Tomorrow (21 December), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold an informal consultation with the representatives of Member States currently undergoing political transitions, namely Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso.

This marks the second instance of the PSC deploying the format of informal consultation pursuant to article 8(11) of the PSC Protocol, Rule 16 of its Rules of Procedure, and article 25(3) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG). The informal consultation affords the PSC the opportunity for direct engagement with Member States suspended from AU activities due to unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) for discussing the transition and the process towards restoration of constitutional order and civilian rule. The first such consultation was held on 26 April of this year, during which the PSC interacted with representatives of Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Sudan. It is noteworthy that this consultation did not result in a formal outcome document. Tomorrow’s informal engagement is expected to take stock of the progress made and challenges encountered in the implementation of key transition activities in the three countries, and exchange on how to enhance the progress in the transitional process.

On Guinea

PSC’s last engagement on Guinea was during the informal consultation in April. Subsequently, PSC had planned to undertake a field mission to Guinea in August and receive an updated briefing on the political transitions in Guinea and Mali in September, as outlined in its program of work. However, neither the field mission nor the updated briefing session occurred as originally planned.

In October 2022, ECOWAS and Guinea’s transition authorities agreed on a two-year transition period after intense negotiations, with the election expected to take place at the end of next year. PSC, at its 1116^th session, welcomed the agreement reached on the timeline, urging all stakeholders for its adoption and support to ensure a sustained and comprehensive return to constitutional order. The transition timeline covers ten priority areas, including the development of a new constitution, a referendum on the new constitution, establishment of an election management body, and organization of local, legislative, and presidential elections. In late April, the transition authorities appealed to the international community for assistance in mobilizing some 6 trillion Guinean francs ($600 million) for the implementation of the transition plan.

One of the issues likely to receive attention during the consultation is progress towards the drafting of the constitution. The National Transitional Council initiated a series of constitutional consultations, inviting key stakeholders to engage in discussions on the guiding principles of the constitution and offer recommendations. Despite the participation of certain stakeholders who provided their inputs, the large opposition and civil society coalition known as Forces Vives de Guinée (FVG) boycotted the initiative. Sources indicate that the transitional legislature was expected to consider and adopt the draft constitution in June, with a subsequent referendum on the draft constitution scheduled for this December. The June deadline has already been missed, and it is also unlikely that the referendum will take place according to the original plan.

Guinea’s transitional authorities are currently experiencing strained relations both internally with opposition parties and externally with the regional bloc ECOWAS, posing a significant challenge to the transition process. The fluid security situation also remains a cause for concern as the prison break staged in early November in the capital Conakry demonstrates. Top ex-military officials, who have been on trial for the 2009 massacre of civilians, were reportedly freed by armed men from a central prison in the capital. Three of them, including the former military leader Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, were recaptured, while former minister of Presidential Security Colonel Claude Pivi remains fugitive. The incident reportedly witnessed a fighting between Special Forces, formerly led by interim President Col. Mamady Doumbouya, and Autonomous Battalion of Airborne Troops, of which Colonel Pivi was once a member. This coupled with preceding events in April and May, during which Col. Doumbouya dismissed key figures, including the armed forces chief of staff and the head of military intelligence, signals internal discord within the transition authorities.

On Burkina Faso

The last time PSC discussed the situation in Burkina Faso was at its 1166^th session on 3 August, while considering the report of the field mission to the country conducted from 22 to 27 July 2023. In the communiqué adopted during that session, PSC urged the’ transitional authority to practically demonstrate its commitment and ensure that elections are successfully organized within the stipulated timelines.’ The interim President, Captain Ibrahim Traore, who assumed power following the military coup on September 30, 2022, agreed to adhere to the initially agreed-upon transition timeline of 24 months, with the election expected to take place in July 2024. While there have been encouraging developments—including the establishment of a Transition Roadmap, an electoral calendar, and the Independent National Electoral Commission—convening the elections on the scheduled timeline of 24 July 2024 remains doubtful, mainly due to the prevailing security challenges. The PSC, during its recent field mission, observed that several stakeholders in Burkina Faso expressed uncertainties regarding the likelihood of the election taking place in July. Meanwhile, in September, interim President Traore explicitly stated on state TV that elections are ‘not priority’ compared to security. He went on to say that ‘there won’t be an election that is only concentrated in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso and other nearby towns’, alluding to cities less impacted by terrorist attacks.

Indeed, the worsening security situation in Burkina Faso will remain a significant challenge to the organization of elections. Despite government claims of significant security gains, with purported control over 65% to 70% of the territory, Burkina Faso has witnessed a concerning surge in terrorist attacks throughout the period from January to September 2023, according to the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on counter-terrorism and related issues. Currently, Burkina Faso ranks second only to Afghanistan in bearing the brunt of terrorism globally, making the country ‘the epicenter of terrorism and violent extremism’ in the continent. On the other hand, the ban on the public demonstrations and political activities, which has been in place since the issuance of communiqué No. 3 of 30 September 2022, remains intact. Political parties are voicing their concerns over the ongoing restriction and limited space for their participation in the management of the transition process. Against this backdrop, PSC’s 1166^th session urged Burkinabé transitional authorities to lift such ban, an important request worth following-up in tomorrow’s consultation.

The other key issue likely to receive attention in tomorrow’s consultation is the operationalization of the monitoring mechanism of the transition, which remains an important aspect of accompanying the transitional process. A year ago, ECOWAS and Burkina Faso signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of a Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism for the 24 months transition—a development welcomed during the 62^nd Ordinary Session of ECOWAS on 04 December 2022. Nevertheless, PSC’s field mission report highlights the challenges to operationalize the mechanism, including difficulties faced by the ECOWAS Mediator in conducting visits to the country. The announcement of the formation of a regional alliance between Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali is not received favorably in the region. In the communiqué adopted during its latest summit on 10 December, ECOWAS expressed its rejection of ‘all forms of alliances that seek to divide the region and promote foreign interest in the region.’ It is also recalled that the PSC, at its 1076^th session, decided to establish a Transition Support Group in Burkina Faso (TSG-BF), in collaboration with ECOWAS and the UN, with the aim to mobilize the necessary resources to address security, development and human challenges.

