Tomorrow (16 December), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene a briefing on the continental early warning and security outlook in the afternoon.

Following opening remarks by Ennio Maes, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for December 2025, a representative of the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a statement. It is also expected that the Executive Secretary of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Service of Africa (CISSA), Jackson V. Hamata, and a representative of the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) will make statements, followed by a briefing that the AU Counter-Terrorism Centre (AUCTC) will deliver on its analytical report on the security and terrorism landscape on the continent.

The last time the PSC met on this theme was in August 2025, at its 1298^th meeting. From the communiqué it adopted after the session, among the decisions Council had was tasking the AU Commission, together with AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), ‘to establish and institutionalise, by December 2025, a dynamic and continuously updated risk mapping tool to allow the PSC to strengthen its ability to engage in early warning for early action, by providing a consolidated picture of threats, vulnerabilities and potential triggers, including colour-coded risk levels linked to a pre-authorised menu of diplomatic, security and stabilisation tools’ as well as ‘an annual review of acted/missed alerts with lessons-learned.’

Africa’s security landscape remains volatile, accentuated by the global surge in insecurity, with terrorism and armed conflict continuing to drive widespread and persistent political violence across the continent. The Sahel remains the structural epicentre of the terrorism threat on the continent, with the central Sahel – Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger – facing the most protracted and escalating terrorist violence. In this environment of institutional, socio-economic and climatic vulnerability, extremist groups exploit shared ethnic, commercial, and migratory networks, facilitating the seamless movement of fighters, weapons, and resources across porous borders. A recent UN Security Council Report highlighted that in Mali, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), an Al-Qaida affiliate, has attacked more than 100 fuel tankers and abducted fuel truck drivers near the capital, Bamako, and other parts of the country. The group’s months-long siege has disrupted access to essential supplies to Bamako. The prolonged fuel blockade had precipitated a severe nationwide fuel crisis, forcing the closure of schools and universities while triggering a sharp contraction in economic activity. Diplomatic missions significantly reduced their staffing, and several partner governments issued urgent travel advisories urging their citizens to depart the country. These developments represent a profound escalation in JNIM’s economic warfare strategy, seeking to undermine the military government’s legitimacy, exacerbating humanitarian vulnerabilities – including reduced lifesaving aid operations and risks to millions dependent on them – and raising fears of broader instability that could further erode state control and fuel regional spillover effects.

In Niger, the recent attack in Assamakka killed six Nigerien Soldiers. JNIM claimed it had taken control of the border post there. The Nigerian military confirmed that militants from the Mali-based JNIM killed one soldier during an ambush in western Kwara State, near the border with Benin. This marked JNIM’s first confirmed attack inside Nigeria, a move which underscored the expanding reach of Sahelian extremist groups deeper into West Africa, which signals a new multi-front threat in the region. A recent Amani Africa analysis on the situation in the Sahel also highlighted that the Tillabéri region – bordering Mali and Burkina Faso – has seen a sharp rise in terrorist attacks. In early September, an ambush in the region resulted in the deaths of 14 soldiers, according to the Nigerian Ministry of Defence.

Burkina Faso also remains one of the most severely affected countries. Extremist groups exert control or significant influence over vast rural areas – estimates ranging from 40% to as much as 60% of the national territory outside major urban centres. In these regions, groups such as the JNIM and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) function as the de facto authorities, operating checkpoints to regulate movement, imposing taxes on transport, commerce, and local economies (including ‘zakat’ funds and levies on smuggling routes), adjudicating disputes under their interpretation of sharia, and controlling access to land, water, and resources. While a full encirclement of Ouagadougou is not imminent, ongoing territorial gains, blockades of peripheral towns, and disruptions to supply routes have made isolation of the capital an increasingly plausible scenario should the collapse of outlying areas persist.

Somalia, on the other hand, remains mired in a deepening crisis, marked by a resurgent jihadist insurgency led by al-Shabaab. Without a fundamental shift in strategy and if the serious challenges facing the AU mission are not addressed, plausible near-term outcomes include the collapse of the federal government or an al-Shabaab seizure of the capital, with severe implications for regional stability. As the group launched a major offensive across central Somalia in early 2025 – intensifying from April onward – the group has since captured a series of strategic towns from Somali forces. By July, the militants had advanced to within roughly 50 kilometres of the capital, effectively encircling much of it, establishing checkpoints on approaches, and prompting many foreign embassies to evacuate non-essential staff to Kenya. The advance then inexplicably stalled, allowing the federal government to declare a tentative ‘victory.’ The group has since focused on building forces around Mogadishu while escalating attacks within the city. In October 2025, an al-Shabaab suicide squad stormed a high-security facility run by the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), destroying critical intelligence assets and freeing dozens of prisoners – just meters from the presidential palace at Villa Somalia.

Beyond the foregoing, it would be of major interest for the PSC to consider in its discussion the need to fully reinstitutionalise the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) to effectively anticipate and address conflicts, as highlighted in its 1251^st meeting held in December 2024. Measures also need to be stepped up to address structural drivers which fuel the geographic expansion of terrorism and violent extremist actors across Africa, including: weak governance and state fragility, pervasive poverty and youth marginalisation, socioeconomic inequalities, intercommunal tensions, and the proliferation of illicit economies linked to transnational organised crime. The effects of climate change cannot go unmentioned, as it exacerbates these underlying pressures by accelerating desertification, disrupting rainfall patterns, depleting scarce resources, and triggering widespread displacement. These environmental stresses erode livelihoods and heighten competition over dwindling land, water, and pasture, creating vulnerabilities that extremist groups skillfully exploit – positioning themselves as alternative providers of resource access, mediators in local disputes, or protectors of marginalised communities.

