The latest offensive has further exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in eastern DRC, with more than 200,000 people displaced since early December, reports of widespread human rights violations, including sexual violence, and a rapidly collapsing health system. In a statement issued on 11 December, the Deputy Spokesperson for the UN Secretary-General warned that the escalation risks seriously undermining efforts to achieve a sustainable resolution to the crisis and increasing the risk of a broader regional conflagration.

The offensive also heightens the risk of regional tension, as it brings Burundi’s capital city, Bujumbura, under a very close target of attack. During the UN Security Council briefing on eastern DRC on 12 December, the representative of Burundi expressed concern over cross-border attacks, some of which he said violated Burundi’s sovereignty. He further described the 4 December attacks in Cibitoke as ‘a grave provocation,’ warning that if such attacks were to continue, ‘it would become difficult to avoid direct escalation between the two countries [Burundi and Rwanda].’

DRC and Rwanda have continued to trade accusations over the latest violence, which both sides claim constitutes a breach of the Washington Accord. On 10 December, Kigali, in a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, accused the DRC and Burundian armed forces of violating the ceasefire, alleging systematic bombardment of civilian villages near the Rwandan border using fighter jets and attack drones. During the 12 December Security Council briefing, Rwanda also raised concerns over what it described as atrocity indicators affecting the Banyamulenge community in South Kivu. The DRC, for its part, criticised what it described as a Rwanda Defence Forces–M23 offensive launched less than a day after the signing of the Washington Accord. It warned that continued attacks, mass displacement, and cross-border risks pose a serious threat to regional stability.

Meanwhile, language directed at Kigali has sharpened amid growing criticism of its alleged involvement in eastern DRC. In the recent UNSC briefing, a US representative expressed ‘profound disappointment’ at the renewed violence and asserted that the Rwanda Defence Forces had provided material, logistical, and training support to the M23, even fighting alongside the group in eastern DRC. The representative also levelled a serious accusation against Rwanda, stating that ‘in recent weeks, Rwanda is leading the region towards increased instability and war.’ In a subsequent post on the X platform, Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that the United States could take action, stating that Rwanda’s actions in eastern DRC constitute a clear violation of the Washington Accord.

In a statement issued on 11 December, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, expressed deep concern over the developments in South Kivu in eastern DRC, as well as in Cibitoke Province of Burundi. He reiterated AU’s ‘long-standing position that lasting peace in the Great Lakes region is predicated on full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states,’ further condemning ‘any attempt to establish a parallel administration in eastern DRC.’ Similar language was reflected in the joint annual consultative meeting held in October between the PSC and the European Political and Security Committee (EU PSC).

The joint PSC and EUPSC communiqué issued after the consultative meeting reaffirmed the ‘imperative obligation to fully respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of DRC’ as essential to resolving the country’s conflict, expressed grave concern over M23’s military operations and territorial expansion, and called for the ‘dismantlement of the so-called ‘parallel administration’ by the rebel movement of M23’. The joint PSC and EU PSC communiqué also called for foreign armed forces not invited by the DRC to unconditionally withdraw, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2773 (2025). While the communiqué did not explicitly identify the forces concerned, its reference to Resolution 2773 leaves little ambiguity. That resolution calls on the Rwanda Defence Forces to cease support to the M23 and to withdraw immediately and without preconditions from DRC territory, a matter that is now governed under the Washington Accord.

Succumbing to the mounting diplomatic pressure, the M23 announced on 15 December the unilateral withdrawal of its forces from Uvira. Despite the reluctant withdrawal of the bulk of its forces, the continued presence of M23 forces in close proximity to Uvira is reported. Thus, a US official is reported as stating that the US was not satisfied due to the fact the recognition that the withdrawal was not total.

One of the issues expected to feature in tomorrow’s discussion is how the AU can reinvigorate its role in addressing the protracted conflict and decades of suffering in eastern DRC. While the AU played a critical role in facilitating dialogue between the DRC and Rwanda under the Luanda Process—including the declaration of a ceasefire in August 2024, the adoption of the Harmonized Plan for the Neutralization of the FDLR and the Disengagement of Forces/Lifting of Defensive Security Measures by Rwanda, and the adoption of the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), which also served as the basis for the US facilitated Peace Agreements— continental peace efforts have since faced setbacks, with mediation momentum shifting to Washington and Doha. At the same time, attempts to reorganise African-led efforts have so far made limited progress.

