrawal from MNJTF. A major factor for Niger’s severance of ties with MNJTF appears to be the withdrawal of support for Niger. The Communique of the Lake Chad Basin 5^th Governors Forum for the Regional Cooperation on Stabilisation, Peacebuilding and Sustainable Development, thus ‘noted with concern the suspension of donor support for Niger’s National Window of the Regional Stabilisation Facility (RSF), which could negatively impact progress across the region.’ Niger’s withdrawal from the MNJTF has created a security void in its Area of Operations in Sector 4 (Diffa), complicating cross-border coordination and patrols along key stretches of the Lake Chad frontier. In this regard, the Council may wish to seek an update on efforts to restore the support to Niger and facilitate its return to MNJTF, recalling its 1282^nd meeting at which it took note ‘with deep concern of the withdrawal of the Republic of Niger from TCCs and its impact on the operations of the MNJTF.’

The other issue that the PSC is expected to discuss during tomorrow’s session is the regional stabilization strategy. The RS-SRR, endorsed by the PSC during the 816^th session held on 5 December 2018 and entered its second phase in 2024, complements the MNJTF’s military efforts by addressing the structural drivers of conflict through addressing broader governance, humanitarian, and development challenges. The strategy, implemented across eight targeted territories in the four LCBC states, has facilitated community reconstruction, market reactivation, and the reintegration of former combatants. Following the revision of the RS-SRR for 2025 – 2030 at the 5^th steering committee meeting on 20 September 2024, with updated Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) and a Community-based Reconciliation and Reintegration Policy to enhance its effectiveness, the 70^th Ordinary Session of the LCBC Council of Ministers held in Niamey, Republic of Niger, on 27 February 2025, adopted the revised strategy. Subsequently, during its 1282^nd session, the PSC endorsed and validated the revised RS-SRR as adopted by the 70^th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the LCBC. The revised strategy seeks to shift focus from stabilisation efforts to sustained stability and put greater emphasis on socio-economic development on the basis of the security, humanitarian and development nexus approach. The LCBC Council of Ministers also directed the Executive Secretariat to revise the Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) and develop a Regional Transitional Justice Policy. Tomorrow’s session will thus provide an opportunity for the PSC to assess progress on the implementation of the strategy..

The other issue that the PSC is expected to discuss during tomorrow’s session is the dire humanitarian conditions. Insecurity, attacks and violence continue to affect millions.  Recurrent flooding is devastating the region, exacerbating existing humanitarian challenges and forcing counterterrorism assets to be diverted to relief operations. MNJTF canoes and army drones were deployed to support evacuations. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports that in the first half of 2025, 487 security incidents were recorded, causing 415 deaths. By June 2025, IDPs still numbered 2.9 million, reflecting only a 6 per cent decrease. Around 330,000 refugees have been registered, marking a 23 per cent rise since January 2025. Nigeria remains the epicentre of the crisis, hosting 2.1 million IDPs due to persistent insecurity in the northeast, followed by Cameroon, where over 476,000 people have fled violence in the Far North. An estimated 220,000 children are severely malnourished, with more than 87 per cent of them in Nigeria. As of June 2025, violence and attacks had forced the closure of 1,827 schools across the LCB, 80 per cent of which are in Chad, the most severely affected country. As of September, humanitarian actors had received US$618 million, just 19 per cent of the total funding required. The Council may therefore call for an urgent and coordinated scale-up of humanitarian access and funding, prioritising the protection of civilians, support for severely malnourished children and the reopening and safeguarding of schools, while urging member states and partners to close the 2025 funding gap and align relief with longer-term resilience in the LCB as part of the stabilisation strategy.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The Council may express its continued concern over the continued serious threat that Boko Haram and its splinter groups continue to pose in the region. It may also reaffirm its continued support for the MNJTF and the need for predictable and sustainable resources for the MNJTF. Taking forward its call from its last session on the need for provision of additional modern technological capabilities, including drone and anti-drone and jamming technology, the PSC may call for the LCBC working together with the AU Commission to develop a realistic plan on the mobilisation of such support. It may also call for restoring the support given to Niger in its capacity as MNJTF TCC in order to facilitate its return to the MNJTF and remove the void created due to its withdrawal. The PSC may further highlight the need to deepen cooperation between the MNJTF and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), particularly the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in order to ensure more coherent cross-border responses commensurate with the transnational nature of the threat. It may also endorse the revised RS–SRR and call on member states to align their national plans with the revised strategy. In addition, considering  that the Council held its last field mission to the region in  July 2017, whose report was considered at the PSC’s 721^st meeting in September 2017. To that end, the Council may seek to follow up on its 1207^th decision to conduct a solidarity field mission to the LCB.

