Popular Uprisings and Unconstitutional Changes of Government Archives - Amani Africa

Informal consultation with countries in transition

Amani Africa — Tue, 16 Dec 2025 10:12:18 +0000

Informal consultation with countries in transition

Date | 16 December 2025

Tomorrow (17 December), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold an informal consultation with countries in transition—namely Burkina Faso, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, and Sudan.

This will be the fourth such informal consultation since the PSC introduced this format into its working methods in April 2023, following its 14^th Retreat on Working Methods in November 2022. The informal consultation was established to enable direct engagement with representatives of countries suspended from AU activities due to unconstitutional changes of government. It drew on Article 8(11) of the PSC Protocol. Tomorrow’s consultation is expected to examine progress made and challenges encountered in ongoing transitions since the last consultation in March 2025.

Two notable developments have occurred since the previous consultation. First, military coups in Guinea-Bissau and Madagascar have expanded the list of countries undergoing political transitions to seven. Second, the lifting of Gabon’s suspension from the AU despite the fact that the elections did not comply with Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) on the ineligibility of perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of government in elections organised to restore constitutional order. As noted in our April 2025 Monthly Digest, Nguema’s participation and victory, in clear violation of ACDEG, and the subsequent lifting of Gabon’s suspension without the PSC affirming its full commitment to Article 25(4), is not without consequences for AU’s purported policy of zero tolerance to coups. It signalled to coup makers and members of the military in other African countries that the PSC may be ‘willing not to insist on full compliance with AU norms if they opt for speeding up the ‘restoration’ of constitutional order as long as they hold elections.’

Not surprisingly, Guinea’s coup leader and interim president, Mamady Doumbouya, is poised to follow Gabon’s path as the country prepares for elections. The PSC is likely to discuss technical and financial support for credible elections and, echoing its 1284^th session, emphasise the importance of inclusivity in Guinea’s political process. In this respect, Guinea’s representative is expected to highlight progress toward the ‘restoration’ of constitutional order, particularly the September 2025 constitutional referendum and the general elections scheduled for 28 December 2025 and the electoral support the country needs. These elections are meant to conclude Guinea’s transition period. However, Doumbouya formally entered the presidential race in early November—reneging on his earlier pledge not to run. The PSC, during its field mission to Conakry in May and its 1284^th session, urged the transition authorities to honour their commitment to complete the transition by December 2025, but stopped short of reminding them of the prohibition under Article 25(4) of ACDEG against coup leaders contesting elections. With Doumbouya now a candidate—and his victory highly probable—the PSC may follow the exact approach it applied to Gabon, unless the regional body, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), raises concern. Under the circumstances, whether or not the coup leaders in other countries will run for elections is now a matter of their choice and is not expected to face any opposition from the AU for non-compliance with Article 24(5) of ACDEG.

Similarly, Sudan’s representative may raise the issue of lifting the country’s suspension, citing the May 2025 appointment of Kamil al-Tayeb Idris as civilian Prime Minister by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Chair of the Transitional Sovereign Council and head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Following the appointment, it is to be recalled that the Chairperson of the AU Commission welcomed it as ‘a step towards inclusive governance.’ However, the appointment of the Prime Minister was not a result of national dialogue, nor did it involve the participation of Sudanese political and social forces. Indeed, discussions around the lifting of Sudan’s suspension remain premature under the prevailing circumstances, where the deteriorating security situation does not allow for an inclusive political process, there is no national dialogue and a clear pathway for the eventual convening of elections. These steps have ‘supposedly’ become the basic requirements the AU expects before lifting sanctions. Recent precedents of the Council suggest that sanctions can be lifted as long as a country organises a national dialogue and elections, even when the very actors who carried out a coup freely participate in those elections. It has become an acceptable shortcut around ACDEG. Additionally, the representative of Sudan may encourage the PSC to have a field mission to Port Sudan. In the light of recent developments including the fall of El Fasher, the last remaining major city in Darfur and the Heglig oilfield, into the hands of the para militaryRapid Support Forces, marking the de facto partition of Sudan and killing of civilians and the attack and the recent killing of UN Peacekeepers, the discussion may centre on deploying a mechanism for humanitarian and civilian protection in El Fasher and identifying credible pathways for accelerating efforts for peace as well as implementing the previous decisions of the PSC on the situation in Sudan.

Similarly, the situation in Madagascar is expected to feature in the consultation, given the military takeover that unfolded. In October 2025, a faction of the Madagascar Armed Forces led by Colonel Michael Randrianirina seized power amid mass protests in the capital Antananarivo, ousting President Andry Rajoelina and prompting the AU to suspend Madagascar’s membership for violating the Union’s zero-tolerance policy on unconstitutional changes of government. The PSC, at its 1305^th and subsequent emergency sessions, condemned the coup, reaffirmed its rejection of any unconstitutional seizure of power, and called on all Malagasy actors, civilian and military, to exercise restraint, engage in inclusive dialogue, and work towards a peaceful and lawful resolution within constitutional frameworks. In its recent session held on 20 November, the Council emphasised the need for coordinated AU-SADC efforts, including high-level missions and strengthening the AU Liaison Office on the ground to support mediation, reconciliation, and stabilisation. The PSC also placed strong emphasis on the need for enhanced coordination and division of labour among the AU, SADC, and the Indian Ocean Commission, while calling on the AU Commission and partners to provide financial and technical support for the electoral management body and the drafting of a new constitution, and to extend support through the Africa Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions (AFSIT), conditional on the implementation of the Transition Road Map. These issues are likely to feature in tomorrow’s consultation with countries in transition, particularly the extent to which regional and continental coordination mechanisms are effectively aligned in supporting the country’s transition to a democratic order. Meanwhile, in the remaining countries—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—relations with the regional bloc ECOWAS remain strained, as the three states continue consolidating their alliance through the confederation established in 2024. It is becoming increasingly clear that the security situation gets in the way of and provides a pretext for the lack of focused progress in the transition process. In Mali, the National Transitional Council adopted a bill on 3 July 2025 revising the Transitional Charter, granting General Assimi Goïta a renewable five-year term as President of the Transition ‘until peace is restored.’ Similarly, in Burkina Faso, the transition period was extended for another five years, starting in July 2024—the year initially planned for its conclusion. The new charter, signed by Captain Ibrahim Traoré, also allows him to contest in the elections. Niger has taken a similar path. A national conference on rebuilding the country in February 2025 decided that the National Council for the Safeguarding of the Homeland (CNSP), which seized power in July 2023, would remain in power for five years without any clear timeline for elections.

The Council is therefore expected to reiterate the concerns expressed during its 1304^th ministerial session on 30 September 2025, which noted with ‘deep concern’ the ‘slow pace of political transition processes’ and urged the transitional authorities to accelerate inclusive transitions, engage all stakeholders, and facilitate genuine political dialogue. It may also again call on these authorities to adhere to their respective transitional roadmaps and operationalise joint transition monitoring committees.

While the issue of progress in the transition process may be the focus of the session, this cannot be separated from and is deeply tied to the possibility of arresting the deepening and widening threat facing these countries. A major issue for tomorrow’s session is the question of how AU and ECOWAS overhaul their approach by integrating the quest for restoration of constitutional order into a wider stabilisation and state authority expansion strategy backed by a security mechanism they develop and deploy together with the Sahel countries to address the existential threat facing these countries.

As such, tomorrow’s consultation needs to both situate the discussion on transition in these countries within the insecurity facing them and consider the kind of role the AU and ECOWAS bring to the counterterrorism efforts of these countries. Similar to Sudan and unlike Gabon and Guinea, the push for progress in the transitional process cannot be abstracted out of the pressing issue facing these countries, which is the terrorism menace that has grown to become an existential threat to these countries. A clear illustration of this involves the recent developments in Mali, with the capital Bamako under imminent threat and cut off from supply routes. Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), affiliated with al-Qaeda, has expanded operations from the north and centre into the western and southern regions of Mali. Its fuel blockade since September has caused severe shortages, power cuts, and economic paralysis in Bamako and other cities, triggering public unrest and fears of broader instability. Weekly fuel deliveries have reportedly fallen from 1,000 to 200 tankers. Facing mounting pressure, General Goïta has replaced several senior military officials, including the deputy chief of staff of the armed forces, the head of military security and the ground forces’ chief of staff, highlighting internal strains within the regime.

The PSC is also expected to discuss the AU’s recent intensified diplomatic engagement with these Sahelian countries and explore ways to enhance coordination. In May, the AU Commission Chairperson met representatives of the three countries in Addis Ababa to explore renewed engagement. This was followed by a visit from Angola’s Minister of External Relations—delivering a message from President João Lourenço, the current AU Chairperson—reaffirming the AU’s commitment to Sahel stability and counterterrorism efforts. In July, the AU Chairperson appointed President Évariste Ndayishimiye of Burundi as Special Envoy for the Sahel. Angola also proposed hosting a summit on the Sahel in Luanda, welcomed by the PSC during its 1304^th session. Additionally, former Gambian Foreign Minister Mamadou Tangara was appointed as Special Representative for Mali and the Sahel, and Head of the AU Mission in Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL). The PSC also decided to establish a Task Force to support counterterrorism in the region and called for a field visit by Special Envoy Ndayishimiye to engage directly with the transitional authorities. In this context, the informal consultation could provide an opportunity to discuss how to advance these initiatives and follow up on the decision of PSC and ECOWAS during their annual consultative meeting last May ‘to develop a security cooperation framework involving the AU and ECOWAS engagement with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, in order to more effectively address insecurity in the West Africa Region.’