In March, the joint EAC-SADC Summit appointed a Panel of Facilitators composed of five former Presidents to support the DRC peace process. On 1 August, the Co-Chairs of the Joint EAC-SADC Summit met the Panel in Nairobi and adopted a framework to merge the Nairobi and Luanda processes. They also decided on the immediate merger of EAC-SADC and AU structures into a single mechanism comprising the AU Mediator and the EAC-SADC Panel of Facilitators. The Summit further called on the AU Commission to ensure all other initiatives and stakeholders align with this African-led process. A major update in this regard will be the planned High-Level Meeting on the Coherence and Consolidation of the Peace Process in the DRC and the Great Lakes Region, to be hosted by Togo, in its capacity as AU Mediator, on 17 January 2026.

The PSC may also need to accord developments in eastern DRC a level of attention commensurate with the gravity and pace of events on the ground. The PSC did not hold a session on the situation since its last meeting in February 2025, on the margins of the AU Summit. Although sessions were scheduled for 19 and 28 November, neither materialised. Without more regular engagement and closer follow-up, it will be difficult for the AU to provide strategic guidance or to play a more proactive and effective role in the peace process.

Supplementing and reinforcing the high-level meeting that Togo is expected to host, one avenue for the AU to reassert its leadership in advancing peace in relation to the conflict in Eastern DRC is to initiate and deploy initiatives for building trust between countries in the region and communities in Eastern DRC. This requires the AU to accord this file a heightened level of diplomatic attention and facilitate a more active role of the SADC-EAC facilitators in advancing confidence-building measures, including dialogue and reconciliation in Eastern DRC.

The expected outcome of the session is the adoption of a communiqué. The PSC is expected to welcome the signing of the Washington Accord between the DRC and Rwanda in December, as well as the Doha Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement concluded in November 2025. However, the PSC is likely to strongly condemn the escalation of violence in South Kivu and the territorial expansion by the M23, including its takeover of Uvira, and the resulting deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the region. Echoing the UNSC, the PSC may call on the M23 to halt and reverse all its military operations and end the establishment of parallel administration in areas it seized. The PSC may further urge all parties to respect their obligations under the Washington Accord and the Doha Agreement, and to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 2773. The PSC may further express grave concern over the attacks affecting Cibitoke Province of Burundi and the resultant heightening risk of further regional escalation. The PSC may call on the various actors, including the DRC army and affiliated forces on the one hand and the M23 on the other, to unconditionally cease hostilities and abide by the commitments made under the Washington and Doha agreements. It may also call on the signatories of the Doha Framework to build on commitments made and finalise remaining agreements for ensuring implementation. It is also expected to re-emphasise the imperative of full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC. With respect to continental mediation efforts, the PSC may welcome the decisions of the joint EAC–SADC Summit, including the merger of EAC–SADC and AU structures into a single mechanism comprising an AU Mediator and the EAC–SADC Panel of Facilitators. In this context, it may also call for the activation of a joint secretariat under the AU to strengthen Africa-led peace efforts in eastern DRC. The PSC may also welcome Togo’s plan to host the High-Level Meeting on the Coherence and Consolidation of the Peace Process in the DRC and the Great Lakes Region on 17 January 2026.

In the PSC’s summit meeting on 14 February 2025, it ‘unequivocally condemned the activities of M23 and its supporters, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and other armed groups’ and called for ‘the immediate withdrawal of all uninvited foreign forces, armed and terrorist groups operating in the DRC.’ On 21 February, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2773 on the situation in eastern DRC, which, among other elements, demanded the immediate cessation of further M23 military advances, calling for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire, and expressed the Council’s readiness to consider additional measures against those contributing to the continuation of the conflict in eastern DRC.