The Lake Chad Basin, encompassing Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, remains a region of complex security, humanitarian, and developmental challenges, largely driven by the activities of Boko Haram and its factions, including the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS). The MNJTF, comprising troops from the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) member states and Benin, remains a critical regional coalition serving as the security instrument in countering the threats posed by these groups. The Force has reportedly facilitated the return of over 3,800 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 2,306 refugees in 2024 alone.

However, despite significant military successes by the MNJTF, the terror groups continue to pose a threat through asymmetric tactics such as the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide attacks, abductions and attacks on civilian and military targets. In one such recent major attack, on 25 March, Boko Haram is reported to have killed at least 20 Cameroonian soldiers in an attack on a military base in the Nigerian border town of Wulgo.

One of the issues expected to feature during tomorrow’s session concerns the operational challenges facing MNJTF. Despite ongoing support from the AU and partners, the MNJTF continues to face capability gaps that undermine the effectiveness of its counterterrorism operations, such as a lack of appropriate counter-IED equipment. IEDs, particularly those placed along main supply routes, accounted for approximately 60% of MNJTF casualties in 2024. The unavailability of sophisticated IED detectors has delayed troop movements and places both civilian convoys and military convoys at risk. The absence of a dedicated attack aircraft has also left the force reliant on TCCs national air forces, delaying approvals and undermining the force’s ability to mount coordinated air-ground operations. Considering that terrorist forces have begun using surveillance drones to monitor MNJTF movements, the Force’s lack of anti-drone technology or jamming systems reduces its operational advantage and leaves it vulnerable to enemy intelligence.

As highlighted in respect to the PSC’s 1254^th session, another major challenge for the MNJTF is the continued presence of terrorist groups on the islands of Lake Chad. As reported back then, the 4^th Lake Chad Basin Governors’ Forum identified as a major challenge the need ‘to clear remnants of Boko Haram fighters from their bases on the Tumbuns (islands on the fringes of the Lake Chad) from which they continue to launch attacks on the surrounding areas and beyond. The Tumbuns serve as their logistics hub, secure havens, and staging grounds. Their occupation of these islands also facilitates their generation of funds through illegal fishing and farming activities.’ In this respect, the 5^th Lake Chad Basin Governors’ Forum held late in January 2025 called for ensuring that ‘member states effectively occupy the Lake Chad islands as a means of strengthening transboundary security, with a focus on securing and controlling waterways.’

Another issue is the follow up on PSC’s decision on ensuring the participation of Niger in the MNJTF. Although the initial interruption of Niger’s participation in MNJTF following the coup of June 2023 was restored owing to engagement from Nigeria, in March 2025 Niger announced its withdrawal from MNJTF. Apart from political dynamics, it appears that withdrawal of support for Niger might have played a role. The Communique of the Lake Chad Basin 5^th Governors Forum for the Regional Cooperation on Stabilisation, Peacebuilding and Sustainable Development, thus ‘noted with concern the suspension of donor support for Niger’s National Window of the Regional Stabilisaiton Facility (RSF), which could negatively impact progress across the region.’

It is feared that Niger’s withdrawal will weaken the MNJTF and create a security vacuum that the terrorist groups operating in Lake Chad could take advantage of. The void from Niger’s withdrawal coupled with the influx of militants and weapons from the Sahel and ISIS networks in North Africa, poses threat to the gains made under the MNJTF. It is also worth recalling that the death of 40 Chadian soldiers in a terrorist attack on a military base in Chad’s border region with Nigeria last December prompted Chad’s President Mahamat Idriss Déby to threaten possible withdrawal from the MNJTF as well. During tomorrow’s session, it would be of interest for PSC members to get clarity on the implications of Niger’s withdrawal for the MNJTF and how any adverse impact of the withdrawal can be mitigated.

The other issue that the PSC is expected to discuss during tomorrow’s session is the regional stabilisation strategy. The RS-SRR, endorsed by the PSC during the 816^th session held on 5 December 2018 and entered its second phase in 2024, complements the MNJTF’s military efforts by addressing the structural drivers of conflict through addressing broader governance, humanitarian, and development challenges. The strategy, implemented across eight targeted territories in the four LCBC states, has facilitated community reconstruction, market reactivation, and the reintegration of former combatants. Following the revision of the RS-SRR for 2025 – 2030 at the 5^th steering committee meeting on 20 September 2024, with updated Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) and a Community-based Reconciliation and Reintegration Policy to enhance its effectiveness, the 70^th Ordinary Session of the LCBC Council of Ministers held in Niamey, Republic of Niger on 27 February 2025 adopted the revised strategy. The revised strategy seeks to shift focus from stabilisation efforts to sustained stability and puts greater emphasis on socio-economic development on the basis of the security, humanitarian and development nexus approach. The LCBC Council of Ministers also directed the Executive Secretariat to revise the Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) and develop a Regional Transitional Justice Policy.