More so, illicit economies serve as vital revenue sources for extremist groups across Africa, embedding them deeply within complex transnational supply chains. Activities such as artisanal gold mining, fuel trafficking, narcotics transhipment, illegal logging, wildlife poaching, human smuggling, and maritime piracy not only generate substantial funds but also enable these actors to exert influence over local communities and cross-border networks. Kidnapping for ransom also remains a particularly pernicious financing mechanism, undermining continental counter-terrorism efforts.

In addition, Amani Africa’s Special Research Report, ‘Towards a New Agenda for Peace and Security in Africa: New Security Threats and the Future of the Peace and Security Council’ highlighted that one of the new security threats in Africa arises from the expansion of the use of emerging technologies. Technological advancements have revolutionised the operational landscape for extremist groups, enabling the use of drones for surveillance, targeted strikes, and intimidation; encrypted platforms for decentralised coordination and agile tactics, including mobilisation of resources; and sophisticated online ecosystems – including AI-generated propaganda – to manipulate narratives, undermine state legitimacy, sow communal divisions, and recruit transnationally. Crypto-based transactions and mobile money systems further evade oversight, with digital laundering techniques complicating tracing and accountability efforts.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to note the briefing and updates from AUCTC, AFRIPOL, and CISSA, and may underscore the need for continued cooperation and collaboration in enhancing early warning, intelligence sharing, and coordinated responses to terrorism and transnational organised crime. The PSC is also likely to condemn all acts of terrorism and violent extremism, as well as the exploitation of communities and the use of illicit economies by armed groups. It may stress the imperative to bridge the early warning-early action gap, critical for the PSC, AU institutions, and Member States to take timely, evidence-informed preventive actions early enough against threats like conflict, terrorism, and organised crime. Council is also expected to emphasise the need for enhanced collaboration, including information sharing, between and among Member States, as well as with international partners, including technology firms, to more effectively counter the exploitation of digital platforms by terrorist and violent extremist groups. Council may also reiterate its 1298^th meeting statement on the need for AU’s risk capacity to anticipate risks through the CEWS, and to ensure that its analysis directly informs the PSC’s agenda-setting and deliberations. It may also reiterate the need for restoring the institutional base of CEWS and for making CEWS the anchor of the early warning and early action initiatives of the AU, working in coordination with the APRM, AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA and the early warning systems of the Regional Economic Communities/Mechanisms.

Tomorrow (27 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene for its 1298^th session to get a briefing on the early warning system and its role in mapping risks and threats across Africa.

The session commences with an opening statement of the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for August 2025, Mohamed Khaled. The AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, will make an introductory remark. The session is expected to get presentations from Marie-Antoinette Rose QUATRE, Chief Executive Officer of the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM); Lallal Idris Lakhdar, Acting Director, African Union Counter Terrorism Centre; Jalel Chelba, Acting Director, African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation; and Maxwell Yaw Kumah, Principal Researcher and Analyst of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services in Africa (CISSA). A representative from the African Regional Standby Forces is also expected to make a statement.

The session will build on previous discussions on the theme, with the recent engagement being the 1247^th session held on 27 November 2024, where CISSA, AUCTC and AFRIPOL briefed the PSC on the Continental Early Warning and Security Outlook. From the communiqué of the session, the Council encouraged these institutions ‘to continue to provide technical assistance and to increase the dissemination of early warning reports and operational intelligence to Member States and the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), with a view to enabling them to more effectively respond to emerging threats.’ In addition, Council tasked the AUCTC, CISSA, AFRIPOL, other specialised AU agencies and Member States ‘to work together towards the establishment of a joint Cybersecurity Task Force focusing on preventing the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and emerging technologies by terrorist groups for radicalisation, recruitment, training and funding.’

According to INTERPOL’s 2025 Africa Cyberthreat Assessment Report, a growing share of reported crimes in Africa is cyber-related. The report goes further and highlights that, despite the rising caseloads, most African states surveyed still lack essential IT infrastructure to combat cybercrime. Just 30 per cent of countries reported having an incident reporting system, 29 per cent a digital evidence repository and 19 per cent a cyberthreat intelligence database. Additionally, while cybercrime routinely crosses national borders, 86 per cent of African countries surveyed said their international cooperation capacity needs improvement due to slow, formal processes, a lack of operational networks and limited access to platforms and foreign-hosted data. Against this backdrop, this upcoming PSC meeting will present an opportunity to advance the discussions from the 1247^th meeting and brainstorm a concrete plan for the establishment of a joint Cybersecurity Task Force.

Relatedly, of concern for tomorrow’s session will be the issue of violent extremism on the continent. It has been reported that, in the past year, nearly half of the fatalities (10,685) occurred in the Sahel, while Somalia accounted for about one-third of Africa’s total fatalities (7,289). Together with the Lake Chad Basin, these three regions comprised 99% of the continent’s militant Islamist-linked deaths. According to one recent report, ‘all five African theatres (including Mozambique and North Africa) remain highly dynamic with militant insurgents mounting offensive operations in each, especially in the Sahel and Somalia.’ There was a 14-per cent rise in battle-related deaths across the continent (15,678).’ Militant Islamist groups in the Sahel and Somalia expand their hold on territory.

