Today (6 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council will hold a ministerial session on Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as an independent state. The session, not initially envisaged in the Provisional Program of Work of the PSC for January 2026, is convened following a request.

Following opening remarks by Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Chairperson of the PSC for January 2026, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission, is expected to make a statement. Abdisalam Abdi Ali, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Somalia, is also expected to deliver a statement as the concerned country. In addition, Abdoulkader Houssein Omar, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of Djibouti, is scheduled to make a statement in his capacity as Chair of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the concerned regional economic community/regional mechanism (REC/RM).

Since its proclamation of independence from Somalia in May 1991, Somaliland, the territory of the northern region of Somalia, has remained without any de jure recognition from any state in the world. This changed at the very end of 2025 with Israel becoming the first state to officially recognise the independence of Somaliland. On 26 December 2026, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that Israel and Somaliland had signed a joint declaration establishing full diplomatic relations, describing it as being ‘in the spirit of the Abraham Accords.’ Despite the willingness that Somaliland authorities expressed for joining the Abraham Accords, Israel’s recognition garnered no backing from any other country, even outside of the region.

Despite the enthusiastic reception in Somaliland of Israel’s official recognition as a historic development, Somalia, as the state with de jure authority over Somaliland, released a strong statement rejecting Israel’s decision, calling it an ‘attack on its sovereignty’ and an ‘unlawful action and asserting that the territory remains ‘an integral, inseparable and inalienable’ part of Somalia. Mogadishu was not alone in the rejection of Somaliland’s recognition. Countries in the region and beyond joined Somalia in their rejection of Somaliland’s recognition by Israel. Djibouti expressed its steadfast support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. Other countries, including Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, as well as the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, also expressed strong opposition. Similarly, the European Union reaffirmed, through its spokesperson, ‘the importance of respecting the unity, the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia.’ Meanwhile, the United States did not immediately follow Israel in recognising Somaliland; however, President Donald Trump reportedly stated, ‘Everything is under study… We will study it.’

For Africa and the AU, the issue of Somaliland is not completely new. Following its declaration of ‘republic’ in 2002 and invitation by Somaliland to the AU for undertaking a fact-finding mission, the AU dispatched such a fact-finding mission to Somaliland between 30 April and 4 May 2005, led by former AU Commission Deputy Chairperson, Patrick Mazimhaka. In December 2005, Somaliland submitted its application for membership in the AU. Somaliland’s President Dahir Rayale Kahin met on 16 May 2006 with the then AU Commission Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konare to discuss the matter.

Despite the legal issues that it raises, ordinarily it is not understandably approached as being exclusively a legal matter. Indeed, the legal dimension of Somaliland’s status has at best been approached in general terms through the lens of the AU’s and its predecessor Organisation of African Unity (OAU) principles of respect for the territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty of states, while it has neither been adjudicated in a proper judicial setting nor a legal opinion been given on it. The prevailing wisdom in the OAU/AU at the time and since then has been that this is a matter best considered as essentially being a strategic issue that needs to be handled, having regard to sensitivities around territorial integrity of states, stability and regional peace and security, hence without totally dismissing Somaliland’s quest. During tomorrow’s session, another legal issue, namely the legality of Israel’s decision, may attract attention. However, given that recognition of states under international law is a sovereign matter, much of the focus for member states could be on the strategic implications of Israel’s actions.

This recognition came at a time of major geopolitical rivalry and rising tension along the coast of the Red Sea and Gulf of Eden, involving various regional powers, including, among others, Turkey, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. Geographically, Somaliland occupies a critical position on the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait at the southern end of the Red Sea. This chokepoint is a vital artery for global commerce and energy shipments – including oil and gas – moving between Asia and Europe via the Suez Canal. In recent years, the attacks by Yemeni Houthis on ships heading to Israel have significantly affected traffic. In exchange for its recognition, Israel is expected to gain a foothold across Yemen’s coast, potentially availing it access to bases or ports for maritime intelligence and security operations on the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. This may also enable Israel to check on the growing interest of Turkey in Somalia.  There are also fears that Somaliland may be used for the resettlement of Palestinians from Gaza.

More generally, Israel’s recognition also broke a longstanding diplomatic understanding internationally that any recognition of Somaliland would follow the lead of Africa and the AU. Additionally, beyond traditional concerns of opening Pandora’s box, there are also concerns, as made apparent by the statement of Somalia, that it may have adverse peace and security implications. It also lacked any regional or international support.

