Tomorrow (26 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1327^th Session to consider the mid-year report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on elections in Africa, covering the period between July and December 2025.

Following the opening statement of the Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Jean-Léon Ngandu Ilunga, Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of Congo to the AU, Bankole Adeoye, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to present the report. Statements are also expected from the representatives of Member States that organised elections during the reporting period.

As per the PSC’s decision from its 424^th session in March 2014, which mandates periodic updates on African electoral developments, the Chairperson presents a mid-year elections report. The previous update was delivered during the 1288^th PSC session on 4 July, 2025 and covered electoral activities from January to June 2025. Tomorrow’s briefing will similarly provide accounts of elections conducted from July to December 2025, covering elections held in Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Malawi, the Seychelles, Somalia, and Tanzania, while also outlining the electoral calendar for the first half of 2026.

Across the second half of 2025, governance trends across Africa reflected a complex and often uneven interplay between electoral continuity, democratic backsliding, and institutional resilience. A recurring pattern was the consolidation of executive power through elections held in constrained political environments, frequently following constitutional changes that weakened term limits or enabled incumbents or transitional authorities to entrench themselves. Many of these polls were marked by low or moderate voter turnout, opposition boycotts or exclusions, and contested credibility, even where regional and continental observation missions officially endorsed peaceful conduct, highlighting a growing gap between formal electoral procedures and substantive democratic competition. At the same time, episodes of acute instability, most notably the military interruption of elections in Guinea-Bissau, underscored the continued fragility of civilian rule in some contexts, prompting robust but reactive responses from regional bodies. In contrast, a smaller number of cases demonstrated democratic resilience through competitive elections, peaceful concessions, and credible alternation of power.

In the aftermath of Cameroon’s contested 12 October 2025 presidential election, President Paul Biya was re-elected to an eighth term amid heightened political tensions. Post-election protests were reported in parts of the country, with security forces intervening to restore order, resulting in casualties. The Constitutional Council confirmed Biya’s victory with 53.7% of the vote, a result rejected by opposition candidate Issa Tchiroma Bakary, who claimed victory and accused authorities of systematic manipulation. The AU deployed an election observer mission led by Bernard Makuza, former Prime Minister and former President of the Senate of the Republic of Rwanda, composed of 40 short-term observers (STOs). Later, a joint statement from the AU and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)indicated that ‘the election was conducted peacefully, with respect for democratic values and citizen participation.’ They also noted low turnout and urged stakeholders to channel grievances through legal mechanisms.

In the Central African Republic’s 28 December 2025 presidential election, the incumbent President Faustin-Archange Touadéra secured a third term, garnering approximately 76.15 % of the vote according to provisional results from the National Elections Authority, which will be officially validated by the Constitutional Court. Touadéra’s victory follows a controversial 2023 constitutional referendum that abolished presidential term limits and extended term lengths, enabling him to run again and entrench his decade-long rule. The major opposition coalition boycotted the vote, decrying an unequal political environment and unfair conditions, and some challengers have alleged electoral malpractice and fraud. Voter turnout was at around 52%, reflecting mixed public engagement amid ongoing instability, even as the election technically proceeded peacefully and without widespread unrest reported.

The 2025 electoral cycle in Côte d’Ivoire opened with the presidential election on 25 October, followed by legislative polls on 27 December. According to the electoral commission, President Alassane Ouattara won decisively with 89.8% of the vote, while businessman Jean-Louis Billon trailed at 3.09%. Voter turnout stood at 50.1%, underscoring limited public participation. At the invitation of Ivorian authorities, the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed a joint Election Observation Mission (EOM) of more than 250 observers across the country, reflecting strong regional engagement. Their preliminary report highlighted candidate exclusions, weak opposition presence, accessibility challenges, and logistical shortcomings. For the December legislative elections, the AU dispatched a separate mission of 31 observers to assess preparations, voting operations, and the post-election environment.

In Egypt, following the August senate elections, parliamentary elections were conducted in multiple phases starting in November, producing a legislature overwhelmingly aligned with President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. His political bloc secured the super-majority required to advance constitutional amendments, consolidating executive dominance. Overall turnout and participation levels fluctuated.