Organised Transnational Crime is also another element of discussion to be addressed. In May 2025, the Council held its 1279^th meeting to discuss this theme, with a focus on the Sahel region. From the communiqué of the meeting, Council expressed concern ‘over the growing operational sophistication of transnational criminal networks exploiting structural vulnerabilities across the Sahel, including governance deficits, legitimate or popular grievances, porous borders and limited state presence.’ Yet, organised transnational crime does not take the same form across various regions of the continent. Thus, Council tasked the AU Commission to coordinate with AFRIPOL, INTERPOL, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and other critical stakeholders ‘in developing tailored responses to the specific geographical and logistical profiles of each criminal corridor, including joint mobile units and specialised port and desert surveillance capacities…’ From Amani Africa’s Insight of the session, the PSC was in the spotlight as it faces ‘the challenge of how to push away from fragmented, security-heavy responses to more holistic, coordinated strategies that address the structural drivers of transnational organised crimes and terrorism’.

It would also be of interest for PSC members to follow up on PSC’s earlier decisions on the need for anchoring the sessions on early warning on the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). It is worth recalling that during its 1251^st session held on 17 December 2024, the PSC underscored the need for greater visibility and prominence of CEWS within the proposed restructuring of the Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) Department. Previously, the 1208^th session of the PSC underscored the imperative of ‘a robust and fully functional CEWS to effectively pre-empt and mitigate conflicts.’

Following the merger of the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peace and Security, the structure that housed CEWS disappeared despite it being a statutory structure. Since then, instead of CEWS, established under Article 12 of the PSC Protocol, this session on early warning has been organised around the work of CISSA, AUCTC and AFRIPOL. This tends to limit the scope of analysis of threats to the domain of intelligence and law enforcement-based threats, hence making it hard security-focused. The implication of this is that it does not fully account for risks of conflict, political, social, economic and environmental issues. A case in point is the lack of attention given to intercommunal conflicts. In recent years, these conflicts have represented the majority of non-state conflicts in Africa.

During tomorrow’s session, the role of the APRM in early warning is also expected to feature. As the entity that identifies risks through its governance assessment of participating states, APRM stands to make a notable contribution in drawing attention to the governance-related risks of conflict. It is to be recalled that the 4^th Joint Consultative Meeting between the PSC and APRM on 7 to 8 April 2025 highlighted the importance of leveraging APRM’s governance-focused peer review reports to enhance early warning strategies. This builds on prior pronouncements, which emphasised closer coordination between APRM and PSC to address structural vulnerabilities and governance deficits that fuel conflicts.

From the perspective of institutional coordination on early warning and continental security outlook, an issue that deserves attention during tomorrow’s session concerns the role of the early warning mechanisms of Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs). In May 2025, during the 2^nd Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the PSC and ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council (ECOWAS MSC), the two bodies reaffirmed in their joint communique ‘the commitment to continue enhancing cooperation between the AU PSC and the ECOWAS MSC on Peace, Security and Governance issues, including by developing stronger and more structured cooperation on conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development. In this respect, they ‘underlined the need to enhance Early Warning and joint analysis capabilities, and to further strengthen the synergy between the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN), including joint scenario planning, data exchange and rapid deployment of early response teams to contain potentially explosive situations.’

Discussions may also address challenges such as climate change vis-à-vis peace and security, as it is a critical factor in Africa’s complex crises, intensifying conflicts, driving forced migrations and worsening socio-economic challenges. Identified as a ‘threat multiplier,’ it amplifies existing vulnerabilities and poses new risks to human security and regional stability. The concept note of PSC’s 1263^rd session of March 2025 highlighted that ‘climate change also weakens state governance, making it harder to maintain security and public welfare. This creates opportunities for terrorist and criminal groups, who exploit climate-related frustrations to recruit and expand their influence, further threatening regional stability. Thus, climate change is not just an environmental threat – it undermines social cohesion and governance, necessitating an integrated approach that combines climate adaptation and resilience, sustainable development and peacebuilding.’

Acute competition for natural resources is a key issue slated for discussion at tomorrow’s PSC session, recognised as a significant threat to peace and security across Africa. The growing demand for limited resources like water, arable land, and minerals intensifies tensions within and between communities and states, particularly in regions such as the Sahel, Great Lakes, and Horn of Africa. This competition drives intercommunal clashes, banditry, and interstate disputes, with conflicts over water and fertile land escalating pastoralist-farmer tensions, and contests for valuable minerals fueling armed groups and transnational crime networks. The PSC is expected to explore integrating resource governance into early warning systems, prioritising sustainable management and equitable access to reduce conflict risks. This will likely involve using geospatial tools to track resource-related tensions and collaborating with RECs/RMs to craft tailored, region-specific strategies for preventing resource-driven conflicts.

Beyond these pressing challenges, the PSC is expected to address a set of emerging threats that further compound Africa’s security landscape. Among these are escalating inter-state tensions, intensifying geopolitical rivalries, and the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government. Youth restiveness, driven by widespread political exclusion and deep-seated structural unemployment, is identified as a particularly significant risk. The Council will also consider the effects of prolonged humanitarian crises, characterised by forced displacement and the weaponisation of sexual and gender-based violence, alongside the cascading impact of post-COVID-19 economic shocks and the growing burden of unsustainable external debt, all of which continue to erode state resilience.

The PSC is also expected to look into how tools like digital maps, satellite images, smart computer analysis, and future risk monitoring can help them better understand security situations and prepare for possible threats before they happen.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to emphasise the need for enhanced collaboration, including information sharing, between and among Member States, as well as with international partners, including technology firms, in order to more effectively counter the exploitation of digital platforms by terrorist and violent extremist groups. The PSC may also reiterate the need for the establishment of a joint cybersecurity taskforce and, importantly, call on AFRIPOL to develop an action plan on expanding the institutional and infrastructural preparedness of AU member states to deal with the increasing cybersecurity threats and enhance transnational cooperation for addressing the cross-regional nature of these threats. Considering the increase in intercommunal conflicts, the PSC may request the CEWS to undertake the mapping of intercommunal conflicts and their trends in close coordination with the concerned RECs/RMs. The PSC may reiterate its decision from its 1208^th session on the imperative of ‘a robust and fully functional CEWS to effectively pre-empt and mitigate conflicts’. In this regard, it may call for the need for anchoring the CEWS in a structure dedicated to CEWS.