Some of these issues emerged in the statements from the regional grouping IGAD and the AU Commission itself. The IGAD statement, which reaffirmed its commitment to the unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Somalia, held that ‘any unilateral recognition runs contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, the Constitutive Act and the Agreement establishing IGAD’ and expressed its commitment to ‘inclusive political processes and regional cooperation in support of lasting peace, stability and prosperity for Somalia and the wider IGAD region.’ In an approach that appears to completely shut any pathway for Somaliland’s recognition, the AU Commission Chairperson, in his statement, rejected ‘firmly’ ‘any initiative or action aimed at recognising Somaliland as an independent entity.’ He warned that such action runs ‘risks setting a dangerous precedent with far-reaching implications for peace and stability across the continent.’

On 29 December, the UN Security Council (UNSC) held an emergency session on Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. During the session, various members of the UNSC and others who, on request, intervened rejected Israel’s action and emphasised the need for respecting the territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty of Somalia. Similarly, the African 3plus members of the UNSC, including Somalia, echoed the statement of the AU Commission. Highlighting the need for addressing the determination of the final status of Somaliland through diplomatic means, in his briefing during the UNSC session, UN Assistant Secretary for the Middle East, Mohamed Khiari, called on ‘Somali stakeholders in peaceful and constructive dialogue, in particular recalling the 2023 Djibouti Communiqué on talks between the Federal Government of Somalia and Somaliland.’

It is generally expected that members of the PSC would echo support for the principle of territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty of states. They may also affirm the need for respecting the position of the AU and regional bodies such as IGAD. It may not also come as a surprise if reference is made to the 2005 AU fact-finding mission and the 2023 Djibouti Communiqué, to which the UN Assistant Secretary for the Middle East made reference during the UNSC session, to underscore the need for addressing the status of Somaliland through diplomatic means, with sensitivity and regard to stability, enhancement of peace and democratic system governance. Given the geopolitical context of the Horn of Africa and the dynamics in the AU, some may also caution that the situation is not instrumentalised by extra-regional actors to settle political scores and fuel division in the region.

At the time of going to press, it remained unclear what form the outcome of the session may take. It is, however, expected that the PSC, drawing on the statement of the AU Commission Chairperson, would reject Israel’s unilateral recognition of Somaliland. It may also welcome the statement of IGAD. The PSC, echoing the AU Commission Chairperson statement, is also expected to reaffirm the territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty of Somalia. It may also urge that all states respect the AU’s constitutive act and the longstanding principle of the territorial integrity of AU member states. The PSC may also state that no situation should be used as a theatre for advancing geopolitical interests of actors outside of the region, and instigate tension and division in Somalia and the region. It may call for constructive dialogue between Somalia and Somaliland, following the December 2023 Djibouti Communiqué.

Tomorrow (15 December), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1317^th session to consider the situation in Somalia and the operations of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).

The session is expected to begin with opening remarks by Ennio Maes, Permanent Representative of Côte d’Ivoire to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for December, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). El Hadji Ibrahima Diene, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Head of AUSSOM, may also brief the PSC. The Permanent Representative of Somalia is expected to deliver a statement as the concerned state, and representatives of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the United Kingdom (UK), the European Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN) may also deliver statements.

On the situation in Somalia, major current issues include the relationship between the Federal Government and the Federal Member States, implementation of the Somalia Stabilisation and Development Plan, consensus on power and resources sharing, including fiscal federalism, and the constitutional review process. In terms of the review of the Constitution, the progress made thus far remains limited to the first four chapters.

During the year, the question of the implementation of one man one vote in the organisation of the upcoming elections has emerged as a major point of contention. Opposition to President Mohamud comes from two main quarters: the Federal Member States—most notably Puntland and Jubaland—whose leaders remain at odds with Villa Somalia and have both suspended relations with Mogadishu; and political opposition groups, including former presidents and prime ministers. Critics accuse the government of contemplating an extension of the president’s term and of using the move toward direct voting as a means to entrench himself in power while disrupting the informal clan-based power-sharing arrangements that underpin the current electoral model. They also question the neutrality of the Independent National Electoral and Boundaries Commission.