On Mali

Mali was last discussed by the PSC during the first informal consultation it held with countries undergoing political transition in April this year. One key development since this informal consultation has been the successful conduct of Mali’s national referendum in June which approved amendment of the constitution with, according to the national electoral authority, 97% votes in favor. While the referendum in itself has by and large been regarded as a test to the transition authorities’ commitment to a democratic process, it has not been free of contentions. Although proponents of the newly amended constitution are hopeful it would strengthen fragile political institutions, opponents criticize the document for bestowing excessive power to the president.

While welcoming the conduct of the referendum and commending the transition authorities for deploying the necessary efforts towards its successful completion, ECOWAS, at its 64^th Ordinary Session held on 10 December, expressed concern over the reluctance of Malian transition authorities to cooperate with ECOWAS.

In late September, Mali’s transition authorities announced that the presidential elections that were set to take place in February 2024 will be slightly delayed due to technical reason including the pending review of electoral lists. Further to the absence of any indication of a projected date for the postponed presidential elections to be conducted, the authorities have also decided not to hold legislative elections which were scheduled for end of 2023, opting instead to exclusively have presidential elections. This partial implementation of the transitional processes may not be without consequences for full return to constitutional and civilian rule.

On the security track, Mali continues to confront intense insurgencies with increasing tensions having been noted in the northern region over the past few months. Reports have indicated that in recent months, Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate has increased its attacks in northern Mali, to exploit the security vacuum already being created due to the ongoing withdrawal of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). As a result of such insecurity, humanitarian access to several parts of Mali’s northern region is now limited, frustrating the already dire humanitarian situation. The heightened tensions and armed presence in the region is also impeding the timely and orderly departure of withdrawing MINUSMA troops and personnel. While reaffirming its plans to stick to the deadline of 31 December 2023 to complete withdrawal of MINUSMA as per Mali’s request, the UN has expressed concern in mid-October, over the challenges being faced in the movement of logistics convoys.

No formal outcome document is expected from tomorrow’s consultation. The consultation may highlight the importance of institutionalizing the practice of informal consultation with countries undergoing political transitions, aiming to expedite their return to constitutional order. In addition to the informal consultation, it may also emphasize the need to operationalize monitoring and evaluation mechanism to effectively track the implementation of transition plans in countries under political transition. In this context, PSC may follow-up on its previous decisions, including the decision to establish a Monitoring Mechanism on Transition in Guinea (MMTG) during its 1064^th session. While recognizing the complex and multi-dimensional challenges facing these countries, the consultation may emphasize the significance of adhering to the agreed transition timelines and fostering close collaboration for the effective implementation of key transition activities. Also of significance in respect to Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger is how to support their efforts in the fight against terrorism and consolidating security in these countries. It may also welcome the recent decision of ECOWAS, during its 64^th ordinary session held on 10 December 2023, which directed its Member States to ‘exempt the Transition Presidents, Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of the Member States in Transition from the travel ban and other targeted individual sanctions imposed on the three Member States’ as important step for mending very strained relations with these countries.

Tomorrow (26 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene an informal consultation with representatives of member states undergoing political transitions (Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Sudan). The consultation mainly aims to serve as an opportunity for direct engagement between the PSC and representatives of member states suspended from the activities of the AU in relation to unconstitutional changes of government (UCG).

The meeting is being convened on the basis of Article 8(11) of the PSC Protocol and Rule 16 of the PSC Rules of Procedure which envisage informal consultations of the PSC ‘with parties concerned by or interested in a conflict or a situation under its consideration’. As Amani Africa’s Handbook on the AUPSC discusses, although a format yet to be properly operationalised, PSC’s informal consultation – along with closed and open sessions – forms one of the three types of meetings stipulated under the provisions of Article 8, sub-articles 9 to 11 of the PSC Protocol. Despite the presence of the mechanism, tomorrow’s consultation forms the first time for the PSC to explore this meeting format as a way to overcome the limitation from the other two forms of PSC meetings to engage with member states suspended from the activities of the AU.

The immediate background that precipitated the activation of this format of PSC’s meeting from its long dormancy is traced back to the challenges for effective PSC engagement in countries facing complex transitions induced by military seizure of power. At the 14^th Retreat on the Working Methods of the PSC held in November 2022, one of the issues which formed part of the discussions was PSC’s interface with AU member states that are suspend from the activities of the union. Highlighting the relevant provision of the PSC Protocol to enable informal consultations with such member states – Article 8(11) – the conclusions of the 14^th Retreat underscored how the PSC may utilise such consultations to engage with AU member states suspended for UCG, to gather first-hand information on the situation on the ground and to work towards finding durable solution.

Additionally, during the AU summit in February, the ministers of Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali were present for holding side meetings, although they were not allowed entry into the formal meetings of the summit. One of the issues that they highlighted in their engagement and presence during the summit without access to and presence in the sessions of the Executive Council and AU Assembly sessions was the unfairness of their exclusion while the AU did not suspend a neighbouring country, Chad, where similar military seizure of power took place, and allowed its full participation despite continuing military transitional rule.

It was also in this context that the concrete idea for the convening of the informal consultation was conceived. This emerged during one of the engagements of these ministers. This engagement involved a meeting with the minister of foreign affairs of Tunisia. After the meeting, Tunisia’s foreign minister agreed to explore the convening of an informal consultation that gives the opportunity for the PSC to have direct engagement and hear first-hand from the parties. According to the information Amani Africa received in the consultation on the program of work for April under the Tunisia’s chairship, the informal consultation may see the participation of the three countries at the level of ministers. At the time the program was developed and adopted, in addition to the three West African countries suspended for UCG, Sudan was also anticipated to participate. It is to be seen if Sudan will participate in the light of its recent descent to the ongoing deadly fighting.

