Tomorrow (23 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene a session to receive an update on the situation in South Sudan.

Following opening remarks from Jean Leon Ngandu Ilunga, the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to the AU and chairperson of the PSC for the month of November, Bankole Adeoye, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, is expected to make a statement. South Sudan, as a country concerned, is also expected to make a statement. Others expected to make statement include the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), as the concerned regional economic community/Mechanism (REC/M), South Africa (as Chairperson of the AU Ad Hoc High-Level Committee on South Sudan (C5), Chairperson of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (R-JMEC); and the representative of the United Nations Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).

The political, security, and humanitarian situation in the country appears to have deteriorated further since the Council last discussed South Sudan on 28 October 2025. Political tension is mounting. Fighting and insecurity are spreading.

It is to be recalled that in its communiqué adopted at the last session of its 1308th meeting held on 28 October, the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) underscored the need to avoid any actions that could jeopardise the full implementation of R-ARCSS, which it described as the only viable pathway towards a consensual and sustainable solution to the country’s challenges.

However, R-ARCSS is now on the verge of collapse. The Revitalised Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), the body monitoring the R-ARCSS, observed in its report released in October that there is ‘systematic violation of the responsibility-sharing arrangements across all crucial bodies, including functionality of the executive and legislature.’ Progress on other provisions critical to South Sudan’s transition from conflict to peace, including those required for the holding of elections, remains stalled. In its report to the Reconstituted Transitional National Legislative Assembly in December 2025, RJMEC expressed ‘serious concerns that if urgent steps are not taken to expedite progress, then holding elections as scheduled in December 2026 may be extremely difficult.’

The SPLM-IO under Machar’s leadership has declared the R-ARCSS defunct following Machar’s arrest, while another faction continues to cooperate with the government. Following the detention of Riek Machar in March, the first vice president and signatory of the R-ARCSS as the leader of the SPLM-IO, the party has experienced internal divisions, with some of the members of the party coopted into and collaborating with the government.

Meanwhile, Machar and seven of his allies are standing trial before a Special Court in Juba. During its most recent session on 12 January, the court barred the public and the media from attending the proceedings, citing the need to protect prosecution witnesses. Machar and his allies have been charged with murder, treason, and crimes against humanity. Machar has rejected the charges and claimed immunity as a sitting vice president. His defence team has also challenged the court’s jurisdiction, arguing that such crimes fall within the mandate of an AU hybrid court, as stipulated under the R-ARCSS. Nevertheless, the Special Court dismissed these objections, including challenges to the constitutionality of the proceedings. It is to be recalled that the AUPSC called for the immediate and unconditional release of Machar and his wife, but the South Sudanese government rejected the appeal.

The SPLM has also experienced internal fragmentation, with veteran politician Nhial Deng Nhial suspending his membership in the party and launching a new political movement, the South Sudan Salvation Movement, which operates under the opposition United People’s Alliance led by Pagan Amum. In a surprise move in November, President Salva Kiir dismissed one of his vice presidents and the SPLM’s First Deputy Chairperson, Benjamin Bol Mel, who had been widely regarded as being prepared to be a possible successor. Although Bol Mel was promoted to the rank of general within the National Security Service’s Internal Bureau, he was subsequently stripped of his military rank and dismissed from the national security service. Kiir then reinstated James Wani Igga as vice president; Igga had been replaced by Bol Mel earlier in 2025.

President Kiir has also frequently reshuffled the cabinet through presidential decrees amid the unfolding political crisis. These reshuffles have been criticised for violating the 2018 R-ARCSS, as the President appoints and dismisses officials without consulting the other signatories, thereby undermining the power-sharing arrangements stipulated in the agreement.

In a step that is feared to cause further erosion of the collapsing R-ARCSS and in another surprise move in December, the government announced a series of amendments to the R-ARCSS following a meeting convened by President Kiir to discuss the final phase of the transition and preparations for general elections scheduled for December 2026. According to the government, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), a faction of the SPLM-IO not aligned with Machar, the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA), the Former Detainees (FD), and Other Political Parties (OPP) attended the meeting.

The amendments agreed at the December meeting reportedly removed provisions linking the holding of general elections to the completion of a permanent constitution, a process that has dragged on for the past eight years. In the absence of a permanent constitution, general elections would be conducted under the Transitional Constitution adopted in 2011. The amendments also stipulate that a national population and housing census—deemed necessary for elections under the R-ARCSS—would be conducted after the elections.

The government indicated that the amendments would undergo a review process before being ratified by the national legislature. However, the SPLM-IO reportedly characterised the move as illegal, arguing that it excluded other signatories to the peace agreement and rejected the amendments in their entirety. Civil society representatives also expressed concern over the unexpected decision, calling for respect for the R-ARCSS and greater inclusion of civil society in the process.

The political crisis has contributed to a significant deterioration in South Sudan’s security situation. Reports indicate intensified fighting in various parts of the country between government and opposition forces. As political tension and fighting escalate, recent weeks have witnessed intensified hostilities in Jonglei State involving ‘repeated aerial bombardments by the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF), clashes with SPLM/A-IO and the reported mobilisation of armed civilian militias’, noted the UN Commission on Human Rights in its press release of 18 January 2026. This escalating fighting is compounded by local and intercommunal violence.

The spreading and intensifying violence is precipitating significant civilian casualties and destruction of critical infrastructure, including health facilities, schools, and public buildings, as well as severe limitations of humanitarian access.

These developments are aggravating an already dire humanitarian situation. According to OCHA, two-thirds of the population will require humanitarian assistance in 2026. It is reported that more than 100,000 people, predominantly women, girls, older persons and persons with disabilities, have been forcibly displaced across the state since late December 2025. The alarming humanitarian and civilian protection situation is compounded by worsening economic conditions, corruption and disease outbreaks. The ongoing conflict in neighbouring Sudan has further strained South Sudan’s already dire humanitarian situation.

As Amani Africa indicated in its briefing to the UN Security Council in November, South Sudanese civilians are the ones bearing the brunt of the deteriorating political and security situation in the country, underscoring a heightening need for reinforcing measures for the protection of civilians and humanitarian support.