On 25 August 2025, the president made a significant concession by signing a political agreement with elements of the Somali Salvation Forum, the main opposition alliance—a development welcomed by the Chairperson of the AU Commission. The agreement’s key provision is that members of Parliament will be elected through universal suffrage, while the president will continue to be elected by Parliament. This partially reverses the provisional constitutional amendment of March 2024 and the October 2024 electoral framework agreement, both of which envisaged a directly elected presidency.

Despite this step, political discord has persisted. In October, a new political alliance—the Somali Future Council—was formed by the leaders of Puntland and Jubaland together with figures from the Somali Salvation Forum, aiming to coordinate positions on political and security matters, including the 2026 elections. The alliance reportedly rejected proceeding with the election without first securing a broad national consensus. In November, another political party—the Union of National Pride—associated with influential political figure and former intelligence Chief Fahad Yasin, was launched, announcing former Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon as its presidential candidate. Meanwhile, the president’s efforts to mend relations with the Jubaland leadership appear to have made little headway, despite his October 2025 visit to Kismayo.

With only five months left before Mohamud’s term expires, moving ahead with elections without agreement on a workable electoral modality risks triggering heightened tensions with serious repercussions for the country’s fragile peace and stability. In the meantime, political infighting affects not only political and institutional stability but also continues to divert government attention from the fight against al-Shabaab, reversing earlier security gains over the terrorist group.

In relation to AUSSOM, this session takes place as the UN Security Council is expected to re-authorise the Mission’s mandate later this month, informed by the joint UN–AU–Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) technical assessment of progress. In a recent appearance on Amani Africa’s Pan-Africanist Podcast, the AU Special Representative, El Hadji Ibrahima Diene, confirmed that the Mission is undergoing an adjustment and that its exit strategy is being updated in consultation with the UN and the FGS. AUSSOM’s one-year mandate under Resolution 2767 (2024) is set to expire at the end of the month. According to the Mission’s Concept of Operations (CONOPs), the realignment of AU troops from ATMIS to AUSSOM was initially scheduled for completion by the end of June 2025. However, this timeline was suspended by the PSC at its 1287th meeting, which extended the realignment phase by an additional six months. Against this backdrop, PSC members may receive an update from the Special Representative on the current status of the realignment—particularly with respect to the repatriation of Burundian troops and the deployment of Egyptian forces. It would not be completely surprising if the timeline for the realignment and the repatriation of Burundian troops is extended for a further period of at least six months.

The PSC may also follow on its previous decisions, made at its 1287th session, requesting the AU Commission to update the CONOPs with regard to the increased number and location of Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), their logistical support and aviation requirements of the operation, and submit these new requirements to the PSC within six weeks. It is recalled that the PSC requested the Chiefs of Defence Forces of the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) plus Somalia to work out a comprehensive plan to deter, degrade and eliminate Al Shabaab.

A major issue of concern for the PSC is the mission’s funding. During its 1287th session, the PSC not only decided to raise the ceiling of the Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF) by an additional USD 10 million—bringing the total for 2025 to USD 20 million to support AUSSOM—but also mandated the AU Commission to engage the UN, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Somalia, and other bilateral partners to convene a resource-mobilization conference for the mission. The long-delayed and repeatedly postponed pledging conference was finally held as a High-Level Financing Event for AUSSOM on the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York on 25 September. The United Kingdom pledged GBP 16.5 million, while Italy and Spain each were reported to commit USD 1 million. Additional, albeit modest, pledges are also expected from Japan and the Republic of Korea. The total amount pledged stands at approximately USD 44 million—far below the USD 196 million required for the mission in 2025.

According to the co-chairs’ summary of the New York event, ‘AUSSOM’s sustainability depends on closing the current financing gap, which remains substantial.’ The largest anticipated contribution is expected from the EU, likely to be announced early next year. However, a key question remains: will the EU’s funding help close the severe 2025 budget gap and establish sustainable financing for 2026 and beyond, or will it focus primarily on future years while leaving the immediate shortfall unresolved?

The 2025 funding gap has already created an enormous strain on the mission. Troop-contributing countries have not received allowances for a year and a half. As the UN Secretary-General aptly noted during the High-Level Financing Event, this situation is ‘untenable,’ and ‘asking those who risk their lives against Al-Shabaab—and who have lost so many colleagues—to serve without pay is unacceptable.’ This level of financial pressure risks pushing TCCs to the breaking point and could ultimately threaten the mission’s viability. Currently, as the Secretary-General underscored, TCCs are ‘essentially subsidising the mission,’ an arrangement that is fundamentally unsustainable.