The security situation in eastern DRC has continued to deteriorate, with further fears that the M23 will expand its territorial control into Uvira. Tension between DRC and Rwanda also continues, with both countries persisting in trading accusations. In his 23 September address during the General Debate of the 80th session of the UN General Assembly, President Tshisekedi accused Rwanda of deliberately obstructing peace efforts and continuing its support for the M23, and he called for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from Congolese territory. Speaking at the General Assembly on 25 September, Rwanda’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Olivier Nduhungirehe, accused the DRC of renewed militarisation and ongoing collaboration with ‘genocidal and sanctioned armed groups,’ including the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) —an ethnic Hutu armed group active in eastern DRC that was implicated in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda—and Wazalendo militias.

As peace efforts from continental initiatives face setbacks, efforts have been underway to reorganise continental efforts. In March, the joint EAC-SADC Summit appointed a Panel of Facilitators composed of five former Presidents to support the DRC peace process. On 1 August, the Co-Chairs of the Joint EAC-SADC Summit met the Panel in Nairobi and adopted a framework to merge the Nairobi and Luanda processes. They also decided on the immediate merger of EAC-SADC and AU structures into a single mechanism comprising the AU Mediator and the EAC-SADC Panel of Facilitators. The Summit further called on the AU Commission to ensure all other initiatives and stakeholders align with this African-led process. The operationalisation of this process remains slow.

Despite the setbacks faced in the Luanda process and attempts to reorganise continental efforts, new peace efforts emerged, albeit outside of the AU and African regional bodies.  Following the collapse of the meeting of the leaders of the DRC and Rwanda in December 2024, on 18 March, the Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, facilitated a meeting in Doha between DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame. According to a joint statement issued afterwards, the two leaders ‘reaffirmed the commitment of all parties to an immediate and unconditional ceasefire.’

On 25 April, US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, hosted DRC’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and La Francophonie, Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, and Rwanda’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Olivier Nduhungirehe, in Washington, D.C. During the meeting, he facilitated the signing of a Declaration of Principles aimed at supporting a ‘pathway to peace, stability, and integrated economic development in the eastern DRC region and the resumption of normal bilateral relations.’

Negotiations between the DRC and Rwanda under US auspices ultimately led to the signing of a peace agreement on 27 June in Washington, D.C. The two parties agreed, among others, to refrain from acts of aggression; to immediately and unconditionally end state support to non-state armed groups; and to implement the Harmonised Plan for the Neutralisation of the FDLR and Disengagement of Forces/Lifting of Defensive Measures by Rwanda—an outcome of the Luanda process. To support implementation, a Joint Oversight Committee—composed of the two parties, the US, Qatar, Togo (as AU facilitator), and the AU Commission—has been operationalised and has convened four meetings so far.

The US has been working through the mechanisms established under the 27 June agreement to ease tensions and help the DRC and Rwanda translate their commitments into concrete action. Most recently, the fourth meeting of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism was held in Washington, D.C., on 20 November. This mechanism is tasked with overseeing the implementation of the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the harmonised plan to neutralise the FDLR and to facilitate the disengagement of forces and the lifting of defensive measures by Rwanda. According to a joint statement issued after the meeting, the DRC and Rwanda reaffirmed their commitment to what is referred to as the Operations Order (OPORD), developed as the implementation plan for advancing the CONOPS.

On 7 November, the Joint Oversight Committee—established under the peace agreement to resolve any disputes arising during implementation—met in Washington, D.C. According to a joint statement issued after the meeting, the parties committed to refraining from any hostile actions or rhetoric that could undermine the full implementation of the 27 June peace agreement. They also initialled the text of a Regional Economic Integration Framework (REIF), which outlines key areas for fostering economic cooperation and development between the two countries. During the meeting, Qatar provided an update on the ongoing negotiations in Doha, including progress on prisoner exchanges and the first meeting of the Doha ceasefire monitoring mechanism, established in October to oversee implementation of the ceasefire between the Congolese government and M23.

Meanwhile, following a first direct encounter between representatives of the Congolese government and the M23 in Doha under Qatar’s facilitation, the two sides issued a joint declaration on 23 April reaffirming their ‘commitment to an immediate cessation of hostilities, a categorical rejection of any hate speech, intimidation, and call on local communities to uphold these commitments.’