At a time when the Horn of Africa is facing multiple challenges, the heightening risk of South Sudan’s relapse back to full-scale war has become a major concern, thus requiring a more robust conflict prevention effort from all quarters, not least of all the AU. In a joint statement issued on 18 December, the Troika (the United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway) expressed alarm over the widespread conflict across the country, describing it as a major setback. The Troika urged South Sudanese leaders to reverse course, halt armed attacks, immediately return to the nationwide ceasefire, and engage in sustained, leader-level dialogue. These calls were reinforced by a subsequent joint statement supported by the embassies of Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, Sudan, Uganda, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as the European Union delegation in Juba, which stressed the need for inclusive dialogue to address the country’s political and security crisis.

It is to be recalled that the AUPSC encouraged the continued engagement of the AU High-Level Ad Hoc Committee for South Sudan (C5) in supporting the constitution-making process and preparations for the December 2026 elections. A C5 delegation comprising representatives from South Africa, Algeria, Chad, Nigeria, and Rwanda visited Juba on 14 January. It held high-level meetings with South Sudanese authorities to discuss the political situation, implementation of the R-ARCSS, and preparations for general elections, among other issues. The AUPSC is expected to receive an update on the outcome of the visit.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to express grave concern over the deteriorating political and security situation, the systematic violations of the R-ARCSS and the rising danger of the country’s relapse to full-scale civil war. It may condemn and call for an unconditional end to the indiscriminate use of violence and violence against civilians. The PSC may also reaffirm that the R-ARCSS remains the most viable framework for sustainable peace and stability in South Sudan and may urge both parties to recommit to the permanent ceasefire and transitional roadmap. It could also call for the release of all political detainees and restoration of political dialogue. As a critical step towards restoration of stability and implementation of R-ARCSS, it may call for an independent investigation of incidents of violations of the revitalised peace agreement, including the March 2025 incident in Nasir, through a mechanism that is put in place by the UN-AU-IGAD. It could also call for full reactivation of the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) to ensure compliance with the ceasefire. To ensure high-level and sustained engagement for preventing South Sudan’s relapse back to full scale civil war, the PSC may reiterate its request for the AU Commission to maintain sustained engagement, including possibly appointing a High-Level Envoy to work jointly with IGAD, the C5, and the Trilateral Mechanism to facilitate direct dialogue between President Kiir and the SPLM-IO leader and signatory to the R-ARCSS Machar.

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For additional reference, check the briefing Amani Africa delivered to the UN Security Council from the link here https://amaniafrica-et.org/amani-africa-tells-the-unsc-to-deploy-preventive-measures-with-urgency-and-decisiveness-to-pull-south-sudan-from-the-brink/

The press statement by the UN Commission for Human Rights in South Sudan, dated 18 January 2026, can also be found at the following link:

https://x.com/uninvhrc/status/2012798544801906798.

Tomorrow (28 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1308^th session to receive an update on the situation in South Sudan.

The meeting will be chaired by Tebelelo Boang, Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for October. Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) will make the introductory remarks. Statements are then expected to be delivered by representatives from South Sudan; South Africa (as Chairperson of the AU Ad Hoc High-Level Committee on South Sudan (C5); Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); Chairperson of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (R-JMEC); and the representative of the United Nations Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The most recent engagement of the PSC on South Sudan took place during its 1302^nd session, held on 19 September 2025. However, the session did not introduce any substantively new or different measures compared to the Council’s previous communiques on South Sudan. During that session, the Council issued a press release urging the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) to redouble its efforts toward the full implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The PSC also called for the organisation of a genuine, “all-inclusive South Sudanese national political dialogue leading to a national reconciliation process that would culminate in the successful conduct of democratic elections in December 2026”.

Since early 2025, the PSC’s engagements on South Sudan (1297^th, 1283^rd, 1270^th, and 1265^th Sessions) have unfolded amid escalating political and security instability. Since clashes erupted in March between the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and armed groups linked to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), the fragile peace established under the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) has been severely undermined. This incident triggered the most serious crisis since the signing of the 2018 peace agreement, with hostilities spreading across Upper Nile, Jonglei, Unity States, Central Equatoria, and Western Equatoria, causing extensive civilian displacement and loss of life.

The political and security situation in South Sudan has sharply deteriorated following the detention of senior officials, mainly First Vice President Riek Machar; the emergence of splinter factions; the deployment of Ugandan troops; and intensified military operations by the SSPDF against SPLM/A-IO and allied groups. Machar’s arrest effectively paralysed the RTGoNU, which the PSC previously described as a ‘blatant violation of the R-ARCSS.’ The crisis further escalated when Machar and eight other senior members of the SPLM/A-IO were charged on 11 September with murder, treason, crimes against humanity, and other serious offences linked to a White Army attack in Nasir County. Subsequently, Machar was temporarily suspended from the vice presidency pending his trial. Since Machar was placed under house arrest, multiple envoys seeking to meet Machar, including former Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga in March and a delegation from the AU in April, have reportedly been denied access. As such, it is expected that during tomorrow’s session, the PSC is expected to receive an update on detention and legal processes concerning Riek Machar and other SPLM-IO detainees.

Beyond Machar’s detention, a series of political manoeuvres by President Kiir has further consolidated executive power while weakening coalition inclusivity. Since March, Kiir has undertaken extensive reshuffles by presidential decree, replacing senior officials, including the Chief of Defence Forces, the Chief Justice, the Central Bank Governor, and several state governors, moves the SPLM/A-IO has condemned as unilateral. The appointment of his daughter, Adut Salva Kiir, to a senior position has fueled perceptions of growing nepotism and entrenched patronage within the government, raising concerns about governance legitimacy and the monopolisation of state institutions by loyalist networks. Furthermore, President Kiir’s reconstitution of the high-level ad hoc committee overseeing the implementation of the R-ARCSS, which excluded former SPLM/A-IO representatives and instead incorporated members aligned with the Par Kuol splinter faction, has raised significant concern. The committee is mandated to oversee the implementation of all aspects of the R-ARCSS, except for provisions related to the permanent ceasefire and transitional security arrangements. Observers note that this move appears to signal an attempt to reshape the peace architecture in favour of the SPLM’s political dominance.

These political manoeuvres by President Kiir have significantly heightened tensions, triggering intense clashes between government forces and opposition groups, particularly in Upper Nile, Jonglei, Central Equatoria, and Western Equatoria, and resulting in substantial casualties and widespread displacement. The humanitarian situation has consequently worsened, with the UN (OCHA) reporting that, in addition to the existing two million internally displaced persons, more than 497,000 people were newly displaced between January and September 2025, approximately 321,000 due to conflict and 175,000 due to flooding. In response, the UN Human Rights Commission has urged the African Union and the UN Security Council to take decisive action to prevent further escalation. UNMISS, on the other hand, has reported increasing restrictions on humanitarian access and attacks on aid workers, warning of a potential collapse of life-saving services in the most affected regions. Exacerbating these challenges, according to OHCHR, systemic corruption among South Sudanese leaders continues to undermine governance and humanitarian interventions, deepening the crisis. It is therefore expected that the PSC’s deliberations will focus on the severe humanitarian repercussions resulting from the escalating political and security crisis.