Tomorrow (30 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1257^th session with two agenda items. Following the Consideration of the Report of the Activities of the Peace and Security Council and the State of Peace and Security in Africa; and the Report on the implementation of the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silencing the Guns in Africa: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects, the Council will receive Updates on the status of the operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF).

Following the opening statement of the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of January, Ennio Maes, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cote D’Ivoire, Bankole Adeoye, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to present the progress made in the operationalisation of the Force with a specific focus on the steps undertaken to facilitate the consultative process for the Strategic Review of the ASF.

The ASF, envisioned under Article 13 of the PSC Protocol as a cornerstone of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), was designed to serve as Africa’s primary mechanism for peace support operations (PSOs) and crisis intervention. Despite being declared fully operational in 2015, the ASF continues to face significant challenges, particularly in political coordination, logistical readiness, and rapid deployment capabilities.

The last time the PSC convened on the ASF was during its 1159^th session held at the ministerial level on 22 June 2023, where it requested the AU Commission, among other things, to expedite ‘the strategic review of the ASF in order to align it with contemporary security challenges facing the continent’ drawing on Conclusions of the Inaugural Lessons Learned Forum on AU Peace Support Operations that was held in November 2022, in Abuja, Nigeria and subsequently adopted by the Council. Previously, the PSC, in its 1129^th session, had also requested the Commission to use the identified lessons in reviewing and reconceptualising the ASF Concept, with a view to ensuring its alignment with the AU Doctrine on PSOs and to ensure the readiness of the ASF to address the contemporary complex, multifaceted and dynamic peace and security challenges facing Africa. The process seeks to ensure that the ASF remains fit for purpose while ensuring its integration with the AU’s peace support operations doctrine.

It is expected that in tomorrow’s session the Commission will provide updates regarding the engagements it had with key stakeholders for the strategic review of the ASF. It is to be recalled that the Commission had held a technical consultative meeting with ASF RECs/RMs Planning Elements (PLAMELMs), strategic partners and subject matter experts  and resources persons in in Algiers from 2-4 December 2024.

A major impediment to the ASF’s operationalisation has been the lack of political consensus and institutional alignment between the AU and Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs). While the adoption of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) during the 15^th Specialised Technical Committee on Defence, Safety, and Security (STCDSS) in May 2023 was a step forward that clarified roles and responsibilities in planning, deployment, and post-deployment stages, it has not fully resolved underlying tensions. Political sensitivities, including competing interests among RECs, continue to impede seamless coordination. This misalignment complicates decision-making and affects the ASF’s ability to plan, deploy, and manage missions efficiently. The ASF’s operational readiness requires clear frameworks and greater harmonisation of roles and responsibilities under AU leadership.

The ASF’s readiness varies across regions. While the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) have made substantial progress, other regions face ongoing challenges that include resource shortages and limited coordination, which are exacerbated by debates over the balance of authority between RECs and the AU. ECOWAS, for instance, has expressed a strong desire to retain control over deployments within its jurisdiction, creating potential conflicts with the AU’s broader coordination role. It is expected that tomorrow’s session will take an interest in enhancing coordination between the Planning Elements (PLANELMs) of the RECs/RMs and the Continental PLANEL in order to facilitate harmonisation of decision-making on the deployment of the ASF based on the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantages to ensure that the ASF can operate as a unified and effective force. To this effect, the AU Commission has held consultations with the five ASF PLANELMs, including EASF, ECCAS, ECOWAS, SADC and NARC, on 5 December 2024 in Algiers.

Logistical readiness also remains another significant obstacle to the ASF’s operationalisation. The establishment of the Continental Logistics Base (CLB) in Douala, Cameroon, in 2018 was a step forward, but the incomplete development of Regional Logistics Depots (RLDs) continues to hinder the ASF’s capacity for rapid deployment. Strategic airlift capabilities, vital for moving troops, equipment, and supplies, also remain inadequate. Recognising this gap, the PSC’s 1159^th session had requested the AU Commission to expedite the assessment exercise of pledged strategic lift aircraft as part of efforts to enhance strategic lift capability and the finalisation of the agreements for the utilisation of the pledged strategic lift assets to enable ASF rapid deployment of troops, reinforcement of troops, casualty evacuations and timely logistic supplies in conflict zones. The ASF’s maritime readiness is also another area requiring attention as preparations for the first ASF maritime exercise are undergoing progress, but further investment is still required to establish a robust maritime component within the ASF. On the Continental Logistics Base, while welcoming the structures approved by the 36^th ordinary session of the Assembly, the PSC may appeal to Member States to support the efforts for the mobilisation of the required budget of USD 4,717,606.45 for the approved structures.

In the context of the shift in the nature of conflicts with conflicts involving terrorist groups having become dominant in recent years, the ASF’s potential role in counter-terrorism is another area of strategic importance. The growing threat of terrorism and violent extremism across the Sahel, Horn of Africa, and other regions necessitates adapting the assumption that underpinned the conception of the ASF with its focus on intra-state conflicts. This has prompted questions on the need for specialised and rapid-response capability. It was against this background that the PSC adopted a decision to establish a counter-terrorism unit within the ASF during its 960^th session in October 2020, which remains a key priority. Tomorrow’s session will also present an opportunity to follow up on this decision.

