The key occasion for presenting a policy briefing to the AU policy organ was the session of the Peace and Security Council held on 17 September 2025, dedicated to climate change, peace and security.

Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa

 

Thank you, Mr President,

I would like to thank you and Sierra Leon’s Presidency for the invitation extended to me to deliver this briefing representing my organisation, Amani Africa Media and Research Services.

I would like to recognise with appreciation the previous briefers, Under-Secretary General Jean-Pierre Lacroix and UN Women Executive Director Sima Bahous.

Amani Africa, a pan-African policy research, training and consulting think tank that works on multilateral policy processes of concern and interest for Africa, is a leading source of information and analysis on conflict situations in Africa on the agenda of both the AU Security Council and this Council.

It is therefore an honour for me to draw on Amani Africa’s work for my briefing today.

Mr President

South Sudan is at a very dangerous crossroads. The country shows all the signs of a clear and present danger of relapsing back to full-scale violent conflict.

Political tension is mounting. Fighting and insecurity are spreading. The dire humanitarian situation is worsening. This Council should therefore heed the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council’s warning of the potential of ‘full-scale civil war’ in South Sudan.

The escalation of political tension and armed fighting since the Nasir incident of March 2025 echoes some of the dynamics that precipitated the relapse of the country back to violent conflict in July 2016.

Similar to 2016 and as documented in the Secretary-General’s report, the deepening political tension manifests itself among others in the purges and replacement of senior officials and detention of others. Apart from aggravating political tension and constitutional uncertainty, these actions constitute, as in 2016, serious violations of the peace agreement, signifying the collapsing of the power-sharing arrangement under the 2018 peace agreement.

The Revitalised Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), the body monitoring the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), observed in its report released last month that there is ‘systematic violation of the responsibility-sharing arrangements across all crucial bodies, including functionality of the executive and legislature.’

The mounting political tension and constitutional crisis are in part a result of the breakdown of the relationship between the parties to the R-ARCSS and the failure of the international community to ensure its faithful implementation. Significantly, it is also a manifestation of a political scheme for taking a lead position for the elections South Sudan is set to convene at the end of the transition period in December 2026.

Alarmingly, as in 2016 and documented in detail in the Secretary-General’s report, the fighting that erupted between the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and armed groups linked to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) has continued to escalate and expand.

With these conditions putting the peace agreement in grave peril, the UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan concluded that ‘the 2018 Revitalised Peace Agreement — once seen as a roadmap to stability — risks total collapse, amidst political detentions and escalating conflict.’ It is thus imperative to act on RJMEC’s call that the violations of the peace agreement ‘must be addressed urgently to return the implementation process back on track in order to safeguard the gains of the peace Agreement and to prevent a relapse to violence in South Sudan.’

Tragically, as in 2016 and the Secretary-General’s Report presented today shows, the deteriorating political and security situation is having its heavy toll on civilians, aggravating an already dire humanitarian situation facing them. The spreading and escalating violence is precipitating significant civilian casualties and destruction of critical infrastructure, including health facilities, schools, and public buildings, as well as severe limitations of humanitarian access.

The UN OCHA reported that, in addition to the existing two million internally displaced persons, more than 497,000 people were newly displaced between January and September 2025, the vast majority of them, approximately 321,000, due to the renewed conflict. The alarming humanitarian and civilian protection situation is compounded by worsening economic conditions, corruption and disease outbreaks.

This clearly attests that South Sudanese civilians are bearing the brunt of the deteriorating political and security situation in the country, underscoring a heightening need for reinforcing measures for the protection of civilians and humanitarian support.

Mr President, Excellencies, members of the Council

The state of the political, security, peace implementation and humanitarian situation indicates that there are at least three pressing issues that require the urgent policy action of this Council.

The first of these is arresting the downward political and security spiral and preventing the relapse of the country back to full-scale civil war. There is a need for deploying robust and prompt preventive diplomacy. This should not aim just at ending the escalating and spreading conflicts. It should also seek to avoid the December 2026 elections from plunging the country into conflict, given the fragility of the context in South Sudan and recent trends on the continent, in which political polarisation erupts into destabilising political crises and violent confrontation during elections.

The second pressing issue is restoring the commitment of parties to the 2018 peace agreement and accelerating the implementation of transitional tasks critical to the peaceful conclusion of the transition period with the convening of peaceful and credible elections.

Third, the imperative to expand support to the work of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), particularly in terms of the implementation of the measures required for both enhancing protection of civilians and advancing sub-national peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts.