Another key issue expected in tomorrow’s session, in view of the foregoing conditions, is the implementation of the R-ARCSS amid worsening humanitarian and governance conditions. In previous sessions, the PSC has also emphasised that the R-ARCSS remains the only viable framework for lasting peace, calling for investigations into violations of the R-ARCSS and warning that peace spoilers will be held accountable. The Revitalised Joint Monitoring Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), body monitoring the R-ARCSS, reported during the reporting period that the country faces a serious and growing risk of the unravelling of the 2018 peace agreement and relapse back to full-blown war. In the report it released this month, the Commission urged the RTGoNU to ‘urgently resolve the current political and security impasse and return to full and inclusive implementation of the R-ARCSS.’ Given the clear warning on the fast-growing risk of the deteriorating situation plunging the country back to large-scale national civil war, the PSC is expected to receive updates on the imminency of the risk and the ways and means and opportunities for reversing this risk.

On 11–12 August, the PSC conducted a field visit to South Sudan to assess the deteriorating political and security situation, review progress on the R-ARCSS, and discuss preparations for the 2026 elections. On 7 October, the RJMEC held an extraordinary meeting in Juba, warning that rising tensions and stalled implementation had increased the risk of a relapse into conflict unless urgent corrective action is taken. On 12 September, the UN Security Council(UNSC) unanimously adopted Resolution 2791 (2025), extending the Sudan sanctions regime, including targeted sanctions and the arms embargo, along with the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 12 October 2026, to align both timelines. Subsequently, on 13 October, the AU Commission Chairperson appointed Abdiwelli Ali as the AU Special Representative and Head of Mission to South Sudan, while important it does not dispense with the PSC’s earlier June call for the AU Chairperson’s sustained engagement with President Salva Kiir and regional leaders, fostering inclusive dialogue, facilitating the release of political detainees, and promoting full implementation of the R-ARCSS.

In tomorrow’s session, the PSC is also expected to follow up on its previous decisions aimed at advancing the implementation of key transitional provisions of the R-ARCSS. Specifically, the Council will likely assess progress on its earlier encouragement to the Trilateral Mechanism (AU, IGAD, and UN) to work closely with the RTGoNU in reactivating the Government–Trilateral Joint Task Force (JTF) to expedite the implementation of pending provisions, including the constitution-making and electoral processes. Furthermore, the PSC is expected to review the extent of progress made in operationalising transitional justice mechanisms, following its reiterated call for the RTGoNU to collaborate with the AU Commission’s Office of the Legal Counsel (OLC) in finalising the guidelines for establishing the Hybrid Court of South Sudan and defining modalities for truth, reconciliation, compensation, and reparation processes.

The expected outcome is a communique. The PSC is expected to express concern on the deteriorating political and humanitarian conditions and condemn continued violations of the R-ARCSS. It may also condemn the violence against civilians and humanitarian workers and call for credible investigations and accountability mechanisms. The PSC may also express concern over the stalled implementation status of the R-ARCSS. In this regard, the Council is expected to call for the acceleration of transitional security arrangements, particularly the unification and deployment of the Necessary Unified Forces, as well as institutional preparations for the election. Furthermore, the Council may reiterate that the R-ARCSS remains the most viable framework for sustainable peace and stability in South Sudan and may urge both parties to recommit to the permanent ceasefire and transitional roadmap. The PSC could also call for the release of all political detainees, restoration of political dialogue, and full reactivation of the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) to ensure compliance with the ceasefire. The PSC may echo RJMEC’s call on the RTGoNU to urgently resolve the current political and security impasse and return to full and inclusive implementation of the R-ARCSS. In addition, the PSC may reiterate its request for the AU Commission to maintain sustained engagement, including possibly appointing a High-Level Envoy to work jointly with IGAD, the C5, and the Trilateral Mechanism to facilitate direct dialogue between Kiir and Machar.

Tomorrow (12 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1283^rd session to receive an update on the situation in South Sudan.

Following opening remarks by Innocent Shiyo, Permanent Representative of Tanzania to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for June, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. Joram Mukama Biswaro, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for South Sudan and Head of the AU Liaison Office in Juba; Ismail Wais, IGAD Special Envoy to South Sudan and representatives from the AU Panel of the Wise and AU Ad-Hoc Committee for South Sudan (C5) are also expected to deliver briefings. The representative of South Sudan, as a country of concern, is also expected to make a statement.

The session follows the Council’s 1265^th and 1270^th sessions on South Sudan, held on 18 and 31 March respectively, in response to the sharp deterioration in South Sudan’s political and security landscape since renewed violence erupted on 4 March. The 4 March attack on the South Sudan People’s Defence Force (SSPDF) base in Nasir by the militia group known as the White Army that is reportedly loosely associated with First Vice President Riek Machar the leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement- In Opposition (SPLM-IO), has triggered the most severe crisis facing the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) since its adoption in 2018. The situation has since devolved into military confrontations, high-level arrests, deployment of Ugandan troops and increased violence. These developments have gravely undermined the transitional process.

Tensions had been mounting even before the 4 March incident, largely due to the breakdown of relations in the presidency and a series of unilateral actions. These included replacing opposition officials with loyalists and reshuffling positions within his own faction, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). Since February 2025, more than 20 senior SPLM/A-IO political and military officials have been arrested, while many others have gone into hiding or fled the country, further deepening the rift between Kiir and Machar. Governors in at least three states loyal to Machar have also been replaced.

The unstable political situation spiralled further down when the government arrested Machar on 26 March in Juba—a move his party denounced as marking the collapse of the 2018 peace agreement, which ended a devastating five-year civil war that claimed nearly 400,000 lives. The move was widely condemned, including by the PSC’s 1270^th session press statement, which called for Machar’s ‘immediate and unconditional release’ and urged the government to uphold his safety and health.