Despite the challenges it faces, the ASF framework offers an unparalleled opportunity for standardising training, enhancing interoperability, and building institutional resilience across Africa’s security architecture. Many troops have benefited from ASF-led training programs, which have built a shared understanding of operational procedures and improved readiness. While RECs and ad hoc arrangements have often deployed peace support operations independently, integrating such initiatives into the ASF framework will enhance collective security efforts and optimise resources.

In terms of follow-up on the request for a strategic review of the ASF, including by the PSC, initial steps were taken last December with the convening of the meeting in Algeria. The consultative meetings held in Algiers, Algeria, which included the Technical Consultative Meeting on the ASF and consultations with ASF RECs/RMs, have been centred around the themes of legal and policy framework of the ASF, the political challenges facing its operationalisation, securing predictable and sustained financing, operational challenges facing ASF and mechanisms to enhance the capacities of ASF. However, the AU Commission claims that the strategic review process of the ASF continues to face delays due to funding gaps. One way of overcoming this is to leverage the Network of Think Tanks for Peace that the PAPS department assembled.

Efforts to develop the ASF’s cost-sharing model must continue, as this approach promotes joint regional solutions and shared responsibility in addressing security challenges. By refining this model, the ASF can encourage greater financial commitment and ownership among member states and RECs/RMs. The efforts in collective resource mobilisation and sharing need to be aligned with the legal expectations of the PSC Protocol. The AU also needs to seize the opportunity that Resolution 2719 presents in affirming the central role of the AU and its leadership as envisaged in the PSC protocol in the deployment of peace support operations.

The PSC’s directive to integrate ASF principles into all AU peace support operations represents a significant step toward institutionalising the framework. Moreover, the alignment of the ASF’s concept with the AU’s doctrine on PSOs would ensure that its operations are guided by a coherent strategic vision. As Africa faces increasingly complex and multifaceted security threats, the ASF remains an indispensable tool for promoting peace and stability.

The ASF remains central to realising the vision of African-led peace and security, but its potential can only be fully realised through concerted efforts to overcome its enduring challenges. As the PSC deliberates on the ASF’s future, it must prioritise ensuring unity of purpose among AU member states and RECs, ensuring that the ASF serves as a symbol of African solidarity and a practical mechanism for achieving peace and security.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique.

Tomorrow (17 December), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1250^th session with two related agenda items. The first agenda item is on ‘Consideration of the AU/UN Policy Paper on Enhancing AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and Early Action’. The other agenda item concerns the review of the Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) and Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies (CSVMS). This edition of Insights on the PSC accordingly presents an analysis of both of these agenda items.

The Permanent Representative of Djibouti to the AU and Chair of the PSC for the month of December, Abdi Mahamoud Eybe, will deliver opening remarks and set the scene for the session. This is followed by a briefing from the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (CPAPS), Bankole Adeoye. It is expected that Adeoye will share elements from the policy paper and update the PSC on the CSVRA and CSVMS.

In terms of background to tomorrow’s session, it was at its 1208^th session convened on 16 April 2024 that the PSC discussed ways to unblock obstacles and ensure effective early warning and response. During the session, the PSC not only expressed its commitment to fully implement Article 12 of the PSC Protocol on the establishment and operationalisation of AU’s Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) but also tasked the AU Commission (AUC) to take specific measures to enhance early warning and early response. The Commission is also required to report back to the PSC before the end of the year. One such measure highlighted in the communiqué is to ‘hasten the ongoing AUC institutional reforms to enhance the utility of the CEWS in PSC decision-making processes as one of the pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).’

While the 1208^th session is the most immediate background for tomorrow’s session, the task that the PSC entrusted during that session to the AU Commission for reporting back before the end of the year draws on prior engagements of the PSC on the subject. Revamping the AU early warning system was one of the focuses of the Mombasa retreat held in May 2021. The conclusions of the retreat emphasised the need for regular horizon scanning briefings and informal consultations as platforms for the AU Commission and the PSC to share particularly ‘sensitive’ early warning information. The 1000^th session of the PSC underlined ‘the need to promote the early warning system in the spirit of identifying at early stages conflict and crises situations while underscoring the imperative to confer the required importance to conflict prevention efforts.’ At its 1073^rd meeting in April 2022, the PSC took note of the critical importance of early warning to avert most of the peace and security threats faced in the continent, including the recurrence of unconstitutional change of government.

Yet, despite the critical place that conflict prevention occupies in the PSC Protocol and the various pronouncements of the PSC, challenges persist. One of the major limitations identified in the implementation of the PSC Protocol in the context of the 20^th anniversary of the PSC is its conflict prevention mandate broadly and Article 12 of the Protocol that establishes CEWS specifically. On the political front, the major hurdle, as alluded to by the PSC in various of its sessions, including the 1208th session as well as the May 2024 High-Level Colloquium, is the ‘culture of denialism’ by Member States and RECs/RMs regarding credible early warning reports of looming crisis and conflict situations, while invoking sovereignty as a shield. This denial prevents timely action, including the deployment of preventive diplomacy and mediation. At times, Member States are backed by RECs/RMs, claiming the principle of subsidiarity, to block a looming situation/crisis from reaching the agenda of the PSC.

Technically, one of these identified in the 527^th session of the PSC is the gap between early warning and early action. The call for the establishment of a ‘trigger mechanism and indicators’—a request first made during the Cairo Retreat held in October 2018—to facilitate the role of the PSC in assessing whether a given situation calls an early action by the PSC remains unheeded.  The need for establishing a trigger mechanism was reiterated in the Dar es Salaam Declaration, adopted on 25 May 2024 at the High-Level Colloquium in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the PSC. This may be an area where the members of the Network of Think Tanks for Peace (NET4PEACE) working in concert with the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA), the African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) and the AU Counter Terrorism Centre (AUCTC) – formerly African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT)).