The 23 November 2025 general elections in Guinea-Bissau, intended to produce a legitimate presidential and legislative outcome in a country long beset by political fragility, were abruptly upended when military forces seized power on 26 November, a day before provisional results were to be announced. Both incumbent President Umaro Sissoco Embaló and opposition candidate Fernando Dias da Costa had claimed victory prior to the official tally, but the military takeover involved storming the National Electoral Commission’s offices, the seizure and destruction of ballots, tally sheets and servers, and suspension of the entire electoral process, making completion of the vote effectively impossible. Major-General Horta Inta-A Na Man was installed as transitional president and appointed a new cabinet, drawing accusations from opposition figures and observers that the coup was either staged or exploited to forestall the constitutional transfer of power and preserve entrenched elite interests. In response, ECOWAS convened an extraordinary summit on 27 November, condemned the coup, suspended Guinea-Bissau, rejected any arrangements undermining the electoral process, and demanded the immediate declaration of the 23 November election results, while mandating a high-level mediation mission led by Sierra Leone’s President Julius Maada Bio. The PSC followed on 28 November by also suspending Guinea-Bissau, strongly condemning the coup, and calling for the completion of the electoral process and inauguration of the winner during its 1315^th session. The Council also tasked the AU Commission Chairperson to create an inclusive AU Monitoring Mechanism, in collaboration with ECOWAS and stakeholders, to monitor the situation, especially the implementation of ECOWAS and PSC decisions.

In the 28 December 2025 presidential election in Guinea, held under a new constitution that followed the 2021 military coup, junta leader Mamady Doumbouya secured a landslide victory with 86.72 % of the vote and was later sworn in as president, marking the end of the formal transitional period since he seized power. AU observers were deployed to monitor the campaign and voting phases, with a mission arriving in mid-December and issuing preliminary statements that attested that the election took place in a peaceful, orderly, and credible environment. However, the electoral trajectory, notably a constitutional referendum earlier in 2025 that amended the legal framework to allow members of the ruling military authorities to stand as candidates, has deepened concerns about compliance with the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) Article 25(4), which seeks to restrict participation of those who have seized power through unconstitutional means.

In Malawi’s 16 September 2025 general elections, former President Peter Mutharika won a clear victory over incumbent President Lazarus Chakwera, securing 56.8 % of the vote to Chakwera’s 33%, with turnout around 76% of registered voters, prompting a peaceful concession by Chakwera and a commitment to a smooth transfer of power. The elections were observed by a joint African Union–COMESA Election Observation Mission and a SADC Electoral Observation Mission, both deployed at the invitation of Malawi’s government to assess compliance with national, regional, and international democratic standards, and to engage with key electoral stakeholders, including the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC), political parties, civil society and media. Preliminary observation reports highlighted a generally peaceful and orderly process, with long queues and broad voter participation, though technical issues such as late polling station openings and structural challenges (e.g., biometric machine failures and the need for improved dispute resolution timelines) were noted, pointing to areas for future reform. This election reinforced Malawi’s democratic resilience and provided lessons for Africa on peaceful leadership alternation and the significance of robust electoral frameworks.

In the 2025 Seychelles general and presidential elections, the multi-stage process began with presidential and National Assembly polls on 25–27 September 2025, observed by a Joint AU and COMESA Election Observation Mission following an invitation from the Government and Electoral Commission; the mission engaged with key stakeholders across political, media, civic and institutional spheres to assess compliance with continental democratic standards enshrined in ACDEG and related instruments. According to the Joint Preliminary Report of the Joint mission, the candidate secured an outright majority in the first round, triggering a run-off held from 9 -11 October 2025 between opposition leader Patrick Herminie of the United Seychelles party and incumbent President Wavel Ramkalawan of Linyon Demokratik Seselwa. Herminie won the run-off with 52.7% of the vote to Ramkalawan’s 47.3%, returning his party to executive leadership and reversing the 2020 result that had first brought Ramkalawan to office. Observers and regional bodies, including SADC, noted the generally peaceful, orderly and professionally managed electoral environment.