In addition to the three Sahelian countries, a further concern is the widening pattern of governance instability across West Africa. This includes the recent coup d’état in Guinea-Bissau and the attempted coup in Benin, developments that underscored the growing threat of unconstitutional changes of government and prompted ECOWAS to declare a state of emergency. As such, the consultation is expected to consider the situation in Guinea-Bissau following the coup d’état of 26 November, which unfolded just before the release of the results of the presidential runoff between incumbent President Umaro Sissoco Embaló and his main challenger, Fernando Dias, on 26 November. In a statement issued during the crisis, prior to Senegal’s confirmation that it had granted Embaló asylum, the military announced that the President and several senior officials were “under the control” of the High Military Command. In response to the coup, the AU convened a PSC session on 28 November, during which it condemned and rejected the unconstitutional change of government and decided to immediately suspend Guinea-Bissau from participation in all AU activities, organs, and institutions until constitutional order is restored. The Council further requested the AU Post-Conflict, Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) Centre in Cairo, in collaboration with UN peacebuilding institutions, to engage relevant national stakeholders in Guinea-Bissau to support development activities aimed at preventing further relapses into political crisis. In addition, the PSC mandated the Chairperson of the Commission to establish an inclusive AU monitoring mechanism, in collaboration with ECOWAS and other relevant stakeholders, to closely follow developments on the ground, particularly the implementation of ECOWAS and PSC decisions. At the sub-regional level, the 68^th Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, held in Abuja on 14 December, rejected the transition programme announced by Guinea-Bissau’s military authorities and called for a swift return to constitutional order. The Authority warned of targeted sanctions against individuals obstructing the process and mandated the ECOWAS Chair to lead a high-level delegation to Guinea-Bissau to engage the junta.

On the other hand, the representative of Sudan is expected to update the PSC on the recent developments in the conflict in Sudan, including the fall of El-Fasher—the last major SAF stronghold— to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on 26 October, and on reports of attacks on civilians and mass killings committed during and after the takeover. During the emergency meeting held in Sudan on 28 October, the PSC ‘strongly’ condemned the ‘criminal activities against Sudanese civilians and the grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, perpetrated by the paramilitary RSF’. The emergency session further requested the AU Commission to regularly monitor and report heinous crimes committed in Sudan, develop proposals on how to address them to prevent their further escalation, develop a plan for the protection of civilians, and make recommendations to the PSC within three weeks. It also requested the Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Other Mass Atrocities to urgently undertake a fact-finding mission to Sudan and report back to the Council with recommendations within three weeks. While meeting these deadlines may prove challenging, tomorrow’s consultation could consider ways Sudan might facilitate the implementation of these tasks.

As with previous consultations, tomorrow’s engagement is not expected to result in an outcome document.

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Informal Consultation with Member States in Political Transition (Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Sudan)

Amani Africa — Wed, 12 Nov 2025 09:33:12 +0000

Informal Consultation with Member States in Political Transition (Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Sudan)

Date | 12 November 2025

Tomorrow (13 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold an informal consultation with countries in political transition—namely Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Sudan.

One notable development since the previous consultation was the lifting of Gabon’s suspension from the AU despite the fact that the elections did not comply with Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) on the ineligibility of perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of government in elections organised to restore constitutional order. As noted in our April 2025 Monthly Digest, Nguema’s participation and victory, in clear violation of ACDEG, and the subsequent lifting of Gabon’s suspension without the PSC affirming its full commitment to Article 25(4), is not without consequences for AU’s purported policy of zero tolerance to coups. It signalled to coup makers and members of the military in other African countries that the PSC may be ‘willing not to insist on full compliance with AU norms if they opt for speeding up the ‘restoration’ of constitutional order as long as they hold elections.’

Similarly, Sudan’s representative may raise the issue of lifting the country’s suspension, citing the May 2025 appointment of Kamil al-Tayeb Idris as civilian Prime Minister by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Chair of the Transitional Sovereign Council and head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Following the appointment, it is to be recalled that the Chairperson of the AU Commission welcomed it as ‘a step towards inclusive governance.’ However, the appointment of the Prime Minister was not a result of national dialogue, nor did it involve the participation of Sudanese political and social forces. Indeed, discussions around the lifting of Sudan’s suspension remain premature under the prevailing circumstances, where the deteriorating security situation does not allow for an inclusive political process, there is no national dialogue and a clear pathway for the eventual convening of elections. In the light of recent developments including the fall of El Fasher, the last remaining major city in Darfur, into the hands of the para military Rapid Support Forces, marking the de facto partition of Sudan, the discussion may centre on deploying a mechanism for humanitarian and civilian protection in El Fasher and identifying credible pathways for accelerating efforts for peace as well as implementing the previous decisions of the PSC on the situation in Sudan.

Meanwhile, in the remaining countries—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—relations with the regional bloc ECOWAS remain strained, as the three states continue consolidating their alliance through the confederation established in 2024. It is becoming increasingly clear that the security situation gets in the way of and provides a pretext for the lack of focused progress in the transition process. In Mali, the National Transitional Council adopted a bill on 3 July 2025 revising the Transitional Charter, granting General Assimi Goïta a renewable five-year term as President of the Transition ‘until peace is restored.’ Similarly, in Burkina Faso, the transition period was extended for another five years, starting in July 2024—the year initially planned for its conclusion. The new charter, signed by Captain Ibrahim Traoré, also allows him to contest in the elections. Niger has taken a similar path. A national conference on rebuilding the country in February 2025 decided that the National Council for the Safeguarding of the Homeland (CNSP), which seized power in July 2023, would remain in power for five years without any clear timeline for elections.

As with previous consultations, tomorrow’s engagement is not expected to result in an outcome document.

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Informal consultation with countries in political transition

Amani Africa — Mon, 17 Mar 2025 06:33:29 +0000

Informal consultation with countries in political transition

Date | 17 March 2025

Tomorrow (18 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold an informal consultations with Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Sudan at the ambassadorial level.

Informal consultation with countries undergoing political transitions was incorporated into the PSC’s repertoire of working methods following its decision during the 14th Retreat on Working Methods, held in November 2022. The conclusions of the retreat introduced these consultations as a mechanism to facilitate direct engagement with representatives of countries suspended from participation in the AU due to unconstitutional changes of government, in line with Article 8(11) of the PSC Protocol. Since then, two such consultations have been held in April and December 2023.

The last time the PSC held informal consultations with countries in political transition was in December 2023. Since then, the PSC convened its 1212th session on 20 May 2024 as a formal meeting to receive updated briefings on the political transitions in Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, and Niger. The PSC also conducted a field mission to Gabon in September 2024. Tomorrow’s session presents an opportunity for the PSC and countries in political transition to exchange views on the latest developments and provides a platform for candid discussions on concerning trends affecting the restoration of constitutional order in these countries.

Map: countries in political transition suspended from the AU

During tomorrow’s informal consultation it is expected that some of the representatives of the affected countries will raise concerns on how suspension from the AU continues to affect effective engagement of the AU. It is worth recalling that one of the reasons for the use of the informal consultation is to provide a platform for engagement between the PSC and the affected countries. As a manifestation of the fact that suspension does not sever AU’s responsibilities towards affected countries, the PSC undertook missions to some of these countries. In September 2024, the PSC undertook a mission to Gabon. The following month, the PSC spent a day in Port Sudan on a field visit as well.

Yet, it remains unclear how these engagements have changed the dynamics of AU’s role in relation to these countries. For example, in the case of Sudan, it appears that the expectation from Port Sudan was for the lifting of Sudan’s suspension. Indeed, this issue was put on the agenda of the PSC during its session on 9 October. After debating the matter, a divided PSC adopted a principled position of upholding the suspension. This is not surprising, considering that there is no political process in Sudan to warrant the lifting of the country’s suspension from AU activities.

This outcome affirms that the effort to improve AU’s engagement in these countries cannot be reduced to the narrow issue of the lifting of suspension. Principally, the expectation, also from earlier experiences, is that the AU deploys and maintains robust diplomatic engagement focusing as relevant on two areas. First, this involves instituting a dedicated mechanism to work with the national actors on the transitional process on a sustained basis. When the AU suspends a state from its activities, its responsibility for sustained engagement becomes higher than usual. Second, the AU is rightly expected to initiate and deploy all the relevant policy measures to address the peace and security challenges facing these countries. For a long time, the focus on the unconstitutional change of government has overshadowed the imperative for the AU to elevate its policy action to address the security threats facing, most notably, the Sahelian countries in transition. This has led to charges of AU being absent in having an active role with respect to the existential threat facing these countries. A case in point is the fact that the AU has not for a long time filled the position of the head of its mission in Mali and Sahel (MISAHL), which has been vacant since the departure of Mamane Sidikou in mid-2023.

Indeed, with respect to the countries in the Sahel, the PSC itself, at its 1212^th session, rightly expressed concern about ‘the deteriorating security situation in the Sahel region due to the activities of terrorist and insurgent groups, and the attendant dire humanitarian situation.’ Despite this concern and the fact that the persistence of conflicts involving terrorist groups is at the core of the security and institutional crises facing Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, the PSC, once again, failed to consider concrete steps for helping to address, this principal challenge. Putting a spotlight on this lack of meaningful action, the AU Commission Chairperson, in his address to the AU Assembly on 17 February 2024, posed the following rhetorical questions: ‘How should we stop watching terrorism ravage some of our countries without doing anything? How can we accept just watching African countries destroyed, and entire regions engulfed by tremors and tsunamis, without doing anything significant?’