Regarding conflict prevention, there are four actions available to this Council. First, I cannot emphasise enough the importance of this Council expressing and availing its full support to the role and ongoing efforts of the AU and the trilateral mechanism (UN-AU-IGAD) plus RJMEC.

Second, and perhaps importantly, this Council needs to exercise its enormous influence to nudge the parties into both ending unilateral actions endangering the peace of the country and engaging in dialogue. The Council can accomplish this directly on its own by undertaking a field mission to South Sudan and engaging the parties, building on the AU Peace and Security Council’s field mission in August 2025.

Third and complementing the foregoing, this Council may encourage the UN Secretary-General, together with the AU Commission Chairperson, to deploy a joint high-level preventive diplomacy initiative under the UN-AU Joint Framework Partnership for peace and security.

Fourth, and to advance trust building between the parties to the peace agreement, this Council may call for an independent investigation of incidents of violations of the revitalised peace agreement, including the March 2025 incident in Nasir, through a mechanism that is put in place by the UN-AU-IGAD and hold perpetrators of the violations accountable.

Regarding the protection of civilians, I urge the Council to take the following measures. First, to call on all armed actors involved in fighting in South Sudan to cease all hostilities and on the two parties to the revitalised peace agreement to restore full adherence to the Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements.

Second, the Council should call for respect for all rules of international humanitarian law and human rights by all armed actors and demand that armed actors lift the humanitarian access restrictions they imposed and assure the safety of humanitarian workers to enable the urgent delivery of assistance to the affected communities.

Third and finally, this august body should also expand, rather than cut down, support for UNMISS and task the Mission to elevate its preparedness for meeting the surge in the need for civilian protection in South Sudan.

Mr President, Excellencies

South Sudanese endured so much suffering for far too long. They cannot afford the perpetuation of the status quo, let alone the addition to their suffering. They deserve some respite. The least of which that can be done in this respect is to spare them from yet another descent of the country into full-scale war.

Prevention of the continuation of the downward spiral of South Sudan is also a regional and international peace and security imperative. With neighbouring Sudan under the grip of a brutal war, the region and international peace and security cannot afford the relapse of South Sudan back to full-scale conflict.

Despite the fact that current global and regional dynamics make your role unenviable, taking the measures listed above and putting South Sudan on a path of concluding its transition peacefully are not beyond your abilities.

I urge you to act with urgency and decisiveness, and deliver for South Sudanese civilians yearning to be spared from further suffering, by preventing South Sudan’s collapse back to full-scale civil war.

I thank you for your attention!

Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République fédérale démocratique d’Ethiopie,

Messieurs et Mesdames les Ministres, les Ambassadeurs et Représentants permanents des Organisations internationales

Distingués invités,

Honorable Assistance

Mesdames et Messieurs,

A l’entame de mon propos, je voudrais adresser les remerciements de l’UA à Chatham House, à Amani Africa, au PNUD et au gouvernement éthiopien pour avoir pris l’initiative d’organiser ce forum. Je tiens également à vous adresser les salutations du Président de la Commission de l’UA, S.E. Mahmoud Ali Youssouf en route pour le Brésil pour faire entendre la voix de l’Afrique.

C’est un privilège de m’adresser à vous aujourd’hui ici à Addis-Abeba, au cœur des institutions continentales africaines, pour discuter de l’influence croissante de notre continent et de sa capacité accrue à agir dans la gouvernance mondiale. L’Afrique n’est plus un observateur passif des affaires mondiales ; nous participons activement à façonner les résultats, définir les agendas et promouvoir des solutions qui servent non seulement nos peuples, mais aussi l’humanité tout entière.

À travers le continent, l’Afrique fait preuve d’un leadership concret. Les initiatives régionales renforcent les cadres de sécurité collective, font progresser les efforts de consolidation de la paix et favorisent la résilience économique. Aujourd’hui, les opérations de maintien de la paix dirigées par l’Afrique mobilisent plus de 75 000 personnes déployées sur plusieurs missions, démontrant notre capacité à maintenir la stabilité et à gérer les conflits. Sur le plan économique, le commerce intra-africain dans le cadre de la ZLECAF a atteint plus de 100 milliards de dollars au cours de ses deux premières années, signe d’une intégration régionale croissante. Dans le domaine de l’énergie, l’Afrique est en bonne voie pour doubler sa capacité de production d’énergie renouvelable à plus de 300 gigawatts d’ici 2030, tandis que les initiatives d’industrialisation verte devraient créer des millions d’emplois durables à travers le continent.