In Gabon, the 27 September (first round) and 11 October (second round) parliamentary elections consolidated President Brice Oligui Nguema’s political dominance following his April presidential win, with his newly formed Democratic Union of Builders (UDB) securing a decisive majority in the National Assembly, winning around 101–102 out of 145 seats and relegating the long-dominant Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG) to a distant second, alongside a handful of smaller parties and independents. According to International IDEA’s Global State of Democracy Tracker, while the elections were largely peaceful and marked a significant shift in Gabon’s post-coup political landscape, they were also marred by irregularities, including missing ballots and annulments in several constituencies.

In Tanzania, the general elections held on 29 October 2025 produced an overwhelmingly one-sided result with President Samia Suluhu Hassan declared the winner on over 98% of the vote, but they were marred by deep controversy, violent unrest, and allegations of severe democratic deficits. The African Union Election Observation Mission’s preliminary report indicated that the elections “did not comply with AU principles, normative frameworks, and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections”, noting a restricted political environment, opposition boycotts and exclusions, internet shutdowns, outbreaks of deadly protests, and significant procedural irregularities that compromised electoral integrity and peaceful acceptance of results. On the other hand, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, H.E. Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, issued a public statement congratulating President Suluhu on her victory while expressing regret at the loss of life in post-election protests and emphasising respect for human rights and the rule of law.

The period also marked a pivotal shift in Somalia’s electoral framework with the introduction of direct municipal elections. Somalia’s municipal elections held on 25 December 2025 in Mogadishu’s Banadir region introduced direct, one-person-one-vote polling for the first time in nearly six decades, a major departure from the indirect, clan-based model used since 1991 and direct voting last seen in 1969. The polls, involving some 1,604 candidates competing for 390 council seats and more than 500,000 registered voters, were widely framed by authorities and local observers as a critical first step toward restoring universal suffrage and laying the groundwork for nationwide direct elections scheduled for 2026, and showcased significant logistical and security efforts amid ongoing instability and insurgent threats. While the exercise proceeded under heightened security and with heavy public interest, it was also shadowed by political tensions, including opposition boycotts and concerns about inclusivity and turnout.

Tomorrow (4 July), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1288^th Session to consider the mid-year report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on elections in Africa, covering the period between January and June 2025.

Following the opening statement of the Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Rebecca Otengo, Permanent Representative of Uganda to the AU, Bankole Adeoye, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to present the report. Statements are also expected from the representatives of Member States that organised elections during the reporting period.

As per the PSC’s decision from its 424^th session in March 2014, which mandates periodic updates on African electoral developments, the Chairperson presents a mid-year elections report. The previous update was delivered during the 1255^th PSC session on January 24, 2025, and covered electoral activities from July to December 2024. Tomorrow’s briefing will similarly provide accounts of elections conducted from January to June 2025 – covering elections held in Burundi, Comoros and Gabon –while also outlining the electoral calendar for the second half of 2025.

The parliamentary elections held in Burundi on 5 June resulted in a sweeping victory for the ruling National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) party, which secured all 100 contested seats in the national assembly with 96.5% of the vote. The AU deployed an Election Observation Mission led by Vincent Meriton, former Vice President of Seychelles, comprising 30 observers. In its preliminary report, the mission noted that the elections occurred in a generally stable socio-political and peaceful security environment. However, the mission also reported that some political parties and candidates expressed concerns about biased coverage by public media, alleging it disproportionately favoured the ruling party. Operational challenges were also observed, including complaints from voters in certain areas who did not receive their voter cards. Additionally, opposition parties criticised the elections as undemocratic, citing the systematic harassment and exclusion of opposition groups, particularly the National Congress for Liberty (CNL).

Similarly, the Comoros held parliamentary elections on 12 January. According to the Independent National Election Commission, the ruling Convention for the Renewal of the Comoros (CRC), led by President Azali Assoumani, won a strong majority, securing 28 out of 33 seats. However, several opposition parties rejected the results, citing widespread irregularities and a lack of transparency. These concerns prompted the Supreme Court to annul the outcomes in four constituencies, leading to reruns held later in January. Voter turnout stood at 66.3%, slightly lower than the 70.9% recorded in the 2020 election.