Since then, negotiations have continued in pursuit of a comprehensive peace agreement. Several contentious issues have emerged. For example, the M23 insisted on implementing confidence-building measures—such as the release of prisoners of war—as a precondition for further progress, while the Congolese government maintained that such measures could only be considered once an agreement is signed, including on the restoration of state authority. Other sensitive matters, including the restoration of state authority and broader governance arrangements, have reportedly elicited strong reactions from both sides.

Nonetheless, Qatar has continued its facilitation efforts, and both the Congolese government and the M23 remain actively engaged in the process. Ultimately, the two parties agreed on a prisoner exchange mechanism, under which the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) will oversee the identification, verification, and safe release of detainees held by both sides.

On 19 July, the Congolese government and M23 signed a Declaration of Principles in Doha, including a commitment to a ceasefire. Subsequent Qatari-led negotiations paved the way for the signing of the Doha Framework for Peace on 15 November. Under this framework, the parties affirmed their commitment to addressing the root causes of the conflict through structured dialogue, confidence-building measures, and a phased approach to de-escalation and stabilisation. The Doha Framework for Peace is intended to serve as the foundation for a comprehensive peace process, with a series of protocols, annexes, and technical arrangements to be negotiated in due course. These are expected to address specific issues, including the consolidation and verification of the ceasefire, modalities for troop disengagement, humanitarian access, reintegration, and support for national dialogue. Media reports have indicated a planned summit this month between DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame in Washington, D.C. The signing of the Doha Framework could provide the necessary momentum for this summit.

The situation was a subject of deliberation in the consultative meetings, both between the PSC and the UNSC and the PSC and the European Political and Security Committee (EUPSC). In the joint communiqué of the PSC and the EUPSC, which, unlike the PSC-UNSC joint communiqué, contained substantive elements that reflect the current policy thinking on the state of the situation in Eastern DRC.  First in relation to the M23, the PSC-EUPSC joint communiqué, reaffirming ‘the imperative obligation to fully respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC’ as essential to resolving the country’s conflict, expressed grave concern over M23’s military operations and territorial expansion, and called for the ‘dismantlement of the so-called ‘parallel administration’ by the rebel Movement of M23.’ Second, the joint communiqué called ‘for foreign armed forces not invited by the DRC to unconditionally withdraw in line with UNSC Resolution 2773 (2025).’ While the EUPSC-AUPSC avoided naming who ‘uninvited foreign forces’ refers to, the reference to UNSC Resolution 2773 leaves very little doubt about who it refers to.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to express concern over the continuation of the conflict in Eastern DRC and the tension between the DRC and Rwanda. It may reiterate the imperative for respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC and its call for unconditional cessation of hostilities. The PSC may also welcome the various peace processes, including the signing of agreements in Washington, D.C., and Doha and call on the parties to the peace processes to abide by the commitments they have made. It may also underscore the need for coordination of the peace processes led by the US and Qatar with the efforts of the AU mediator and the EAC-SADC Panel of Facilitators for the DRC. It may also welcome the decisions of the joint EAC-SADC Summit and the merger of EAC-SADC and AU structures into a single mechanism comprising the AU Mediator and the EAC-SADC Panel of Facilitators. In this respect, the PSC may also call for the activation of the joint secretariat under the AU for enhancing the role of the continent in peace efforts in Eastern DRC.

The situation in Goma appears stable now, except for sporadic gunshots in the city, according to UN officials. M23 continues to deepen its grip on the territories it has seized. Most notably, it is instituting its own administrative structures in those territories, marginalising the structures under the current constitutional arrangement of the DRC. This has understandably triggered fears of the fragmentation of the territory of the DRC.

M23 had declared a unilateral humanitarian ceasefire on 4 February, but it did not hold as fighting resumed in South Kivu with M23 advancing southwards and capturing Nyabibwe, a mining town on Lake Kivu 40 miles from Bukavu, the provincial capital. After a few days of lull, fighting has reportedly resumed in South Kivu. According to UN officials, M23 is targeting Kavumbu Airport, a major airport in the province, and Bukavu is likely to be next. The fighting in South Kivu appears to have created fears in Burundi which borders the province and has its forces deployed in eastern DRC as part of a bilateral agreement with the Congolese government.