In terms of instituting a dedicated mechanism to work with national authorities for facilitating transitional processes, it can be discerned from the outcome of the 1212^th session of the PSC that the AU neither deployed effective mechanisms nor ensured the effective functioning of existing ones. As a result, the PSC reiterated its request for the AU Commission ‘to appoint a High-Level Facilitator at the level of sitting or former Head of State to engage with the Transitional Authorities.’ Additionally, taking note of ‘the leadership vacuum within the African Union Mission for Mali and Sahel (MISAHEL)’ at a time when the AU needs active engagement in these countries, the PSC requested ‘the Chairperson of the AU Commission to ensure the nomination of a High Representative, which remains a crucial interface in ensuring collective oversight between the Commission, Council, and the Countries in transition.’ The AU Commission Chairperson failed to act on this demand and his term came to an end, leaving MISAHEL without a leader.

One notable and positive development that emerged since the 1212^th PSC meeting is the decision of the AU to use the Crisis Reserve Facility of the Peace Fund to provide symbolic funding for supporting the efforts of Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali in the fight against terrorist groups with allocation of $ 1 million to Burkina Faso and $ 500,000 each to Niger and Mali.

In terms of enhancing AU’s role in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel, the AU may build on this recent support and adopt a Sahel stabilisation strategy supported by the activation of the decision to deploy 3000 troops to the Sahel made by the AU Assembly at its 33^rd Ordinary Session [Assembly/AU/Dec.792(XXXIII)] in February 2020. It is a good time to have such a strategy and deployment considering the decision of Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali as the Alliance of Sahel States (ASS) to deploy a new regional 5000 strong force to fight against terrorism.

It is expected that some of the representatives of the countries concerned may put a spotlight on the lack of consistency of the AU in applying the rules on unconstitutional changes of government. This may become a key area of contestation, particularly as it relates to the eligibility of the coup makers for elections that may be held for restoring constitutional order. Despite the fact that the PSC affirmed the AU rule that the members of the Transitional Military Council in Chad are ineligible for election, the Chairman of the Council, Mahamat Idriss Déby, oversaw an orchestrated national dialogue and constitutional referendum that enabled him to run for elections, ultimately being declared the winner of the 6 May 2024 presidential election. The PSC’s failure to enforce its principles and decisions against the eligibility of military authorities in elections has put the AU in the difficult position of not being able to uphold this principle with respect to military leaders in other countries in transition, as highlighted by the 16 September 2024 edition of Amani Africa’s Ideas Indaba.

Another issue likely to receive attention in tomorrow’s engagement is the duration of the transition period. In Burkina Faso, the transitional timeline initially agreed to come to an end by 2 July 2024 has been extended by an additional five years. Similarly, Mali’s agreed timeline with ECOWAS for a February 2024 transition has been postponed indefinitely. In Niger, no clear transition timeline has been announced, though the junta proposed a three-year period. Guinea, which had committed to organising elections by the end of 2024 under a 24-month transition agreement with ECOWAS, also failed to meet this deadline. In Sudan, the prospect of a return to civilian rule has become a distant luxury as the ongoing conflict plunges the country into one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. Meanwhile, Gabon’s transitional government has set 12 April 2025 as the date for the presidential election to end military rule, which has been in place since August 2023. Earlier this month, military leader General Brice Oligui Nguema announced his intention to run for President in the upcoming election. The variations in the specific political, institutional and security context of these countries also underscore that a generalised approach to AU’s role in respect to these countries would be inadequate and unfit and require a policy approach tailored to the specificities of each.

Tomorrow’s informal consultation is also expected to touch on the issue of the severing of ties by three central Sahel countries with ECOWAS, dealing a major blow to AU’s ideal of regional integration. On 15 December, during its 66th ordinary session, ECOWAS approved the withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger (who formed their own Alliance of Sahel States (AES abbreviated in French) from the regional bloc, effective 29 January 2025. However, it also decided to institute a six-month transitional period (29 January–29 July 2025) for these countries, leaving the door open for them to reverse their decision. In a step that signals the determination of the countries to exit ECOWAS, the three states unveiled a new common passport of the Confederation of Sahel States, which is expected to come into circulation the same day the exit from ECOWAS takes effect. That the separation of AES states from ECOWAS took effect is an indictment on the AU’s role of advancing regional integration, underscoring its inability, if not failure, to play the role of mediating between the two.

No outcome document is expected from tomorrow’s informal engagement.

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Informal consultations with countries in political transition

Amani Africa — Sun, 26 Jan 2025 07:42:54 +0000

Informal consultations with countries in political transition *

Date | 26 January 2025

Tomorrow (27 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold informal consultations with countries in political transition at the ambassadorial level.

Informal consultations with countries undergoing political transitions were incorporated into the PSC’s repertoire of working methods following its decision during the 14^th Retreat on working methods, held in November 2022. The conclusions of the retreat introduced these consultations as a mechanism to facilitate direct engagement with representatives of countries suspended from participation in the AU due to unconstitutional changes of government, in line with Article 8(11) of the PSC Protocol. Since then, two such consultations have been held in April and December 2023.

Map: countries in political transition suspended from the AU

During tomorrow’s informal consultation it is expected that some of the representatives of the affected countries will raise concerns on how suspension from the AU continues to affect effective engagement of the AU. It is worth recalling that one of the reasons for the use of the informal consultation is to provide a platform for engagement between the PSC and the affected countries. Since the introduction of this format, the engagement between the PSC and these countries has shown improvements. In September 2024, the PSC undertook a mission to Gabon. The following month, the PSC spent a day in Port Sudan on a field visit as well.

Despite these improvements, it remains unclear how these engagements have changed the dynamics of the AU’s role in relation to these countries. For example, in the case of Sudan, it appears that the expectation from Port Sudan was for the lifting of Sudan’s suspension. Indeed, this issue was put on the agenda of the PSC during its session on 9 October. After debating the matter, a divided PSC adopted a principled position of upholding the suspension. This is not surprising, considering that there is no political process in Sudan to warrant the lifting of the country’s suspension from AU activities.

This outcome affirms that the effort to improve AU’s engagement in these countries cannot be reduced to the narrow issue of the lifting of suspension. Principally, the expectation, also from earlier experiences, is that the AU deploys and maintains robust diplomatic engagement focusing as relevant on two areas. First, this involves instituting a dedicated mechanism to work with the national actors on the transitional process on a sustained basis. When the AU suspends a state from its activities, its responsibility for sustained engagement becomes higher than usual. Second, the AU is rightly expected to initiate and deploy all the relevant policy measures to address the peace and security challenges facing these countries. For a long time, the focus on the unconstitutional change of government has overshadowed the imperative for the AU to elevate its policy action to address the threats facing, most notably, the Sahelian countries in transition. This has led to charges of AU being absent in having an active role in respect to the existential threat facing these countries. A case in point is the fact that the AU has not for a long time filled the position of the head of its mission in Mali and Sahel (MISAHL), which has been vacant since the departure of Mamane Sidikou in mid-2023.

Indeed, with respect to the countries in the Sahel, the PSC itself, at its 1212^th session, rightly expressed concern about ‘the deteriorating security situation in the Sahel region due to the activities of terrorist and insurgent groups, and the attendant dire humanitarian situation.’ Despite this concern and the fact that the persistence of conflicts involving terrorist groups is at the core of the security and institutional crises facing Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, the PSC, once again, failed to consider concrete steps for helping to address this principal challenge. Putting a spotlight on this lack of meaningful action, the AU Commission Chairperson, in his address to the AU Assembly on 17 February 2024, posed the following rhetorical questions: ‘How should we stop watching terrorism ravage some of our countries without doing anything? How can we accept just watching African countries destroyed and entire regions engulfed by tremors and tsunamis without doing anything significant?’

One notable and positive development that emerged since the 1212^th PSC meeting is the decision of the AU to use the Crisis Reserve Facility of the Peace Fund to provide symbolic funding for supporting the efforts of Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali in the fight against terrorist groups with an allocation of $ 1 million to Burkina Faso and $ 500,000 each to Niger and Mali.

In terms of enhancing the AU’s role in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel, the AU may build on this recent support and adopt a Sahel stabilisation strategy supported by the activation of the decision to deploy 3000 troops to the Sahel made by the AU Assembly at its 33^rd Ordinary Session [Assembly/AU/Dec.792(XXXIII)] in February 2020. It is a good time to have such a strategy and deployment, considering the decision of Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali as the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) to deploy a new regional 5000-strong force to fight against terrorism.

Another issue likely to receive attention in tomorrow’s engagement is the duration of the transition period. In Burkina Faso, the transitional timeline initially agreed to come to an end by 2 July 2024 has been extended by an additional five years. Similarly, Mali’s agreed timeline with ECOWAS for a February 2024 transition has been postponed indefinitely. In Niger, no clear transition timeline has been announced, though the junta proposed a three-year period. Guinea, which had committed to organising elections by the end of 2024 under a 24-month transition agreement with ECOWAS, also failed to meet this deadline. In Sudan, the prospect of a return to civilian rule has become a distant luxury as the ongoing conflict plunges the country into one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. Meanwhile, Gabon’s transitional government has set 12 April 2025 as the date for the presidential election to end military rule, which has been in place since August 2023. The variations in the specific political, institutional and security context of these countries also underscore that a, generalised approach to AU’s role with respect to these countries would be inadequate and unfit and require a policy approach tailored to the specificities of each.