Looking ahead, and as rightly underscored by the Secretary-General, two urgent priorities should be addressed: closing the 2025 budget gap and securing predictable financing for the remainder of the mission. Without predictable funding, the AU may be compelled to reconsider its original exit timeline, currently envisaged for the end of 2029. During the high-level financing event, the Chairperson of the AU Commission stressed that AUSSOM is ‘not an open-ended mission.’ Yet, instead of exploring such other options as bilateral deployments, ad hoc coalition support and importantly, the development of an effective political strategy for the resolution of the conflict in Somalia, there seems to be a single-minded focus on finding a financing-only solution to the existential challenge facing AUSSOM.

Compounding the financial challenges, AUSSOM is expected to lose around USD 130 million from the UN logistics support package due to the liquidity crisis affecting UN peacekeeping operations. In a letter dated 10 October 2025, the UN Secretary-General instructed all peacekeeping missions funded through the peacekeeping budget to activate contingency plans reflecting a 15 per cent expenditure reduction. The UN Support Office for Somalia (UNSOS)—mandated for providing logistical and related support to AUSSOM—has been required to implement an even steeper 25 per cent reduction within the current fiscal year. While the AU and the UN are working on determining and mitigating the impact of this significant cut, there is little doubt that this would affect the kind of support AUSSOM receives and hence the operational efficacy of the mission. The Head of AUSSOM may also update the PSC on the implications of this reduced support and on efforts to mitigate its impact.

The expected outcome is a communiqué. On the political situation in Somalia, the PSC may welcome the signing on 25 August 2025 of the Agreement on the Revised Electoral Framework between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and one political wing of the Salvation Forum. At the same time, the PSC may urge all Somali political actors to pursue inclusive political dialogue and to reach a broad-based consensus on contentious issues related to electoral and constitutional reforms ahead of the 2026 elections. On AUSSOM, the PSC may express deep concern over the significant funding shortfall facing the mission. It may also express concern over the envisaged budget cuts to UNSOS and their implications in further exacerbating the Mission’s operational challenges. The PSC may welcome the convening of the recent high-level financing event and express appreciation to partners that have contributed to the Mission. The PSC may further appeal to both traditional and non-traditional partners to increase financial support in order to close the significant 2025 budget gap, and to commit to predictable and adequate multiyear financing to enable the Mission to effectively discharge its mandate. In this regard, the PSC may encourage the AU Commission and the UN to work out modalities that ensure the least minimum impact on the operational efficacy and safety of AUSSOM in their ongoing exploration of options for mitigating the impact of the reductions to the UNSOS budget and encourage close coordination between the two for ensuring that they mobilise timely response to challenges and risks that the financial shortfall may precipitate. Concerning the operationalisation of the Mission, the PSC may commend the Burundian troops for their flexibility and other troops for their continued commitment and reiterate the need for the AU Commission to expedite the finalisation of the realignment of AU troops from ATMIS to AUSSOM and implement the next phases of the Mission in line with the approved CONOPs. In the event of inability to find the funds to fill in the significant financial gaps of AUSSOM, the PSC may consider tasking the AU to work with the FGS and partners on developing options for alternative ways of protecting the gains made and develop a political strategy for enhanced effort on advancing national reconciliation and a sustainable path for political settlement in Somalia.

Tomorrow (3 July), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1287th session at the ministerial level to receive an update on the situation in Somalia and the operations of the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).

The session is expected to commence with opening remarks by Uganda’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chair of the PSC for July 2025, General Jeje Odongo, followed by an introductory statement from the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Somalia, Ali Mohamed Omar, as well as representatives from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU), are also expected to deliver statements.

Tomorrow’s ministerial meeting comes as the timeline for the completion of the transition from ATMIS to AUSSOM came to an end on 30 June 2025. The last briefing to the PSC on AUSSOM operations took place during its 1276th session, held on 29 April. It focused on ongoing efforts towards the operationalisation of the mission. During that session, the PSC endorsed the Troop and Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs) for AUSSOM, along with the breakdown of the contribution of each T/PCC. The PSC also called on the T/PCCs and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), in coordination with the AU Commission, to finalise the necessary steps for the full and expeditious deployment of the mission.