These major changes in the battlefield conditions of the conflict involving the M23 brought about very adverse consequences to the presence of UN and regional third-party mechanisms. The UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) and the Southern African Development Community Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC), deployed in the region since December 2023 with an offensive mandate, attempted to halt M23’s advance but were unsuccessful. Tragically, three MONUSCO peacekeepers and 19 SAMIDRC troops (14 South Africans, three Malawians and two Tanzanians) lost their lives.

Beyond the loss of peacekeepers, the very continuation of these missions has emerged to be a major issue. With the announcement of the withdrawal of troops by the troop contributing countries of SAMIDRC, the mission exists only in name. For all practical purposes, the M23’s military gains have pushed the SAMIDRC into implosion. Similarly, it remains unclear whether and how MONUSCO can pursue its current mandate under the new realities established on the ground as a result of these gains.

In light of the regional tension that followed these recent developments, there are also understandable concerns about the heightened risk of the situation degenerating into a wider regional conflict, with the loss of lives involving peacekeepers from Southern Africa and the anxiety that the threat of the fall of Bukavu into the hands of M23 triggered in Burundi. Uganda, another neighbouring country  that has its forces in eastern DRC as part of a bilateral agreement with the Congolese government, also reportedly decided to adopt an ‘offensive defence’ posture by deploying 1000 additional troops for this purpose. These dimensions of the volatile situation necessitate urgent de-escalation initiatives by the AU, building on the decisions that the PSC ministers adopted and the outcomes of the EAC-SADC summit.

The last session of the PSC held on 28 January on the situation condemned the attacks by M23 and expressed grave concerns about the escalating tensions between the DRC and Rwanda. It also condemned ‘any foreign military support’ to M23, a euphemism to refer to Rwanda. It further called for the immediate withdrawal of ‘any external party’ from Congolese territory, though without explicitly referencing Rwanda, which has been implicated by UN reports for supporting the group and demanded the cessation of such support while also condemning support for the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), once again without specifying the sources of this support, and demanding its immediate cessation. The FDLR is an ethnic Hutu armed group implicated in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide against the Tutsis, which operates in eastern DRC and has been supported by the Congolese government, as corroborated by UN reports.

In New York, the Security Council convened on the same day to discuss the situation. Council members have had divergent views on the role of external forces, with the A3 Plus (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) previously resisting any explicit reference to Rwanda due to concerns that it might complicate ongoing mediation efforts. However, the group softened its position after the fall of Goma. In its 28 January joint statement at the Security Council, the A3 Plus, for the first time, urged ‘the Government of Rwanda to withdraw its troops from DRC territories without preconditions and without delay, and cease its reported support for the M23.’ At that meeting, Security Council members expressed hope that regional efforts would lead to a reinvigoration of mediation processes to find a lasting solution to this longstanding and intractable conflict.

Following the AUPSC and Security Council meetings, the EAC and SADC met in an extraordinary session to discuss the situation in eastern DRC on 29 and 31 January, respectively. The EAC, among other things, strongly urged the Congolese government to engage directly with M23 and other armed groups. It is to be recalled that the EAC spearheaded a peace process focusing on facilitating dialogue between the Congolese government and a wide array of armed groups operating in eastern DRC. This process had been stuck for some time because the Congolese government was not willing to engage in direct dialogue with M23. Instead, it preferred to engage with Rwanda, which was accused of supporting the M23. The platform for this has been another regional initiative known as the Luanda process under the auspices of the Angolan President João Lourenço, who was designated by the AU to facilitate dialogue between the two countries to ease their diplomatic tensions.

There has also been a regional and international push to revive the Nairobi process, considering the evolving security situation and the need to address the issue of M23. The Congolese government’s position also seems to have shifted recently; it is now open to allowing M23 to participate in the Nairobi process. However, it remains unclear if Kinshasa would engage in direct talks with M23 while the latter remains to be in control of the territories it seized during the past few months and is seen to be undermining the constitutional administrative structure of DRC in Eastern DRC by establishing its own administrative structures.