The communiqué of the 5^th Lake Chad Basin Governors’ Forum, among others, encouraged the PSC to endorse the adjusted RS-SRR. Tomorrow’s session will thus provide an opportunity for the PSC to assess progress on the implementation of the strategy and consider the updated RS-SRR for endorsement. The PSC is also likely to reiterate its 1207^th session call for the states to develop National Action Plans in line with UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 2250 and 2419, and to operationalise these two UNSC Resolutions through the revised TAPs, in order to ensure that the implementation of the revised RS SRR effectively addresses the structural root causes of the conflict.

Sustained reintegration of returnees and fighters that deserted the terror groups requires stronger investment in infrastructure, education and livelihoods. In the report to the PSC in January 2025, the AU Commission Chairperson noted that ‘[w]hile the number of resettled populations have continued to rise, most of these communities received little or no form of humanitarian assistance, and there is a need for urgent actions to enhance the livelihoods of these resettled communities.’   Environmental degradation, exacerbated by climate change, compounds these challenges and increases community vulnerability.

The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The Council is expected to endorse the revised RS–SRR and call on member states to align their national plans with the revised strategy. The PSC may underscore the need for enhancing close coordination and commitment of MNJTF member states and for continuing to engage in Niger on collaboration in addressing the collective threat posed by terrorist groups in the region. The PSC may also call for fortifying the capabilities of the MNJTF, including by equipping the mission with anti-drone technology or jamming systems to address the threat posed by the deployment of drones from terrorist groups. The Council may also wish to follow up on its 1207^th decision to undertake a solidarity field mission to the Lake Chad Basin. The PSC may call on AU and LCBC to mobilise additional support to the MNJTF, particularly in terms of enhancing its anti-IED and amphibious and naval capabilities. The PSC may underscore the need for climate change sensitive programming and provision of rehabilitation support for affected regions and communities. The PSC may emphasise the importance of enhancing collaboration between the MNJTF and Regional Economic Communities, particularly ECOWAS, to facilitate more coherent cross-border responses and address the transnational nature of the threats posed by Boko Haram and the ISWAP. The PSC may also task the AU Commission and the LCBC to undertake an assessment of the impact of the withdrawal of Niger from the MNJTF and develop strategy for mitigating adverse impacts.

Following opening remarks by Ennio Maes, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for January 2025, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a statement introducing the Chairperson’s report. As usual, the Executive Secretary of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), Mamman Nuhu, is also expected to brief the PSC.

It was during its 1197^th session held on 30 January 2024 that the PSC last renewed the mandate of the MNJTF for another period of twelve months, which is set to expire on 1 February 2025. The PSC also requested the AU Commission and the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) to renew the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and Support Implementation Agreement (SIA) between AU, LCBC and MNJTF Troop Contributing Countries, which will guide the provision of AU additional support to the MNJTF, for a year. Tomorrow’s session could focus on the state of operation of the MNJTF, the security situation in the Lake Chad Basin and the implementation of the regional stabilisation strategy.

There have been some notable developments during the year in the operation of the MNJTF. Although it took the MNJTF two years since the conduct of Operation Lake Sanity in 2022, the Force managed to undertake Operation Lake Sanity II during April-July 2024, following its postponement from 2023. This focused on focused on the degradation of the capacity of terrorists within the fringes of the Lake Chad Islands while enhancing local support to isolate them and induce more surrender. It is reported that the operation and related activities led to the ‘neutralisation’ of 344 members of terrorist groups and the capturing of various weapons, including one RPG bomb, 2 Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) tubes and 4 Anti-Aircraft guns. Despite these successes, it was noted in the report of the 4^th LCB Governors Forum that ‘the urgent need remains to clear remnants of Boko Haram fighters from their bases on the Tumbuns (islands on the fringes of the Lake Chad) from which they continue to launch attacks on the surrounding areas and beyond. The Tumbuns serve as their logistics hub, secure havens, and staging grounds. Their occupation of these islands also facilitates their generation of funds through illegal fishing and farming activities.’ To this end, it emphasised ‘[o]ne key area of need is enhancing its (MNJTF’s) amphibious and naval capabilities in and around Lake Chad.’