As 30 June marked the end of Phase I of the mission, during which all AU troops were envisaged to transition from ATMIS to AUSSOM, a major development likely to be highlighted by the AU Commission is the negotiation on the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Troop/Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs). Pending the finalisation of the signing of the MoU and Status of Force Agreement as well as the completion of ‘the AU and UN procedures to expediate the deployment of Egyptian troops,’ Burundian troops and Ghana’s Formed Police Unit (FPU), as well as the Sierra Leone FPU would need to remain. PSC is expected to extend the timeline for the repatriation of Burundian troops and Ghanaian FPUs as well as the relocation of Sierra Leon’s FPUs.

The session is also expected to follow up on the outcome of the Kampala Summit of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) on 25 April 2025. It is to be recalled that the TCCs Summit underscored the need to augment AUSSOM troop strength of 11,146 by at least 8,000 through a bilateral arrangement to address the deteriorating security situation in Somalia. The summit also endorsed the proposal for enhancing air assets and capabilities, as well as strengthening Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).

The outcome of the Kampala Summit illustrates the gap between what is required for the effective functioning of AUSSOM and the achievement of its mandate on the one hand and the ‘operational shortfalls’ and the financing gaps facing the mission. While the Summit reiterated that ‘the best solution to adequate, predictable and sustainable funding is the application of the UNSC Resolution 2719 (2023) on Somalia,’ the lack of support from the US meant that this option could not be applied for funding AUSSOM.  On 12 May 2025, the UN Security Council failed to authorise the activation of Resolution 2719, even in the hybrid format proposed by the UN Secretariat on the basis of Resolution 2767. The resultant lack of a reliable source of funding has cast serious doubt not only over AUSSOM’s effective functioning but also its continuity.

The estimated budget for AUSSOM from July 2025 to June 2026 is $166.5 million, based on a troop reimbursement rate of $828, according to the UN Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council dated 7 May 2025. However, the financial demands of the mission extend well beyond this figure. AUSSOM needs $92 million in urgent cash requirements for liabilities incurred from January to June 2025. Furthermore, arrears owed to TCCs from 2022 to 2024 total $93.9 million. In contrast, currently committed funding amounts to only $16.7 million, of which $10 million comes from the AU Peace Fund’s Crisis Reserve Facility. The mission’s liabilities continue to mount, with a need for at least $15 million per month.

With Resolution 2719 no longer presenting a viable funding pathway, the AU, T/PCCs, Somalia, and the wider international community now need to work on Plan B for addressing the existential financial crisis facing AUSSOM. The European Union (EU), the single largest direct contributor to AU missions in Somalia—with nearly €2.7 billion provided since 2007— is understandably not keen on maintaining previous levels of support, amid shifting geopolitical priorities. While some EU contributions may still be forthcoming, they are unlikely to bridge the funding gap. Similarly, support from non-traditional donors appears limited, as evidenced by the modest pledges from China, Japan, and South Korea, which amount to no more than $5.6 million.

Against this backdrop, a major area of interest to PSC members during tomorrow’s session is to receive an update on the options being explored and most notably the ongoing effort to organise a pledging conference for AUSSOM. The AU sees this as a potential lifeline for the mission. Although previous attempts to convene the conference in Doha, Qatar, during April and May did not materialise, efforts are underway. While the date is yet to be confirmed, the AU and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) are jointly proposing the convening of an AUSSOM Financing Conference. Tomorrow’s session is therefore expected to provide strategic guidance on fast-tracking the convening of the pledging conference, as well as on strategies to secure the necessary financial commitment from international partners.

An update on security and political developments in Somalia is expected to be another key focus of the session. AUSSOM and the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF) are working to reverse the recent territorial gains made by Al-Shabaab. A major development in this regard is the three-day joint operation code-named ‘Operation Silent Storm,’ launched in June by AUSSOM and SNAF against Al-Shabaab positions in the Lower Shabelle region. The operation, undertaken to recapture the Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) of Sabiid Anole, Aw Degeele and Bashir that were lost to Al Shabaab, registered some success, most notably the recapturing of the key villages of Sabiid and Anole.