Institutionally, CEWS suffered a major blow in the context of the institutional reform of the AU. Unlike the previous structure, which had a division dedicated to conflict prevention and early warning in the now-defunct Department of Peace and Security, the new PAPS structure does not have such a dedicated structure. Under the PAPS structure, early warning, for example, falls under the ‘Conflict Management’ directorate and is said to have been ‘mainstreamed’ into the regional desks. Similarly, the Situation Room, established as part of the CEWS under Article 12, is envisaged under the new structure to serve the PAPS department in its entirety rather than being part of the conflict prevention directorate. This restructuring not only fails to confirm with Article 12 of the PSC Protocol but also has downgraded CEWS, leading to operational difficulties, as CEWS is deprived of a fully dedicated structure for its regular and effective functioning. In light of the foregoing, the AU/UN Policy Paper on Enhancing the AU Continental Early Warning System and Early Action is expected to recommend the reestablishment of a dedicated CEWS division.

The brief that Adeoye is expected to share with PSC members responding to the 1208^th session also comes in the wake of the Dar es Salaam Declaration’s commitment ‘to enhancing the PSC’s conflict prevention mandate, including by responding swiftly to early warning signs of looming conflicts and crises and fully utilising all available preventive diplomacy tools.’ This policy preoccupation with revamping CEWS also comes against the backdrop of the renewed emphasis on conflict prevention globally, as elaborated in the New Agenda for Peace and the Pact for the Future.

Apart from reinvigorating diplomacy at international and regional levels for advancing prevention, both the New Agenda for Peace and the Pact for the Future call for the establishment of national prevention capacities and infrastructure for peace. Action 18 of the Pact of the Future commits member states of the UN to build and sustain peace through, most notably, building ‘national capacity to promote, develop and implement their nationally-owned prevention efforts and address the root causes of violence and conflict.’ It is worth recalling that the PSC was the first to identify the establishment of mechanisms for the prevention of conflicts at the national level as a key action for advancing peace as far back as 2013. The 360^th session of the PSC held in March 2013 thus called on Member States ‘to put in place comprehensive national prevention mechanisms that would operate in conjunction with the relevant AU and RECs/RMs structures.’

The establishment of the CSVRA and CSVMS was in part initiated to facilitate the establishment of national infrastructure and mechanism for prevention. The second agenda of tomorrow’s session accordingly focuses on review of CSVRA and CSVMS.

Tomorrow’s session marks the third time in less than two years that the PSC has included the CSVRA and CSVMS on its agenda. Similar reviews were scheduled in March and May 2023 but did not take place as planned.

Developed by the now-defunct Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Division (CPEWD) of the Peace and Security Department, these tools are integral to the Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF). They aim to provide a coordinated, Commission-wide approach to structural conflict prevention. The CSVRA identifies structural vulnerabilities to conflict, while the CSVMS outlines medium- to long-term strategies to mitigate such vulnerabilities and build resilience.

However, the institutional restructuring that transformed the Peace and Security Department into the PAPS has undermined these efforts. The removal of a dedicated CEWS division has left the CSVRA and CSVMS without clear institutional support, raising questions about the tools’ future coordination and implementation. Recent policy discussions on reinstating a dedicated conflict prevention and early warning division offer hope for revitalising the CSVRA and CSVMS tools.

The CSVRA/CSVMS came within the framework of a continental early warning system and as a follow-up to PSC’s 360^th session, held in March 2013, a session that stressed the need for a strategic focus on addressing the structural/root causes of conflicts. During its 463^rd session that took place in October 2014, the PSC commended the Commission for its efforts to finalise the elaboration of the CSCPF as well as to develop a Structural Vulnerability Assessment tool and further requested the Commission to expedite the process. PSC’s 502^nd session, convened in April 2015, adopted the CSVRA/CSVMS tools and requested the Commission, in collaboration with the RECs, to avail all the necessary assistance to Member States and popularise the tools while encouraging Member States to fully take advantage of these tools in their efforts towards the structural prevention of conflict.

The AU Assembly, during its 35^th ordinary session, held in February 2022, encouraged Member States to ‘utilise the opportunities afforded by the Commission and RECs/RMs to address structural causes of violent conflict through the implementation of the Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment/Country Structural Vulnerability and Mitigation Strategies (CSVRA/CSVMS) processes.’ In that summit, the Assembly went on requesting the Commission to establish a ‘Monitoring and Oversight Committee’ comprising the AU Commission, RECs/RMs, APRM and Member States to facilitate effective coordination, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. In tomorrow’s session, PSC may follow up on progress made towards the implementation of this decision.

The CSVRA/CSVMS are voluntary processes and, hence, should be implemented by Member States through a request simultaneously addressed to the AU Commission and the concerned REC. The request may come at the initiation of the AU. Following the request, a team of experts composed of an expert nominated by the Member States, the CEWS staff, representatives of relevant AUC departments, representatives from the concerned REC, as well as representatives from other stakeholders will be formed to work on the CSVRA report, which is envisaged to be finalised within three months. Once the report is finalised, the next phase will be for the concerned state, in coordination with the AUC and the relevant REC, to start working on the CSVMS.

Indeed, the status of implementation of the CSVRA/CSVMS leaves a lot to be desired, highlighting the need for revamping implementation of these tools. In that context, there are at least three points that the PSC may consider in tomorrow’s deliberation.