The suspension of member states from AU’s activities at the occurrence of UCG is not an end by itself, but rather a means to the desired end result of ensuring the restoration of constitutional order in the concerned member state. The 2000 Lomé Declaration on UCG is in fact clear on the importance of sustained engagement of the AU with the perpetrators of a coup in order to exert the necessary pressure to ascertain a speedy return to constitutional order. The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) also clarifies under Article 25(3) that notwithstanding the suspension of a given member state, the AU ‘shall maintain diplomatic contacts and take any initiatives to restore democracy’ in that member state. In light of these guiding norms therefore, it is important to conceptualise suspension as a tool to register displeasure over the breach of agreed community rules and as a lever to use diplomatic efforts in member states affected by UCG for the initiation and implementation of roadmap for relevant reforms that facilitate both the return to constitutional order and its sustainability by preventing recurrence of UCG through addressing the conditions for its occurrence.

Upon suspension from the AU, representatives of member states are not invited to address the PSC as concerned country when the PSC convenes a meeting on their country situation. At the very best, those countries have to present their case by proxy either through members of the PSC or if their view is canvased as part of the report, briefing or statement that the AU Commission presents to the PSC. As a result, with the exception of the only time the PSC has been able to conduct a field visit to one of these member states (the PSC’s evaluation mission to Mali conducted in July 2021 following the coup of May 2021), its direct interface with authorities in charge of the transition processes has been lacking. After the October 2021 military power grab experienced in Sudan, the PSC had also planned to conduct a similar evaluation mission to engage Sudanese actors but the visit could not be carried out as intended. There have also been no PSC missions to the other two member states suspended for UCG, Burkina Faso and Guinea. This is seen by PSC members as having the effect of limiting both PSC’s understanding of perspectives of the de facto authorities and the full scope of the issues and dynamics at play as well as its diplomatic leverage over the authorities. Tomorrow’s informal consultation is accordingly designed to address these perceived challenges around the direct engagement between the PSC and the de facto authorities of countries suspended on account of UCG.

Another critical area the informal consultation could contribute to is in responding to concerns that have been raised from various stakeholders, regarding inconsistencies observed in the way the AU has responded to UCG that occurred in the course of 2021 and 2022. After the consecutive coups that took place in Chad, Guinea, Mali and Sudan in 2021 (Burkina Faso’s coming in 2022), only Chad has remained immune from suspension in line with Article 7(1)(g) of the PSC Protocol. Despite Chad’s specific circumstances which led to the PSC’s decision to refrain from imposing immediate suspension, not only has this decision brought up questions around the consistent application of the AU principles and norms banning UCG, it has also raised concern over the perceived differential treatment accorded to Chad – whose representatives had direct access to the PSC during its sessions on the situation in Chad while the other countries were restricted from the same privilege, having been suspended. Although it may not respond to the complex issues that arise from these experiences, the envisaged informal consultation could in part address some of the concerns that have been raised in this regard.

While appreciating the advantages of an informal consultation of the PSC with member states suspended from the AU, it is also important to maintain the established practice through which the PSC keeps track of the status of developments in countries in political transitions. Although it has not had direct exchanges with suspended member states, the PSC constantly maintains engagement on the developments in these countries through the AU Commission and its Chairperson, though the PSC has not been receiving updates as regularly as the period as stipulated in PSC decisions. Indeed, even with PSC’s direct engagement the best way to facilitate effective political transition for restoring constitutional order is through deploying diplomatic initiative (through a special envoy or high-representative or transition support mechanism and through the provision of technical support to transition authorities in required specific transitional tasks) as envisaged the Lomé Declaration and Article 25(3) of ACDEG. The role of the PSC would largely be to mandate the establishment or launching of such diplomatic initiative, the accompanying and monitoring of such initiative, and the review of its decision on suspension based on assessment of progress made.

No formal outcome document is expected from tomorrow’s informal consultation. The consultation is expected to emphasise the importance of AU norms on democracy, good governance and constitutionalism, not only to avert the occurrence of coups, but also to ensure sustained peace, security and stability in Africa. It may commend member states currently undergoing political transitions for their ongoing efforts to restore constitutional order in their respective territories and urge them to continue abiding by the agreed terms in their transition charters and to fully handover authority to democratically elected civilian governments by the envisaged timelines. Highlighting the importance of occasional informal consultations to enable direct interaction between the PSC and member states suspended from the AU, it may stress the need for maintaining the established method of engagement through the auspices of the AU Commission, particularly the Chairperson.

In October, the Kingdom of Morocco was the monthly rotating chairperson of the Africa Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). The provisional program of work initially envisaged five substantive sessions of which two agenda items were dedicated to country/region specific issues. Two more agenda items with country/region focus were added in the course of the month. Accordingly, situations in the Horn of Africa, Central Africa and the Sahel were considered during the month. Overall the PSC convened seven (7) sessions and one joint consultative meeting addressing a total of eight (8) agenda items plus the consultative meeting.

Tomorrow (19 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council will convene its 1106^th session to receive updates on the political transitions in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, and Mali.

The session starts with opening remarks from Amma Twum-Amoah, Permanent Representative of Ghana to the AU and PSC Chairperson for the month of September 2022, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security. Maman Sidikou, High Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Head of the AU Mission for the Sahel (MISAHEL) and Basile Ikouebe, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Head of the AU Office in Ndjamena are expected to deliver statements. The representatives of Chad, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) are also expected to make statements as relevant country and regional mechanisms, in addition to the representative of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

It will be for the second time that Council considers the situation in countries undergoing political transitions due to unconstitutional changes of government as one agenda item. The first was held on 14 April 2022 at its 1076^th session where Council discussed the political transitions in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, and Sudan. It is not clear why Council has not included Sudan in the agenda item this time. It has been now more than five months since the PSC considered the political transition in Sudan despite its decision, at its 1041^st session, to receive monthly update on the evolution of the situation in Sudan.