Tomorrow’s informal consultation is also expected to touch on the issue of the severing of ties by three central Sahel countries with ECOWAS, dealing a major blow to AU’s ideal of regional integration. On 15 December, during its 66th ordinary session, ECOWAS approved the withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger (who formed their own Alliance of Sahel States (AES abbreviated in French) from the regional bloc, effective 29 January 2025. However, it also decided to institute a six-month transitional period (29 January–29 July 2025) for these countries, leaving the door open for them to reverse their decision. In a step that signals the determination of the countries to exit ECOWAS, the three states unveiled a new common passport of the Confederation of Sahel States, which is expected to come into circulation the same day the exit from ECOWAS takes effect. That the separation of AES states from ECOWAS may take effect is an indictment on the AU’s role of advancing regional integration, underscoring its inability, if not failure, to play the role of mediating between the two.

No outcome document is expected from tomorrow’s informal engagement.

*Post Script: The session was postponed indefinitely.

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Presentation of the Report of the Inaugural Meeting of the PSC Sub Committee on Sanctions

Amani Africa — Wed, 14 Aug 2024 07:32:39 +0000

Presentation of the Report of the Inaugural Meeting of the PSC Sub Committee on Sanctions

Date | 14 August 2024

Tomorrow (15 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1227^th session to receive the report of the inaugural meeting of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions.

The Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for August 2024, Tebelelo A. Boang, is expected to deliver the opening remarks, followed by statements from the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye. Michael Wamai, an expert from Uganda to the AU and Chairperson of the Sub-Committee for the month of June 2024, is anticipated to present the report of the inaugural meeting of the Sub-Committee on Sanctions.

This session is convened in line with the decision made during the inaugural meeting of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions (SCS) on 12 June 2024, in which the Sub-Committee agreed that the Chairperson for June, Michael Wamai, would present the Summary Record of the meeting to the PSC for consideration.

The PSC SCS was launched in June, fifteen years after the PSC first decided to establish it during its 178^th session in March 2009. This decision was made pursuant to Article 8(5) of the PSC Protocol, which empowers the Council to create subsidiary bodies to perform its functions. Despite the 2009 decision, momentum for operationalising the Sanctions Committee only accelerated in recent years, largely due to the resurgence of military coups across the continent since 2021. With six Member States currently suspended from AU activities due to unconstitutional changes of government (UCG), it appears that the AU’s anti-coup norms—once praised for reducing the occurrence of UCGs in Africa—are now facing significant challenges, raising doubts about their effectiveness.

The inaugural meeting of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions, 12 June 2024 (source: @AUC_PAPS)

Although the PSC has the option to impose a range of sanctions beyond suspension, the most common form of sanction that the PSC adopted over the years remains suspension. During its 15^th retreat on its working methods, held in Tunis, Tunisia in November 2023, the PSC recognised various challenges in the implementation of AU sanction regimes. These include: disparities between the AU and some RECs/RMs on the application of sanctions regimes, non-compliance by some neighbouring countries in the implementation of sanctions imposed by the PSC, and lack of enforcement mechanisms. In response to these challenges, recent years have seen renewed efforts to reactivate and operationalise the PSC SCS. For instance, PSC’s 1061^st session, the ACCRA Declaration on UCG in March 2022, and the 16^th extraordinary session of the AU Assembly on terrorism and UCG, held in May 2022, called for the operationalisation of the Sub-Committee on sanctions. Particularly significant was PSC’s 1100^th session, which directed the Committee of Experts (CoE) to develop the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the SCS.

Against the background of the repeated calls for the operationalisation of the SCS, the AU Commission organised training to enhance the capacity of the PSC CoE on sanctions in Accra in September 2022, which enabled the development of ToRs for the PSC SCS while outlining modalities for operationalising the Sub-Committee. The ToRs were further developed during the retreat of the CoE in Zanzibar held in May 2023 and were considered by the PSC during its 15^th retreat on working methods in Tunis, Tunisia, in November 2023.

Key decisions and milestones in the operationalisation of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions

The SCS, comprising the fifteen expert-level members of the PSC, is envisaged to serve as a technical Sub-Committee to assist the PSC on matters relating to sanctions within the framework of Articles 7(g) and 8(5) of the PSC Protocol. According to the ToRs, the chairperson of the Sub-Committee will align with the monthly rotational chairship of the PSC and the PSC Troika to ensure continuity. While the ToRs do not specify the exact frequency of meetings, the Sub-Committee agreed during its inaugural meeting in June to convene at least once a month and additionally as needed, as determined by the PSC. The ToRs also stipulate that the Sub-Committee will provide the PSC with at least quarterly reports on its activities and the implementation of specific sanctions measures.

During tomorrow’s session, Michael Wamai is expected to brief the PSC on the key outcomes of the inaugural meeting. As noted in our policy brief, one of the critical contributions of the Sub-Committee lies in restoring some level of the lost credibility of AU’s anti-coup norm faced, due to PSC’s failure to apply the norm consistently as highlighted by the case of Chad, by ensuring consistent application by the PSC.

In this regard, a key outcome of the inaugural meeting was its emphasis on the imperative of uniformly applying AU normative instruments and measures against Member States that experience UCG, avoiding selective or case-by-case approaches. This is particularly important given the setback the PSC faced after its handling of the military takeover in Chad in April 2021, in which the Council not only failed to label the military’s seizure of power as UCG but also fell short of imposing sanctions as per its instruments and well-established practice. It was also unable to enforce its decision barring the leader of the Transitional Military Council not to take part in the 6 May 2024 Presidential elections, setting a dangerous precedent for similar situations in Mali, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Niger, and Sudan.

Furthermore, given the lack of clarity surrounding the processes and criteria for lifting sanctions—and the potential for this ambiguity to cause policy divergence with RECs/RMS, as evidenced in the cases of Sudan and Gabon with IGAD and ECCAS, respectively calling for lifting of suspension before conditions were met—the inaugural meeting underscored the need to develop robust sanctions implementation, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, as well as a universally applicable procedure for imposing and lifting sanctions.

Considering the uncertainties surrounding the return to constitutional order in many African countries undergoing political transitions, the inaugural meeting also emphasised the need for the Sub-Committee to devise practical measures to address situations of prolonged or stalled transitions. It also stressed the importance of continuing the practice of holding informal consultations with these countries, providing a platform to update progress toward restoring constitutional order.

Another key outcome of the inaugural meeting, likely to be highlighted during tomorrow’s session, is the Sub-Committee’s request for the AU Commission to conduct a comprehensive study on the effectiveness of sanctions as a deterrent against UCG. A follow-up on this remains crucial, given that the efficacy of AU actions against coups depends on a clear appreciation of the sources of influence and leverage of the AU. The meeting also stressed the importance of assessing the impact of sanctions on the broader public in Member States experiencing UCG and submitting the findings to the PSC.

Amani Africa’s policy brief further notes that the ‘effective functioning of the Sub-Committee also depends on the extent to which its works draws on and is informed by solid independent technical analysis and advise.’ In this context, the Sub-Committee, during its inaugural meeting, underlined the need for regular capacity-building training for its Members, and the importance of collaborating with entities such as CISSA, AFRIPOL and INTERPOL. Reactivating other PSC Sub-Committees with a complimentary mandate was also deemed essential for fulfilling its functions effectively. However, as the policy brief argues, it is imperative to accompany the Sub-Committee with an independent expert body on AU Response to UCGs for the provision of objective and in-depth technical advisory and support on the basis of independent assessment and analysis that helps the Sub-Committee to navigate the complex political dynamics relating to situations of UCG.

The SCS is now operational, with its first task—assigned during the PSC Summit on 21 June 2024—to identify external actors supporting Sudan’s warring parties and propose containment strategies within three months. However, the Sub-Committee’s success in fulfilling its mandate will largely depend on its technical capacity and the degree of political support it receives from the AU.

The session’s outcome remains uncertain, but it seems the Sub-Committee aims to have the report of its inaugural meeting adopted through a communiqué. The PSC is expected to welcome the launch of the Sub-Committee on Sanctions as a significant step in strengthening its institutional framework to address unconstitutional changes of government in the continent. In adopting the inaugural meeting report, the PSC is expected to highlight key outcomes, including a request for the AU Commission to conduct a comprehensive study on the effectiveness of the AU’s sanctions regime, the development of robust mechanisms for implementing, monitoring, and evaluating sanctions, and the establishment of a universally applicable procedure for imposing and lifting sanctions. The PSC may stress the importance of equipping the Sub-Committee with the necessary technical and financial resources to effectively fulfill its mandate, while also reminding the Sub-Committee to submit at least quarterly reports on its activities, in accordance with its Terms of Reference.

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Discussion on AU Sanctions regime

Amani Africa — Mon, 23 Oct 2023 12:01:55 +0000

Discussion on AU Sanctions regime

Date | 23 October 2023

Tomorrow (24 October 2023), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1181^st session on the AU Sanctions regime, at the Ambassadorial level.

The Chairperson of the PSC, Daniel Owassa, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Congo to the AU will start the meeting with an opening statement, followed by remarks from Ambassador Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS).

Following the waves of coups that swept across parts of the continent, there has been increasing policy discussion on the need for bolstering the response for containing the spread. Since 2020 alone, the AU has grappled with seven coups in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Sudan, Chad, Niger and most recently, Gabon. Of the seven coups, two countries have faced dual coups (i.e., Mali and Burkina Faso). As the sanction measures adopted by the AU and regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) fail to change the behavior of coup makers or to deter the occurrence of new coups, one of the issues that received increased attention in continental and regional policy processes is how to reinforce the sanctions measure.