Apart from the constitutional crisis it has triggered for the Government of National Unity under the R-ARCSS, Machar’s detention also instigated a rapid unravelling of the SPLM-IO’s cohesion. Reports indicate that key party figures, including Deputy Chairperson Oyet Nathaniel, fled or went into hiding, while internal disputes escalated into factionalism. Internal rifts within the SPLM-IO erupted publicly in April 2025 when Deputy Chairman Oyet Nathaniel, who is also the first deputy speaker of parliament, suspended four senior members of the party, including Peacebuilding Minister Stephen Par Koul, for allegedly plotting to replace Machar. In response, a convening of a faction of SPLM-IO members in Juba on 9 April announced the establishment of a temporary leadership structure that will cease upon Machar’s release and named Koul as the interim chairperson of the party. Despite the PSC’s firm position calling for Machar’s immediate and unconditional release, Juba did not heed this call. Machar and other political and military leaders from the SPLM-IO remain in detention.

Further compounding the difficult political situation is the major changes in the leadership of the ruling SPLM that President Kiir chairs. In a move that is widely seen to be an orchestration of a succession plan, President Kiir took steps to elevate his former financial advisor, Benjamin Bol Mel, to very senior positions.  First, he appointed Bol Mel to the position of vice president of the country. Most recently, on 21 May, after dismissing James Wani Igga, a long-serving liberation struggle stalwart, Kiir appointed Bol Mel to be the first vice chairman of the ruling SPLM, a position that is viewed to be a launching pad to the presidency.

The security situation has also deteriorated markedly. Across Upper Nile and other hotspots, clashes between the SSPDF and SPLM-IO forces have intensified, resulting in widespread civilian displacement and the destruction of critical infrastructure, including the 3 May aerial bombing of a Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) hospital. The AUC Chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, condemned the attack, which he described as ‘a flagrant breach of International Humanitarian Law’ and urged for an investigation. The UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan also warned the attacks ‘could amount to a war crime.’ The gravity of the situation in South Sudan is further underscored by recent UNHCR data indicating that over 165,000 have fled since the resurgence of violence in March, with over 100,000 people seeking refuge in neighbouring countries.

While Uganda’s military deployment in South Sudan is under a bilateral agreement for training and technical support and positions Uganda in shaping the political and security trajectory in South Sudan including as one of the guarantors of the R-ARCSS, there are concerns that Uganda’s presence tips the balance firmly in favor of President Kiir and away from SPLM-IO and may trigger militarised external interference on the side of SPLM-IO. The SPLM-IO also accuses Ugandan forces of participating in military operations, hence in a manner contrary to the R-ARCSS.

Given that the implementation of the R-ARCSS was already derailed, the current situation is feared to deal a mortal blow to the transitional process. In his briefing to the extraordinary summit of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on South Sudan held on 12 March, the Executive Secretary of IGAD warned that ‘should tensions escalate, the risk of a return to widespread hostilities looms large, with repercussions that would echo resoundingly across the region.’ In his 16 April briefing to the UN Security Council, Nicholas Haysom, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNMISS described the conditions as ‘darkly reminiscent of the 2013 and 2016 conflicts, which took over 400,000 lives’ and warned of a trajectory that could shift from community-based violence to ‘a more complex picture involving signatory parties and foreign actors.’ He also flagged the intensifying use of hate speech and misinformation, which continue to fuel ethnic tension and violence.

In response to the growing crisis, regional and international actors have ramped up diplomatic efforts despite minimal breakthroughs. On 29 March, the AUC Chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf and UNSG António Guterres discussed the evolving situation in South Sudan. They reaffirmed their support for the R-ARCSS as the best path to lasting peace in South Sudan and agreed to coordinate efforts between the AU, IGAD, and the UN.

The PSC’s 1265^th and 1270^th sessions had called for the AU Commission Chairperson to deploy a high-level delegation to engage the parties in South Sudan. Led by former Burundian President Domitien Ndayizeye, the AU Commission Chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, deployed the AU Panel of the Wise to Juba on 2 April. The delegation held meetings with various stakeholders, including President Kiir, but was reportedly denied access to Riek Machar. It is expected that tomorrow’s session will consider the Panel’s report of the visit.

The Panel’s visit was followed by a joint AU–IGAD high-level visit from 5–6 May, during which the AU Commission Chairperson and the IGAD Deputy Executive Secretary met with South Sudanese leaders to reaffirm support for the R-ARCSS and preserve its hard-won gains and reiterate support for the timely, credible, and transparent implementation of the transitional roadmap. Yet again, the Chairperson did not get access to Machar.

More recently, on 8 May, the Quartet – AUMISS, IGAD, UNMISS and RJMEC- issued a joint statement urging an immediate cessation of hostilities, the release of detainees, and the revitalisation of the R-ARCSS. The statement welcomed the recent joint visit by the AUC and IGAD to South Sudan and highlighted that the 2018 peace deal remains the only viable framework for resolving the crisis. The Quartet, also called the reinvigoration of the ‘visibly stalled peace implementation by addressing all grievances through an inclusive political dialogue’, with the release of the First Vice President and other SPLM/A-IO officials as the starting point.

From 3 – 4 June, IGAD convened a consultative meeting bringing together regional and international envoys, including representatives from the AU, UNMISS, and the C5, to address South Sudan’s peace process. The discussions aimed to identify viable solutions to de-escalate tensions and reinforce support for the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), emphasising the need for coordinated efforts to sustain stability and advance the country’s transitional roadmap. (A consolidated overview of key developments, policy positions and diplomatic engagements can be accessed via Amani Africa’s regularly updated Tracker of events and diplomatic efforts on the crisis in South Sudan)

Apart from following up on its proposed policy measures from previous sessions, tomorrow’s session is expected to help the PSC take stock of both the political and security developments on the one hand and the diplomatic efforts underway, including the steps taken by the AU. Building on the mission of the Panel of the Wise and the joint AU-IGAD visit, the statement of the Quartet may help structure PSC’s deliberations on additional steps to be taken to arrest the deteriorating situation and put the transitional process in South Sudan back on track. Undeniably, for any initiative of the PSC, the role of the region and most notably Uganda, with its presence on the ground and its role as Guarantor, is expected to be paramount.