Tomorrow’s session is expected to review the political developments in the four countries since its last meeting in April. It also presents Council the opportunity to follow up on the implementation of some of its key decisions taken at its 1076^th session, including the establishment of a monitoring dashboard of the situations in Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, Chad, and Sudan; the organization of a Needs Assessment Mission to Guinea; the operationalization of the Monitoring Mechanism on the Transition in Guinea; and the establishment of a Transition Support Group in Burkina Faso (TSG-BF).

On Burkina Faso, a major development since the last session is the decision of Burkinabe authorities to set a shorter transition period than its initial 36 months timetable. Duration of the transition was a source of disagreement between Burkinabe authorities and ECOWAS as the latter found the 36 months proposal in early March unacceptable. As part of the effort to support the transition in Burkina Faso and resolve the disagreement over the duration of the transition, it is to be recalled that ECOWAS appointed former President of Niger Mahamadou ISSOUFOU as its mediator. Subsequent engagement between ECOWAS and Burkinabe authorities through the mediator bridged differences between the two sides. While the communique of the 61^st ordinary session of the ECOWAS Authority stated that the progress made led to lifting of economic and financial sanctions, there was no specified list of economic & financial sanctions imposed on Burkina Faso. What is lifted could only be the threat of immediate application of unspecified economic and financial sanctions to which reference was made in the March 2022 ECOWAS Authority meeting. Despite various policy measures including the reshuffling of the army command & the understanding reached on the duration of the transition, the security situation in the country did not show any improvement. If anything, the dire security situation has continued to deteriorate since the coup. According to ACLED data, more than 530 violent incidents occurred between February and May 2022, showing a 115 percent year-on-year increase. The humanitarian situation also continues to worsen. According to the latest data provided by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) published on 5 September, ‘violent attacks has driven more people to flee between January and July 2022 than during the entire year of 2021’ in Burkina Faso, making the country one of the three fastest growing displacement crises in the world. Close to 2 million (nearly one in 10 persons) have been displaced in the country. The same source indicates that the ‘rate of severe food insecurity has nearly doubled compared to last year, with over 600,000 people in emergency hunger levels during this lean season’. The deteriorating security and humanitarian situation underscore the need for ending the political and constitutional crisis and implementing the necessary political and institutional reforms.

On Mali, like in the case of Burkina Faso, diplomatic engagements between ECOWAS and the transition authorities in Mali culminated in acceptable transition timeline of 24 months from 29 March 2022. With Malian transitional authorities submitting a new timetable of 24 months and taking other positive steps notably the promulgation of a new electoral law on 24 June and establishment of the single election management body, Agence Indépendante de Gestion des Elections (AIGE), the 61^st ordinary session of ECOWAS authority decided to lift the economic and financial sanctions it imposed on 9 January while maintaining the suspension and targeted sanctions against individuals and groups.

The convening of the 3^rd meeting of the Monitoring and Support Group for the Transition in Mali (GST-Mali) took place on 6 September in Togo pursuant to 1027^th and 1076^th sessions of the Council. Co-convened by the AU, ECOWAS, and UN under the auspices of the Togolese government, the 3^rd meeting of the GST-Mali presented an opportunity for Malian authorities to present steps being taken for implementing the transitional roadmap and mobilize support from regional and international actors for the reform process. The Transitional Authority of Mali, during the 3^rd meeting of the GST-Mali, also requested the lifting of remaining sanctions. It remains to be seen how Council will respond to the call for lifting also of suspension, which under current circumstances could realistically happen only with agreement with ECOWAS. Mali’s request of the lifting of sanction also brings the gap in AU’s normative framework of sanctions into the spotlight as there is still unclarity on the issue of how and when sanctions are lifted.

On Guinea, the country has witnessed deteriorating political situation as tension erupted between the National Front for the Defense of the Constitution (FNDC) (an alliance of political parties, trade unions and civil society groups and a leading opposition group that spearheaded protests against former president Alpha Conde), and the military authority that took over-power unconstitutionally on 5 September 2021. The opposition group staged protests in late July and on 17 August over concerns of military authority’s ‘unilateral management’ of the transition towards a civilian rule. On 8 August, the transition authorities dissolved the FNDC, a further blow to the country’s transition towards democracy. Following the same pattern in Mali and Burkina Faso, the National Transition Council of Guinea set a 36-month transition to civilian rule on 11 May, which ECOWAS rejected. ECOWAS at its 61^st ordinary session requested the transition authorities either to propose an acceptable transition timeline until 1 August 2022 or face economic and financial sanctions as well as targeted sanctions. The authorities did not comply with the provided deadline, and it is accordingly susceptible for ECOWAS sanctions. ECOWAS mediator, former Beninese President Boni Yayi, was reportedly in Conakry in August trying to convince the transition authorities to agree for a shorter duration of transition period, but no indication that such diplomatic engagements bore fruit so far.