The instruments guiding the AU on imposing sanctions on Member States include the PSC Protocol, Lomé Declaration, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), the Constitutive Act of the African Union, and the Accra Declaration. While the AU ordinarily adopts suspension from participation in AU activities, the other sanctions are what the Lomé Declaration calls ‘limited and targeted sanctions’. The ‘limited and targeted sanctions’ listed in the Lomé Declaration travel bans, asset freezes, visa denials for the perpetrators of unconstitutional change of governments (UCG), restrictions of government-to-government contacts, and trade restrictions.

During the Reflection Forum on UCGs, convened in March 2022 in Accra, Ghana, one of the recommendations was to reactivate the PSC Sanctions Committee. This was echoed in the decision of the AU Extraordinary Summit held in May 2022. Subsequently, the PSC held a session on sanctions and enforcement capacities in the deterrence against UCGs and called for the full operationalization of the PSC Sub-Committee and the development of the requisite technical capacities to ensure its effectiveness. During this 1100^th session, the PSC also instructed the Committee of Experts (CoE) to develop the ToRs for the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions. It is important to note that the sub-committee on sanctions was initially established in 2009 through the PSC’s 178^th communique, but it has never been operational. During the CoE retreat in May, the CoE identified certain issues, such as the composition of the Sub-committee and the level of its chairship that require the guidance of the PSC with respect to the Sanctions Sub-Committee. During its 1170^th session, the PSC received report from the CoE on the work accomplished during the CoE retreat for developing the sanctions regime and the terms of reference of the Sub-Committee on Sanctions.

It is expected that tomorrow’s session will also cover the discrepancy in the application of sanctions as one of the critical challenges faced by the AU in imposing sanctions and deterring UCG. In this respect, it is vital that this PSC session aims to look at the divergence in policy implementation between the PSC and the relevant regional mechanisms and foster an environment where there is coordination and collaboration among these entities yielding a more effective and consistent application of sanctions.

Unsurprisingly, tomorrow’s meeting would also give an update on PSC’s request to the AU Commission to establish a solid sanctions infrastructure using the available resources in the PAPS Department that will effectively support the work of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions, as well as a monitoring and evaluation group, to assess the implementation of the sanctions imposed against the Member States. This is in accordance with the decision in communique PSC/PR/COMM.1100 (2022) adopted at PSC’s 1100^th session on 15 August 2022. Furthermore, it will be prudent for this meeting to consider the need for refining existing sanctions pronouncements into consistent frameworks that are aligned with the current evolution of the challenges they are meant to address. To put this into context, the PSC had requested the Commission, ‘in collaboration with the UN stakeholders and relevant African research institutions and think tanks, including the African Members of the UN Security Council (A3) and UN Security Council Permanent Members, to explore and develop an effective collaborative mechanism to strengthen the AU sanctions regime and provide appropriate technical capacities to the PSC Committee of Experts and the Military Staff Committee’.

In addition to highlighting collaborative efforts towards the concretization of a sanctions infrastructure, the deliberation is also likely to give latest update on the operationalization of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions. Moreover, it is imperative for the PSC to engage on the need for the establishment of an independent expert body on AU Response to UCGs. This is crucial for the provision of objective and in-depth technical advisory and support on a regular basis to the PSC and its subsidiary or affiliated bodies, including the Sub-Committee on Sanctions; the Committee of Experts (CoE); and the Military Staff Committee (MSC).

The other and critical issue that would be of interest to the PSC in its consideration of sanctions is the need for ensuring that sanctions are targeted. There is also the related issue of crafting sanctions with the requisite carveouts for ensuring that they don’t lead to collective punishment of the population of the target country. As noted above, the Lomé Declaration took care in specifying the need for targeted sanction. It thus speaks only of ‘limited and targeted sanctions.’ Accordingly, when adopting sanctions that go beyond suspension, there is a need for ensuring that they provide for humanitarian carveouts for facilitating humanitarian access and essential socio-economic activities vital for the wellbeing of populations. It may also interest the PSC to discuss how once fully reactivated, the Sub-Committee on Sanctions can ensure the establishment of clear benchmarks on the criteria and process for easing and lifting sanctions.

The anticipated outcome of tomorrow’s session is a Communique. It is expected that the PSC will highlight the status of the recently suspended countries, namely Niger and Gabon, and emphasize the need to meet the timeframe of the transitional term limit of six months following military coups. The PSC may also underscore the need for enhanced coordination and synergy between the decisions taken by the PSC and that of RECs/RMs on sanctions. The PSC may also call for full and effective implementation of the step by step and graduated approach to sanctions envisaged in the Lomé Declaration and ACDEG as well as the 2009 Ezuliweni framework on UCG. The PSC may also reiterate and refine its earlier call for the establishment of a multidisciplinary team of experts to operate as an independent expert body that works with the PSC Sub-Committee and provides independent technical analysis on the occurrence and nature of UCG, the appropriate response measures including proposals on diplomatic initiatives, and the mobilization of leverage and coordination for maximum and swift impact. The PSC may also affirm the primacy of diplomacy and political engagement for which suspension and sanction provides support for securing agreement on the pathway for restoration of constitutional order. It may further underscore the importance of ensuring that sanctions are ‘limited and targeted’ to constrain those they intended to affect and spare the population of the country concerned from their impacts. The PSC may encourage finalization of the work for the operationalization of the Sub-Committee on Sanctions and call for the full operationalization of the PSC Sanction Committee. Lastly, the PSC may also call for respect for constitutionalism and rule of law as well as term limits set in Constitutions. It may also reiterate its earlier calls for the AU Commission to undertake a study on the root causes of UCG and on ways for reinforcing measures against manipulation of term limits as specified in the Accra Declaration and the Malabo Summit outcome documents. It may also call for a follow-up to the Accra Declaration in having a follow up convening considering developments since March 2022.

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Updated Briefing on the development of the Common African Position on cyber security in Africa

Amani Africa — Wed, 23 Aug 2023 07:18:19 +0000

Updated Briefing on the Development of the Common African Position on Cyber Security in Africa; Presentation of the Draft ToR of the PSC Sub Committee on Sanctions; Draft ToR of Ministerial Committee on Terrorism; and Draft Manual on Modalities for Enhancing Coordination Between the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the African Members of the United Nations Security Council

Date | 23 August 2023

Tomorrow (24 August) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1170^th Session. This session will cover a range of important topics, including a briefing on the development of the Common African Position (CAP) on cybersecurity in Africa, the presentation of the Draft Terms of Reference (ToR) of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions, a Draft ToR of Ministerial Committee on Terrorism and a Draft Manual on Modalities for Enhancing Coordination Between the PSC and the African Members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

The session is expected to begin with the opening remarks by Willy Nyamitwe, the Permanent Representative of Burundi and Chairperson of PSC for the month of August. This will be followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Dr. Guy Fleury-Ntwari, Legal Counsel of the AU and Director of Legal Affairs and Prof. Mohamed Helal, a member of the African Union Commission on International Law (AUCIL) and Special Rapporteur on the Prohibition on Intervention in the Internal and External Affairs of States, are also expected to give a presentation. In addition, Tapiwa Masunungure Zimbabwe’s Committee of Experts member, who chaired the retreat of the Committee of Experts that considered the three documents will deliver a presentation.

Tomorrow’s session on the update briefing by AUCIL is a follow-up to the decision of the 1120^th session of the PSC and the request in its subsequent 1148^th session. During the 1120^thsession, which was dedicated to the inaugural engagement of the PSC with the AUCIL, the PSC recognized the need for the development of a CAP on the application of international law on cybersecurity. It was the first time the PSC approached the issue of cyberspace for peace and security from the perspective of regulating it with the rules of international law. The session emphasized the importance of cybersecurity and the need for adequate regulation. Additionally, discussions were held on the management and regulation of cyberspace in order to prevent activities that threaten international peace and security, including the emergence of cyber-weapons and the manipulation of cyberspace for political influence.

Most importantly, during the session, the PSC acknowledged the applicability of international law to cyberspace, and called on AU Member States to adopt a CAP and emphasized the need for Africa to actively engage in the process. To this end, the Council tasked the AUCIL, in collaboration with the AU Commission, to organize consultations with relevant stakeholders on the application of international law to cyberspace. In its most recent 1148^th session on cybersecurity, the PSC requested ‘the AU Commission on International Law to expeditiously complete, and submit to the Peace and Security Council, the draft statement of a Common African Position on the Application of International Law to Cyberspace.’

In response to PSC’s assignment from its 1120^th session, the AUCIL collaborated with the AU Commission and organized a series of capacity-building training sessions for AU member states. These sessions aimed to equip participants with the knowledge and skills necessary to effectively contribute to the formulation of the CAP regarding the application of international law to cyberspace.

The first session was held online on 29 and 30 March 2023, while the second session took place in Addis Ababa from 12 – 14 June 2023. The third and final part of the capacity-building program took place in New York from 19 – 21 July 2023. The program was attended by experts representing AU Member States who are responsible for following multilateral processes. The third session of the training aimed to strengthen the capacities of AU Member States in cyberspace and international law in order to empower them in multilateral processes like the Open-Ended Working Group on Cybersecurity and the UN General Assembly’s 6th Committee. It also aimed to assist in the process of reviewing and enriching the draft CAP statement.