L’influence croissante de l’Afrique repose sur la confiance, le respect mutuel et un engagement partagé envers l’humanité. Au sein de nos institutions, la collaboration s’approfondit, le pouvoir de négociation augmente et l’action collective devient plus efficace. En alignant les politiques, en échangeant des expertises et en promouvant l’intégration régionale, l’Afrique transforme son potentiel en résultats tangibles et mesurables qui profitent à nos peuples et contribuent à un ordre mondial plus équitable. Par exemple, des efforts de santé publique coordonnés ont permis de réduire l’incidence du paludisme de plus de 20 % dans plusieurs régions, illustrant la puissance de la solidarité continentale en action.

À l’échelle mondiale, l’Afrique retrouve la place qui lui revient. D’abord au G20 dont le prochain Sommet se tient pour la première fois en terre africaine dans deux semaines. L’Afrique oeuvre pour avoir sa place au sein du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies, mais aussi dans les institutions financières internationales.  L’Afrique s’engage de manière stratégique avec ses partenaires, en influençant les discussions sur le commerce, l’investissement, le climat et le transfert de technologie, tout en affirmant sa voix dans la définition des normes en matière de paix, de sécurité et de développement durable. L’innovation africaine, l’influence culturelle et l’énergie entrepreneuriale créent un soft power qui amplifie les priorités et les perspectives du continent dans le monde entier. L’économie numérique à elle seule devrait atteindre 150 milliards de dollars d’ici 2030, avec plus de 450 millions d’utilisateurs mobiles d’internet, offrant une plateforme pour l’innovation, l’entrepreneuriat des jeunes et la connectivité panafricaine.

Mais l’influence seule ne suffit pas. L’Afrique recherche des résultats tangibles, fondés sur l’équité, la solidarité et le respect de la dignité humaine. Plus précisément, nous appelons à :

• Un accès fiable et prévisible aux financements climatiques et au développement, visant au moins 100 milliards de dollars par an pour soutenir les transitions énergétiques, l’industrialisation et des infrastructures résilientes.
• Un soutien aux initiatives africaines dans le domaine de la paix, de la sécurité et de la stabilité régionale, garantissant un financement soutenu de l’Architecture africaine de paix et de sécurité, qui sous-tend plus de 75 000 personnels déployés.
• En 2007, l’Afrique a réussi à remettre la Somalie sur la carte.
• Des partenariats renforçant la souveraineté économique, favorisant l’intégration régionale et libérant le plein potentiel de la ZLECAF, dont la croissance commerciale devrait passer de 100 milliards de dollars aujourd’hui à 450 milliards de dollars d’ici 2030.
• La reconnaissance du leadership africain dans les solutions durables, depuis l’expansion de la production solaire et éolienne jusqu’au développement des pôles industriels verts, qui pourraient générer plus de 15 millions d’emplois d’ici 2030 et contribuer de manière significative aux objectifs mondiaux de réduction du carbone.

This is the moment for Africa to move from aspiration to achievement, from potential to performance. By leveraging our resources, creativity, and collective resolve and by building partnerships grounded in trust, mutual respect, and humanity, we can advance a vision of global governance that is inclusive, just, and effective.

Let us therefore commit, here in Addis Ababa, to tangible action, bold partnerships, and outcomes that transform influence into impact. Africa is ready to lead, to innovate, and to deliver. The world is watching and Africa will rise.

I Thank you.

Excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen,

It is a great pleasure to welcome you all to Addis Ababa, the diplomatic capital of Africa and the home of our continental union. This city has been the site for some of the most consequential moments in modern Africa’s political history. Therefore, it is a fitting venue for a collective reflection on how our continent can shape the global order during this time of profound change.

Only a few days ago, a convoy of trucks as well as cargo planes left Ethiopia carrying the first shipment of goods traded under the African Continental Free Trade Area. They were bound for Kenya, Somalia, and South Africa, filled with coffee, fruits, and processed foods. It was a modest start, yet deeply symbolic.

Those trucks and planes carried more than merchandise — they carried the promise of a continent trading with itself, investing in itself, and believing in its own capacity.

Such seemingly simple acts capture the essence of what this gathering seeks to advance: African agency, solidarity and cooperation as the foundations of our rising collective influence.

We are meeting at a moment when global power is dispersing and the old assumptions of international politics are being redefined. As the world transits toward multipolarity, Africa must not be a bystander or a prize in someone else’s contest for influence.

In a continent that is obsessed with football, I hope you will forgive me if I use a soccer metaphor to illustrate the reality of multipolarity.

If we were to use a football analogy to provide a simple depiction of the Cold War era, the best parallel would be with the Spanish La Liga. As most of those who follow the European football leagues understand, in the Spanish La Liga, the main contenders for the championship are Barcelona and Real Madrid. The real competition is between these two clubs.