As voluntary processes, the success of the CSVRA and CSVMS hinges on stronger political buy-in of Member States. The fact that only three countries—Ghana (2017), Côte d’Ivoire (2019), and Zambia (2020)—have initiated structural vulnerability assessments highlights both limited buy-in and the lack of a dedicated structure in PAPS in effectively promoting the tools and their benefits. While it is encouraging that Seychelles, Madagascar, and Mauritius have shown interest, as well as more recent indications from Malawi and Kenya, these developments reflect only modest progress.

Enhancing political buy-in and wider subscription will require concerted efforts from the PSC and the Commission to demonstrate the practical advantages of these tools to Member States, including addressing concerns about the framing of the process as a ‘vulnerability assessment,’ which may deter some states. The AU may leverage the commitment to prevention in the Pact for the Future, which puts focus on promoting the bolstering of national conflict prevention mechanisms, for advancing buy-in and collaboration with UN and international partners for using CSVRA and CSVMS as critical platforms for rolling out the establishment and strengthening of national prevention capacities and infrastructure for peace.

Beyond advancing political buy-in on the part of member states, the other issue of clarifying the relationship between the CSVRA/CSVMS and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), as the APRM also involves structural vulnerability analyses as part of its country reviews. The PSC should provide policy guidance to ensure these mechanisms complement one another and avoid overlaps, thereby enhancing their collective effectiveness. Similarly, there is also a need to establish and strengthen coherence and coordination in early warning analysis between the CEWS on the one hand and CISSA, AFRIPOL, and AUCTC on the other hand.

Additionally, strengthened coordination with Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RMs/RMs) is critical to advancing the implementation of the CSVRA and CSVMS. Recent efforts in this area appear promising, as demonstrated by the interest from Malawi and Kenya, which could be partly attributed to closer engagement between the AU and RECs/RMs on early warning systems. Building on this momentum, the AU should further leverage partnerships with RECs/RMs to expand the adoption of these tools among a broader range of member states.

The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may extend its support for the efforts of the CPAPS to reinvigorate the CEWS within the framework of the communique of the 1208^th session of the PSC. It may reiterate the commitment under the Dar es Salaam Declaration, adopted on 25 May 2024 at the High-Level Colloquium in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the PSC, to enhancing the PSC’s conflict prevention mandate, including by responding swiftly to early warning signs of looming conflicts and crises. It may request full implementation of Article 12 of the PSC Protocol, which requires the reinstitution of the CEWS structure in the PAPS department as envisaged in the PSC Protocol. The PAC may also underscore the need for clarifying the relationship between the respective roles of various AU entities with relevant areas of work and the modalities for ensuring coherence with CEWS while affirming the centrality of CEWS for early warning and conflict prevention as established under Article 12 of the PSC Protocol. It may also task the AU Commission to work with the NET4PEACE, CISSA, AUCTC and AFRIPOL in the development of a trigger mechanism with clear criteria and indicators and the threshold for activating early action. The PSC may underline the critical importance of CSVRA/CSVMS tools to the structural prevention of conflict and consolidation of peace and stability in the continent. Considering the benefits that the CSVRA/CSVMS tools offer, particularly in identifying and addressing the structural vulnerabilities of member states that may evolve into violent conflicts, the PSC is expected to encourage member states to take full advantage of these tools. It may also request the Commission to provide all the required support to Member States. It may further request the Commission to develop a strategy to better popularise these tools and ensure greater buy-in of Member States so that more countries undertake the assessment. The PSC may underscore the importance of CSVRA/CSVMS as the vehicle for cooperation between the AU, the UN and other international actors for the implementation of Action 18 of the Pact for the Future.  In the light of the fact that the institutional reform had left the Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework without a structure for its effective operationalisation, the PSC may call for a dedicated capacity within PAPS for taking responsibility for CEWS and in promoting and implementing CSVRA/CSVMS.

Tomorrow (9 July), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold an informal consultation with the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (CPAPS) on early warning.

Miguel Cesar Domingos Bembe, Permanent Representative of Angola to the AU and PSC Chairperson for July, will make an opening remark during the informal consultation. The CPAPS, Adeoye, is expected to brief the PSC.

The last time the PSC held an ordinary session on early warning was at its 1208^th session convened on 16 April 2024, discussing ways to unblock obstacles and ensure effective early warning and response. During the session, the PSC not only expressed its commitment to fully implement Article 12 of the PSC Protocol on the establishment and operationalisation of AU’s Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) but also tasked the AU Commission (AUC) to take specific measures to enhance early warning and early response. The Commission is also required to report back to the PSC before the end of the year. One such measure highlighted in the communiqué is to ‘hasten the ongoing AUC institutional reforms to enhance the utility of the CEWS in PSC decision-making processes as one of the pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).’ Furthermore, it is recalled that the PSC, during its Mombasa retreat, held in May 2021, agreed to hold monthly early warning meetings with CPAPS and use such platforms to share particularly ‘sensitive’ early warning information.

While tomorrow’s informal consultation aligns with the Mombasa retreat, the main focus is likely to be on CPAPS providing the PSC with an update on the actions taken as a follow-up to PSC’s 1208^th session and sharing proposals for enhancing early warning drawing on analysis received from technical experts tasked by PAPS.

As the PSC reflected on its 20-year journey last month, one of the major limitations identified in the implementation of the PSC Protocol is its conflict prevention mandate broadly, and Article 12 of the Protocol that establishes CEWS specifically. The Dar es Salaam Declaration, adopted on 25 May 2024 at the High-Level Colloquium in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the PSC, commits to enhancing the PSC’s conflict prevention mandate, including by responding swiftly to early warning signs of looming conflicts and crises and fully utilising all available preventive diplomacy tools, such as the Panel of the Wise, the Network of African Women in Conflict Prevention and Mediation (FEMWISE), AU’s Pan-African Network of the Wise (PANWISE), and YouthWISE. The Declaration further emphasises the need for the Commission to elaborate a clear and objective criterion on a trigger mechanism to facilitate the role of the PSC in assessing the need for early action while ensuring its consistent application in all circumstances.