It is therefore expected that the PSC will receive a progress report and a presentation on the CAP statement in tomorrow’s session. It may be of interest for members of the PSC to know whether the draft statement identifying the rules of international law applicable to cyberspace being presented to the PSC was considered and reflected upon by the AUCIL and updated based on such reflection and whether it covers rules on responsible state behavior in cyberspace. The PSC may also consider whether the statement would benefit from consideration and input of the AU Special and Technical Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs for it to receive strong support and ownership on the part of Member States and the AU broadly. The PSC may also consider how the statement can help in informing the development of a regional legal framework and strategy for promoting the rules of international law governing cyberspace for addressing threats to peace and security arising from cyberspace.

Also worth mentioning for the PSC is whether and how the draft statement took account of and built on the various decisions of the PSC relating to cyberspace and peace and security. Although the PSC has not regularized the decision of its 850^th session dedicating a session on this theme on an annual basis, it has since then convened a number of sessions highlighting its increasing engagement and concern about the peace & security implications of cyberspace. Of direct relevance for tomorrow’s session, among other critical points, the 1097^th session drew attention to the need for enactment of necessary legislations and regulations at national, regional and continental levels to govern issues related to cyberspace. Most recently, the PSC considered the issue of cybersecurity during its 1148^th session last April under Tunisia’s Chairship of the PSC. As the PSC pointed out, its focus on this subject is informed by ‘the growing threat to peace, security and stability in the Continent emanating from the increasing cyber-attacks, malicious use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and incidents of unethical and hostile cyber-activities undertaken by both, state and non-state actors, including the targeting of government institutions and public infrastructure; the spread of misinformation and disinformation, subversive activities and interferences with national government processes, as well as the promotion of ideologies of hate and hate speech.’

In addition to the CAP statement on cybersecurity, the PSC is expected to receive a presentation on three documents. It is to be recalled that these documents were finalized during the Committee of Experts (CoE)’s retreat that was held from 18 – 22 May 2023.

One such document is the draft TOR of the PSC Committee on Sanctions. During the Reflection Forum on Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCGs), which was convened in March 2022 in Accra, Ghana, one of the recommendations was to reactivate the PSC Sanctions Committee. Subsequently, the PSC held a session on sanctions and enforcement capacities in the deterrence against UCGs and called for the full operationalization of the PSC Sub-Committee and the development of the requisite technical capacities to ensure its effectiveness. During this 1100^th session, the Council also instructed the CoE to develop the ToRs for the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions. It is important to note that the CoE was initially established in 2009 by the PSC’s 178^th session communique, but it has never been operational. During the CoE retreat in May, the CoE identified certain issues, such as the composition of the Sub-committee and the level of its chairship that require the guidance of the PSC with respect to the Sanctions Sub-Committee.

The second document is the draft ToR of the Ministerial Committee on Terrorism. One of the key outcomes of the 16^th Extraordinary Summit of the AU Heads of State and Government on UCGs, which was held in May 2022 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, was the establishment of the Ministerial Committee on Counter Terrorism. This committee is meant to coordinate, monitor, evaluate and follow-up on the mechanisms of the implementation of the decisions made during the summit. In this regard, it was expressed in the PSC’s 1107^th session communique that the PSC looks forward to the first meeting of the Ministerial Committee on Terrorism. Since the decision of the Malabo Summit was for the AU Commission to prepare the ToR of the Committee, in tomorrow’s meeting the CoE may propose that the draft ToR be referred to the AU Commission for finalization and presentation to the minsters. The ToR is expected to outline the purpose, goals, scope, working arrangement and composition of the ministerial committee.

Lastly, the PSC will consider the draft manual on modalities for enhancing coordination between the PSC and the African members of the UNSC. The development of this manual is in line with the request made by the PSC during its 1056^th session that considered the Conclusions of the 8^th High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa. The session also requested for the manual to be considered and adopted by the 9^th Annual High Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa on 18 January 2023. Accordingly, the draft manual was presented to the participants of the Seminar and it was requested to circulate the draft to all AU member states for inputs before submitting it for the consideration of the PSC. Following its update during the CoE meeting last May, the representative of the CoE is expected to propose the adoption of the manual by the PSC during tomorrow’s session.

What is expected following the presentations of these three documents is that the PSC will take the required steps including the adoption of the documents and/or clearing of the documents that may require adoption at a different forum or level.

The outcome of the session is expected to be a Communiqué. It is expected that the PSC will reiterate the urgent need for a Common African Position on the application of international law on cyberspace, as well as the need for Africa to actively engage in the process. It is also expected that it will commend the work of the AUCIL in working towards appraising representatives of AU Member States of the latest developments in the field of the rules of international law applicable to cyberspace. It may also emphasize on the importance of capacity building and the need to continue such efforts. The Council may also welcome the draft CAP statement on cyberspace for peace and security. The PSC may recommend that it is presented to relevant AU bodies such as the STC on Justice and Legal Affairs for wider input and build on and reflect the relevant decisions of AU policy organs including those of the PSC. The PSC may request the AU Commission to use the statement in the development of a regional legal framework and strategy for promoting the rules of international law governing cyberspace for addressing threats to peace and security arising from cyberspace.

Additionally, the PSC may welcome the work of the CoE in developing the three documents presented to it. It may also adopt the Terms of Reference of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions with clarification of the issues presented to it for its guidance. The Draft Manual on Modalities for Enhancing Coordination Between the PSC and the African Members of the United Nations Security Council is expected to be adopted by the PSC. The PSC may also refer the Draft ToR of the Ministerial Committee on Terrorism to the AU Commission for its updating and submission for adoption by AU Ministers.

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Sanctions and Enforcement Capacities: Deterrence Against UCG

Amani Africa — Sun, 14 Aug 2022 08:19:38 +0000

Sanctions and Enforcement Capacities: Deterrence Against UCG

Date | 15 August 2022

Tomorrow (15 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is set to convene its 1100^th session to discuss “sanctions and enforcement capacities: deterrence against unconstitutional changes of government (UCG)”.

Following opening remarks of the Permanent Representative of The Gambia to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Jainaba Jagne, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to deliver a statement. Representatives of the respective Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) are also expected to deliver statements while presentations will be made by representatives of the United Nations (UN) and the Institute of Security Studies (ISS).

The recent resurgence in UCG in the continent, noted particularly over the course of 2021, has brought the issue to the fore of policy discourse continentally in the AU and various state and non-state actors and regionally at RECs/RMs. Regionally, the policy debate has been dominant in West Africa, within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). As highlighted in Amani Africa’s Policy Brief, the fact that sanctions imposed on Mali did not deter subsequent coups in four other cases has brought into sharp focus the efficacy of the responses of the AU and RECs/RMs.

While some of the recent conversations on UCG in the continent have focused on the critical importance of comprehensively addressing governance deficits, human rights violations and other governance related underlying root causes which create the fertile ground for coups, the debate within the AU and among the wider policy stakeholders illustrated that not any less important is the issue of ensuring enforceability and impactfulness of sanctions imposed once UCG takes place in a given member State. Beyond the emergence of divergent perspectives in the PSC about whether and when to apply the enforcement measures of suspension and sanctions, the importance of this issue also came out during the March 2022 Accra Forum that the PSC convened in Ghana. In addition to reflecting on the challenges faced so far in applying the enforcement measures (of suspension from AU and/or regional bodies), tomorrow’s session may also serve as an opportunity for building on and articulating modalities for effective operationalization of commitments made under the Accra Declaration with respect to enforcing UCG sanctions.

When addressing the issue of enforceability of sanctions against UCG, one of the first considerations that will require close examination is the existence of a comprehensive framework which establishes clear designation criteria, thresholds and categories for imposition of sanctions as well as conditions that need to be met for lifting them. It is true that the AU Constitutive Act, the Lome Declaration of 2000, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) of 2007, the PSC Protocol and the practice of the PSC in enforcing the AU norms on UCG show that there is adequate clarity about the automaticity of suspension from the AU in cases of UCG, most notably coups. The PSC for example invoked Article 7(1)(g) to suspend AU member states for 19 times. Only in two instance that the PSC withheld the automatic application of suspension (November 2014 on Burkina Faso & April 2019 on Sudan), underscoring that automatic suspension from participating in the AU upon the occurrence of UCG in a member state is the norm.

It is worth noting that this clarity and largely consistent application has significantly contributed to the decline of coups until their unprecedented upsurge in 2021. As established in our policy brief of May 2022 published ahead of the Malabo Summit, ‘until 2021, the trends in the occurrence of coups in Africa is largely characterized by decline, despite its sporadic occurrence in a range of one to two coups per year (in the years when it occurred).’ Prior to 2021 the maximum that Africa experienced a coup since 2000 was in 2003. Since then, there were a few years (2005, 2008 and 2012) when a maximum of two coups occurred, with several years passing without coups.

However, with the unprecedented number of coups in 2021/22, signs of doubt on upholding this established norm and practice on applying suspension has been observed on the part of policy makers (including some PSC members). It is however critical to resist any temptation to blame the lack of effectiveness during 2021/22 on the norm that may lead to the revision or the scraping of the normative automaticity of suspension and the dominant practice of applying it (throwing the baby with the bath water). Instead, attention should focus on whether there is weakening of the strong political commitment & wider public support for the AU norm of zero tolerance against coups. Indeed, although the lack of regard by coup perpetrators is mostly a product of national political power dynamics, this weakening of both political commitment in AU & wider public support for zero tolerance would not be without its contribution. Tomorrow’s session affords the PSC an opportunity for finding ways of strengthening strong political commitment within the AU (both on the part of member states and AU Commission) for upholding the principle of zero tolerance for coups irrespective of their origins.