Of course, there are other clubs in the league, but it is these two clubs are more often than not, the most likely to finish at the top of the league. During the Cold War, just like the Spanish La Liga, there were two contenders for global supremacy. There were two superpowers, and everybody else was playing second fiddle.

Then, the Cold War came to an end. The world witnessed a unique unipolar moment that is very similar to the French Ligue 1, where PSG is the sole dominant force. Year after year, one entity takes the top position without much difficulty or serious challenge.

But this era of unipolarity seems to be coming to an end. Right now, international relations are more akin to the English Premier League, where several clubs compete fiercely to finish in the top five. In this League, competition is intense and outcomes cannot be predicted with confidence.

Today, we find ourselves in such a context. We live in a world where competition is becoming more salient than cooperation. The entities engaged in this competition are not just the big powers. There are also middle powers in intense competition with one another as they each try to carve out a sphere of influence for themselves.

The scope of competition includes the economic, technological, and military spheres. It is rife with transient alliances, pragmatic transactions, and a complex web of considerations that are difficult to pin down.

Normative frameworks, established national doctrines, multilateral institutions and procedures seem to be having a diminished effectiveness.

The question we need to consider is how the African continent should approach this situation.

What are the opportunities and risks this multipolar world present to Africa?

In this context, is there room for collective continental action?

Will Africa be subject to another scramble or would it emerge as a rising power in its own right?

How can we expand and consolidate our influence?

This and many other related questions require serious deliberation. We need to reflect deeply and critically on these questions.

If Africa is to be a co-author of the evolving global order, we need to be conscious of the new reality and wide awake to its implications.

The African Union’s accession to the G20 is a recognition that the world’s challenges — from equitable growth to climate resilience — cannot be solved without African participation and leadership.

Yet participation alone is not enough. Our task now is to turn presence into influence, and influence into tangible outcomes for our people.

For Ethiopia, the key lies in synergetic unity of purpose, institutional strength, and shared prosperity. Our continental frameworks already provide the tools we need — the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities, and the AfCFTA.

What we must do now is make them work in harmony and effectively. The existence of the institutions should not be an end in itself.

Regional organizations such as IGAD, ECOWAS, and SADC should serve as operational engines of continental integration. When these regional blocks are better aligned with the AU Commission and the AfCFTA Secretariat, Africa can act with one voice — in trade negotiations, in peace initiatives, and in shaping global norms.

Ethiopia’s own experience shows that regional cooperation is not a choice but a necessity. In the Horn of Africa, we are working with our neighbours to expand cross-border infrastructure, trade corridors, and power interconnections.

This imperative of interdependence is a principle that should guide our thinking and action.

The reform of global governance structures is another pillar of our collective aspiration. Institutions created eight decades ago no longer reflect today’s realities. The United Nations Security Council, for instance, should include full permanent African representation.

This is not a demand for privilege but for fairness — a recognition that Africa contributes the most to peacekeeping, bears the greatest cost of global instability, and deserves to have a meaningful voice in global decision making.

Similarly, the international financial architecture must also be reformed to reflect our economic realities. Ethiopia supports the establishment of a regional credit rating agency that captures the real dynamism of African economies, free from outdated perceptions.

We also advocate for reforms that expand access to development finance, climate adaptation resources, and debt restructuring mechanisms that enable countries to invest in their future.

Peace and prosperity are inseparable. Our continent’s security challenges cannot be outsourced; they must be met through African-led solutions that prioritize prevention, dialogue, and regional solidarity. Ethiopia continues to support the African Peace and Security Architecture and efforts to secure predictable financing for peace operations.

Africa’s influence, however, will not be defined only by political and economic factors. It will also be shaped by its culture, its creativity, and its people.

From music to innovation, from fashion to technology, our youth are reshaping global perceptions of Africa continent. This soft power — the power of ideas and identity — must become an integral part of our foreign policy.

It is through telling our own stories, in our own voices, that we will secure a rightful place in global discourse.

Excellencies,

the world is watching Africa with renewed attention. The question is no longer whether Africa matters — but how Africa will choose to lead.

From the AfCFTA trucks crossing our borders to the African Union’s seat at the G20 table, from our peace missions to our green energy ambitions, every initiative signals a continent asserting its voice and shaping its own destiny.

Nevertheless, we need to bear in mind the fact that progress is not linear and that we still face many challenges. Our rise should not be a short-term phenomenon. Africa’s rise should not be seen as a transient illusion built on fashionable platitudes.