On Chad, the situation in Chad is marked by two significant developments since Council’s last session in April. The first is the signing of peace agreement between Chad’s transition government and about 40 politico-military groups on 8 August in Doha, Qatar, after more than five months of peace talks. Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), main rebel group which was behind the April attack that cost the life of former President Idriss Déby Into, remains a holdout group, denting the success of the Doha peace talk. The second key development is the launch of the 21-day ‘Inclusive National Dialogue’ on 20 August following the signing of the Doha agreement. The dialogue gathered some 1,400 delegates from various stakeholders. After the launch, the dialogue ran into procedural challenges, its scheduled end has been pushed back by ten days, to 30 September. Apart from FACT, the dialogue was also boycotted by Wakit Tamma, a large coalition of opposition groups and civil society groups. Last week, Chadian forces fired tear gas on supporters of the leader of Transformers, one of the parties of the coalition that boycotted the dialogue, after he was summoned for questioning by authorities. The authorities have been cracking down on members of Transformers, with about 200 having been arrested and held for several days before their release for planning to stage a rally.

In apparent departure to its own norms and established practices, PSC did not sanctioned Chad for the military seizure of power in April 2021 but outlined list of conditions that Chad’s transition authorities should meet. During its 996^th session held on 14 May 2021, Council requested the Transitional Military Council (TMC), among others, to complete the transition within 18 months from 20 April 2021, further stating that ‘no form of extension of the transition period prolonging the restoration of constitutional order, would be acceptable to the AU’. It also urged the Chairman and members of the TMC not to run for the upcoming elections. PSC’s 18-months deadline will lapse this October and it is unlikely that the deadline will be met. The question therefore remains: will the PSC proceed with sanction or extend the transition timeline? The PSC is seen as having dealt with the military seizure of power & the suspension of constitution leniently. For it to be seen to be applying AU norms fairly, at a minimum it needs to uphold its own decisions on Chad by reaffirming the timeline and conditions of the transition as set out in the communique of its 996^th session.

The expected outcome is a communique. Council is expected to welcome the agreement reached between ECOWAS and Burkina Faso as well as Mali on the new timetable of the transition and the resultant lifting of the economic and financial sanctions on these countries by ECOWAS. It may also note the convening of the 3^rd meeting of the GST-Mali, the promulgation of a new electoral law and the establishment of the single election management body in relation to Mali and the need for enhancing closer working relationship and support for the transitional process in Mali; and the signing of Doha peace agreement between Chadian Transitional Authorities and politico-military groups, the launch of the ‘inclusive national dialogue’ in relation to Chad as steps in the right direction towards the restoration of constitutional order and ensure lasting peace in these countries. While commending the signing of the peace agreement, it may call upon the holdout groups to join the peace process. It may also reiterate the demands it set in its 996^th session and call on the transitional authorities to respect the freedom of assembly and protest of opposition groups and ensure full inclusion of all political and social forces in the national dialogue by addressing concerns of various stakeholders. On Guinea, Council may express its dissatisfaction over the Transitional authorities’ proposal of 36 months transition, and thus, it may urge the authorities to engage with ECOWAS in good faith with the view to reaching agreement on acceptable timetable for a rapid return to constitutional order and call for the operationalization of the Monitoring Mechanism on the Transition in Guinea for working with ECOWAS to get a transitional roadmap agreeable to all. It may also express concern over the deteriorating socio-political situation in Guinea due to the political disagreement with opposition groups over the transition. In this regard, Council may urge transition authorities to respect political rights as enshrined in the relevant instruments of the AU and hold inclusive national dialogue to resolve underlying issues. Council may also express its grave concern over the worsening security and humanitarian situation particularly in the context of Burkina Faso and Mali, which Council may call upon international partners to step up efforts to address these situations.

In September, Ghana was the monthly Chairperson of the Africa Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). From the items making up the agenda of the Provisional Program of Work at the beginning of the month, the PSC did not consider one agenda item and another item that did not initially feature in the program of work was added during the month. In total, the PSC convened six sessions. Four of these sessions were committed to thematic agenda, while two addressed country/region specific issues.

INTRODUCTION

On 28 May, the African Union (AU) Assembly of Heads of State and Government are scheduled to hold the 16^th extraordinary session in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. One of the two major agenda items for the extraordinary summit will be to deliberate on and adopt measures to address the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) that the continent experienced during the past few years.

Tomorrow (14 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1076^th session to receive updates on political transitions in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali and Sudan.

Following opening remarks by Willy Nyamitwe, Permanent Representative of Burundi to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of April, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. Other participants that will be delivering statements and presentations include: Professor Mohammed Al-Hacen Lebatt, Principal Strategic Adviser of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and AU Special Envoy to Sudan; Representative of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Secretariat; Representative of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chair of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); Basile Ikouebe, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Head of the AU Office in Chad; Representative of the Republic of Ghana, Chair of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); and Maman Sidikou, High Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Head of the AU Mission for the Sahel (MISAHEL).

This session is convened in line with the PSC’s request of the Commission for a regular update on Chad, Mali, Sudan, Guinea and Burkina Faso at its different sessions held to consider the situation in each of these countries after experiencing unconstitutional change of government (UCG). Previously, the Council has dedicated separate sessions to receive updates on the situations in each of the above countries, and this will be the first time that the Council will consider them in one session. Tomorrow’s session is an opportunity for the Council to take stock of latest developments around the transition towards the restoration of constitutional order in member States that have experienced UCG in 2021 and early 2022. It is worth recalling that the PSC has imposed sanctions against all of these countries with the exception of Chad.

It is the second time that the Council considers the situation in Burkina Faso after the 24 January 2022’s military coup against the democratically elected President Marc Roch Christian Kabore, the first meeting being held at its 1062^nd session convened on 31 January. In that session, it is to be recalled that the Council suspended the country from all AU activities until the effective restoration of normal constitutional order. Council also endorsed the 28 January 2022 communique of the Extraordinary Summit of ECOWAS, which among others requested the immediate restoration of constitutional order without specifying timeline. However, in the subsequent Summit held on 3 February, the regional bloc asked military authorities to ‘establish the Transition institutions, adopt a transition calendar and facilitate the return to constitutional order within the shortest time’.