On 12 April 2025, Gabon held a presidential election in which General Brice Oligui Nguema, the interim president and leader of the August 2023 military coup that ousted President Ali Bongo, was a candidate. He was later declared the winner, securing over 90 % of the vote. Voter turnout reached 70.4%, a significant rise compared to the 56.65% recorded in the disputed August 2023 elections.

The AU deployed an Election Observation Mission to Gabon led by Trovoada Patrice, Former Prime Minister of São Tomé and Príncipe, and supported by Domitien Ndayizeye, former President of Burundi and member of the AU Panel of the Wise. Following the election, during its 1277^th session, the PSC welcomed the ‘successful’ conduct of the election without addressing the lack of compliance with Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG). As highlighted in an analysis featured on Amani Africa’s Ideas Indaba, the PSC’s failure to express its continuous commitment to Article 25(4) while recognising the election outcome in Gabon as marking the return of constitutional order can be interpreted by militaries across the continent that ‘a coup has once again become a viable avenue for ascending to power with the possibility of it being recognised by the AU following the coup’s legitimisation through elections.’ Not surprisingly, the AU appears to be on a path to accord Guinea the same treatment that it accorded Gabon, deepening concerns about the political viability and legitimacy of AU’s norm on non-eligibility of perpetrators of coups, as provided for in Article 25(4) of ACDEG.

Tomorrow (24 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1255^th session to consider the half-year report of the AU Commission on elections in Africa, covering the period between July and December 2024.

Following the opening statement of the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of January, Ennio Maes, Permanent Representative of Cote D’Ivoire, Bankole Adeoye, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to present the report. Statements are also expected from the representatives of Member States that organised elections during the reporting period and from the representatives of the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) that observed the elections.

The chairperson’s mid-year report on elections in Africa aligns with the PSC’s 424^th session decision to receive quarterly briefings on national elections in Africa. Tomorrow’s session builds on the updates provided during the 1224^th session on elections that were conducted during the first half of 2024. It will review the outcomes of elections held between July and December 2024, discuss broader trends in electoral governance across the continent and provide a snapshot of elections planned for the first half of 2025.

Dubbed an ‘election super year’, 2024 witnessed significant electoral activities in Africa, with at least 17 AU Member States conducting elections. In the second half of 2024, from July – December alone, 11 Member States organised presidential and parliamentary elections, namely: Algeria, Rwanda, Tunisia, Mozambique, Botswana, Mauritius, Gabon, Senegal, Namibia, Ghana and Chad. While the AU deployed Election Observation Missions (AUEOMs) that were notable for their inclusivity, with significant representation of women and youth among the observers to nine of these Member States, no missions were deployed to the Republics of Algeria and the parliamentary elections in Chad as the AU did not receive invitations from these Member States. The lack of such invitations risks setting a precedent that undermines AU missions and potentially weakening collective efforts to ensure transparent and credible elections on the continent.

The comprehensive electoral support extended by the AU to Member States includes deploying Election Observation Missions comprising diverse teams of short-term observers, technical experts, and representatives from civil society, youth and women’s organisations. The AU conducts pre-election and needs assessment missions to evaluate political environments stakeholder preparedness, and technical gaps. Capacity-building initiatives, such as training electoral experts and publishing reports on best practices, enhance institutional effectiveness. The AU also promotes stakeholder engagement, preventive diplomacy, and electoral reform advocacy to foster peaceful and inclusive elections. Financial and logistical support includes resources for Election Management Bodies (EMBs) and advocating state funding for equitable media coverage. Additionally, the AU emphasises post-election stability through legal dispute mechanisms and follow-ups to ensure adherence to democratic principles.

While the AUEOMs highlighted constructive roles played by political parties and EMBs in fostering inclusivity and transparency, challenges such as increased voter abstention in some member states and security concerns in areas like Mozambique were noted.

Tomorrow (6 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to hold its 1226th open session on the theme of Constitutionalism, Democracy, and Governance.