In this vein, we should remind ourselves, we are still very far from the Africa we want. We are still not close to an African century.

Excellencies,

We need to look at the longue duree and imagine a future where we have not just influence but decisive impact. We need to lay the foundations for an African century.

If demographic trends are anything to go by, the 22^nd century is bound to be the African century. For that to be a reality, the choices we make, the commitments we enter into and the priorities we adopt today make all the difference.

Preserving our sovereignty over our resources, channelling the energy and dynamism of the youth in more constructive and productive directions are among the paramount duties of our generation.

Ethiopia stands ready to work with all African nations and our international partners to ensure that this moment of possibility becomes a sustained era of progress.

The future we seek — one of dignity, solidarity, and prosperity — depends on how we deploy our collective capacity as a continent with bold strategic foresight.

Thank you.

Chairperson of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) for September 2025, Ambassador Professor Miguel Bembe,

Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Ambassador Bankole Adeoye,

Excellencies, distinguished members of the Peace and Security Council, dear friends,

A very good morning to you all.

It is an honour for me to address you today, representing Amani Africa Media and Research Services (Amani Africa), an organisation that is dedicated to the advancement of peace and security through research and analysis, supporting the noble mandate of this august house, our Union’s standing peace and security decision-making body.

Chairperson, Commissioner Adeoye, Excellencies, members of the PSC, dear friends

Today’s meeting is convened ahead of four major global policy meetings: the United Nations (UN) General Assembly (UNGA), COP30, the AU-EU Summit and the G20 Summit, with the last two being held on African soil. We therefore note with appreciation the strategic significance of the timing of this meeting for crafting the position of Africa that will be communicated in these meetings and wish to commend the Chairperson and this house for the timely session.

In view of the foregoing, my intervention will focus on three points on the climate, peace and security nexus.

The first relates to the imperative of anchoring the climate, peace and security agenda in and addressing it as part of the broader climate change policy process, focusing on justice and development rather than in isolation from and outside of it.

The second point that I will make relates to the need to give particular attention to mobility as a lever in the climate, peace and security nexus.

The last and third aspect of my briefing concerns how to take forward the climate, peace and security agenda in peace and security policy making in particular.

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen

It is now beyond dispute that climate change is the most pressing present and existential threat facing humanity. Apart from the compelling scientific evidence the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has built and presented, this present and existential threat that climate poses has become incontrovertible by the frequency and ferocity of climate change-induced extreme weather events we are all witnessing.

Yet, as much as it poses a present and existential threat to all of humanity, climate change does not affect all equally. Due to weak socio-economic conditions and historical marginalisation, climate change carries much more devastating consequences in Africa, as in other similarly positioned parts of the world.

This is evident from the droughts in Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa, cyclones in South Eastern Africa, floods in central, west and north east Africa, depletion of water sources in the Lake Chad basin, sea level rise in coastal West Africa, which are wreaking havoc.

Lives are cut short. Entire villages are washed away. Livelihoods on which communities depend for their existence are lost. Infrastructure is destroyed. The resultant loss and damage is taking away a significant portion of the GDPs of relatively weak economies, with estimates reaching as much as 11 per cent for some countries.

The weak level of socio-economic development and the resultant existence of conditions of vulnerability not only manifest a context in which the capacity to cope and recover is very weak. But they also make the impacts of climate change highlighted above more devastating.

The unjustness of the situation is borne out by the fact that Africa is the least responsible for the global greenhouse gas emissions causing climate change, despite bearing the brunt of some of the most severe impacts of climate change.

It is these fundamental conditions that render climate change to be first and foremost and essentially a development and justice issue. Thus, as important and necessary as it is, the focus on climate, peace and security is supplementary to and not a substitute for the core climate change policy process with its focus on justice and development.

The AU and this Council are accordingly right in anchoring the climate, peace and security agenda in the broader climate change policy process. Simultaneously, the merit of the climate, peace and security agenda is not only to ensure that peace and security policy making takes full account of the impact of climate change on conflicts, but also to ensure that the peace and security impact of climate change is given systematic due consideration in climate change policy processes writ large.

It is therefore clear that the peace and security implications of climate change cannot and should not be dealt with on its own and in isolation from the essential and wider justice and development focus of climate change policy processes. Within this context, the policy issues deserving of the most serious consideration are the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, climate financing for adaptation and loss and damage responsive to the needs of the most affected and vulnerable, the trade impacts of individual climate response measures and just energy transition and sharing of know-how and technology.

On financing, while pressing for scaling up of the funds for both adaptation and loss and damage in particular, the AU and this Council need to put particular emphasis on the necessity of those most responsible honouring existing financing commitments.