Since its last session on 31 January, Burkina Faso adopted a Transition Charter on 1 March, setting a three-year transition period. The Charter was adopted after consultations between the military leaders, political parties, civil society groups, and other stakeholders. Among the provisions of the Charter is the one that bars the interim President and the coup leader Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba (he was sworn in as President on 2 March to lead the transition), as well as members of the transitional government from running for elections. A civilian Prime Minster and a cabinet consisting of 25 ministers were also appointed on 4 and 5 March. On 19 March, a transitional assembly was appointed as well, which will serve as the legislative body during the transition. The reported release of President Roch Kabore is another welcome development.

While all these developments are positive steps towards the restoration of a constitutional order, the 36 months duration of the transition period will remain issue of concern for the Council though it did not put any specific timeline for the transition at its previous session. On the part of ECOWAS, it has already expressed its concern over the duration of the transition at its most recent extraordinary summit convened on 25 March. The communique adopted at the Summit further demanded the ‘finalization of an acceptable transition timetable no later than 25th April 2022’, failure to which the regional bloc threatened to impose an immediate economic and financial sanctions. On the security front, terrorists have continued to stage their attacks which has exacerbated the humanitarian situation in the country.

The last time the Council considered the situation in Chad was in August 2021 during its 1016^th session. Hence tomorrow’s meeting will be the first session of 2022 where the Council considers the developments in the country. It is to be recalled that following the military seizure after Idriss Deby’s death on 20 April 2021, the PSC decided not to suspend Chad contrary to AU norms. The event in Chad was not referred as a coup or unconstitutional change of government by the PSC. However, the Council urged the military to hand over political power to civilian authorities and authorised the urgent deployment of a fact-finding mission to Chad. Moreover, in its 996^th session the Council requested, among others, the completion of the transition to democratic rule within 18 months, effective from 20 April 2021; guarantee that the Chair of Transitional Military Council (TMC) and its members do not run in the upcoming national elections; and the urgent revision of the Transition Charter. The Council also requested Chadian authorities to ‘urgently establish the National Transition Council’. During the 996^th session the PSC also decided for the establishment of an AU-led Support Mechanism (AUSM) for Chad. The PSC, in its last session on Chad, at its 1016^th session has urged for ‘dialogue between the Transition Government and all relevant Chadian stakeholders including opposition political parties and armed groups’.

Tomorrow’s session will be critical in assessing the level of implementation of the various requests made by the PSC and to examine the overall status of the transition process. The National Transition Council has been announced in September 2021 to serve as an interim parliament during the transition period. On the other hand, considerable delays have been witnessed around the national dialogue process. The TMC has declared amnesty for various rebel armed groups to facilitate their participation in the planned dialogue. However, there are still concerns around the inclusivity of the national dialogue, as key civilian groups are still missing and the focus has been more on the inclusion of politico-military groups. It would be also important for the PSC to underline the importance for respecting the 18-month transition period.

Council’s last deliberation on Guinea took place at its 1064^th session convened on 10 February 2022. At that session, Council welcomed some of the key positive developments in Guinea’s political transition which include the establishment of a Transition Government with complete appointment of members of the National Transitional Council (NTC), the appointment of a civilian Prime Minister and the adoption of a Transition Charter. The release of former President Alpha Conde was also another positive development highlighted at the 1064^th session – although Conde has returned to Conakry on 8 April, after which the transition government announced he shall remain in Guinea as long as his health allows.

Despite taking some positive steps, the transition authorities are also yet to meet the key requirements fundamental to ensuring the restoration of constitutional order. Notwithstanding the appointment of a civilian Prime Minister, key government positions continue to be held by military figures. The transition authorities were also unable to conduct national elections within the six months period stipulated by ECOWAS at its Extraordinary Summit of 16 September 2021 and endorsed by the PSC at its 1036^th session of 5 October 2021. Not only have Guinean authorities failed to respect the stipulated timeline for the conduct of elections, they are also yet to announce a clear transition timetable. Having regard to the slow progress of restoring constitutional order and particularly in light of the missed deadline for the conduct of elections, ECOWAS, at its Extraordinary Summit of 25 March 2022, demanded the “finalisation of an acceptable transition timetable no later than 25 April 2022”. It further threatened the immediate imposition of economic and financial sanctions upon the expiry of this deadline without submission of the transition timetable.

In addition to following up on some of the key decisions of its previous session including its request for the AU Commission to ensure provision of technical support to Guinea, Council may urge Guinean authorities to finalise and submit a transition timetable which presents a reasonable and acceptable timeline for the conduct of elections and restoration of constitutional order.

At its last session dedicated to the situation in Mali – the 1057^th session held on 14 January 2022 – the PSC endorsed the Communiqué of ECOWAS’s 4^th Extraordinary Summit of 9 January 2022 which imposed economic and political sanctions against Mali, following the latter’s adoption of a transition calendar which delays the national elections until the end of December 2025. Council also strongly rejected the calendar submitted by Mali and referred to the timeline suggested as an “undue elongation of the transition process in Mali” as well as an “unconstitutional, impermissible, inappropriate and a grave obstruction to democratic processes”. Accordingly, it called on Malian authorities to ensure completion of the transition period within 16 months.

Despite the sanctions imposed by ECOWAS and PSC’s endorsement of the regional block’s decision as well as condemnations from the international community, the transition in Mali remains very slow. On 4 February 2022, the European Union (EU) adopted sanctions, including travel ban and asset freeze, against five members of Mali’s transitional Government, in support of ECOWAS’s decisions. In response, members of the transition authority organised a rally against EU’s sanctions. Recent developments including the request for Danish forces, deployed as part of the Takuba Task Force to leave the country on 24 January as well as France’s Ambassador to Mali to leave the country within 72 hours on 31 January demonstrate the deteriorating relationship of Mali’s transitional government with various partners. Moreover, on 11 April, the EU decided to halt its military trainings in Mali voicing concern over the interference and operation of Wagner Group.