The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC may reiterate that the R-ARCSS remains the most viable and relevant Agreement for sustainable peace and stability in South Sudan. The PSC may call for immediate and unconditional cessation of hostilities and restoration of strict adherence to the permanent ceasefire, with IGAD’s Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) reinforced to ensure compliance. Echoing the Quartet, the PSC may also call for the full and scaled-up return to and implementation of the R-ARCSS and the transitional process with the full and effective participation of the signatories of the R-ARCSS. To this end, the Council may reiterate its demand for the release of detained politicians, including First Vice President Riek Machar. The PSC may also call for the streamlining and coordination of diplomatic efforts. The PSC may request the AU Commission Chairperson to task a head of state of an AU member state to work with the guarantors of the R-ARCSS and the Committee of 5 to facilitate dialogue between the leaders of the main signatories of the 2018 agreement to restore mutual confidence and culminate in a joint public declaration affirming their commitment to peace.

Tomorrow (18 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1265^th session to discuss the situation in South Sudan.

The Permanent Representative of Morocco to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for March, Mohammed Arrouchi, will deliver the opening remarks, followed by an introductory report from the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye. The Special Representative of the AU Commission Chairperson to South Sudan is also expected to brief the Council. As per the applicable practice and established procedure, a representative of South Sudan is expected to make a statement as a country concerned. A representative of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Mission in South Sudan may also deliver statements.

Tomorrow’s session came amidst heightened tensions between longtime rivals President Salva Kiir and First Vice President Riek Machar, following the 4 March incident when the White Army, Nuer militia linked with Riek Machar, overran a South Sudan People’s Defence Force (SSPDF) base in Nasir, Upper Nile State—a strategic town on the South Sudan-Ethiopia border. The violence was triggered reportedly due to disagreements over the replacement of the existing SSPDF in Nasir stationed for close to eight years with a combined force of SSPDF, Agwelek, and Abushok militias.

Tensions had been building since January and February, not only in Upper Nile State but also in Western Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal states. On 27 February, it appears that Machar requested a face-to-face meeting with President Kiir to address deteriorating security situations in these regions. Machar cited attacks by SSPDF forces on areas controlled by SPLM-IO in Western Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal and accused SSPDF and allied militias of violating the Permanent Ceasefire Agreement by deploying forces to Nasir, including the Agwelek and Abushok militias. This deployment was seen as a violation of the 2018 revitalised peace agreement, which envisages the deployment of the Necessary Unified Forces.

In response to escalating tensions, on 27 February, the African Union Mission in South Sudan (AUMISS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) expressed deep concern over the deteriorating security situation in Upper Nile State, as well as clashes in Western Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal involving signatory parties to the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The statement warned that failure to address these incidents could undermine the Permanent Ceasefire, urging all parties to utilise established mechanisms under the R-ARCSS to de-escalate tensions and restore calm.

This call went unheeded, and tensions escalated into violence in Nasir on 4 March, followed by the arrest of several senior SPLM/A-IO military and government officials, including a deputy military chief and two ministers allied with Machar in the capital, Juba. The situation worsened on 7 March when an attack on a UNMISS operation to evacuate stranded SSPDF personnel resulted in tragic casualties, including the late General Majur Dak, several soldiers, and a UN crew member.

Despite President Kiir’s assurance on 7 March that South Sudan would not revert to war, tensions remain high in Juba and elsewhere, prompting widespread concerns about the potential collapse of the 2018 Revitalised Peace Agreement, which ended a five-year civil war claiming nearly 400,000 lives. In his briefing to IGAD’s 43rd extraordinary summit, Executive Secretary Workneh Gebeyehu warned that ‘the Nasir clashes are the latest episode in a series of incidents and cyclic violence pushing South Sudan ever closer to the brink of war.’ Indicating the gravity of the situation, reports suggest that Uganda has deployed special forces to Juba despite denials by South Sudan’s government.

Against these developments, regional and international organisations reacted. On 8 March 2025, the Chairperson of the AU Commission issued a statement expressing deep concern over the escalating tensions and clashes, calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities and reaffirming the AU’s longstanding appeal for South Sudanese parties to fully implement the revitalised peace agreement. IGAD also convened its 43rd extraordinary summit of Heads of State and Government on South Sudan, held on 12 March 2025. In the communiqué adopted at the summit, IGAD urged the parties to immediately de-escalate tensions, demanded the release of detained officials, instructed the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanisms (CTSAMVM) to investigate the Nasir clashes and the attack on the UN helicopter to establish facts and ensure accountability, and called for the reactivation of various security mechanisms impacted by the arrests. The regional bloc further agreed to form an IGAD Ministerial-level sub-committee on South Sudan to engage and monitor the restoration of calm and the implementation of the revitalised peace agreement. The Sub-committee was tasked with travelling to Juba immediately to assess modalities for initiating inclusive dialogue.

The renewed tensions are unsurprising given the lack of meaningful progress in implementing key provisions of the revitalised peace agreement, including drafting a new constitution, preparing for elections, and deploying the Necessary Unified Forces (NUF). In September 2024, the parties to the peace agreement extended the transitional period by another two years, pushing the long-awaited first elections to December 2026 without a clear plan for implementing the new transitional roadmap within the agreed timeline.

Delays in deploying the NUF, a critical component of the agreement under chapter two essential for the country’s peace and stability, have become a major obstacle to its full implementation. Reports indicate that since the graduation of 53,000 unified forces in phase one, only seven per cent of the required 83,000 have been deployed, while the long-overdue training for phase two has yet to commence due to a lack of funding. The government’s failure to allocate the necessary resources for training has been a key factor in these delays. Moving forward, prioritising phase two training and ensuring the full deployment of the unified forces at their required strength of 83,000 remains critical to enhancing security, addressing rising subnational violence, and preventing incidents like the clashes on 4 March.

As the IGAD Executive Secretary noted in his briefing to the extraordinary summit, mechanisms established to oversee security arrangements, such as the Joint Defence Board (JDB), have fallen into disuse, while mutual confidence within the Presidency, as established by the agreement, has been gravely undermined. The JDB, composed of chiefs of staff, directors general of the national security service, police, and other organised forces, is mandated to exercise command and control over all forces under the revitalised peace agreement. However, its failure to convene regular meetings and prevent escalating tensions has further weakened security arrangements. Ensuring the full functionality of the JDB is now more urgent than ever.