In a special research report we released in May to complement the policy debates on the lessons from the two-decade journey of the PSC, the PSC’s conflict prevention mandate is identified as one of the key aspects of the PSC Protocol where implementation has fallen short and requires further attention. According to the report, despite the PSC Protocol’s emphasis on conflict prevention, the PSC has predominantly functioned like a ‘fire brigade,’ primarily responding to conflicts after they erupt. This tendency, the report argues, has resulted in the proactive dimension of its mandate, especially conflict prevention, being largely ignored.

As noted in our previous analysis, including ‘Insights on the PSC’ and the special research report indicated above, there are several factors that account for this poor state of implementation of early warning and early action dimension of the (APSA). These factors can be categorised into institutional, technical, and political spheres.

Institutionally speaking, the major factor is the AU Commission’s limited focus on conflict prevention as reflected in the institutional reform that restructured the Peace and Security department into the new Political Affairs, Peace, and Security (PAPS). Unlike its predecessor, the new PAPS lacks a dedicated division for conflict prevention and early warning, marking a significant institutional regression in the conflict prevention mandate. With the CEWS structure removed, early warning and governance monitoring are ‘mainstreamed’ into the regional desks, thereby depriving CEWS of a dedicated structure housing and responsible for it. The ‘Situation Room’ now serves PAPS in its entirety rather than being part of the conflict prevention directorate. This restructuring not only fails to confirm with Article 12 of the PSC Protocol but also has created operational difficulties, as CEWS is deprived of a fully dedicated structure for its regular functioning.

The technical aspect of the challenge to the use of early warning for conflict prevention concerns the development of methodologically sound, substantively rigorous and solid early warning reports. Related to this is the process not only for the collection of quality data but also for an informed analysis and interpretation of the early warning data. The call for the establishment of a ‘trigger mechanism and indicators’—a request first made during the Cairo Retreat held in October 2018—to facilitate the role of the PSC in assessing whether a given situation calls an early action by the PSC remains unheeded. The other challenge that traverses the technical and political domains is the lack of effective flow of information between the early warning mechanism and those responsible for initiating early response, the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the PSC. The analysis and reports generated by the early warning system fail to effectively reach decision-makers or prompt timely action. For example, although the ‘horizon-scanning briefings’ were intended to facilitate the exchange of ‘sensitive’ early warning information between the Commission and the PSC, as envisaged in the Mombasa retreat, these briefings seldom delve into such sensitive matters.

On the political front, the major hurdle, as alluded to by the PSC in various of its sessions including the 1208^th session as well as the May 2024 High-Level Colloquium, is the ‘culture of denialism’ by Member States and Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) regarding credible early warning reports of looming crisis and conflict situations, while invoking sovereignty as a shield. This denial prevents timely action, including the deployment of preventive diplomacy and mediation. At times, Member States are backed by RECs/RMs, claiming the principle of subsidiarity, to block a looming situation/crisis from reaching the agenda of the PSC.

The PSC has explored several options to address these challenges. It is thus critical to ensure the implementation of the relevant parts of the conclusions of the Cairo and Mombasa retreats of the PSC. The 1208^th session also outlined several measures, including expediting the ongoing AUC institutional reforms; utilising the Panel of the Wise and AU Inter-Regional Knowledge Exchange on Early Warning and Conflict Prevention (I-RECKE); leveraging technological advancements; ensuring the timely dissemination of daily, weekly and monthly early warning reports to Member States; and monitoring, tracking and ensuring the implementation of previous decisions of the PSC on continental early warning and security outlook.

The next and critical phase in the effective deployment of early warning is ensuring the reinstitution of the CEWS as envisaged in the PSC Protocol. Indeed, critical to compliance with the PSC Protocol as envisaged in Article 12 is housing the CEWS in a dedicated structure within PAPS, hence reversing the mistake of dismantling the structure where CEWS was housed during the institutional reform that led to the emergence of the current PAPS Department. It is also critical to develop and implement a protocol for sharing early warning on country-specific developments with the AU Commission Chairperson and the PSC.

Not any less important is ensuring the timely crafting and activation of early action. As outlined in our special research report cited above, there can be no effective conflict prevention where early warning is not accompanied by and does not trigger follow-up preventive action. Article 9 enjoins the PSC to ‘take initiatives and action it deems appropriate with regard to situations of potential conflict’. It is thus incumbent on the PSC to determine whether to pursue such ‘initiatives and action’ through a) collective intervention of the Council as a whole, b) its Chairperson, c) the Chairperson of the AU Commission, d) the Panel of the Wise, and e) in collaboration with a regional mechanism. It is thus clear that the collective intervention of the PSC—whether through a) having a matter on the agenda of the PSC, b) considering such matter in an informal consultation, or c) undertaking a field mission—is only one of the range of options available for preventive action.

No formal outcome document is expected from tomorrow’s consultation. However, concrete recommendations on enhancing the continental early warning system are anticipated to emerge from the consultation. The PSC may provide direction on the next steps to translate the recommendations, as well as previous decisions on the issue, into action. Member states may request full implementation of Article 12 of the PSC Protocol, which requires ensuring the reinstitution of the CEWS structure in the PAPS department as envisaged in the PSC Protocol. PSC may also reiterate its request from the 1208^th session for the Commission to report to the PSC before the end of this year on the implementation of the specific measures outlined in the communiqué, with a view to unblocking obstacles and ensuring effective early warning and response.