On 21 February, Mali’s National Transition Council (NTC) unanimously adopted a draft law tabled by the Government for amending the 2020 Transition Charter. Among the contents of the revision is the modification of the transition timeline in line with recommendations of the national dialogue of December 2021. Key political oppositions, particularly the Cadre d’échange or “Exchange Framework” have completely rejected the revision of the Transition Charter. Meanwhile, efforts to resolve the impasse between Malian government and regional and international partners have continued. Particularly, ECOWAS’s Mediator for Mali has been actively engaging the transition government, although no agreement could be reached so far. At its recent Extraordinary Summit of 25 March 2022, ECOWAS showed flexibility and indicated possibility for gradual lifting of its sanctions on the condition that Malian authorities adhere to the timeline established by the joint technical team of ECOWAS, AU and UN, to extend the transition period for additional 12 to 16 months, effective from 15 March 2022. However, Mali’s interim President did not take part at the 15 March ECOWAS Summit, despite invitation extended by the regional body. On the other hand, upon ECOWAS’s communication of the proposed addition of 12 to 16 months to the transition period, Malian authorities engaged the ECOWAS mediator for Mali and successively proposed a period of 36, 29 and then 24 months. ECOWAS has however maintained the 12 to 16 months proposed by the joint technical team.

In light of this discourse, Council may urge Mali’s transition authorities to adhere to the new timeline agreed by ECOWAS, AU and UN and to work towards resolving the stalemates faced with regional and international stakeholders. It may also reiterate its previous calls for Malian transition authorities to commit to not participate in the elections at the end of the transition period.

The Council was last updated on the situation on Sudan during its 1060th session held on 25 January 2022. In this session, the Council is expected to hear about latest developments in the country and AU’s engagement to resolve the crisis following the 25 October 2021 coup. The anti-coup protests have continued and the absence of any political agreement that would break the dangerous political stalemate over the future of the transition. The military has continued its grip on power while regular protests against military rule have persisted in Khartoum and elsewhere, leaving at least 94 people reportedly dead and thousands injured.

Meanwhile, diplomatic efforts have intensified to help Sudanese parties find way out of the current crisis. The Chairperson of the Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, visited Sudan in February where he met Sudanese parties for consultation on the political situation in the country. Professor Mohammed Al-Hacen Lebatt, the AU Special Envoy, also visited Sudan on several occasions to ensure consultations are inclusive. A field mission was also scheduled to take place from 27 to 28 February, but this has been postponed pending the readiness of Sudan. The United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) also released its report on 28 February highlighting areas of convergence and divergence among stakeholders, which is an outcome of more than 110 consultations. The regional bloc, IGAD, also undertook a fact-finding mission to Sudan from 29 January to 1 February 2022. Though diplomatic efforts by UNITAMS, AU and IGAD were not coordinated initially, this has changed in recent weeks as they agreed to join efforts in supporting Sudan to resolve the crisis.

As noted by Volker Perthes, the Special Representative for Sudan and Head of UNITAMS, in his latest brief to the UN Security Council on 28 March, reaching an agreement on: interim constitutional arrangement, the criteria and mechanisms to appoint a Prime Minster and a cabinet, a roadmap for the transitional period, and the type and timing for the elections remain ‘urgent priorities’ to address the current impasse and put the political transition back on track.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. Having addressed the key issues specific to each of the countries on its agenda, Council may generally emphasise the importance of adhering to AU norms on democracy, good governance and constitutionalism in order to avert the occurrence of coups and the resulting disruption to constitutional order as well as peace and security. On Burkina Faso, Council may take note of the positive developments notably the adoption of the Transition Charter, establishment of transitional bodies and the release of President Roch Kabore. However, echoing the 25 March 2022 Communique of ECOWAS, it may express its concern over the duration of the transition period set for 36 months under the Transition Charter.

Similarly, Council may emphasise its concern over the slow progress in Guinea’s transitional process. Based on its previous practice, it is possible for Council to endorse ECOWAS’s decision with respect to Burkina Faso and Guinea adopted in the Communiqué of its Extraordinary Summit of 25 March 2022. It is however possible that some members of the Council may find the threatened imposition of immediate sanctions in ECOWAS’s Communiqué counterproductive to diplomatic efforts and engagements with the transitional authorities of each country, particularly having regard to the recent experience of Mali. With respect to the transition in Mali, Council may welcome and commend the engagements between Malian authorities and ECOWAS Mediator. It may also welcome the initiative of the Malian Minister of Foreign Affairs to set up a Framework for dialogue at the political and technical level, which led to the formation of the joint technical team of ECOWAS, AU and UN that proposed an electoral timetable of 12 to 16 months.

On Chad, the PSC may urge the military council to honor its pledges to limit the transition to eighteen months and exclude its own members from running in the planned election. The PSC may further underline the importance of holding an inclusive and genuine national dialogue.

Regarding Sudan, the PSC may express its concern over the lack of political agreement on the future of the transition and its impact on the economic and security conditions of the country. Council may welcome the joint efforts of AU, UNITAMS and IGAD to facilitate consultations among Sudanese stakeholders. It may also urge both the military and the civilian political forces to reach a deal on a transitional arrangement that would steer the country to the election. The PSC may reiterate its call upon the Sudanese authorities to refrain from using excessive force against protesters and hold perpetrators to account.

Tomorrow (10 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene its 1064th session. As one of the agenda items of the session, the PSC will receive updates on the situation in Guinea.

Following the opening remarks of the PSC Chairperson of the month and Permanent Representative of Kenya to the AU, Jean Kamau, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to provide update to the PSC. The representative of Ghana, as Chair of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Authority of Heads of State and Government, is also expected to deliver a statement.