Fragile states receive only USD 2.1 per person annually, while non-fragile states receive USD 161.7. These numbers reflect a global financial system that rewards stability and punishes vulnerability. The African Union’s (AU) March 2024 report rightly called for prioritising fragile and conflict-affected states in funding access. But financial mechanisms such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF) remain out of reach for many.

On trade and development implications of Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), the Joint Namibia-Amani Africa High-level Panel of Experts Report noted by way of example that ‘the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)…is projected to cost the continent at least US$25 billion annually.’ As others set similar measures, this would have serious consequences on the export trade of African countries.

In view of the foregoing and as part of AU’s position in the upcoming COP31 being held in Brazil and the G20 summit to be held in South Africa, as well as the EU-AU summit expected to be held in Angola, the following are the key actions this Council may adopt:

a) To underscore the imperative for upholding the principle of common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) as a cornerstone of collective action for addressing the impacts of climate change, including its peace and security implications.

b) To call for timely, climate-focused and faithful implementation of both the commitment to mobilise climate finance to the scale of $ 300 billion per year by 2035 adopted at COP29 and the earlier goal of mobilising USD 100 billion per year through 2025 to address the financing needs of developing countries.

c) From the perspective of responsiveness to the needs of Africa, attention should be given to the nature and source of climate finance. For climate finance to meet the pressing needs of addressing the challenges that climate change pose along with the development needs of Africa, the PSC may thus emphasise that the AU call on COP30 and G20 summit to ensure that the source of financing is grant based and concessional rather than one that accentuates the debt burden distress that is cripling the economies of many countries in Africa.

d) Related to the issue of financing is the loss and damage fund that was adopted at COP27. As a continent where the increasing frequency and ferocity of climate is resulting in increasing loss and damage, this Council also needs to call for measures to be adopted at COP30 and G20 summit for both the capitalisation at expanded scale and operationalization of the loss and damage fund as well as the inclusion of debt pause clauses in agreements on financing for development when countries experience climate disasters.

e) To advance ease of access for the countries most in need, including particularly fragile and conflict-affected countries. Simplified access procedures, as emphasised during the most recent Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (Ffd4) held in Sevilla, Spain, from 30 June to 3 July 2025 – Compromiso de Sevilla, and de-risking access of African countries to climate finance are critical to unlocking investments in early warning systems, climate-smart agriculture, flood defences and renewable energy.

f) On the trade impacts of unilateral ‘climate response’ measures such as CBAMs, the PSC may underscore the importance of respect for the implementation of Article 3(5) of the UNFCCC and the call in COP28 related to the avoidance of unilateral trade measures based on climate or environment.

Adaptation initiatives should also focus on fostering support for building resilience for the most vulnerable regions of the continent in key social and economic sectors such as agriculture and rural economy, and promoting regional cooperation to build the capacity of vulnerable populations, as well as embedding climate considerations into peacebuilding and development strategies.

Excellencies, dear friends

Coming to the second point of mobility, apart from those consequences noted earlier, mobility has increasingly become a major issue in climate, peace and security. As the high-level side event on climate, mobility and peace and security held on 9 September during the 2^nd Africa Climate Summit (ACS2) highlighted, the movement of people, including when it is a product of climate change and conflict, is an opportunity to be harnessed for coping with the impacts of climate and building resilience.

As the chief of staff of the IOM pointed out at that high-level event and the research work, Amani Africa is carrying out with IOM, reveals, traditions of seasonal mobility in Africa by various communities and emerging contemporary experience on the continent to govern mobility including those induced by climate change show that, if managed well and facilitated as part of anticipatory action, mobility becomes instrumental for climate action. IGAD’s Transhumance Protocol has facilitated safe cross-border pastoral movements, mitigating disputes over resources. Kenya’s forecast-based financing enabled communities to take anticipatory action before floods, protecting lives and assets. Senegal successfully relocated communities from high-risk coastal zones through inclusive and dignified planned relocation initiatives. Ethiopia has integrated mobility mapping and early warning into national climate and peace strategies. These cases demonstrate that anticipatory governance, resource planning, and early relocation measures undertaken with participation of affected communities can reduce risks and foster cooperation.