The spillover of Sudan’s conflict may be another factor behind the renewed tensions in South Sudan. According to a recent report on the fighting in South Sudan, one major impact is South Sudan’s economic crisis, triggered by damage to its main oil export pipeline near Khartoum amid fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This disruption has cost South Sudan two-thirds of its revenue and fueled widespread discontent. As Sudan’s conflict drags on, South Sudan appears to be struggling to maintain neutrality between the two warring parties, SAF and RSF. Reports indicate that economic pressures have drawn President Kiir closer to the RSF and its alleged backer, the UAE, a shift further intensified by the RSF’s alliance with the SPLM-North, a Sudanese rebel group aligned with Juba. What makes the suspicion about Port Sudan’s possible hand is the interest of the SAF in using its allies in South Sudan to squeeze RSF out of the areas on the border with South Sudan.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. The PSC is likely to welcome the convening of IGAD’s 43rd Extraordinary Summit and endorse its outcomes, particularly the decision to establish an IGAD Ministerial-level sub-committee on South Sudan. It may call on the AU Commission to coordinate with this committee to facilitate dialogue and ensure the full implementation of the revitalised peace agreement to prevent further violence and the risk of renewed conflict. Expressing deep concern over the recent violence in Nasir County, Upper Nile State, the PSC may stress the need for de-escalation and urge parties to uphold the peace agreement. In line with IGAD’s summit conclusions, it may call for the immediate release of detained officials as a critical de-escalation measure. The PSC may also condemn the attack on the UN aircraft and the death of UN personnel, which could constitute a war crime. In this regard, it may support IGAD’s decision to conduct an investigation, through CTSAMVM, into the Nasir clashes and support the UN’s initiatives to investigate the UN helicopter attack to ensure accountability. The PSC may further urge the parties to expedite the implementation of key provisions of the revitalised agreement, including drafting a new constitution, preparing for elections, and deploying the Necessary Unified Forces (NUF). It may also call for strengthening oversight mechanisms such as the Joint Defence Board. The PSC may call on the AU High-Level Ad Hoc Committee for South Sudan (C5) to dispatch to South Sudan a high-level mission as a critical step to de-escalate the situation and prevent both the relapse of South Sudan into conflict and the risk of merger of the conflict in Sudan into South Sudan.  Finally, it may request the AU Commission to put in place an emergency task force dedicated to the situation in South Sudan, both for monitoring and crafting interventions for preventive diplomacy.

Tomorrow (12 March) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1204^th session on the situation in Abyei.

The session commences with an introductory statement from the PSC Chairperson for March 2024, Emilia Mkusa, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Namibia to the AU. The statement will be followed by a briefing by Ambassador Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner of Political Affairs and Peace and Security (PAPS). Representative of the Secretariat of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and a representative of the United Nations (UN) are also expected to deliver statements. As a concerned country, South Sudan will also make a statement through its representative. Considering that the other concerned state, Sudan cannot participate in PSC meetings, the PSC envisaged to hold an informal consultation to canvas the views of the representative of Sudan with respect to the situation in Abyei.

During its 1108^th session when it last considered the situation in Abyei in 2022, the PSC highlighted the need for the acceleration of the implementation of the Agreement on Temporary Security and Administrative Arrangements for Abyei and the Cooperation Agreement signed in 2012 which includes the actualization of the demarcation of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ) and the Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM). Additionally, the PSC requested the AU Commission to nominate a facilitator for the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee (AJOC) to support the implementation of the agreements and decided to conduct a field mission to the region. Tomorrow’s session will provide a chance for the PSC to receive an update on the progress of these issues and developments since the last session.

Despite some positive developments concerning the rival communities in Abyei, during the last part of 2023 and in early 2024, Abyei experienced deadly clashes inducing major displacement. Not only that armed clashes between the two adversary communities of Misseriya and Dinka Ngok in Abyei have diminished, the two communities signed a peace deal in December 2023 to prevent tensions during the annual migration through among others, identifying migration corridors.

Unfortunately, during the past few months, Abyei experienced a deterioration of its security situation. Two factors account for this deteriorating security condition. The first relates to the adverse impact of the war that broke out in Sudan in April 2023. In her briefing to the UN Security Council in November, it is to be recalled that Tetteh warned about the likely adverse consequences of the expansion of the war in Sudan into the border areas of South Sudan including on the fragile social cohesion of Abyei. This development has affected the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) in various ways. First, as the fighting expanded to Sudan’s West Kordofan state and the Rapid Support Forces (RPF) captured oilfields there and the resultant worsening security situation, UNISFA evacuated all international UN staff from Kadugli to Entebbe and Abyei town. Second, the UN Secretary-General’s report in October also observed that the JBVMM’s implementation of its mandate was affected significantly by the closure of Sudanese airspace in connection with the conflict, making aerial patrols impossible for the JBVMM bases in Sudan.

The other source of the deterioration of the security situation in Abyei is the spike in intercommunal clashes. In November 2023, various incidents of attacks were recorded. An attack on 19 November in three villages claimed the lives of 27 people and injured 14 others. In another incident during the same month, violence in Warrap State, South Sudan and Southern Abyei Administrative Area claimed the lives of 75 people. A similar incident in Abyei in early December led to the killing of 10 people. An ambush in Agok claimed the lives of six people including Abyei Deputy Chief Administrator, Deng Nyok. The various incidents involve clashes between armed Twic Dinka youth (also known as Titweng) and the Ngok Dinka of Abyei. Incidents of attacks and clashes involving these groups persisted into January with at least four such incidents.

In one of these deadliest incidents since 2021 that took place on 27 January 2024, UNISFA reported that 52 civilians lost their lives and 64 others were gravely injured in the incident. In this particular incident, the attack also led to the death of two UNISFA peacekeepers, prompting the Secretary-General to issue a statement expressing deep concern over the incident and UNISFA expressing concern by ‘continuing inter-communal clashes.’  At least two such clashes were reported in February as well. UN Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix expressed his concern about hate speech and disinformation in Abyei, which according to him, ‘can increase tensions and fuel violence’.

In light of these various concerning developments, tomorrow’s session should even have come earlier. As such it presents an opportunity for the PSC to consider the increasing fragility of the situation in Abyei and how to mitigate and avoid the danger of the region being overwhelmed by the security pressures from the rising intercommunal clashes and the consequences of the Sudan war.

Beyond the security situation, the humanitarian dimension of the situation would also be of interest to the PSC. Due to the recent intercommunal clashes, people were displaced. UNISFA in late January and early February received for providing protection, more than 2000 of those displaced. The inflow of a large number of refugees and returnees from Sudan further exacerbates the existing humanitarian situation in Abyei. According to the UNHCR, as of 7 March 2024, some 20,000 people crossed from Sudan to South Sudan through Abyei fleeing the war in Sudan since its outbreak in April 2023.