The last time Council addressed the situation in Guinea was at its 1036th meeting convened on 5 October 2021. At that session, in addition to upholding the decision of its 1030th session to suspend Guinea from all AU activities until the restoration of constitutional order, Council endorsed the outcomes of the communiqué of the 16 September 2021 Extraordinary Session of ECOWAS. The ECOWAS communiqué, among others, called for the conduct of general elections in Guinea within six months period. Tomorrow’s session is expected to review developments in Guinea since PSC’s last session and consider how to address challenges to the return of constitutional order in Guinea.

Despite the measures taken both at the level of the AU and ECOWAS, Guinea is not any closer to having clear plan for return to constitutional order. According to ECOWAS’s decision, Guinea was to conduct elections in the upcoming month of March 2022 to ensure the end of the transition period and peaceful transfer of power to a democratically elected government. Five months after the coup, the authorities are yet to adopt a transitional calendar. It is to be recalled that Guinea’s authorities have already expressed concerns that more time may be required for constitutional review and institutional reforms to be completed.

From the perspective of the AU and ECOWAS, some of the policy challenges that the coup in Guinea and the other West African countries give rise to include the parameters for determining timeline for restoration of constitutional order and the set of reform measures that the AU and ECOWAS need to support to ensure that the countries will not find themselves in the same situation. While speedy return to constitutional order prevents the chance of the men in uniform entrenching their hold and influence on the political process of their countries, it does not give enough time for initiating, developing and implementing the minimum reform measures that address the factors that created the conditions for the coup. Striking the balance between the two demands necessitates that ECOWAS and the AU along with the UN and other actors need to adopt a hands-on approach to the initiation, development and rolling out of the requisite reform measures by being active part of the process of drawing up transitional plans by the countries concerned.

On 3 February 2022, ECOWAS convened an Extraordinary Summit where it deliberated on the occurrence of repeated coups in multiple countries in the west African region. The session addressed the political situations in Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali. While the communiqué of the Extraordinary Summit was strongly worded in its rejection of coups and in affirming the regional bloc’s “principle of zero tolerance for ascension to power through unconstitutional means”, it also makes it evident that there is a need for flexibility and striking a balance between those competing needs of speedy return to constitutional order and investing enough time and the requisite support for ensuring successful transition. This was demonstrated through the request of ECOWAS for the proposal of acceptable transitional timelines in the cases of all three countries addressed at the session. In the case of Guinea, while it expressed concern over the lack of an electoral calendar and decided to uphold the sanctions imposed at the Extraordinary Session of 16 September 2021, it requested the transition authorities to submit “an acceptable timetable for restoring constitutional order”. ECOWAS’s choice to refrain from demanding that the previously stipulated timeline of six months be met could be regarded as a more realistic approach which would allow the authorities to take account of circumstances on the ground and determine the shortest possible period it would take for conducting elections. While the recognition of the need for such principled flexibility and balancing explains this policy shift on the part of ECOWAS, the controversial reactions invoked by ECOWAS’s additional sanctions against Mali imposed at its Extraordinary Summit of 9 January 2022, and particularly Guinea’s following declaration that it will not close its borders with Mali in clear opposition to ECOWAS’s sanctions, could have also influenced the regional bloc’s somewhat softened stance.

While determination of a specific timeline for the elections is still a pending issue, the formation of the National Transitional Council (CNT) has been a commendable step achieved by Guinean’s transition authorities. The CNT which is to serve as the interim legislative organ is expected to adopt the transition calendar which will establish the schedule for the conduct of the elections. The CNT convened its inaugural session on 5 February 2022 where notably, the importance of drawing up a constitution which will not allow elites to remain indefinitely in power was highlighted. Having regard to the context under which Guinea’s unconstitutional change of government took place and noting how one of the underlying factors which facilitated the coup was the 2020 constitutional amendment – which served to keep former President Conde for a third term in office – the CNT’s focus on drafting a constitution which cannot be easily manipulated for extension of presidential term limits is well placed. But it is imperative that such constitutional review process actually serves such public and democratic purposes by, among others, enhancing separation of powers and checks and balances, independence of the judiciary, accountable and constitutionally limited authority of the executive and security sector reform that ensures a professional military that is under a democratic civilian authority.

Another development since Council’s previous session on the situation in the country is the appointment of a civilian Prime Minister, although key political positions in the transition, including positions of regional administrators, continue to be occupied by military figures. It is also to be recalled that the demand to release former President Conde has been repeatedly reiterated by both the PSC and ECOWAS. Following the initiation of legal proceedings to look into crimes committed during Conde’s term in office, the former President has reportedly been permitted to leave the country for medical reasons. The continued limitation to Conde’s freedom of movement in the absence of any concreate legal charges would constitute violation of basic human rights standards. The decision to allow the former President’s medical travel is therefore a move made in the right direction for Guinea’s transitional leaders which should be maintained.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. Council is expected to note the formation of the CNT and encourage Guinea’s military authorities to sustain their commitment in finalising the establishment of the interim legislative body. It may urge Guinea’s transition authorities to prioritise the determination of a timeline for the transition period and schedule the date for general elections. Council may also encourage Guinean authorities to ensure that they stick by the decision made not to run for elections at the end of the transitional period. It may also stress the need for the authorities to ensure inclusivity in the constitutional review and institutional reform processes. Council may also follow up on the request made at its 1036th session for the AU Commission to provide the needed technical support to Guinea in order to assist the authorities in developing and implementing a transitional plan that ensures restoration of constitutional order and successful implementation of necessary constitutional and institutional reforms. The PSC may also call on the AU Commission working with ECOWAS and the UN to undertake a needs assessment mission to Guinea for engaging Guinea authorities and other stakeholders on the adoption of transitional plan that is in accord with AU and ECOWAS norms and addresses the factors that precipitated the coup in Guinea. It may also reiterate its plan to undertake a field mission to Guinea.