Following opening remarks by the Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Mr. Tebelelo A. Boang, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to make a statement. The statement will be followed by a presentation by Professor Mpho Molomo, Political Advisor to the President of the Republic of Botswana and a statement by H.E. Mr. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations to the African Union and Head of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU).

The theme of this session lies in the cross-section of the PSC mandate that combines security and democratic governance. Indeed, under Article 7(1)(m) the PSC is explicitly mandated to ‘follow up, within the framework of its conflict prevention responsibilities, the progress towards the promotion of democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law by member states’.

The last time the PSC convened a session on this theme was during its 1061st session. In that session, the PSC requested the AU Commission to undertake an in-depth analysis of the 2000 Lomé Declaration on unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA) with the aim to ensure that these frameworks and instruments respond appropriately to the challenges that the continent is currently facing and submit to the PSC for consideration. In addition, the PSC made two important decisions: convening a brainstorming seminar on UCG in Africa and reactivating the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions. As a follow-up to these decisions, two editions of the AU Reflection Forum on UCGs, also known as the Accra Forum, were held in Accra in March 2022 and 2024 to critically engage on the structural root causes of UCG in the continent and explore practical recommendations to address the phenomenon. It is also recalled that in May 2022, the Assembly of the AU convened its 16^th extraordinary summit in Malabo, which adopted the Declaration on UCGs as well as terrorism in Africa.

There are at least three sets of issues that are of direct concern for tomorrow’s session and are deserving of attention during the session. The first of these concerns the approach of the PSC to the theme of the session and follow-up to its various engagements on the matter thus far. The second concerns a candid reflection on the state of constitutional rule and democratic governance on the continent. The third relates to the role of relevant AU governance instruments, institutions and processes.

In terms of the approach of the PSC to the theme of the session, despite the importance attached to the subject in the PSC Protocol as noted above, the PSC has not established a systematic approach to this dimension of its mandate. It is true that the PSC addresses various aspects of the theme of tomorrow’s session through sessions focusing on specific aspects of this theme as part of its annual indicative program of work or when it is crafted into the monthly program of work of the PSC. Accordingly, the PSC held sessions on ‘popular uprisings and its impact on peace and security’, ‘sanctions and enforcement capacities’, the AU sanctions regime, ‘African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance’, ‘promoting constitutionalism, democracy and inclusive governance to strengthen peace, security and stability in Africa’, ‘engagement between the PSC and the PRC sub-committee on human rights, democracy and governance’ and the regular ‘elections in Africa.’ Added to these are the consultative meetings with AU organs with human rights and governance mandates notably the one between the PSC and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the briefings by an annual retreat with the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

Despite the richness that these engagements of the PSC highlight, they also illustrate that they reflect fragmentation and ad hocism. While some of the sessions such as the one on ‘elections in Africa’ have become regularised, the engagement of the PSC tends to be largely performative, lacking in critical and dynamic interrogation of the increasing disenchantment of the increasing number of Africans with elections. One way through which the PSC can institutionalise its engagement on constitutionalism, democracy and governance into a systematic approach is by integrating and addressing these sessions under a standing agenda dedicated to the review of and systematic reflections on the implementation of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.   

In terms of follow-up on previous decisions of the PSC relevant to tomorrow’s session, of particular significance is the decision of the 1061^st session of the PSC. It would be of interest for members of the PSC to get an update during tomorrow’s session on the decision of that session regarding the request for an in-depth analysis of the 2000 Lomé Declaration on unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA) with the aim to ensure that these frameworks and instruments respond appropriately to the challenges that the continent is currently facing.

With respect to the second set of issues of concern for tomorrow’s session, it would be fitting for the PSC to execute its mandate under Article 7(1) (m) of the PSC Protocol to reflect on the state of constitutionalism, democracy and good governance in Africa. In this respect, one overarching feature of the constitutional and democratisation landscape of the continent is the normative acceptance of regular elections, constitutional systems, the role of media and civil society at national levels and the endorsement of constitutional and democratic norms at the level of the AU. The other, perhaps most significant, feature is the growing popular support and demand for an accountable, corruption-free responsive system of governance. The large number of elections being held this year reflects that elections are widely accepted in the political practice of African states irrespective of the quality of democratic credentials of these states.