In the political front, the war in Sudan has completely changed the process for the resolution of the final status of Abyei. Since the PSC’s last session, there have been positive developments most notably towards the revival and enhancement of the efforts by the Republic of Sudan and South Sudan to identify a long-lasting solution to the issue of Abyei region. The May 2023 report of the UN Security-General on UNISFA observed that there was ‘high-level engagement between the Sudan and South Sudan aimed at enhancing cooperation on Abyei and border issues, and paving the way for discussion on its final status.’ It in particular noted that ‘on 24 October 2022, the chairpersons of the national committees established by both South Sudan and the Sudan – Tut Gatluak Manime, Presidential Adviser on National Security Affairs of South Sudan, and Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, Deputy Chairperson of the Sovereign Council of the Sudan and Head of the Rapid Support Forces – met to discuss the final status of Abyei, which resulted in an agreement to enhance cooperation and address outstanding issues.’ They held a second meeting in Khartoum with the presence of UNISFA and representatives of the UN, AU and IGAD on 9 and 10 April, only days before the outbreak of the Sudan war. With the war in Sudan raging, further engagement to take these discussions forward was disrupted. The result is that the process for the final settlement of the status of Abyei is unlikely to be back on the agenda of the talks between Sudan and South Sudan in the near future before any progress is made in containing the war in Sudan itself.

In light of these various developments, the role of UNISFA and the JBVMM has acquired particular significance. Thus PSC’s 1108^th session assertion of ‘the need to maintain the presence of UNISFA in order to continue maintaining peace and stability in the Abyei region’ is even more important in the current context than when the PSC held the meeting in September 2022. It is a welcome development in this context that members of the UN Security Council were unanimous in their support of the important role of UNISFA and the JBVMM. On 14 November 2023, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2708, renewing the mandate of UNISFA for another year, until 15 November 2024. The resolution also extended UNISFA’s support for the JBVMM for one year.

Tomorrow’s session also serves for taking stock of the follow up to the decisions of PSC’s 1108^th meeting when it last discussed Abyei, in September 2022. Beyond those already highlighted above including the nomination of a facilitator for the AJOC, the PSC in this respect may also consider the role of the AU High-Level Panel on Sudan (AUHIP). It is to be recalled that, following the update by President Thabo Mbeki, Chair of AUHIP during the 1108^th session, the PSC expressed its gratitude to AUHIP ‘for the sustained efforts over the years, which contributed to the stabilization of the Abyei Area; in this regard, requests the AU Commission to scale up the mobilization of the requisite resources to ensure the success of this undertaking aimed at negotiating solutions to the challenges in Abyei; and looks forward to receiving the comprehensive report of the activities of the AUHIP.’

The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC may condemn the increase in the frequency and impact of intercommunal conflicts in the region and the attack on UNISFA peacekeepers that claimed the lives of two peacekeepers. It may urge South Sudan to enhance its efforts for taking measures that help deescalate the situation, particularly the tension involving the Twic Dinka and Ngok Dinka. Further, the PSC may reaffirm the increasing importance of the role of UNISFA in view of changing dynamics affecting Abyei and welcome the decision by the UN Security Council to extend the mandate of UNISFA and the latter’s support to the JBVMM. The PSC may also highlight the importance of the role of the AU and IGAD including the continuing importance of the role of the AUHIP and in this respect, may express its expectation to receive the report of the AIHIP. It may commend the efforts of UNISFA to protect those affected by recent conflicts including through the provision of shelter to the displaced and encourage the mission to expedite the humanitarian response and call for other humanitarian providers to scale up their contribution for humanitarian assistance to the region. The PSC may welcome a peace deal that the Misseriya and Dinka Ngok signed in December 2023 to prevent tensions during the annual migration and encourage community leaders to sustain such peace efforts. The PSC may call on Sudan and South Sudan to not let the conflict in Sudan waver the commitment of the two parties to the Agreement on Temporary Security and Administrative Arrangements.

Tomorrow (27 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is set to receive updates on the situation in South Sudan, as an agenda item of its 1202^nd session.

Following opening remarks by Mohamed Arrouchi, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Morocco to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for February 2024, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is expected to brief the Council on what he gathered from his recent visit to South Sudan on the state of the transition and the progress towards the holding of elections scheduled for end of 2024. As the country concerned, a representative of South Sudan is also expected to deliver a statement. The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for South Sudan and Head of AU Liaison Office, Joram Mukama Biswaro; representative of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (R-JMEC); representative of Djibouti as Chair of the Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); and the Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General for South Sudan and Head of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) Nicholas Haysom are also expected to participate in tomorrow’s session.

As the country prepares to hold its first elections in December 2024 since its independence, President Salva Kiir Mayardit appointed the leadership of the National Elections Commission (NEC); the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC), and the Political Parties Council (PPC) on 3 November 2023. In its last meeting on the situation in South Sudan – the 1186^th session held on 16 November 2023 –, the PSC welcomed the decision as an important step towards facilitating the constitution-making and electoral processes.

The December elections are expected to pave the way for the end of the transition period as envisaged in the 2018 Revitalised Agreement to the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). With only 10 months left before this important milestone in the country’s political trajectory, however, there appear to be serious concerns that the conditions necessary for holding credible elections are not yet in place. UNMISS Head Haysom explained these conditions in his most recent media briefing on 13 February. He underscored the need to decide on the type of elections to be held; agree on a realistic electoral calendar, taking into account operational, logistical, legal, and security issues; fast-track the implementation of the transitional security arrangements, agree on an electoral security plan, and deploy the Necessary Unified Forces (NUF) to provide a secure environment.

There seems to be an emerging consensus that if these conditions are not met by April 2024, South Sudan may not be in a position to conduct free, fair, credible, and peaceful elections. In the words of Haysom, ‘elections can be held in December, but only if the country’s leaders take urgent action to overcome key obstacles’. Similarly, RJMEC reported last month that ‘without adequate funding towards the unification of the Necessary United Forces, & the effective functioning of the Agreement Institutions & Mechanisms, including the recently reconstituted Political Parties Council, National Constitutional Review Commission & the National Elections Commission, South Sudan will continue to struggle to adhere to the implementation schedule of the R-ARCSS, & this could seriously jeopardise the holding of elections in Dec. 2024.’