This necessitates a change in policy imagination of shifting away from treating mobility as a threat and towards the consideration of mobility as an opportunity in the climate, peace and security agenda. Properly managed, mobility is not only a coping mechanism and contributes to peacebuilding but also serves as an adaptation strategy that can strengthen communities’ capacity to withstand climate shocks. In view of the foregoing, the PSC may consider the following:

• The convening of a session dedicated to mobility, climate and peace and security for ensuring that climate-induced and related mobility is turned into an opportunity for managing the impacts of climate rather than becoming an accelerator of conflict risks.
• The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) should integrate mobility indicators to anticipate displacement, in order to prevent conflict and facilitate planned mobility.
• Ratification and operationalisation of key agreements, such as the AU Free Movement Protocol and IGAD’s Transhumance Protocol, are essential to harness mobility as an instrument for addressing challenges relating to the climate, peace and security nexus.

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen

Finally, on taking the climate peace and security agenda specifically forward in peace and security policy making specifically, we note that while the relationship between climate and peace and security is at very best correlational rather than causational, our work established that there is a two-way correlation between climate and peace and security. On the one hand, climate change operates as a threat multiplier but only in specific contexts of governance and security fragility or in countries in conflict or crisis. On the other hand, conflict, by destroying existing coping mechanisms and hugely constraining investment in and mobilisation of effective responses to climate disasters, can undermine climate action and thereby turn climate disasters into catastrophes, as the case of Derna in Libya illustrates.

In this context, the first of the issues that deserves the attention of today’s session is strengthening early warning systems as a strategic climate, peace and security measure for anticipating how climate variability interacts with fragility and conflict drivers. Here, there is a need for ensuring that climate indicators such as rainfall anomalies, drought cycles, sea level rise, shrinking of water, pasture and other resources on which communities depend for their livelihoods and migration flows are systematically incorporated. Without this, early warning remains reactive rather than predictive. Relatedly, there is a need for enhancing and leveraging early warning capacity through investment in climate data collection, satellite monitoring and localised reporting networks that can capture the lived realities of vulnerable communities as well as close coordination and coherence between climate early warning systems and conflict early warning systems.

Advancing this agenda also requires, in addition to enhancing collection and quality of data and anticipatory action, the creation of platforms for knowledge and experience sharing.

The other and last aspect of this final point is the need to follow up on this Council’s decision from its 1114^th session that called for the inclusion of discussions on climate and security in the agenda of the meetings of the AU Assembly Committee of African Heads of States and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC). This is a prerequisite for ensuring that the security dimension of climate change is fully factored in policy initiatives across the mitigation, adaptation, financing, loss and damage and transition streams of the COP processes.

• As such, the action that takes forward PSC 1114^th session decision will be for this Council to task the AU Commission to take steps for ensuring the full integration of the climate, peace and security nexus in CAHOSCC as a necessary condition for addressing the peace and security implications of climate across all the work streams of the COP processes.

With the foregoing and while looking forward to having further exchanges during the interactive segment, I now wish to thank you all for your kind attention and yield the floor back to the Chairperson!

Your Excellencies, Members of the High-Level Panel,

Your Excellency Amb. Adeoye, Bankole, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security,

Your Excellencies, Ambassadors,

Distinguished Experts.

Ladies and Gentlemen.

1. On behalf of His Excellency President William Ruto, the Government, and the people of the Republic of Kenya, I welcome you all to Nairobi. Karibuni sana. I thank all of you for graciously turning up to participate in this High-Level Meeting on the Review of the African Union’s Governance, Peace and Security Frameworks.
2. At the outset, allow me to convey President William Ruto’s goodwill and best wishes for the successful outcomes of this High-Level Meeting. As the AU Champion for Institutional Reforms, President Ruto fully supports this process and looks forward to receiving the report and recommendations arising from the Review of the African Union’s Governance, Peace, and Security frameworks. Allow me also to commend the Chair of the AU Commission, H.E Youssef Mohammed for the choice of such distinguished members of the Panel whose collective experience will undoubtedly lend immense value to the strengthening of the AU peace mechanisms. Equally, I salute AU Peace and Security Commissioner, H.E. Adeoye Bankole, for providing the needed technical support to this process.