On the political front, tensions are escalating as divisions deepen over critical national issues, including the constitutional review process and the electoral model that will be used for the 2026 presidential election. Despite a lack of consensus, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud appears determined to replace the long-standing clan-based indirect voting system with a one-person, one-vote model for the upcoming election. This has further deepened the rift in the political arena, with various political forces mobilising mounting opposition against the president, with some concerned by the disruption that the shift in the electoral model could cause to the delicate clan-based power-sharing arrangement.

In a development that added another layer of political disquiet, President Sheikh, along with several regional and political leaders, launched a new political party, the Justice and Solidarity Party, ahead of the 2026 election. The party includes leaders from three federal member states—South West, Hirshabelle, and Galmudug, with Puntland and Jubbaland, which remain at odds with the Federal Government, condemning the initiative as lacking constitutionality.

While recent efforts, including the National Consultative Conference (some of whose members were co-opted into the new political party) and the President’s engagement with opposition groups are encouraging, progress on key national issues should be grounded in careful negotiation and inclusive political engagement. As Somalia enters its electoral season, the shifting political landscape is expected to have significant implications for national security. Prolonged and deepening political infighting risks undermining collective and sustained action in bolstering security measures, including the fight against Al-Shabaab. As in the past, Al-Shabaab is likely to exploit such fractures for its own strategic gain.

Against this background, members of the PSC may also reflect on the kind of arrangement that needs to be put in place for stronger collaboration and accountability between the AU, FGS, and donors. As the PSC weighs on the quest for financing of AUSSOM, there is a need for considering a) the options for the immediate future of AUSSOM, b) the plan and options for its exit, c) the alternative security support for Somalia that may be required (including bilateral deployments) both for complementing AUSSOM and ensuring continuity as it draws down and exists and d) the kind of political process, including national reconciliation and negotiation, necessary for the resolution of the conflict involving Al Shabaab.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to welcome the successful bilateral negotiations on the draft Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which outlines the roles, responsibilities, and operational modalities for troop and police contributions to AUSSOM. The PSC may request the AU Commission to expedite the signing of the MoUs as one of the key steps in ending Phase I of the mission (realignment of all AU troops from ATMIS to AUSSOM). The PSC may extend the timeline for repatriation of Burundian troops, while commending them for their irreplaceable contribution to the stabilisation of Somalia and calling for the finalization of deployment of Egyptian troops. Regarding the pledging conference, the PSC may urge the AU Commission, in collaboration with the Government of Somalia and international partners, to work on a solid plan that guarantees success in mobilising the funds required for addressing the dire shortfalls threatening the continuity of AUSSOM. The PSC is also expected to encourage international partners to make the necessary financial commitments. As the AU prepares for the Mid-Year Coordination Meeting later this month, the PSC may also request a continued allocation of an additional amount from the AU Peace Fund. The PSC may also task the AU Commission to develop a plan and options on the immediate future and the steps needed for a smooth drawdown and exit of the mission. Regarding the political situation in Somalia, the PSC is likely to encourage the Government of Somalia to engage in an inclusive political dialogue on key national issues and to ensure that political divisions do not undermine efforts to safeguard and strengthen the stabilisation process in Somalia.

Tomorrow (29 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to hold its 1276^th session for receiving updates on the operations of the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).

The meeting will commence with the opening remark of Rebecca Amuge Otengo, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uganda to the AU and stand-in Chair of the PSC for April 2025. Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) will deliver a briefing.

This is the second meeting of the PSC on AUSSOM during the month. As examined in detail in the edition of Insights on the PSC dedicated to that session, the last session was held on 10 April. During that session, the PSC received an update on the state of operation of AUSSOM with a focus on the status of its funding. With only less than 20% of the funding required for the period of January to June 2025 mobilised, the briefing session revealed that AUSSOM faces major funding shortfalls. While AUSSOM operates under conditions that militate against the moral and operational effectiveness of the mission with a much-reduced troop size of about 11,146, the security situation continues to deteriorate with Al Shabaab on the resurgence.

Tomorrow’s meeting comes following the extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Governments of the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) to AUSSOM held in Kampala, Uganda on 25 April. The summit was preceded by a preparatory senior officials and ministers meeting on 22-24 April, which concluded their respective meetings by adopting several recommendations for the summit’s consideration. Subsequently, the summit adopted a communiqué endorsing these recommendations, which are now expected to be submitted to the PSC and the UN Security Council.