Equally significant in restoring confidence in the principle of zero tolerance to coups and hence the automatic suspension of States upon occurrence of coups is to ensure that the enforcement of suspension for coups is backed by strong consensus within the AU and at the level of RECs/RMs with formidable backing from AU’s partners. The weaker the consensus among AU member states and between the AU and RECs and the divided the backing of the UN, EU and major powers, the less effective will suspension by AU & RECs/RMs against coups would be.

When it comes to enforcement measures other than suspension (namely diplomatic, territorial and economic sanctions), the major gap (other than the fact that the AU lacks the economic tools (such as those at the disposal of the EU) or (economic & military tools, at the disposal of the UN Security Council) both at the AU and RECs/RMs levels is the absence of a common framework on what kind of sanctions to be applied, under what circumstances, the mechanism for monitoring and the criteria for the lifting of such sanctions. On account of this, participants of the Accra Forum have undertaken to ensure the development of a ‘comprehensive framework establishing different categories of sanctions that may be gradually applied, upon the approval of the relevant AU policy organs, in accordance with the gravity of the violation or threat to the constitutional order.’ It is critical that the PSC uses tomorrow’s session for initiating a process for developing a framework for sanctions, which could also potentially serve as basis for reforming the UN’s sanctions regime, which has increasingly become under scrutiny.

Another important point that must form part of the discourse on imposition and enforcement of sanctions is ensuring protection of the rights and welfare of ordinary citizens of the concerned member State. Imposition of blanket economic and financial sanctions on member States or the closure of borders have had disastrous impacts on populations as multiple examples across the world stand to demonstrate. Mali’s recent experience has particularly invoked much concern and is among the factors that have informed the need to convene tomorrow’s session on sanctions. It is to be recalled that following the inability of Mali’s transition authorities to conduct elections by the timeline stipulated by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the regional bloc imposed sanctions against Mali at its Extraordinary Summit of 09 January 2022. At its 1057^th session, the PSC also endorsed ECOWAS’s decision, albeit reluctantly and with a proviso on the need for ensuring that it does not affect the general public. The sanctions which carried measures such as closure of borders, suspension of economic and financial transactions and suspension of financial assistance, affected the country’s economy which has already been battered by insecurity and impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, the sanctions were felt more among ordinary citizens. The resultant public anger against the sanctions and ECOWAS contributed to the weakening of the efficacy of the sanctions.

One key lesson to draw from Mali’s experience is therefore the importance of making sanctions as specifically targeted as possible. In order to make sanctions impactful and avert negative implications on wider populations, they need to as much as possible be targeted against specific individuals and entities. So far, the PSC has dealt with UCG in various member States 23 times. Out of these, the Council imposed targeted sanctions only four times – at its 168^th, 204^th, 363^rd and 551^st sessions – while it merely resorted to suspension in all other cases. Equally important is the need for building into sanctions, well-crafted carve-out clauses that ensure that lifesaving activities such as provision of humanitarian assistance or access to life supporting supplies are not impeded.

Another critical area that has contributed to the lack of effectiveness of enforcement measures against UCG is the lack of consistent application. At one level this has to do with inconsistency in how the AU applied, for example, suspension. The seizure of power by the military in Chad by suspending the constitutional process is case in point. The failure of the PSC to apply the same measures it applied on Mali has led to legitimate charges of selective application and double standard of the norms. At another level, there is also the fact that the AU is more disposed to take measures against coups than other forms of unconstitutional changes of government outlined in the Lome Declaration of 2000 & ACDEG. Accordingly, it is of utmost importance that the AU develops a predictable process for taking measures against extension of term limits within the framework of Article 23(5) of ACDEG.

The role of various complementary measures is another essential consideration that should be taken into account while imposing sanctions. If the ultimate objective of restoring constitutional order is to be realised, enforcement measures (whether suspension and/or sanctions) need to be combined with parallel, complementary measures such as diplomatic engagement with the concerned member State and support to national dialogue. The need for diplomatic engagements with transition authorities should not however be regarded as a factor for dispensing with more serious measures such as suspensions. In this regard, the Lome Declaration of 2000 clearly requires that such diplomatic engagements are undertaken parallel to the suspension of the country concerned following UCG.

The outcome of the session is expected to be a Communiqué. Council may reaffirm the conclusions of the Accra Forum on strengthening the efficacy of enforcement measures and request that the measures outlined in this regard in the Accra Declaration are followed up and reports are submitted to the PSC within specified timelines. It may underscore the need for restoring the political commitment of the AU and other stakeholders in the principle of zero tolerance to coups and the automatic application of suspension upon the occurrence of UCG such as coups as a matter of principle. The PSC may also underscore the need for building strong consensus within the AU and among other stakeholders with the relevant leverage when considering and adopting enforcement measures. It may call on the AU Commission, in collaboration with RECs, to work towards the development of a comprehensive sanctions framework which illustrates relevant criteria and benchmarks for imposition, monitoring and lifting of sanctions. It may also urge the immediate activation of its Sanctions Committee which, supported by an expert body, could play an instrumental role in monitoring implementation of sanctions imposed by the Council and in assessing fulfilment of conditions for their lifting thereof. It may also reiterate the sentiment of the Accra Declaration on ensuring that sanctions do not harm the ordinary citizens of a non-complying member State. It may further highlight the importance of having clarity on the goals intended with sanctions so that they do not aggravate political disputes and the need to closely examine the humanitarian and human rights consequences of sanctions, particularly on countries experiencing overlapping governance, security and humanitarian crises.

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Open Session on Promoting Constitutionalism, Democracy and Inclusive Governance to Strengthen Peace, Security and Stability in Africa

Amani Africa — Wed, 26 Jan 2022 10:10:59 +0000

Popular Uprisings and Unconstitutional Changes of Government

Date | 27 January, 2022

Tomorrow (27 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to hold its 1061st meeting. The open session will take place under the theme ‘Promoting Constitutionalism, Democracy and Inclusive Governance as a Means of Strengthening Peace, Security and Stability in Africa’.

Following opening remarks by Permanent Representative of Ghana to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Amma Adomaa Twum-Amoah, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to make a statement. Emma Birikorang Deputy Director of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre (KAIPTC) and Paul Simon, the East Africa Regional Representative and Representative to AU of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) are also expected to deliver presentations. Representatives of the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) as well as members of the international community represented in Addis Ababa are also expected to participate in the session.

Tomorrow’s session comes against the backdrop of the resurgence in unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) and related challenging political transitions witnessed in the continent throughout 2021. During the year, the continent has seen the occurrence of four successful coups (in Chad, Guinea, Mali and Sudan). As 2022 commences, another coup has taken place in Burkina Faso following the detention of President Kabore by mutinous soldiers. In light of this concerning trend, the upsurge in UCG formed part of the key issues addressed at the Eight High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa convened from 2 to 4 December 2021 in Oran, Algeria. As a key recommendation, participants of the seminar proposed the review of the African Governance Architecture (AGA) as well as the 2000 Lomé Declaration on Unconstitutional Change of Government, in order to ensure that these frameworks are more suitable to the contemporary peace and security landscape of the continent. The sessions is expected to reflect on the concerning resurgence in UCG and its implication on constitutionalism and democracy as well as its impact on peace and security in Africa.

The AU already has developed various norms promoting democracy and constitutionalism and banning UCG in the form of key instruments including the AU Constitutive Act, the PSC Protocol, the 2000 Lomé Declaration, the Ezulwini Framework, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter). There is however lack of consolidated approach in the implementation of these instruments. Further to condemning UCG and imposing applicable sanctions whenever they take place, it is important to ensure that the underlying root causes which lay a fertile ground for the occurrence of coups are also addressed. As observed in various previous cases, some of the key underlying causes of UCG in Africa relate to democratic deficits, mainly the extension of term limit through contested constitutional amendments and the absence of transparency and credibility in the conduct of elections. The importance of adhering to basic democratic principles as a way of averting the risk of UCG is also clearly captured in the 2000 Lomé Declaration. One of the points worth reflecting at tomorrow’s session is therefore the importance of adopting a consolidated approach in implementing AU norms on democracy and constitutionalism in order to prevent the very occurrence of UCG by addressing the root cause as well.

Over the years, the PSC has convened various sessions dedicated to the theme of UCG and popular uprising which are essential in informing tomorrow’s session. The latest of these sessions was the 871st session convened on 22 August 2019, where the PSC noted governance issues as one of the underlying root causes of conflicts and crises in Africa. Studies also indicate that coups experienced in Africa between 1960 and 2000 have had devastating impact on the continent’s stability. Another important PSC session on the topic was the 432nd session convened on 29 April 2014 which served to adopt some key decisions including the establishment of a sub-committee which could undertake an in-depth review of AU’s relevant normative frameworks to develop a consolidated approach in responding to UCG and popular uprising in Africa. Tomorrow’s session may serve to follow up on the progress in the establishment of this sub-committee.