Tomorrow (25 July), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1224^th session to consider the mid-year report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on elections in Africa, covering the period between January and June 2024.

Following the opening statement of the Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Miguel Cesar Domingos Bembe, Permanent Representative of Angola to the AU, Bankole Adeoye, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to present the report. Statements are also expected from the representatives of Member States that organised elections during the reporting period and from the representatives of the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) that observed the elections. Despite not deploying election observation to Chad due to violation of relevant PSC decisions and AU norms on non-eligibility of members of the Transitional Military Council (TMC) in elections, it appears that Chad is invited, along with Madagascar, Mauritania, Senegal, South Africa, Togo and The Union of Comoros, to make a statement on the presidential election held on 6 May 2024.

The Chairperson’s mid-year report on elections in Africa is in line with the PSC’s decision at its 424^th session of March 2014 to receive regular briefings on national elections in Africa. The last time the Chairperson presented the half-year report was during PSC’s 1194^th session held on 24 January 2024, covering elections held between July and December 2023. As with the previous report, tomorrow’s briefing on the Chairperson’s report will provide an update on the electoral process and the conduct of the elections held during the reporting period, while also providing a snapshot of elections planned for the second half of 2024. The report is also expected to highlight emerging governance trends during the period under review, as well as positive practices and areas of concern.

During the first half of 2024, seven Member States organised presidential and parliamentary elections, namely The Union of Comoros, Senegal, Togo, Chad, South Africa (where the AU Commission also deployed a pre-election assessment mission in April), Madagascar, and Mauritania. The AU Commission deployed Election Observation Missions (EOMs) in the elections in all these countries, except the Presidential elections in Chad.

The Presidential and gubernatorial elections of the Union of the Comoros held on 14 January, in which the incumbent was declared to have won the presidential election by 57.2 per cent, saw varying levels of turnout for the two elections held on the same day. The elections were marred by political tension and protests over allegations of irregularities.

On 24 March, Senegal held presidential elections following a turbulent electoral season. Deadly protests erupted following Macky Sall’s decision to postpone the originally scheduled 25 February 2024 election. The Constitutional Council rejected both the law passed by parliament delaying the election until December and the 2 June proposed election date by the National Dialogue Commission. Consequently, Sall’s government was compelled to set a new election date before his term expired on 2 April. The vigilance of the Senegalese youth-led mass movement gave the Constitutional Council the conducive context for it to play its critical role in safeguarding Senegal’s democratic process. Bassirou Diomay Faye from the opposition PASTEF party emerged victorious with 54 per cent of the vote.

On 29 April, Togo convened legislative elections alongside its inaugural regional elections, with a voter turnout of 61.76 per cent, following the adoption of a controversial constitutional amendment that changed the country’s system of government from presidential to a parliamentary system. The ruling party amassed 108 out of the 113 contested seats. The opposition criticised the constitutional reform as an ‘institutional coup’, claiming that this would pave the way for the incumbent President Faure Gnassingbé’s prolonged rule if his party maintained an assembly majority, effectively circumventing previous term limits.

The other election held during the period under review is the presidential election in Chad held on 6 May. The Constitutional Council declared Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno, who led the TMC that unconstitutionally seized power following the death of his father Idriss Déby Itno, the winner with 61 percent of the votes.

Déby’s candidacy and eventual victory in the election clearly disregarded the AU’s anti-coup norms and the decision of the PSC on 14 May 2021, which expressly demanded that the chairman and members of the TMC do not take part in the election at the end of the transition. Amani Africa’s ‘Ideas Indaba’ published on 9 April warned that ‘If the PSC is unable to enforce the rule on non-eligibility concerning Chad, it would be the end of any future application of this rule as well. And most immediately, this would also mean that the AU would have no standing to apply this rule for stopping any of the military leaders in the six other countries (Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Sudan) from becoming candidates for elections.’ The invitation of Chad to make a statement during this session without the PSC reaffirming its decision on non-eligibility for election may constitute another instance of the PSC enabling disregard of its own decisions and the applicable AU norms it is meant to safeguard.