The MNJTF has also continued to implement non-kinetic activities in support of the regional stabilisation strategy, including civil-military coordination (that seeks to foster trust, community dialogue and close coordination with local communities and facilitate humanitarian activities), quick impact projects and counter-messaging radio and other communication programmes. The Chairperson’s report also recorded that by ‘November 2024, the MNJTF had facilitated the return of over 3,800 IDPs to Kukawa and other communities within the MNJTF Area of Operation and about 2,306 refugees to Banki town in Nigeria.’

During 2024, the MNJTF also faced operational challenges not just from lack of resources but also from divergence of national interests and variations in military strategies among participating countries, as well as geopolitical challenges. In October 2024, 40 Chadian soldiers were killed in a terrorist attack targeting a military base near Chad’s border with Nigeria. Boko Haram was allegedly responsible for the attack, prompting the Chadian security forces to launch a military operation, reportedly killing at least 61 terrorist elements. Following this incident, Chad’s President Mahamat Idriss Déby threatened to withdraw from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), accusing the force of failing to address the security threats posed by terrorist groups. Additionally, the MNJTF was forced to operate for much of 2024 without the participation of Niger, which suspended its participation following the souring of relations owing to the sanctions imposed on Niger by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). As such, the Force operated its 13,799 troops in 3 MNJTF Sectors of Cameroon, Chad and Nigeria.

However, a major positive development took place during the third quarter of 2024 with respect to Niger’s participation in MNJTF. The December 2024 report of the UN Secretary-General on West Africa noted that on ‘28 August, the defence chiefs of Niger and Nigeria signed a memorandum of understanding in Niamey to boost cooperation against terrorism in the Lake Chad basin, with the Niger resuming its participation in the Multinational Joint Task Force.’

The security situation in the region indicates that the LCB region continues to maintain the significant degrees of stabilisation achieved in the affected areas, with military operations contributing to eroding the capabilities of terrorist groups operating in the areas of operation of the MNJTF and successfully restoring state presence in several borders and other areas in the region. Yet, the major terrorist groups operating in the region, namely Boko Haram and its splinter group Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), continue to pose a significant threat.

One major development that persisted during the reporting period is the worrying increase in the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Thus, despite the overall decline in the threat level of the region, there has been a spike in the use of IEDs, particularly in the Far North Province of Cameroon and corresponding areas on the Nigerian side of the border, targeting the MNJTF and national armed forces as well as civilians. According to the Chairperson’s report, ‘a total of 70 IED incidents were recorded compared to 50 similar incidents during the same period in 2023, with 37 soldiers and 13 civilians killed during these attacks against 34 soldiers and 57 civilians killed during similar attacks in 2023.’  Further threats to the security situation arise from suicide attacks, kidnappings and other militant and criminal activities, including predatory attacks by terrorist groups on civilian communities. In June and July 2024, suicide attacks were reported in Borno State, Nigeria, attributed to Boko Haram/Islamic State West Africa Province, resulting in several fatalities. Additionally, in September 2024, suspected Boko Haram members targeted communities in Yobe State.

The threats from the two major terrorist groups in the region, combined with the impact of climate change, have exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in the region. The report of the 4th Governance Forum of the LCB noted that during the 13 years of insurgency and conflicts, ‘Boko Haram and ISWAP continue to attack and unleash violence on communities, producing around 2.9 million internally displaced (IDPs), including 2 million in Nigeria alone.’ According to the latest UN figures from September, there are approximately 21,650 refugees, more than 220,600 internally displaced persons, and around 16,885 returnees in Chad. In Cameroon, the numbers are about 120,600 refugees and 453,660 internally displaced persons. The humanitarian situation is also affected by inadequate humanitarian and rehabilitation support, which undermines returnees. In this respect, the Chairperson’s report noted that ‘[w]hile the number of resettled populations have continued to rise, most of these communities received little or no form of humanitarian assistance, and there is a need for urgent actions to enhance the livelihoods of these resettled communities.’   Climate change further aggravates the difficult humanitarian situation in the region, as recent flooding events affecting all of LCB countries highlighted. The UN reported that as of ‘2 December, over 4.9 million people have been affected by floods, with 1.94 million in Chad, 1.52 million in Niger, 612,700 in Nigeria and over 448,000 in Cameroon.