In addition to ensuring coherence in the implementation of AU norms on democracy and constitutionalism, it is also important to address how the AU should approach cases of popular uprising. The AU is yet to develop a norm on popular uprising and elaborate its correlation with UCG. It is noteworthy that while condemning violent uprisings, the PSC has at various occasions affirmed the legitimacy of peaceful popular uprisings. For instance, at its 432nd session the council underscored some of the circumstances which would justify popular uprising, underscoring the oppressive nature of regimes; systematic abuse of human rights; and failure of governments to fulfil their responsibilities as the conditions which could trigger “the right of the people to peacefully express their will against oppressive systems”. In responding to the military takeover of power in Sudan in 2019 at its 840th session, the PSC also made a clear distinction between its condemnation of the military’s power grab and its recognition of the aspiration of the Sudanese people “to the opening of the political space in order to be able to democratically design and choose institutions that are representative and respectful of freedoms and human rights”.

Another critical issue which warrants the Council’s attention is the growing concern over security challenges, particularly terrorist insurgency and the lack of effective government response which has in multiple cases served as the central justification given by militaries for staging coups. Notwithstanding the manipulation of such justification as a means of legitimising suspension of constitutions, there is indeed a growing frustration over the lack or inadequate government response to security challenges. In addition to its immediate security related impact therefore, the absence of an effective government response to security threats endangers not only the stability of a country but also democratic rule. Hence, as the rate and complexity of security threats in the continent increase, governments role remains important in the way it handles and responds to such threats.

Incorporating indicators related to human rights and governance within AU’s continental early warning system could also be an important aspect which the Council may consider. Closely monitoring situations in individual member States which are at risk of experiencing disruptions to constitutional rule could play a crucial role in averting UCG by setting the stage for the deployment of AU’s preventive diplomacy. Lack of inclusive governance, political confrontations, highly contested elections, constitutional amendments to extend presidential term limits, and grave violations of human rights and democratic principles are some of the major warning signs of disruption to democratic rule as well as peace and security in Africa.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. The Council may condemn all acts which endanger constitutionalism and democracy and threaten the continent’s peace and security. It may express concern over the increasing trend of UCG in Africa and it may underline the importance of enforcing and advancing the relevant AU norms to curb this trend. In this respect, it may urge all AU member States to sign, ratify and implement relevant AU norms on human rights and democracy. It may also follow up on the implementation of its previous decisions on the theme, particularly the request made at its 432nd session for the AU Commission to finalise the draft AU framework on responses to popular uprisings and to submit the draft for Council’s consideration. Council may also request the AU Commission to propose modalities for the review of AGA and the Lomé Declaration as well as other relevant AU instruments including the Banjul Charter.

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Brainstorming Session on “Popular uprisings” and its Impact on Peace and Security on the Continent

Amani Africa — Thu, 22 Aug 2019 09:28:45 +0000

Popular Uprisings and Unconstitutional Changes of Government

Date | 22 August, 2019

Tomorrow (22 August) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold its 871st meeting. This is designed to be a brainstorming session on the concept of “popular uprisings” and its impact on peace and security on the continent.

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) are expected to brief the PSC. The Department of Political Affairs that has been engaged on the subject of popular uprisings and unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) is also best placed to provide insights on the subject. Ambassador Albert Chimbindi, chair of the month, is expected to make a statement highlighting the issues that need to be interrogated during the session.

While recent events in Algeria and more specifically Sudan reignited policy interest in the subject, it was the popular uprisings that erupted in North Africa in 2011 that first brought the issue of popular uprising to the fore of continental peace and security agenda. The AU responded to those events, particularly the precedent setting events in Tunisia, in relation to its norm banning unconstitutional change of government (UCG). Although in a strictly legalistic interpretation the ouster through street protest of Tunisia’s then President Ben Ali in early 2011 could have been deemed an UCG on account of the fact that it was not constitutionally envisaged, the PSC did not consider the lack of stipulation of changing government through popular uprising in Tunisia’s constitution as an UCG. Instead, it expressed its respect for the democratic aspiration and the will of the people, implying that the demand for constitutional rule is not simply about respecting constitutional processes for their own sake but about safeguarding the will of the people.

Clearly the issue of popular uprising has since that time become recurrent, it was in 2014 that the PSC looked specifically into the question of the relationship between popular uprising and UCG. Under Nigerian chairmanship in April 2014, the PSC dedicated its 432nd session to the theme ‘unconstitutional changes of government and popular uprisings – Challenges and lessons learnt’. In the statement issued at the session, the PSC affirmed the legitimacy of popular uprisings. It in particular held that ‘[i]n circumstances where governments fail to fulfill their responsibilities, are oppressive and systematically abuse human rights or commit other grave acts and citizens are denied lawful options,’ it ‘recognized the right of the people to peacefully express their will against oppressive systems.’

At the same time, the PSC in this statement also underscored the need ‘for developing a consolidated AU framework on how to respond to situations of unconstitutional changes of government and popular uprisings’. It in particular noted that such a framework ‘should include the appropriate refinement of the definition of unconstitutional changes of government, in light of the evolving challenges facing the continent, notably those related to popular uprisings against oppressive systems, taking into account all relevant parameters.’ Indeed, this is important since the AU norm on UCG as it stands offers no clear and systematic guidance on how to differentiate legitimate popular uprising from acts that can be considered as UCG and on how to respond to such popular movements. The PSC accordingly tasked ‘the Commission to prepare the elements of the framework and to submit to it for consideration.’

While there has been efforts within the Department of Political Affairs to undertake the review process, there has been no follow up on this subject from the side of the PSC. Instead, the issue featured as part of the final report of the AU High-level Panel on Egypt in June 2014. Observing the lacuna in the AU norm on UCG, the Panel proposed the elaboration of a guideline for determining the compatibility of popular uprisings that result in a change of government with the norms on UCG. According to the proposal, for popular uprisings to be compatible with existing AU norms, consideration should be had to the following five elements: ‘(a) the descent of the government into total authoritarianism to the point of forfeiting its legitimacy; (b) the absence or total ineffectiveness of constitutional processes for effecting change of government; (c) popularity of the uprisings in the sense of attracting significant portion of the population and involving people from all walks of life and ideological persuasions; (d) the absence of involvement of the military in removing the government; (e) peacefulness of the popular protests’.

As can be seen from these considerations, rather than being completely new the Panel built on the press statement of the PSC from its 432nd session as the references to failure of the government or its descent into repressive authoritarian rule and the lack of any effective constitutional means for changing the government (the principle of last resort) make it clear.

In a measure that illustrated an emerging norm affirming the legitimacy of popular uprisings, the PSC reiterated the language it used in its press statement of 432nd session in the case of Burkina Faso. The PSC in the communique of its 465th session relating to the situation in Burkina Faso of made reference to “the recognition of the right of peoples to rise up peacefully against oppressive political systems”. Even more recently in relation to the situation in Sudan, the PSC clearly stated its recognition of the ‘legitimate aspirations of the Sudanese people to the opening of the political space in order to be able to democratically design and choose institutions that are representative and respectful of freedoms and human rights’. The PSC accordingly made a distinction between the popular protests in Sudan and the military takeover of power, which it condemned as being contrary to the AU norm on UCG.

Clearly, AU’s treatment of the popular uprisings in North African, Burkina Faso and most recently in Sudan vis‐à‐vis its norm on UCG has signaled a new approach in interpreting legal frameworks that provide justification and legitimacy for popular uprisings in ousting authoritarian regimes. Yet, although the considerations elaborated in the final report of the AU High‐level Panel on Egypt offer the framework for establishing the framework for distinguishing those popular uprisings that constitute UCG from those that do not, there has been no follow up to the Panel’s useful foundational work. Accordingly, there remain lack of clarity including on the question of what makes an uprising or protest movement popular and hence consistent with the AU norm on UCG.

The most recent background to the agenda of this session is the surge of protest events on the continent. While these events have been witnessed in many parts of the continent, they have been notable, among others, in Burundi, Congo, DRC, and Ethiopia. Indeed, some of the conflict data sets notably the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) noted that, accounting for a total of 5660 events in 2017, protests and riots have become the leading conflict or crisis events on the continent.

This session affords the PSC an opportunity for clarifying a number of questions related to popular uprisings including vis‐à‐vis the list of considerations developed in the June 2014 AU High‐Level Panel report. Apart from the question noted above, these questions include who makes the determination of when an uprising becomes popular, what sets ordinary protest events apart from popular uprisings and whether there is a threshold that should be met for making such determination. While these questions are important, it is worth recognizing that there can be no full proof and mathematically precise formula for making determination on these questions.

What these questions rather highlight is the need for following up on the outstanding tasks stipulated in the press statement of the 432nd session of the PSC. The PSC is holding tomorrow’s brainstorming session five years after its landmark meeting on UCG and popular uprising in 2014. This presents it with the opportunity for making such follow up to the outcomes of its 432nd session.
As a brainstorming session, the expected outcome of the session remains unclear. Yet, irrespective of whether the outcome takes the form of a communique or press statement, it is expected that the PSC would reiterate its 432nd session on the need for addressing the gap in the AU normative framework. More specifically, the PSC may also task the AU Commission to establish an ad hoc body composed of the PSC Committee of Experts and legal experts who have studied the issue to produce and submit to it a proposal with objective guidelines on determining popular uprisings based on the various PSC outcome documents and the outline set out in the report of the AU High‐Level Panel and with the support of the Department of Political Affairs and the AU Legal Counsel. The PSC may also call on for addressing the root causes of popular dissent highlighted in its 432nd session including through the expansion of the democratic space, respect for constitutional term limits, ensuring the credibility of elections as the normal avenue for changing governments and by addressing socio‐economic grievances and inequalities.

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