Ladies and Gentlemen, 

3. The fundamental objective of this meeting is to review the existing continental peace and security framework and assess whether it is fit for purpose.
4. African leaders have long recognized that accelerating the continent’s political and socio-economic integration must go hand in hand with the promotion of peace, security, and stability. It is for this reason that we established the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Continental Early Warning System, the Standby Force and the Panel of the Wise to constitute an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to address persistent challenges of armed conflicts in Africa. Indeed, the scourge of conflicts, primarily intra-state and, at times, inter-state, remains the leading cause of Africa’s socio-economic stagnation and the greatest source of suffering for its people.
5. The AU Peace Architecture is thus entrusted with core responsibilities including, anticipating and preventing disputes, undertaking peacemaking and peacebuilding, authorizing peace support operations, and harmonizing efforts at both regional and continental levels to effectively combat terrorism. The AU Peace frameworks were never designed to be standalone stallions for peace but were intended to act in cooperative fashion while also taking advantage of the capacities of regional economic blocks and non-state actors to secure peace. It was envisioned that the interactions between these decisional nodes happening at different levels and scales would yield a polycentric peace profile that would respond effectively, alone and as a collective, to the multiplicity and complexity of conflicts.
6. Unfortunately, the frameworks we established have failed to evolve fully to deliver their full potential. As a result, we are struggling to keep pace with the growing multiplicity and complexity of today’s conflict and security challenges. Our efforts, regrettably, remain fragmented, uncoordinated, competitive and underfunded. It is for this reason that the review of the African Peace and Security Architecture has been placed at the front and centre of the reform agenda.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

7. The security scenario is made murkier by a global arena that is marked by intense geopolitical tensions and major power competition. Multilateralism is under unprecedented strain aggravated by intensified geo-strategic competition, deepening inequality, state fragility and an increasingly complex set of threats and challenges.
8. Within this context, Africa is navigating a series of complex and interlinked challenges. Several states are facing a crisis of legitimacy amid a difficult post-pandemic recovery, the debt crisis, fiscal pressures, climate change, increasing inequality.
9. We are witnessing increasing political instrumentalization and manipulation of Africa’s youth, the majority of whom face unemployment. Many of these youths, with access to digital technologies, are increasingly being mobilized in ways that undermine existing democratic systems. Moreover, the rapid spread of populist ‘sovereignty’ narratives, as evident in the Sahel, coupled with calls from some quarters for military takeovers, risks gaining wider traction across other parts of the continent.
10. West Africa has experienced both civilian and military challenges to constitutional order, compounded by deep-seated and rapidly expanding terrorism and insecurity. The region is also witnessing a fundamental rupture in regional cooperation and a strain on long-standing ECOWAS integration arrangements.
11. The Horn of Africa too has entered a challenging period with the war in The Sudan, protracted conflict in South Sudan, and a complex security transition in Somalia. Sharp geo-strategic competition, both around the Red Sea and within the wider global arena, is increasingly shaping dynamics in the region. In the Great Lakes, the complex war economy in eastern DRC remains at the heart of the long-standing crisis, compounded by rising inter-state tensions and intensifying geo-strategic rivalries.
12. To compound the situation of Africa’s security landscape, the continent has, in recent years, regrettably become the global epicentre of terrorism. Terrorist activity has expanded dramatically from the Sahel to the coastal states, while persisting in the DRC, Mozambique, the Lake Chad Basin, and Somalia. Weakening political systems and the emergence of governance vacuums have created fertile ground for terrorists and criminal networks to expand their influence, often including exploiting longstanding grievances.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

13. This is a defining moment for our continent. It is evident that the existing frameworks in their current configuration are not adequate and effective to address today’s complex dynamics and challenges. This underscores the urgent need to reform and strengthen Africa’s peace and security architecture.
14. The AU’s presence in regional hotspots remains weak, less coordinated and under-resourced. The AU’s network of Special Envoys and High Representatives is under-utilized and is probably in need of a reset in certain cases. Strengthening the performance and effectiveness of AU peace support operations is a strategic imperative, given the complex and interconnected nature of threats to collective peace and security. The fight against terrorism on our continent remains fragmented, reactive, not effectively coordinated and inadequately resourced. Developing a comprehensive Plan of Action for countering terrorism in Africa as envisioned in the 2022 Malabo Declaration, cannot wait any longer.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

15. Despite the foregoing challenges, the last two decades have provided veritable lessons which we must harness in the search for a more robust peace and security arrangement. I am confident that this meeting and this esteemed panel has what it takes to reimagine a more effective framework.
16. In the past, we have witnessed assessments and reviews of previous AU reform initiatives that revealed a rich catalogue of recommendations and proposals. Yet, many of these have remained unimplemented due to limited stakeholder buy-in, weak monitoring and evaluation, and, most critically, the lack of a structured implementation process within the Union. I believe that the review of the AU’s Governance, Peace and Security Frameworks that we are undertaking now will not be allowed to fall victim of these shortcomings.

Excellencies, Distinguished Experts, Ladies and Gentlemen,

17. Once again let me welcome you to Kenya and wish you fruitful deliberations. It is now my honour and pleasure to declare the High-Level Meeting on the Review of the African Union’s Governance, Peace and Security Frameworks officially open.

Thank you.