Ahead of the EAC and SADC joint summit, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) met on 7 February in an extraordinary session in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. It condemned ‘M23 supported by Rwanda and order[s] it to immediately cease its offensive and leave the illegally occupied territories’. It also calls for ‘the immediate withdrawal of the Rwandan Defence Forces from the Congolese territory, including the normalisation of the operations of the Goma airport in order to facilitate the return of members’ of the various verification mechanisms deployed in Goma under the Luanda process. Angola withdrew these members due to the worsening security situation.

The joint EAC/SADC summit took place in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on 8 February with the participation of several leaders from eastern and southern Africa, preceded by a preparatory ministerial meeting of the two regional bodies on 7 February.

The joint summit decided to merge the Nairobi and Luanda processes and mandated the appointment of additional facilitators from other African regions to support the mediation effort. Furthermore, the joint summit called for the resumption of direct dialogue with all armed groups, including M23, under the merged process. It called for the implementation of the Concept of Operations of the harmonised plan for the neutralisation of FDLR and the lifting of Rwanda’s defensive measures as agreed within the framework of the Luanda process.

At the UN Security Council, a draft resolution was circulated to all Council members last week. Currently, Security Council members are negotiating the draft, which, among other things, demands the M23 to stop further territorial expansion and withdraw from Goma and all other controlled areas. It also called on the Rwandan Defense Forces to cease support to the M23 and withdraw from the Congolese territory. Additionally, it expresses its intention to consider additional targeted sanctions against the leadership of M23 and its external backers.

The other issue of concern for the PSC, when the heads of state and government meet tomorrow, is how to ameliorate the dire humanitarian situation in Eastern DRC, which is one of the largest humanitarian crises in the world. Apart from interrupting the operation of MONUSCO, including its peacekeeping mission, the fighting in Goma has curtailed humanitarian access and activities. Further to heightening inter-communal tension and violence, it is also forcing a large number of people into displacement. About 3 thousand people have been reportedly killed in this latest round of fighting. An estimated 178,000 people fled the surrounding areas, with 34,000 of them seeking refuge in already overcrowded camps for internally displaced persons within Goma. The worsening humanitarian situation has been compounded by the disruption of critical infrastructure and basic services. The UN Human Rights Council, after an emergency session it held on 7 February, adopted unanimously a resolution on the establishment of ‘an independent fact-finding mission on the serious violations and abuses of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the provinces of North and South Kivu in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.’

One of the issues for the heads of state and government to address is how to institute a complete cessation of hostilities and de-escalate the mounting regional tension and the attendant risk of countries in the region being sucked into the conflict. The other issue that tomorrow’s session needs to address is how to build on and take forward the steps outlined in the communiqués of the 1256^th PSC ministerial session, the joint EAC-SADC Summit and the ECCAS meeting. Beyond the question of implementation of the outcomes of these sessions, there is also the issue of the additional urgent measures that the PSC summit may need to consider for a more effective peace process. The PSC also needs to clarify the proposed merger of the Luanda and Nairobi processes.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may reiterate its call for an unconditional cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the M23 from areas it has occupied. Building on the outcome of the EAC-SADC summit, the PSC may request the AU Commission to establish the territories held by the M23 as neutral territories and the constitution of a neutral force from countries outside of EAC, SADC and ECCAS that will facilitate the neutral status of these territories pending peace talks. It may call on the DRC on its part to cooperate with the inter-Congolese peace process initiated under the Nairobi process by allowing the participation of the M23, as there is no military solution to the conflict in Eastern DRC, including the one involving the M23. The PSC may also urge a follow-up of the discussions under the Lunda Process for the neutralisation of the FDLR. The PSC may call for the establishment of a mechanism for monitoring the ceasefire concluded under the Launda process. It is also expected to call for respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC and restate its call for the withdrawal of all foreign forces operating in the DRC. The PSC may call for urgent dispatching of a high-level delegation of Heads of State and Government from countries that are not members of SADC, EAC, and ECCAS to Kinshasa and Kigali for urgent implementation of de-escalation measures. As a follow-up to the EAC-SADC summit communiqué, the PSC may propose the formation of a high-level ad hoc committee of Heads of State from outside of SADC, EAC, and ECCAS to support and reinforce the enhanced complementary resumption of the Luanda and Nairobi processes.