The TCCs summit reviewed the security situation in Somalia and assessed the performance of the AUSSOM sector by sector to evaluate its operational effectiveness in combating Al-Shabaab. The TCCs stressed the need to increase troop strength by at least 8,000 additional personnel to address the prevailing security challenges. This proposal, endorsed by the summit, seeks ‘to address the prevailing security situation in Somalia so as not to roll back the hard-earned gains made so far and bridge manpower gaps by having more personnel than before the drawdown.’ Highlighting the gravity of the deterioration of the security situation, beyond the additional troop surge for AUSSOM, the summit also adopted the Minister’s conclusion that it is ‘urgent to consider deploying bilateral troops to augment’ AUSSOM. On its part, the Federal Government of Somalia is expected to ‘recruit community/local defence forces and mobile force in order to hold and consolidate the areas that were liberated.’ All of these are clear admissions that the drawdown of troops during the past years has not been replaced with Somali forces as planned, resulting in major gaps that Al Shabaab has been able to exploit to regain territories. In this context, the summit directed the Chiefs of Defence Forces, together with Somalia, to work out a comprehensive plan to deter, degrade and eliminate Al-Shabaab.

The summit also endorsed the proposal for enhancing air assets and capabilities, as well as strengthening Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), considering the fragmented deployment of AUSSOM TCCs and their limited ability to support Somali Security Forces in conducting mobile operations.

During the meeting, the Somali Federal Government provided an update on the preparedness of its security forces and the progress made in force generation and integration. It reported to the summit that over 20,000 troops had been trained over the past two years, with plans to train an additional 5,000 elite special forces in 2025. Since January 2023, the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF) have assumed control of 23 forward operating bases (FOBs) from the AU mission. Of these, only one position—Biyo Cade—was recaptured by Al-Shabaab, while the remaining 22 FOBs remain under SNAF control.  At the same time, Somalia’s representative admitted that Somalia is ‘challenged with defeating terrorism and stabilising liberated areas’, while dismissing the portrayal of the country as being in political turmoil. Yet in apparent indication of the role of political cohesion in Somalia, the summit underscored the need for the Somalia Federal Government to strengthen its engagement with Federal Member States and traditional leaders to enhance efforts in the fight against Al-Shabaab. It also emphasised the importance of bolstering civil-military coordination, prioritising humanitarian relief, and implementing quick-impact stabilisation projects in recovered areas to consolidate security gains and foster lasting community trust.

In apparent indication that there is a need for close alignment between the implementation of the mandate of AUSSOM and the political and institutional advancements in Somalia, the summit decided to establish TCCs plus Somalia Peer Review Mechanism at the Heads of State and Government Level chaired by Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni supported by the AU Commission. This is envisaged to serve as an oversight, accountability, coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation of AUSSOM and the Somalia Security and Development Plan (SSDP).

The elephant in the room was the funding challenge facing the mission, particularly the outstanding reimbursements for military and police personnel since January—an issue the TCCs warned is significantly undermining morale and operational effectiveness. At the meeting, it was reported that the total urgent cash requirement to cover the financial costs for the period January to June 2025 is estimated at approximately US$96 million. Thus far, the AU has secured only US$16.7 million, while the mission requires roughly US$15 million per month to meet its obligations. Therefore, the TCCs reiterated that securing predictable and sustainable financing remains a strategic priority to maintain AUSSOM’s operational viability and to ensure continued support for Somali security forces in fully assuming security responsibilities. In this context and in the light of the proposal for the additional 8000 troops surge, they emphasised the urgent need for the AU Commission to develop a comprehensive Resource Mobilisation Strategy.

AU Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf stated in his remarks that the Commission will spare no effort in mobilising financial resources. He emphasised, however, that saving the mission will require a collective effort from member states and international partners. Youssouf underscored that the security and stability of Somalia is vital not only for the Horn of Africa but also for global peace. The summit welcomed the role of traditional and non-traditional partners to support AUSSOM and the Somali federal government. Recently, China and Japan contributed US$ 1 million and US$ 3 million, respectively, in support of AUSSOM. The AU is urging other partners to follow their example. A donors’ conference was anticipated to take place this month in Doha, Qatar, but there is currently no indication that it will proceed as scheduled.