The other issue expected to receive attention during tomorrow’s session is the implementation of the Regional Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience Strategy for Areas Affected by Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin. One of the major developments in this respect during the reporting period is the updating of the Strategy. On 20 September 2024, the 5th meeting of the Steering Committee for the implementation of this regional strategy took place virtually. The meeting approved the adjusted Regional Strategy and Community-based Reconciliation and Reintegration Policy for 2025-2030, which is expected to be endorsed by the LCBC Council of Ministers. The revised strategy seeks to shift focus from stabilisation efforts to sustained stability and put greater emphasis on socio-economic development on the basis of the security, humanitarian and development nexus approach.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may commend the MNJTF for the progress it registered in degrading the capabilities of the terrorist groups operating in its areas of operation in the LCB region and the resultant progress in the stabilisation of the affected regions. It may also welcome the productive conclusion of Operation Lake Sanity II undertaken by MNJTF. The PSC may commend the MNJTF participating countries and encourage them to sustain and enhance the close coordination between them. In this respect, the PSC may welcome the MOU signed between Nigeria and Niger and the resumption of Niger’s participation in the MNJTF. It may call on AU and LCBC to mobilise additional support to the MNJTF particularly in terms of enhancing its anti IED and amphibious and naval capabilities. It may request the renewal of the MoU between the AU and the LCBC for another year. In light of the threat that terrorist groups in the LCB region pose and the need for sustaining gains made, the PSC is expected to renew the mandate of the MNJTF for a further period of 12 months. The PSC may also commend the LCBC for its role in the stabilisation of the region through the implementation of the Regional Stabilisation Strategy and the progress made towards the revision and adjustment of the Strategy. The PSC may express concern about the humanitarian situation in the region, including the impact of climate change and the recent flooding. It may underscore the need for a climate change sensitive programming and provision of rehabilitation support for affected regions and communities.

Despite the encouraging progress and Boko Haram’s weakened capacity, it by no means implies that the terrorist group or its splinters are no longer in a position to orchestrate deadly attacks. Indeed, Boko Haram continues to be a major threat to peace, security and stability in the region. In one of its latest gruesome operations for example, Boko Haram killed 20 people in north-eastern Nigeria in early November 2023, who were returning from the burial of their family members executed by the same terrorist group, for resisting their usual extortion of payments.

It also remains critical to note that while Boko Haram’s capacity is notably declining, other terrorist groups such as the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) are taking the upper hand and intensifying their insurgency, such as notably in Nigeria. In the last few months of 2023 for instance, the ISWAP expanded its activities and successfully carried out attacks particularly in north-eastern Nigeria, targeting farmers in the area. In the last week of September 2023, ISWAP was reported to have killed over 10 farmers in less than two-weeks, in the areas of Borno state.

One emerging trend over the past couple of years has also been the competition and power struggle among terrorist groups in the LCB. Multiple clashes between ISWAP and Boko Haram have specifically been recorded in the course of 2022 and 2023. According to ACLED’s latest records, six incidents of insurgent infighting were documented in the Extreme-North region and Nigeria’s bordering Borno state, in November 2023 alone. Although government forces of the affected member states and the MNJTF consider this as a strategic advantage for their operations against the insurgent groups, these clashes nonetheless continue to devastate the overall regional stability and security while compounding the dangers faced by civilians in the affected areas.

The continuing proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons in the LCB is another concerning trend worthy of tracking and addressing. Not only is the illicit transfer of weapons in the region escalating conflict and violence, it also impedes social and economic development. In addition to porous borders, diversion from regional and national stockpile not only through raids and theft, but also due to corruption, is also major avenue through which arms and ammunition are illegally transferred in the LCB.

The increasing demand of civilians for arms on account of insecurity and the resultant resort to self-defence has also been the cause for proliferation of vigilante groups. Illicit weapons and weak provision of security by the state have also made banditry possible. A direct impact of the absence of effective state security apparatus, this situation entails grave consequences not only in terms of the immediate effect it has on fuelling illicit transfer of arms, but also what it could mean in the long run for disarmament efforts and for consolidation of state security.

Another trend worth paying attention to is the increase in the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and the associated adverse impacts of such increased use. The number of IED attacks and the resultant fatalities in the AU report shows that compared to 2022, the use of IEDs in 2023 have shown 138% increase. Similarly, this spike in the use of IEDs led in 2023 to more than 78% and 171% increase in military and civilian fatalities respectively than in 2022. Not surprisingly, similar to other forms of attacks, this increasing use of IEDs has much more adverse impact on civilians than militaries.