The AU has been working closely with the UN and IGAD through the Trilateral mechanism to engage with the Government on the constitution-making and electoral processes. The South Sudanese government also set up a joint task force in July 2023 to coordinate efforts on these issues. At tomorrow’s meeting, the Trilateral mechanism is likely to report to the PSC on the state of constitution-making and electoral processes. All indications are that the AU needs to prioritise South Sudan in terms of the provision of support for the implementation of the key transitional processes necessary for the elections. More importantly, the AU needs to put in place a high-level and standing preventive diplomacy mechanism for regularly monitoring the situation, maintain close contact with all stakeholders and promote together with other entities including the C5, UN, RJMEC and IGAD a platform for promoting dialogue and consensus among the South Sudanese major stakeholders on the various transitional processes and the preparations for the holding of elections.

“The AU needs to put in place a high-level and standing preventive diplomacy mechanism for regularly monitoring the situation, maintain close contact with all stakeholders and promote together with other entities including the C5, UN, RJMEC and IGAD a platform for promoting dialogue and consensus among the South Sudanese major stakeholders on the various transitional processes and the preparations for the holding of elections.”

In the meantime, the security situation in South Sudan remains volatile. In a sign of the precariousness of the transitional process, on 24 January 2024, it was reported that fighting erupted in northern Unity State between SSPDF and SPLA-IO, in violation of a longstanding cessation of hostilities under the R-ARCSS and the current efforts to unify the national army under one command. The volatility of the security situation also involves the continued impact of inter-communal violence in various parts of the country including in Unity, Jonglei, Lakes, and Warrap states. According to UNMISS, ‘Warrap, in particular, has witnessed persistent cross-border clashes between the Dinka Twic and Dinka Ngok communities over territorial disputes in the Abyei Administrative Area, which has led to [the] loss of lives and properties, abductions as well as largescale displacement since last year’. The National Salvation Front (NAS), a non-signatory armed group, also continues to wage war against the South Sudanese government.

It seems that the South Sudanese government requested Kenya in December 2023 to take over the Rome process, which was initiated by the Community of Sant’ Egidio, a lay Catholic association, to facilitate talks between the South Sudanese government and non-signatory parties of the R-ARCSS.  The Rome talks had been stalled for several months after the government withdrew its delegation but the parties met in March 2023 after the visit of Pope Francis to South Sudan in February 2023. Although there was a plan to hold a follow-up meeting in May 2023, apparently it did not take place. The PSC has been urging the parties to the Rome peace talks to resume negotiations, given the limited time available before the end of the transition period. After South Sudan’s request for Kenya to take over the Rome process, Kenya’s President William Ruto reportedly met and held discussions with officials of Sant’ Egidio in Rome during the Italy-Africa Summit in January and expressed his commitment to work with the former mediators.  On 12 January 2024, he delivered message through the Principal Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Korir Sing’Oei to General Paul Malong Awan Anei, Chairman, South Sudan United Front and through him to other key leaders of the South Sudan Opposition Movement (SSOMA). After a phone call he held with President Kirr on 23 January 2024, President Ruto reported on his X platform that he ‘reached out to all the hold-out opposition parties under the South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance expressing my desire to ensure an all-inclusive and equitable mediation.’

The security situation coupled with the impact of climate change and increasing socioeconomic difficulties has worsened the humanitarian situation in South Sudan. This has been further compounded by the massive influx of Sudanese refugees and South Sudanese returnees due to the ongoing fighting in that country. According to OCHA, more than half a million Sudanese refugees and South Sudanese returnees have entered South Sudan since the onset of the war in Sudan in April 2023. This is in addition to the 2.2 million internally displaced people in the country. However, the security and humanitarian situation in South Sudan does not seem to be getting the necessary attention because of other crises around the world. There also appears to be donor fatigue which limits the availability of resources.

On the margins of the 37^th AU Summit, the AU Ad hoc Committee on South Sudan (C5) met at the Ministerial level to discuss the situation in South Sudan and exchange views on how to support the country in conducting successful elections by the end of this year. The C5 seems to have decided to undertake a ministerial visit to South Sudan to engage with all the parties and stakeholders to assess the situation on the ground and discuss the way forward.

Tomorrow’s meeting of the PSC happens ahead of the UNMISS mandate renewal in March. The outcome of the meeting is likely to provide the necessary guidance to the three African members of the Security Council as they engage in the upcoming mandate renewal negotiations. Given the prevailing concerns over various outstanding transitional processes and the holding of elections before the end of this year, there are speculations that the Security Council may opt for a technical rollover of the mandate until April pending South Sudan’s progress in its elections preparations and other outstanding tasks related to the implementation of the R-ARCSS.

In May, the Security Council is also expected to renew the sanctions regime imposed on South Sudan. The country has been calling for the lifting of the sanctions regime arguing that this will be critical to arm and equip the NUF for their effective deployment. In its most recent communique adopted on 16 November 2023 following its meeting on the situation in South Sudan, the PSC reiterated its call for the lifting of the arms embargo to enable the South Sudanese government to implement the R-ARCSS, particularly relating to transitional security arrangements.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to commend the Reconstituted Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) for taking some of the necessary steps for the conduct of elections by December this year. It may urge the government to expedite implementation of key pending tasks required for the conduct of free, fair, credible, and peaceful elections. It may welcome the ongoing efforts being made in the constitution-making process and call on the Trilateral mechanism to strengthen and fast-track the process, in collaboration with the government of South Sudan. The PSC may also welcome the efforts of President Ruto to bring the hold-out armed rebel groups into the peace fold. It may also welcome the visit that Bankole undertook to South Sudan and may in this respect highlight the need for maintaining high-level and sustained attention and engagement in view of the current delicate stage of the transitional process in South Sudan. It may further call for the establishment of a preventive diplomacy mechanism for regularly monitoring the situation, maintain close contact with all stakeholders and promote together with other entities including the C5, UN, RJMEC and IGAD a platform for promoting dialogue and consensus among the South Sudanese major stakeholders on the various transitional processes and the preparations for the holding of elections. The PSC may also call on all relevant stakeholders, particularly the R-TGoNU to avail conducive political and civic space to enable citizens’ free participation in the electoral processes. It may note and express concern over the recently reported fighting involving the armed elements of the signatories of R-ARCSS and the continued intercommunal violence in parts of the country and caution against its potential to reverse the gains made thus far. The PSC may also take note of the aggravated humanitarian situation which is compounded by the impacts of climate change and socioeconomic difficulties and appeal to partners and the international community to extend support and assistance to affected communities, including South Sudanese returnees and Sudanese refugees.