The TCCs also recommended the allocation of additional resources from the AU Peace Fund to help address the mission’s financial shortfalls. This was the case in 2023, when the AU was authorised to use the Peace Fund’s crisis reserve facility to address the funding shortfall faced by the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)—the predecessor of AUSSOM—particularly with regard to troop allowances. However, given that the largest commitment from the Fund has so far been to AUSSOM, this call for use of additional funds from the Fund may face major pushback from various PSC members who express concern that the Peace Fund risks being used as a funding mechanism for AUSSOM while it is meant to cover the peace and security efforts of the AU across the continent.

Most importantly, the TCCs are placing their hopes on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2719, which outlines a framework for financing AU-led peace support operations, as a means to address the financial challenges facing AUSSOM. However, Chairperson Youssouf acknowledged reluctance in New York regarding its application. This hesitation stems from the position of the United States, which has communicated to both the UN and the AU that it ‘will not support the application of the UNSCR 2719 framework to AUSSOM when the matter comes before the Security Council on May 15.’ The representative of the US informed the summit in Kampala that the US does not believe that ‘Somalia is the best place to trigger the resolution’ and does not ‘support the implementation of a hybrid implementation model to finance AUSSOM.’ It seems that the AU Commission leadership might travel to Washington, D.C., to engage with the US administration and other relevant stakeholders on this matter. Donald Kaberuka, the High Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on Financing, is also reported to be in the US in search of resolution.

In the meantime, the UN has been working with the AU to conduct an independent strategic review of the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) pursuant to Security Council resolution 2767 adopted on 27 December 2024. The review is meant to facilitate the hybrid implementation of resolution 2719 for AUSSOM starting from 1 July 2025. The two organisations appointed Maman Sidikou of Niger and Neil Cole of South Africa to co-lead the review process. They undertook consultations in Mogadishu, Addis Ababa and New York with the Somali government, TCCs and international partners. They submitted their report by the end of March, but the Secretary-General, following consultations with the AU, requested additional time to finalise the review process by 30 April, which the Security Council granted.

The outcome of the UNSOS review is expected to enable the hybrid implementation of resolution 2719 for AUSSOM starting 1 July, utilising existing resources made available through the rightsizing of UNSOS. Cost savings from this process are anticipated to cover up to 75 per cent of AUSSOM’s estimated US$ 190 million budget, with the remaining funds to be jointly mobilised by the AU and the UN as extra-budgetary resources. However, the review reportedly yielded only US$ 61 million in savings—well below the amount needed to meet the 75 per cent threshold for funding through UN-assessed contributions. This shortfall appears to have prompted the request for an extension, allowing the UN and AU to continue exploring options for additional savings (they are looking at an additional US$ 40 million).

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may condemn and express concern over the threat to the gains made by AU troops and Somali forces posed by the intensification of attacks in recent months by Al Shabaab, with territorial gains particularly in the Middle and Lower Shebelle. It may, in this regard, underscore the need for reinforcing AUSSOM’s troop levels and capabilities. The PSC may, in this respect, welcome the outcomes of the Kampala summit of TCCs. With respect to the decision of the summit for the additional surge of 8000 troops, the PSC may request the AU Commission to develop a plan on the surge and deployment of the additional troops including on whether they will be deployed under AUSSOM or bilateral basis. With respect to funding, the PSC may welcome the promising outcome of the UNSOS review within the framework of Resolution 2767 and the effort to enable the hybrid implementation through cost-saving from rightsizing of UNSOS. It may express deep concern about the huge financial shortfall facing AUSSOM, undermining the effective operation of the mission. It may remind the international community that AUSSOM, as a mission authorised by the UN Security Council, represents a global public good for maintaining international peace and security, which requires the assumption of full responsibility by the UN and the international community by ensuring predictable, sustainable and reliable funding for AUSSOM. In this respect, it may reiterate its previous decision, stressing the importance of ensuring predictable, sustainable and adequate funding for AUSSOM, including through a dedicated funding mechanism through UN-assessed contributions in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) as the most suitable mechanism. PSC may commend the funding contributions that some members of the international community made and the continued commitment of others. It may, echoing the Kampala summit, request the AU Commission to develop a comprehensive Resource Mobilisation Strategy, including through pursuing the implementation of Resolution 2719.