On 29 May, South Africa held general elections to elect Members of the National Assembly and Provincial legislators. The election was notably competitive, with the ruling African National Congress (ANC) receiving only 40.18 per cent of the votes, losing its parliamentary majority for the first time since the end of apartheid in 1994. This unprecedented outcome forced the ANC to strike a deal with the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA), which came in second with 22 per cent, and other parties to form a ‘national unity’ government.

Madagascar also convened legislative elections on 29 May. Contrary to last year’s presidential election, which was marred by low voter turnout and boycotts, political actors showed interest in the legislative elections, fielding 473 candidates for the 163 parliamentary seats. The ruling party secured 51.53 per cent of the vote. Mauritania also held its presidential election on 29 June, in which the incumbent President, Mohamed Cheikh El Ghazouani, who is also the current chairperson of the AU, was re-elected with 56 per cent of the vote.

The report is expected to preview ten elections scheduled to take place between July and December 2024: Rwanda, Algeria, Tunisia, Mozambique, Botswana, Guinea Bissau, Namibia, Ghana, South Sudan, and Mauritius. On 15 July, Rwandans elected their President, with President Paul Kagame re-elected to a fourth term in office in a landslide victory, securing a provisional result of 99 per cent of the vote.

In Algeria, President Abdelmadjid TEBBOUNE will be seeking a second term in the upcoming election slated for 7 September. Tunisia will hold its presidential election on 6 October, while in Mozambique, general elections are slated for 9 October, with the ruling party FRELIMO represented by regional governor Daniel Chapo, succeeding President Filipe Nyusi. Botswana’s general election is also set to take place no later than 29 October. The legislative elections in Guinea-Bissau are scheduled for 24 November, a year after President Umaro Sissoco Embaló dissolved the opposition-dominated parliament in December 2023. On 27 November, Namibia will hold presidential and legislative elections, while Ghanaians will elect their new president on 7 December, with President Nana Akufo-Addo stepping down as he completes his second term. Mauritian legislative elections are also expected to take place before the end of this year.

Tomorrow (24 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1194^th session to consider the mid-year report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on elections in Africa, covering the period from July to December 2023 and providing an outlook for 2024.

Following the opening statement of the Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Amma A. Twum-Amoah, Permanent Representative of Ghana to the AU, Bankole Adeoye, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to present the half year report. Statements are also expected from the representatives of Member States that organized elections in the second half of 2023, namely Zimbabwe, Eswatini, Liberia, Madagascar, Egypt, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

The Chairperson’s mid-year report on elections in Africa is in line with the PSC’s decision at its 424^th session of March 2014 to receive regular briefings on national elections in Africa. The last time the Chairperson presented the half year report was during PSC’s 1165^th session held on 31 July 2023, capturing the outcomes of elections organized between January and June 2023. As a continuation of this update, tomorrow’s briefing report will cover elections conducted between July and December 2023 while providing a snapshot of elections held in or planned for the first half of 2024. The report is also expected to shed light on electoral and political governance trends observed during the period under review. In addition, PSC may follow up on the initiatives on the Annual Report on Elections in Africa and the Documentary on AU Election Observation Mission (AUEOM), both scheduled for publication and dissemination in the third quarter of 2023.

In the latter part of 2023, seven Member States—Zimbabwe, Gabon, Eswatini, Liberia, Madagascar, Egypt, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)—conducted presidential and/or parliamentary elections. AU deployed election observers to all these countries, except Gabon, to assess the electoral process. During the review period, incumbents emerged victorious in all presidential elections with the exception of Liberia, which witnessed a peaceful transfer of power. The re-election of President Emmerson Mnangagwa of Zimbabwe, President Andry Rajoelina of Madagascar, and President Félix Tshisekedi of DRC also marks their final term in office as stipulated by their respective constitutions.

Despite the generally calm atmosphere in which the elections were conducted, the outcomes in the majority of cases turned out to be highly contentious, indicating a worrisome trend regarding the credibility of the electoral process in the continent. In some cases, such as in Madagascar and the Comoros, elections were marred by boycotts and low turnout.